


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
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AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

ODYSSEY 23.218–24: ADULTERY, SHAME, AND MARRIAGE

At the dramatic moment when she is accepting Odysseus as her long lost husband, Penelope introduces the case of Helen (*Od.* 23.218–24):

οὐδέ κεν Ἀργεῖη Ἑλένη, Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖα,
ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἄλλοδαπῷ ἐμίγη φιλότῃ καὶ εὐνῇ,
εἰ ἤδη ὁ μιν αὖτις ἀρήϊοι υἴες Ἀχαιῶν
ἄξεμέναι οἰκόνδε φίλῃν ἐς πατρίδ' ἔμελλον.
τὴν δ' ἦ τοι ῥέξαι θεὸς ὥρορεν ἔργον ἀεικές·
τὴν δ' ἄτην οὐ πρόσθεν ἔφ' ἐγκάτθετο θυμῷ
λυγρὴν, ἐξ ἧς πρῶτα καὶ ἡμέας ἔκετο πένθος.

These seven lines were condemned as an interpolation in Alexandrian times because of the lack of parallelism between Helen and Penelope, and because they were judged an inappropriate parenthesis between 215 (αἰεὶ γάρ) and 225 (νῦν δ').¹ Even modern editors and critics who defend the lines have found them "obscure,"² have noted "irrelevancies of detail,"³ or have explained the apparent lack of parallelism by psychological interpretations of Penelope's own sexual desires and fears.⁴ It will be argued here, however, that the lines are not obscure nor

¹W. B. Stanford, *The Odyssey of Homer* II (London 1962) 401; cf. Eustathius, *Commentarii ad Homeri Odysseam* II, ed. G. Stallbaum (Leipzig 1830; reprint Hildesheim 1960) 305.

²A. Platt, "Notes on the *Odyssey*," *The Classical Review* 13 (1899) 383.

³Stanford (note 1 above) 401.

⁴G. Devereux, "Ὁ Χαρακτήρ τῆς Πηνελόπης," *Platon* 10 (1958) 250–55; A. Amory, "The Reunion of Odysseus and Penelope," in C. Taylor, ed. *Essays on the Odyssey* (Bloomington, Ind. 1963) 100–121; S. Murnaghan, *Disguise and Recognition in the Odyssey* (Princeton 1987) 141–43.

do they require elaborate explanations of Penelope's own character;⁵ rather, they may be more simply understood in terms of Homeric rhetoric and their thematic relationship to their immediate context.

First, the parenthetical nature of the lines is a characteristic of Homeric parataxis.⁶ Especially significant here is that such parentheses commonly occur in Homer in speeches addressed by one person to another.⁷ Thus that the lines are a paratactic parenthesis is not only not a reason for athetizing them, but actually affirms them as typically Homeric.

Second, Helen's case is not parallel, but it is certainly appropriate. One can hardly imagine a better example of a lack of caution than Helen, who rashly took the stranger to her bed.⁸ Penelope is explaining to Odysseus that she has always been very careful to avoid being deceived, even remaining hesitant until now to accept him (213–17). Far from adducing any parallel, she contrasts herself with Helen (219–24) and thereby underlines and justifies her own exacting caution that has been necessary until this moment.

Third, that she says a god made Helen do it is not an example of the sweetness of Penelope's character,⁹ nor "eine leise Entschuldigung,"¹⁰ but a conventional view of Helen in the Homeric poems; for example, Helen herself says this (*Od.* 4.261–62; *Il.* 6.349), as does Priam (*Il.* 3.164), and Telemachus (*Od.* 17.118–19).¹¹

Finally, and most significantly, Penelope says that Helen would not have done it if she had known that she would be brought back home. This remarkable statement, ignored by all the critics, reveals the central

⁵This is not to deny that Penelope's adducing Helen may have suggestive and complex connotations such as those cited in note 4.

⁶Platt (note 2 above) 383 noted this but concluded that the parataxis contributed to the obscurity.

⁷P. Chantraine, *Grammaire Homérique* 2 (Paris 1953) 352–53.

⁸K. Ameis, C. Hentze, P. Cauer, *Homers Odyssee* 2.2 (Leipzig 1911; reprint Amsterdam 1964) 143, remarked:

Rührend ist es und klug zugleich, wie sie an Helena erinnert, die sich durch einen fremden Mann hatte betören lassen.

⁹Platt (note 2 above) 384.

¹⁰Ameis et al. (note 8 above) 144.

¹¹For variations on the "blameless Helen" theme, cf. *Il.* 3.154–60, 400–402, and see Linda Lee Clader, *Helen: The Evolution from Divine to Heroic*, *Mnemosyne Suppl.* 42 (Leiden 1976) 22.

idea behind Penelope's use of the contrast between herself and Helen to justify her own behavior. Penelope is very conscious of the shame before family, peers and countrymen that is the inevitable lot of a married woman whose adultery becomes common knowledge.¹² Such would have been Penelope's own fate if she had not exercised her exacting caution. Had she allowed herself to be deceived and had she admitted an impostor Odysseus to her bed, she too, like Helen, would have committed an ἔργον ἀεικέες (222), an act whose shamefulness is by no means reduced even if the gods or deception, not the woman herself, are ultimately responsible.¹³ Thus by invoking Helen, Penelope not only provides a rhetorically effective defense of her seemingly over-zealous circumspection, but also emphasizes her commitment to the prevalent mores of the institution of marriage itself at the very moment she is accepting Odysseus back into their marriage bed.¹⁴

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¹²Helen, as we see her in Book 4, has been successfully reestablished in Sparta with Menelaus; however, that she also shares the view Penelope expresses is clear from her self-reproach ἐμείο κυνώπιδος (4.145); similarly, Helen in the *Iliad* rebukes herself (3.180, 242; 6.344ff.; 24.764).

¹³Mihoko Suzuki, *Metamorphoses of Helen: Authority, Difference and the Epic* (Ithaca 1989) 74–75 agrees that Penelope is saying "she is not very different from Helen," but Suzuki attributes Penelope's caution to "her vigilant consciousness of the passage of time." On Homeric attitudes about shame and proper behavior, see the succinct survey of Mark W. Edwards, *Homer: Poet of the Iliad* (Baltimore 1987) 149–54 with bibliography (157–58).

¹⁴Penelope's sense of shame in marriage parallels that of the heroes in warfare; thus she too will be the subject of song (24.196–98).

NON-TECHNICAL *PISTEIS* IN ARISTOTLE AND ANAXIMENES

The remarkable similarity of the account of the non-technical (*atechnoi*) *pisteis* by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1.15) with that of the supplemental (*epithetoi*) *pisteis* by Anaximenes (*Rhet. ad Alex.* 14.8–17.2) raises interest about their differences.¹ Both handle “witness,” “torture” and “oath” in the same order. But while Aristotle adds “laws” and “contracts,” Anaximenes includes “the opinion of the speaker.” Both have very probably adopted the structure of their treatments from a common source. The ordering “witness, torture, oath” indicates this adoption *prima facie*. In addition, the elevated importance given to “laws” and “the opinion of the speaker,” inasmuch as they are the first elements in each account, suggests even through discrepancy an observance of a common model. (Contracts are discussed by Aristotle as a mixture between law and witnesses, so they do not take any significant place in the ordering.) Despite Quintilian (5.1), who cites Aristotle as the source from whom the term ‘non-technical *pisteis*’ has been handed down, the obvious differences of the Anaximenean account from that of Aristotle (as well as the fact that it is likely to be temporally prior) rule out the possibility that Anaximenes adopted the model from Aristotle.

Interestingly, as the contents of the *echinos*, which were the only documents to which the orator could appeal in a trial following an arbitration, the *Athenaiōn politeia* (52.2–3) presents laws, testimony from witnesses and *proklēseis* (‘challenges’). By replacing the *proklēseis* with tortures and oaths one could see here a legal manifestation of the rhetorical model to be dealt with in this paper. But the suggestion by Harrison, that the challenge should be recognized as a sixth non-technical *pistis*,² should be rejected. The *proklēsis* appears in the Athenian

¹ For later treatments of the non-technical *pisteis* see Cicero, *De or.* 2.116; *De inv.* 2.46; *Top.* 24; *Part. orat.* 48; Quintilian 5.1–7; Apsines 6 (*Rhet.* 1.2 260.18ff. Spengel); Anon. *Seg.* 145 (*Rhet.* 1.2 378.4ff. Spengel); Julius Victor 21.19 and 44.2–13 (Giomini-Celentano); Fortunatianus 2.23–25 (*RLM* 115.15–116.23). See also M. Fuhrmann, *Das Systematische Lehrbuch* (Göttingen 1960) 138–42 and J. Martin, *Antike Rhetorik* (Munich 1974) 98–101.

² A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens 2* (Oxford 1971) 133–34 is actually anticipated by R. Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer* (Leipzig 1882) 178, and R. J. Bonner, *Evidence in Athenian Courts* (Chicago 1905) 68.

courtroom not as an additional non-technical *pistis*, but as a substitute for oath and torture, so that issues concerning it essentially only concern them, even if at one level removed. Moreover, the *proklēsis* was only relevant in private disputes, those that involved a preliminary arbitration. For trials involving crimes against the state it could not be used.

It is likely that the common model from which Aristotle and Anaximenes took their start was not reached according to strictly legal perspectives, but rather according to the needs of rhetoric, as has already been argued by G. Thür.³ It must, accordingly, be emphasized that the present study focuses mainly on the rhetoric of the non-technical *pisteis*, not their legal significance. After reviewing the background to the two accounts it will be necessary first to sort out the discrepancy in the first non-technical *pistis*. Then points of contact and divergence in the common elements can be identified. Aristotle's accounts of laws and contracts are largely omitted. Since they raise quite different issues, I treat them in a separate paper.⁴

Aristotle defines the non-technical *pisteis* as those that are already at hand for the orator, not those that come about through his agency (1355b35). In contrast to the technical *pisteis*, which the orator constructs either through his own character, the emotional response of the listeners or the facts of the case, the non-technical *pisteis* are already at his disposal as a result of the documentary procedures of the trial. The modern reader of Attic forensic speeches is familiar with the gaps in the text in which simply the word ΝΟΜΟΣ or ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ appears. The text of these "gaps" lay outside the text of the orator's speech *per se*, since it was read out not by the litigant but by the court secretary. The litigant would simply comment before and after the reading in order to make the document into something that would further his case. The technical *pisteis*, on the other hand, had to be composed completely by the orator. Furthermore, Aristotle says explicitly that the non-technical *pisteis* belong exclusively to forensic oratory (1375a23–24).⁵

³G. Thür, *Beweisführung vor den Schwurgerichtshöfen Athens: Die Proklēsis zur Basanos* (Vienna 1977) 10, note 4 and 316, note 4.

⁴D. Mirhady, "Aristotle on the Rhetoric of Law," *GRBS*, in press.

⁵I argue in "Aristotle on the Rhetoric of Law" that the phrase *kai protreponta kai apotrepona*, which has occasioned commentators to doubt Aristotle's definitive statement about the exclusively forensic use of the non-technical *pisteis*, is genuine, but that he means by it not that they have applications outside the courtroom, although obviously

Anaximenes defines his supplemental *pisteis* as those that consist not of the words, actions, and people (of the case), but of what supplements what was said and done (7.2). His *pistis*-system is somewhat more complicated than Aristotle's, but his division is similar; for the "words, actions, and people" take somewhat the same position as the technical *pisteis* of Aristotle (*pragmata*, *ēthos* and *pathos*), even if they do not correspond exactly. Anaximenes' system is more complicated because he defines the technical *pisteis* as "probabilities, examples, evidences, enthymemes, maxims, signs and refutations." And in contrast to Aristotle, Anaximenes directs the application of the technical *as well as* of the non-technical *pisteis* to forensic oratory.

At this point it would be worthwhile to make some observations/speculations about the rhetorical and legal context in which the non-technical *pisteis* were used.⁶

First, all three non-technical *pisteis* common to both authors, witnesses, torture (hereafter *basanos*⁷), and oath, come out of a period in which the rhetorical *technē* was first developing; of course in a non-rhetorical sense they existed much earlier. At the court of Rhadamanthys, who stands as a Platonic model for archaic jurisprudence, trials are supposed to have been regularly decided on the basis of an oath (Plato, *Laws* 12 948B). Yet in the accounts of Aristotle and Anaximenes oaths appear to be looked upon with some skepticism, although Aristotle admits that only a scoundrel would willingly swear a false oath (1377a16).⁸ Even the challenge to *basanos* appears to have experienced an ambivalent attitude among the Athenians, so that it seems rarely to have been accepted and carried out. Presumably it was also, however, originally considered a common and reliable source of testimony.⁹ Of course some of these appearances may reflect the fact that our assortment of speeches is limited and chronologically distorted, with

they can, but that political terminology, like *to sumpheron* (1375b3 and 13), can be brought into the court.

⁶M. Gagarin, "The Nature of Proofs in Antiphon," *CP* 85 (1990), who also discusses Aristotle's treatment of the non-technical *pisteis*, sketches some of the issues with regard to Antiphon and early Greek law. I wish to thank Professor Gagarin for having sent a draft of his paper to me prior to its publication.

⁷The word *basanos* is used to mean at least two things: the interrogation by torture of a witness, usually a slave, and the testimony derived from that torture.

⁸Cf. Isocrates, *Ad Dem.* 23; R. J. Bonner (note 2 above) 77.

⁹Antiphon, *De caede Her.* 32 and 42, Isocrates, *Ad Dem.* 54; see also G. Thür (note 3 above) 4.

speeches from homicide trials dominating our early evidence and private and political disputes forming the matter of the later speeches. Challenges to *basanos* may, for example, have been often employed and disputes ended on the basis of testimony derived from them without courtroom speeches. Anaximenes 16.1 (see below) would appear to confirm this view. Nevertheless, oath and *basanos* do appear to be at Aristotle's time somewhat obsolescent as significant means of persuasion, so that they were likely to have been introduced into the muster of non-technical *pisteis* much earlier. They are usually replaced in the extant speeches by a discussion of the challenge to them (*proklēsis*) and not debated directly. Conversely, contracts gained an increasing role,¹⁰ which is acknowledged by Aristotle's account of them, likely his own addition to the list of non-technical *pisteis*.

Second, the rhetoric of Corax and Tisias in Sicily was developed primarily for forensic oratory (Cic., *Brut.* 46) and a particular tradition of rhetoric concentrated itself on this area, for which the composition of handbooks rather than the imitation of set speeches (as with Gorgias) was pursued. It may be that Anaximenes directs both types of *pisteis* toward forensic oratory because he has simply taken over the entire scheme of a handbook of the sort that was exclusively directed toward forensic oratory.¹¹ Aristotle's chapter 1.15 also has the character of a discrete handbook and Aristotle's successor Theophrastus is said to have written a one-book work on non-technical *pisteis* (Diog. Laert. 5.45). Both of these no doubt arose from the *Synagōgē technōn*. As a forerunner as author of such a handbook it is attractive to postulate Theodorus of Byzantium (fl. 400–380 B.C.). As a contemporary of Lysias he is chronologically well suited to have composed a handbook of this sort¹² and Plato credits him with having formulated a system of *pistōsis* ('confirmation') and *epipistōsis* ('further confirmation') (*Phaedrus* 266E), which may be reflected in Anaximenes' term *epithetos pistis*. It can perhaps not be ruled out that such a handbook was written as a result of the move from oral to written testimony about 378 B.C.¹³

In any case the muster of non-technical or supplemental *pisteis*

¹⁰D. M. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (London 1978) 231–33.

¹¹Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.1 1354b26f., *Soph. El.* 183b28–184a1 and Isocrates, *In soph.* 19–20; see also G. Kennedy, "The Earliest Rhetorical Handbooks," *AJP* 80 (1959) 169–78.

¹²Cf. Cicero, *Brut.* 48 *Theodorus esset in arte subtilior* and Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.23 1400b16. See also E. Drerup, "Theodorus von Byzanz," Section 5 *Jahrbücher für klassische Philologie*, Suppl. Bd. 27 (1902) 332–46.

¹³See E. Leisi, *Der Zeuge im Attischen Recht* (Frauenfeld 1907) 84f., and Bonner (note 2 above) 46f.

comes out of an old rhetorical tradition and consists of three elements, witnesses, *basanos*, and oath. According to Anaximenes these three elements confirm something: statements from witnesses and from the torture of slaves are agreements (*homologiai*) of people who share knowledge of the circumstances; the oath is a statement that entails divine recognition. Aristotle and Anaximenes have these three in common, but differ in the fourth element, which for both as the first in order plays the main role.

THE FIRST NON-TECHNICAL *PISTIS*

While Aristotle presents laws as the first non-technical *pistis*, the starting point for Anaximenes is "the opinion of the speaker" (*hē doxa tou legontos*), which indicates his attitude toward the facts (*dianoia kata tōn pragmatōn*). In its favor Anaximenes recommends two arguments: first, that the speaker has experience concerning his subject matter, and second, that it pays for him to tell the truth. Nothing in this description suggests that it is confined to forensic oratory. The opinion of the speaker appears at first glance to be similar to Aristotle's conception of *ēthos*, a technical *pistis* in his account.¹⁴ According to Aristotle the speaker should plead that he is intelligent, virtuous, and well-disposed (1378a6f.). But the difference is that Aristotle is talking about the character of the speaker in general, while Anaximenes is referring only to his attitude toward specific facts (*peri toutōn*). Anaximenes uses the expression *to ēthos tou legontos* in another section in a very Aristotelian way (10.1). And his presentation of the character of the speaker in the proemium of a political speech (29.11–25) corresponds to Aristotle's account very well, for it describes the usual behaviour and intelligence of the speaker. "The opinion of the speaker" is, however, only mentioned by Anaximenes in one other place, in which it is presented as the first element in the *confirmatio* of a political speech (32.1–4). There it is again clear that the knowledge of specific facts is meant, since the speaker is supposed to show if not his attitude toward the facts at issue then at least his attitude toward similar facts. Fuhrmann prints a third place (7.2)—with Sauppe, who compares chapter 14—in which

¹⁴This interpretation was accepted by L. Spengel, *Philol.* 18 (1862) 626, H. Usener, *Kleine Schriften* (Leipzig 1912) 1.29–30, 47, and K. Barwick, *Hermes* 57 (1922) 37. See also P. Wendland, *Anaximenes* (Kiel 1905) 50–54 and W. Süss, *Ethos* (Leipzig 1910) 56 *et passim* and K. Barwick, *Philol.* 110 (1966) 222.

"opinions of the speaker" appears.¹⁵ But there is no manuscript evidence to support them.

The statements of witnesses and the *basanoi* are considered by Anaximenes to be agreements by someone who shares a familiarity with the facts (*homologia (para) suneidotos*). According to the definition both must agree with some other statement. As G. Thür shows, the testimony consists of a statement formulated by one of the parties, which the witness (or tortured person) either had to confirm or to deny.¹⁶ The relationship of the oath to the two forms of testimony is not spelled out, but it can be assumed that it takes their place as a form of confirmation. These three *pisteis* of Anaximenes, therefore, direct themselves to the first, inasmuch as they all serve to support it.

As said above, it is unlikely that the concept "the opinion of the speaker" was originally a non-technical or supplemental *pistis*. It was, rather, a political *pistis* (*oikeiotatai (de) tais dēmēgoriais eisi pisteis . . . hē doxa tou legontos* 32.1). For this reason it does not show up in 7.2 (*pace* Sauppe) or in 36.18 or 36.31 as a non-technical *pistis*, where it might be expected. On the other hand, it may indicate to us a very meaningful aspect of the original first non-technical *pistis*, namely that it reflected an opinion of the speaker about specific facts.

Law stands in the same position in Aristotle's treatment of the non-technical *pisteis* as does "the opinion of the speaker" in Anaximenes'. If it can be assumed that both authors in some way observed aspects of the original first non-technical *pistis* in their accounts, then the following hypothesis may gain some plausibility.

The first non-technical *pistis* appears originally to have been the *egklēma*, the statement of accusation, or for the defence the statement of defence, what the Germans call the *Klageschrift* and *Klagebeantwortung*. It played of course a central role in the Athenian court. There are certainly cases wherein it becomes the object of debate.¹⁷ On the other hand, the form of such charges—whether oral or written, civil or state, performed as an oath or not—could be quite variable.¹⁸ There are many

¹⁵ M. Fuhrmann, *Anaximenes Ars Rhetorica* (Leipzig 1966) 30; H. Sauppe, *Ausgewählte Schriften* (Berlin 1896) 176.

¹⁶ G. Thür (note 3 above) 316.

¹⁷ E.g., Antiphon, *De caede Her.* 9–10; Isaeus, 11.28, 32, and 35; Dem. 54.1; Hyperides, *Pro Eux.* 1–3.

¹⁸ G. M. Calhoun, "Oral and Written Pleading in Athenian Courts," *TAPA* 50 (1919) 177–93.

words that could be used for it in Greek: e.g., *egklēma*, *dikē*, *graphē*, *eisangelia*; for the defence there was at least *antigraphē*. But the statement of accusation involved two things in every case, *a statement about specific facts* and *an application of the law*.¹⁹ It was also fixed before the speeches were composed and so found itself in the same position as the other non-technical *pisteis*, i.e., in the *echinos*.²⁰ Harpocration appears to confirm this interpretation (95.14–19 Dindorf). He of course used the *Athenaiōn politeia* as a source, but it is significant that in his retelling of chapter 52.2–3 he initially replaces “laws” with “charges” (*egklēmata*).

Aristotle deals of course with the application of law, since he considers law the basis of courtroom discussion (3.17 1418a26). But his treatment is highly charged with his own philosophical terminology and he tries to avoid the details of an *egklēma*. Anaximenes, on the other hand, treats laws in quite some detail in other parts of his work.²¹ So he replaces the *egklēma* with a concept that attests the experience and objectivity of the speaker. It is clear that in his accounts “the opinion of the speaker” takes about the same place in the *confirmatio* of a political speech (32.1) as do the testimony of the witnesses and *basanos* in the *confirmatio* of a speech for the prosecution or defence (36.18, 36.31). But before mentioning the testimonies, Anaximenes mentions in each case a short description of the facts of the case that involves some sort of archetype of stasis-theory, a way of dealing with law completely foreign to Aristotle’s treatment of it in *Rhetoric* 1.15.²² It appears that this short application of the stasis-theory replaces “the opinion of the speaker” at this point in Anaximenes’ work. “The opinion of the speaker” appears only in 14.8–9 as a non-technical *pistis* and even there it seems out of place. For in 14.9 Anaximenes uses as an argument against it that even those with experience of the facts sometimes make mistakes. This argument would seem appropriate in a political context.

¹⁹G. Thür, “Neuere Untersuchungen zum Prozessrecht der griechischen Polis: Formen des Urteils,” *Akten des 26. Deutschen Rechtshistorikertages* (Frankfurt 1987) 476: “Das Formular eines Enklema ist demnach höchst einfach: Kläger, Beklagter, Bezeichnung der Klage, Schätzungsantrag, Sachverhaltsdarstellung.”

²⁰To what extent the other non-technical *pisteis* also had to be fixed before the trial can be disputed, but see G. Soritz-Hadler, “Ein Echinus aus einer Anakrisis,” *Festschrift Kränzlein* (Graz 1986) 103–8.

²¹He mentions laws also at 1.8, 18–19; 2.13f.; and 36.19–28.

²²Cf. *Rhet.* 3.17 1417b21f. See also G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1961) 306–14, and J. Martin (note 1 above) 28–52.

But for one litigant to use it of another in a forensic context would seem very weak.

THE OTHER NON-TECHNICAL *PISTEIS*

Aristotle's section on witnesses is an exception in his treatment of the non-technical *pisteis*. He begins it with a long description of witnesses in general and not confined to forensic oratory (1375b13–76a17).²³ The description reminds one of Socrates' discussion of the old and new accusers in the *Apology* (18A_f.): it is claimed that the old accusers, or witnesses, are more persuasive than the new. But for the purposes of this paper, this description is out of place, since its structure and content are so different from those of all the surrounding passages, which are characterized by a symmetry of arguments for and against the different *pisteis*.

But there is occasion here to investigate the structure and content of those surrounding passages further in order to discover which aspects of them are unique to Aristotle or to Anaximenes and which are perhaps inherited from an earlier tradition of rhetorical handbooks. Anaximenes explains his intention in 7.3 (repeated in 17.3 with changes): first he describes what each *pistis* is (*poia tis*), what it consists in (*pothen*), and what different kinds of it there are (*ti allēlōn diapherousin*). Each *pistis* has a *chrēsis* or *dunamis* (17.3) that is influenced by supporting (*auxēseis*) and opposing (*tapeinōseis*) arguments. Aristotle uses similar technical terminology: *chrēsis* (1376a33), *chrēsimē marturia* (1376a26), *diaphorai* (1376a31). On this level, however, it must be recognized that Aristotle puts very little emphasis on defining the individual *pistis*, or on explaining the form of his account.

The *chrēsis* ('usefulness') appears to function in two steps, as exemplified both by Anaximenes' account of witnesses and Aristotle's account of contracts. The first level involves only credibility (*piston ē apiston* 15.1; *ē pistas poiein ē apistous* 1376a34); the second involves persuasiveness (*pithanon ē apithanon ē amphibolon pros pistin* 15.1), which admits of amplification (*auxein ē kathairein* 1376a33). Contracts depend for their persuasiveness on whether they are valid (*kurios*) so it

²³For an interpretation and division of this section see W. Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric I, A Commentary* (New York 1980) 326f. See also P. D. Brandes, *A History of Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Metuchen, NJ 1989) 195–201.

is on this that Aristotle focuses his section on contracts. The persuasiveness of a witness depends, however, beyond his being shown to be credible, on what he has testified (15.1–2), whether after analysis (*exetazein* 15.4) the testimony can be shown to be relevant and so persuasive.

Even the content of the arguments suggests regularity. Both authors appear to find it necessary to say that other themes exist that they choose not to discuss. In 1375b25, for example, Aristotle ends his treatment of laws quite definitively (*houtōs diōrithō*). But he makes clear that he is passing over themes concerning witnesses because he treats them elsewhere (1376a29–32). He claims, likewise, that other themes concerning oath exist, which he also chooses to pass over (76b11). Anaximenes makes similar remarks about *basanos* and oath (16.3, 17.2).

On the other hand, Aristotle indicates several places in which he departs from a previous model. As said above, the introductory passage about witnesses departs in both structure and content from the surrounding passages. Also the passage 1376a23–29 appears to present a new approach to witnesses. The introductory passage to the section on contracts is quite detailed, since through it Aristotle is justifying the addition of a whole new *pistis* to the usual muster. With the oath he introduces several innovations, splitting the first section into four parts dealing with oath-challenges and creating a short section at the end to deal with false oaths. This last section appears so Aristotelian in content that it can be assumed to have been wholly composed by Aristotle himself.

How the two authors adopted the original model, from which they of course departed to suit their own desires, should now be more or less clear: a definition of the *pistis* was followed by a statement concerning its use and effectiveness, then variations in it were mentioned and arguments given both to support and to weaken it. Anaximenes stays closer to this model, but it is apparent also in Aristotle.

WITNESSES

Only after the long and atypical introduction discussed above does Aristotle begin to discuss witnesses as non-technical *pisteis per se*, that is, within the context of arguments that make witnesses, or their testimony, persuasive. He calls these arguments *pistōmata*. All of the arguments deal with the conflict between testimony and pleading on the

basis of probability. Nevertheless the arguments are very short and are broken off after six Bekker lines (1376a17–23). There then follows some direction, again atypical, about how witnesses can be employed (23–29), e.g., in attesting to the fairness of the litigant. Then Aristotle ends the passage by mentioning, but not elucidating, arguments that might be used in support of the character of the witness; the reader is referred elsewhere for elucidation (29–32).

Through a more precise analysis of the central passage (1376a17–23), it can be noticed that Aristotle presents only five arguments, precluding the total symmetry of positive and negative that exists at least in the treatment of laws and contracts. Moreover, the concentration on probability is so clear that one might ask whether Aristotle actually means to treat that theme instead of witnesses; it certainly clarifies the tension between these two modes of argumentation. The first argument employs for the third time in the chapter the phrase from the heliastic oath that allows the judges' reasoning to be led away from a strict interpretation of the law and evidence regarding the case (see 1375a30, b16–17). Aristotle appears to imply that the judges would surrender their task in the case to the witnesses if they assumed that everything the witnesses testified were true. They ought to consider some testimony as being only to some extent likely to be true. The second argument treats the theme of bribery, which has often been discussed in the literature.²⁴ Athenians were notoriously bribable, which casts a cloud of suspicion over the testimony of all witnesses. The third argument brings in the law against false testimony, whose mere existence is supposed to suggest that witnesses give false testimony. The fourth argument, the first in favor of witnesses, presents the contrary view of the foregoing argument, namely that pleadings on the basis of probability are not liable to prosecution. This argument has some basis in fact, for it is rare to find speeches in which the starting points of argumentation are not grounded in some documentary evidence supported by the testimony of a witness. The fifth and last argument employs a *reductio ad absurdum* and recalls the reasoning given in support of the written law that there is no difference between a nonexistent and an unutilized law (1375b20).

As said, the next passage (1376a23–29) appears to be an addition by Aristotle to the model treatment of non-technical *pisteis* from which

²⁴E. Leisi (note 10 above) 114f.

he starts. He appears to want to recommend a new application of witnesses. After that (1376a29–33) other arguments are only very cursorily mentioned with a note that they can be investigated further in the section on enthymemes. But at least two additional themes are mentioned: friendship connections on the part of the witness and the witness' reputation.

Aristotle explains, therefore, or at least mentions, five themes altogether that can be employed in strengthening or weakening the persuasive force of witnesses: the heliastic oath (a18–19), bribery (a19–20), the law against false testimony (a20–21), friendship (a29), and reputation (a30). And he admits that there are just as many themes yet to come (a31), some of which, of course, may be handled in the introduction (1375b25–76a17), but in a quite different way.

In contrast, Anaximenes writes (15.1–2) that the persuasive force of a witness depends on two things: his own credibility and the persuasiveness of his testimony. Moreover the witness' credibility need only be argued if he is suspect. Thus Anaximenes makes this credibility the focus of his account to a far greater extent than does Aristotle. The arguments in favor of the witness (15.2–3) fall into two parts: first, a demonstration that the witness would not give false testimony because of thanks, vengeance, or profit, and second, a lesson about the disadvantageousness of such false testimony both legally and to the witness' reputation.

The arguments against the witness (15.5–6) put the entire thematic into sharper focus. For here it becomes clear that the combination "thanks, vengeance, profit" (15.2) is just a stock phrase used for describing character motivation. It is used again at 36.41. The themes that really interest Anaximenes, friendship and profit (*viz.* bribery), are elucidated in section 5. Then there follows a rather long explanation of the suspicion inherent in the law that witnesses might give false testimony. Included in this explanation is a mention of the heliastic oath.

With regard to witnesses, therefore, Anaximenes discusses all five themes that Aristotle uses, or at least mentions in his account: friendship, bribery, the law against false testimony, the reputation of the witness and the heliastic oath. This great similarity in content is obscured by Aristotle's injection of probability as a foil to witnesses. Moreover, the awkwardness of Aristotle's failure to achieve a symmetry among his five *pistōmata* (1376a17–23) is mirrored by Anaximenes' failure to bring two of his themes, the reputation of the witness (15.3) and the heliastic oath (15.6), into a syntactic parallel with the others. What appear to be

additional applications of witnesses by Aristotle (1376a23–33) may turn out in the light of Anaximenes' account to be an attempt by Aristotle to account for all the thematic material left out because of the role given by him to probability.

Anaximenes adds two aspects to his account of witnesses (15.4 and 15.7–8) that are not mentioned by Aristotle; only the first need be discussed here:

In speaking against testimony one should slander the character of the witness, if he is bad, or else analyze what has been testified, if it happens to be unpersuasive, or else speak against both of these by gathering together the worst aspects of the opponents into the same argument. (15.4)

He picks up the idea first mentioned in 15.1–2 that the testimony has a persuasive force distinct from that of the witness: He says that it can be challenged through an analysis (*exetazein*) of the testimony itself, which should show that it is not in fact persuasive. This idea is completely lacking from Aristotle's account of witnesses. On the other hand, Aristotle follows his account of witnesses with a discussion of contracts, which is introduced in the following way:

As regards contracts, argument is useful to the extent of amplifying or minimizing or making them credible or not, if they support [the speaker's] position credible and valid, but the opposite if they help the opponent. As far as rendering them credible or not credible goes, there is no difference from the treatment of witnesses; for contracts are credible in so far as the signatories and custodians of them are. (1376a33–b5)

Aristotle considers contracts to involve, for the sake of rhetoric, both the testimony of witnesses and a quasi-legal status, which is elaborated in the rest of the account. Their credibility rests on that of the witnesses; their validity rests on their relation to the law. Aristotle appears, therefore, to have passed over testimony *per se* in his account of witnesses with the intention of discussing contracts in their stead. Aristotle's rhetorical-technical vocabulary comes closest in this short passage to that of Anaximenes since he must justify in the traditional language his inclusion of this new non-technical *pistis* into the traditional muster.

TORTURE (*BASANOS*)

G. Thür's fairly recent book on the *proklēsis eis basanon*,²⁵ which includes an account of the relevant passages in Anaximenes and Aristotle, would make a very detailed discussion here somewhat redundant. The similarity of the two passages, can, however, be clarified through the following rather technical discussion, in which each section of the two accounts will be compared step by step.

1. αἱ δὲ βάσανοι μαρτυρίαι τινές εἰσιν, Aristotle

1. Βάσανος δέ ἐστι μὲν ὁμολογία παρὰ συνειδότος, ἄκοντος δέ.²⁶
Anaximenes

Both authors begin with a definition. For Aristotle it is enough to say that *basanos* is a form of testimony. Anaximenes gives, on the other hand, a modified version of his definition for the testimony of a witness. The similarity is clear: both authors say that *basanos* is a form of *marturia* ('testimony').

2. ἔχειν δὲ δοκοῦσι τὸ πιστόν, Aristotle

2. ὅταν μὲν οὖν συμφέρῃ ἡμῖν ποιεῖν αὐτὴν ἰσχυράν, λεκτέον, ὥς οἱ τε ἰδιῶται περὶ τῶν σπουδαιωτάτων καὶ αἱ πόλεις περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐκ βασάνων τὰς πίστεις λαμβάνουσι,²⁷ Anaximenes

Both then mention the generally held faith in the credibility of the *basanos*. Anaximenes does so at much greater length, but the underlined words encapsulate his point, which is the same as Aristotle's.

²⁵G. Thür (note 3 above) 287–90.

²⁶1. "Tortures" are a kind of testimony,

1. "Torture" is an agreement of someone who shares knowledge [of the case], but it is involuntary.

²⁷2. and seem to have credibility,

2. So whenever it pays for us to make it strong, we must say that both private people concerning the most serious matters and states concerning the greatest affairs take their "credibilities" from tortures,

3. ὅτι ἀνάγκη τις πρόσεστιν. οὐκ οὐκον χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν
τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, ἐξ ὧν ἐάν τε ὑπάρχουσιν οἰκείαι αὖξιν ἔστιν,
4. ὅτι ἀληθείς μόναι τῶν μαρτυριῶν εἰσιν αὗται. Aristotle
4. καὶ διότι πιστότερόν ἐστι βάσανος μαρτύρων· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μάρτυσι
συμφέρει πολλάκις ψεύσασθαι, τοῖς δὲ βασανιζομένοις λυσιτελεῖ
τᾶληθῇ λέγειν·
3. οὕτω γὰρ παύσονται τάχιστα τῆς κακοπαθείας.²⁸ Anaximenes

The next two steps in the argument are in reverse order, but are, nevertheless, quite clear. Again the underlined words are the key. Aristotle expresses the definitive basis of the whole argument first, that the credibility of the *basanos* rests on the application of force (3). For this reason the *basanos* is the only “true” form of testimony (4). Anaximenes tempers this somewhat by saying that the *basanos* is “more credible” than other testimony (4). Again the diction of his reasoning (3) is more elaborate—*kakopatheia* for *anagkē*—but his meaning is clearly the same. In both accounts these two steps are meant to be supportive of the previous one (2), the *communis opinio* about *basanos*.

The similarity of the argumentation against the *basanos* is somewhat obscured by textual problems in the text of Aristotle. Kassel seems correct, however, in rejecting *t’alēthē* (1377a2) and *ē t’alēthē* (1377a4), both of which are printed in the Ross OCT edition.

ἐάν τε ὑπεναντίαι ᾧσι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, διαλύοι ἂν τις
[τᾶληθῇ] λέγων καθ’ ὅλου τοῦ γένους τῶν βασάνων.²⁹ (1377a1–3)

Although both have manuscript support, the chance of diplography from 1377a5 (see below 5a) seems great, especially as it would make

²⁸3. because some compulsion is involved. It is thus not difficult also about them either to see the available [means of persuasion] from which it is possible to amplify if they are in favor [of the speaker],

4. [saying] that this form of testimony is the only true one.

4. and that this is because torture is more credible than [other] witnesses; for often it pays for witnesses to lie, but it profits those who are tortured to speak the truth;

3. for thus they most quickly stop the suffering.

²⁹But if they are against him and favor his opponent, one could refute them by speaking about the whole concept of torture;

Aristotle's view appear much more humane. The spurious lines following 1377a7 are further evidence of tampering in the text. There is no reason to think that Aristotle would inject his own opinion into this discussion by taking sides and saying that the negative view of *basanos* is the "true" one. He does not commit himself anywhere else in the chapter in this way.

Instead what he presents are first general arguments (5a and b) against the *basanos* (*kath'olou tou genous*) and then (6) specific examples (*paradeigmata*) in the last section.

- 5a. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἤττον ἀναγκαζόμενοι τὰ ψευδῇ λέγουσιν [ἢ τᾷ ἀληθείᾳ], καὶ
διακαρτεροῦντες μὴ λέγειν τᾷ ἀληθείᾳ,
5b. καὶ ῥαδίως καταψευδόμενοι ὡς παυσόμενοι θᾶττον. Aristotle
- 5a. ὅταν δὲ βούλῃ τὰς βασάνους ἀπίστους ποιεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν λεκτέον,
ὡς οἱ βασανιζόμενοι τοῖς ἐκδιδοῦσι πολέμοι γίνονται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
πολλὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν καταψεύδονται.
5b. ἔπειθ' ὅτι πολλάκις τοῖς βασανίζουσιν ὁμολογοῦσιν οὐ τὰς ἀλη-
θείας, ἵν' ὡς τάχιστα τῶν κακῶν παύσωνται.³⁰ Anaximenes

Aristotle divides the strong from the weak, both of whom, however, can lie during a *basanos*. Anaximenes' division is, on the other hand, between slaves who become hostile to their masters and those who befriend their torturers. These divisions are certainly similar; Anaximenes simply imputes a more elaborate motivation for the victims of the interrogation. The underlined words again betray an essential similarity.

³⁰5a. for [slaves] do not lie any less when under compulsion, both those who harden themselves not to tell the truth

5b. and [those who] say false things easily [against their masters] to stop [the pain] more quickly,

5a. and whenever you wish to make the tortures not credible, first you must say that tortured [slaves] become enemies of those who have handed them over, and because of this say many false things against their masters;

5b. and then [say] that many times they agree with their torturers and not with the truth, so that they can stop their torments as quickly as possible.

6. δεῖ δὲ ἔχειν ἐπαναφέρειν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα γεγεννημένα παραδείγματα ἃ ἴσασιν οἱ κρίνοντες. Aristotle
6. δεικτέον δ' ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων πολλοὶ ἤδη βασανιζόμενοι καθ' ἑαυτῶν ἐψεύσαντο βουλόμενοι τὴν παραυτίκα κακοπάθειαν ἐκφυγεῖν, ὥστε πολὺ μᾶλλον εὐλογον τοὺς δούλους ψευσαμένους κατὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν βούλεσθαι τὴν αὐτῶν τιμωρίαν ἐκφυγεῖν ἢ πολλὰς κακοπαθείας τοῖς σώμασι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑπομείναντας, ἢν' ἕτεροι μὴδὲν πάθωσιν, {αὐτοὺς βούλεσθαι} μὴ ψεῦδος εἰπεῖν.³¹ Anaximenes

Aristotle gives the last argument in extremely abbreviated form, but Anaximenes appears to handle the same material in a very detailed way. His *a fortiori* argument is based on examples the judges should know, that is, of free people like themselves who, after being convicted on some charge such that they lost their civil rights, were subjected to the *basanos*.³² These are the *paradeigmata* left out by Aristotle.

The structural similarities of the two accounts of *basanos* are confirmed by similarities of content. They are the shortest of all the accounts of the non-technical *pisteis* and so afford a view of the basic structure with which Aristotle and Anaximenes began all of their accounts. This basic structural similarity disappears entirely, however, in the accounts of oath.

OATH

In contrast to Anaximenes' treatment of oath, Aristotle bases his on the current Athenian judicial practice. For he describes the differing situations in which an orator challenges his opponent to swear an oath or vice versa. Therefore, without expressly saying so, Aristotle is discussing the rhetorical tactic of the challenge (*proklēsis*) as well as oath

³¹6. There is [also] need to cite examples that the judges know, which have actually happened.

6. And one must show that many of even the free people, who have already been tortured, have lied against themselves wishing to escape the immediate suffering, so it is much more reasonable that slaves should wish to escape their own punishment by lying against their masters rather than saying nothing false and abiding by many physical and mental sufferings in order that others suffer nothing.

³²A *psephisma* passed under Scamander protected Athenian citizens from torture (Andoc. *Myst.* 1.43). But they could lose this protection (Dem. 18.132 and 25.1). See also G. Thür (note 3 above) 15–18.

itself. This involves two levels of argumentation; Anaximenes handles only one.

In fact, Anaximenes' account of oath (17.1–2) could scarcely be more different from that of Aristotle. According to his definition, however, the oath is an undemonstrated statement supported by divine acknowledgement and so to this extent both authors are discussing the same kind of oath. Both oaths appear to be assertory and thus used instead of a normal demonstration (*apodeixis*) of the facts, that is, instead of a speech with its witnesses and other documentary testimony.³³ For Anaximenes the usefulness of the oath rests on the punishment to be delivered by the gods and the shame incurred among people because of false oath-swearing. Against the oath Anaximenes presents only the argument that those who behave badly are the same ones who swear false oaths. This account is very short, but is to some extent embellished by Anaximenes' rich language—rich at least in comparison with Aristotle's.

In order to interpret Aristotle's much more complicated account of oath one must first have a clear idea about the meaning of the various expressions used.³⁴ The objective stance of the swearing of the oath is quite confusing, since it seems almost the reverse of what would be expected from the standpoint of a modern language. Moreover, Aristotle uses the expressions with two senses: *didonai horkon* means at 1377a26 to give an oath to one's opponent, which he should swear,³⁵ but at 1377a12 it means to accept the swearing by one's opponent of an oath that the opponent formulated;³⁶ *lambanein horkon* means at 1377a15 to agree to swear an oath given by one's opponent,³⁷ but at 1377a22 it means to offer to swear an oath formulated by oneself.³⁸ (Swearing oneself and having one's witnesses swear seem to be equivalent from the point of view of the challenge, likewise with the opponent and his witnesses.) These distinct senses need not be reflected in a translation,

³³ Hermogenes (326.23–327.21 Rabe) differentiates the oath discussed here by Aristotle and Anaximenes (*agonistikos horkos*) from one used spontaneously in the speech by the speaker (*ethikos horkos*). See B. P. Wallace, "Ps.–Hermogenes and the Characterizing Oath," *GRBS* 22 (1981) 257–67.

³⁴ The terminology is discussed by J. H. Lipsius, *Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren* (Leipzig 1905–14) 895, n. 123.

³⁵ See also Dem. 33.13; 39.3; 52.15 and 27; and 55.27.

³⁶ See [Dem.] 29.54; Dem. 49.65 and 67; and Isaeus 9.24.

³⁷ See Dem. 33.13; 39.3; 40.10–11; 52.15 and 27; there is a refusal at Dem. 59.60.

³⁸ See Dem. 54.40 and Isaeus, 12.9.

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but they certainly do need to be understood in the context of the oath-challenge. The initiator of the challenge will want to dictate the wording of the oath to be sworn, so that although *didonai* always means 'to give' in terms of the administration of the oath-swearing, the arguments surrounding its significance, as at 1377a11–15 and a25–29, change greatly depending on whether the "giver" of the oath is the oath-challenger or the oath-challenged.

Second—and perhaps more importantly—it must be understood that the entire first part of Aristotle's account of oath (1377a11–b3) is about oaths that have been demanded, or challenged, but not actually sworn or even accepted.³⁹ The speaker is only supposed to be recalling the maneuvers of the two parties at the arbitration before the trial. One (or both) of the parties challenged the other at that time either to swear an oath or to accept the swearing of an oath. Such challenges might have resulted in either or both the parties swearing an oath, but in all the cases presented by Aristotle the challenges were rejected. Certainly Aristotle writes as if the oaths were sworn, but this is only to avoid having to commit an already very complicated matrix of conditional statements into the contrary-to-fact. It is the position of each party in the *proklēsis* that is introduced (in the third person) at the beginning of every subsection: *ou didōsi men oun* (1377a11–12), *ou lambanei d'* (1377a15), *ei de lambanei* (1377a21–22), and *ei de didōsi* (1377a25–26). In each case the speaker is supposed to be presenting his own thoughts from the arbitration, which include suppositions about the thoughts of his opponent. The possibility of officially swearing an oath is already past by the time of the courtroom speech (see Isaeus, 9.24). The usefulness of an oath demanded through a challenge and actually sworn is not discussed at all by Aristotle. Such an oath apparently ended a litigation at the arbitration stage, or perhaps earlier.⁴⁰ The false oaths discussed in the second part of the section (1377b3–11) appear to be oaths that were sworn at some time prior to the occurrence of the event that led to the litigation.

Aristotle suggests in his introduction (1377a8–11) that he will discuss every possible combination of giving and accepting oaths. But at the end of the first part of the section (1377a29–b3), he repeats the same information, even if in a slightly modified form, for he recommends

³⁹Neither Lipsius (note 34 above) 895–900, nor Harrison (note 4 above) 150–53, cite this section of Aristotle in connection with the oath-challenge.

⁴⁰See Dem. 39.3; 40.10–11; and 49.65.

there the joining of arguments for use with combinations that have not been discussed. Aristotle appears to have changed his mind mid-stream and to have reorganized this part of the section along different lines from those originally conceived. In the second part of the introduction he describes briefly the second part of the section, about false oath.

Instead of a full-scale account of every possible case Aristotle sketches in the first part (1377a11–29) arguments to be used first in cases in which one declined to receive a sworn oath from one's opponent (1) or to swear an oath formulated by him (2), and then in cases in which one offered to swear one's own oath (3) or to have one's opponent swear an oath of one's own formulation (4). Through this ordering the discussion moves from the strongest arguments against the oath to the strongest arguments for the oath. However, while most of the arguments suggest only a one-sided oath-swearing, some of them imply the reciprocal swearing of oaths (see 1377a8–9, 12–13, 19–21). In this situation the two parties might agree on a pair of oaths that they would swear agreeing on what had happened ("The boy really is his/my son") or perhaps on what they each would do, promissory oaths. These oaths would not necessarily be identical, but could be.

1. οὐ δίδωσιν μὲν οὖν, ὅτι ῥαδίως ἐπιπορκοῦσι, καὶ ὅτι⁴¹ ὁ μὲν ὁμόσας οὐκ ἀποδίδωσι, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὁμόσαντος οἶεται καταδικάσειν, καὶ ὥς οὗτος ὁ κίνδυνος κρείττων, ὁ ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πιστεύει (αὐ)τῷ δ' οὐ.⁴² (1377a11–15)

This first passage involves two arguments against the acceptance of an oath formulated and sworn by one's opponent. The first is, like the first arguments in the succeeding passages, very short: they swear falsely easily. The emphasis is laid upon "easily." Aristotle gives no

⁴¹ Kassel prints, with others, *kai dioti*. Only Ross correctly prints *kai hoti*. In the entire chapter this would be the only example of *kai dioti*. There are numerous examples of *kai hoti*; it is Aristotle's most common way of introducing an argument. The better mss. do support Kassel, but this would necessitate a tight logical connection between the two arguments, which does not correspond to the logic of the sentence.

⁴² If a person does not give [his opponent an opportunity to swear he can say] that people swear false oaths easily, and that one who has sworn does not [necessarily] allow his opponent to swear in return, but thinks [a jury] will condemn one who has not sworn and that this risk, the one before the jurymen, is greater; for he trusts jurymen but not himself.

further explanation, but it can be assumed that he is implying that the absence of a legal punishment for those swearing falsely in such situations makes perjury "easy." In the second argument it is then claimed what one's opponent is supposed to think when he offers to swear an oath: "He swears and avoids allowing me to swear an oath in return (*ouk apodidōsi*),⁴³ since he thinks that the judges decide against those who have not sworn; moreover, he thinks (*kai hōs*) that it is more dangerous for him in court with the judges, for he trusts them (to keep to the heliastic oath and to decide justly), but not himself (despite the oath)." If such an opponent is allowed to swear an oath, there is no trial before judges. On the other hand, simply by offering in writing (through the *proklēsis*) to swear an oath a litigant does in a sense swear it, even if not at an official level, since the judges may presume that someone offering to swear an oath really means to do so. There is always a benefit in offering to swear.

The phrase *mē omosantos* is one of the most treacherous for my view that the entire first part of the section concerns only challenged and not accepted or sworn oaths. The implication of the phrase might be that a litigant enters the court having sworn by way of an oath-challenge. But Demosthenes gives us a passage that quite definitively removes doubt (49.65): "I wish now to tell you also about the oath-challenge that I made to this man and that this man made to me. For after I had placed an oath into the box, this man thought it right himself to get free by having sworn." The litigant is only describing the oath-challenge and yet speaks of the opponent as if he had in fact sworn. We learn from the succeeding lines that neither challenge was accepted.

The textual emendation at 1377a15 requires explanation. Some mss. read *pisteuei tōi* (Ross), while others read *pisteuein tōi* (Kassel). Aristotle is still following the supposed train of thought of the opponent here, which is introduced with *oietai* (a13) and continued with *hōs* (a14). *Pisteuei autōi d'ou* certainly makes for surprising Greek, but this element of surprise is consistent with the succeeding series of arguments. In the second set a paradox is set up by the maxim of Xenophanes. And the idea of suggesting ridiculous thought processes on the part of one's opponent is continued at 1377a24 (*deinon*) and a28 (*atopon*). Moreover, Aristotle himself suggests the reading at 1377a22: *hoti pisteuei autōi*,

⁴³Despite the commentaries this expression has nothing to do with money; see Aesch. 3.74 and Dem. 19.318.

ekeinōi d' ou: a speaker would want to impute the opposite view to his opponent (cf. Dem. 54.40).

2. οὐ λαμβάνει δ', ὅτι ἀντι χρημάτων ὄρκος, καὶ ὅτι εἰ ἦν φαῦλος, κατωμόσατο ἄν· κρείττον γὰρ ἂν (ἦν) ἔνεκά του φαῦλον εἶναι ἢ μηδενός· ὁμόσας μὲν οὖν ἔξει, μὴ ὁμόσας δ' οὐ· οὕτω δὲ δι' ἀρετὴν ἂν εἴη, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' ἐπιτοκίαν τὸ μή. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους ἀρμόττει, ὅτι "οὐκ ἴση πρόκλησις αὐτῇ τάσεβει πρὸς εὐσεβῆ," ἀλλ' ὁμοία καὶ εἰ ἰσχυρὸς ἀσθενῇ πατάξαι ἢ πληγῆναι προκαλέσασαιτο.⁴⁴ (1377a15–21)

In the second passage, in which the speaker is refusing to swear an oath presented to him by his opponent, Aristotle presents three arguments. The first is again very short: "I would swear an oath if I didn't have proper arguments (*chrēmatōn*).⁴⁵" The *Lexica Segueriana* (242.19–22) report a Solonian law that compels both parties to swear an oath in cases in which they have no contracts or testimony to present. The judges must then decide between them. Similarly here the oath is to be used when normal evidentiary material is unavailable. Many have translated *chrēmatōn* as 'money.' But Aristotle's reference to bribery in 1376a20 with the words *epi arguriōi* seems to rule out that interpretation, since he shows himself willing to use a more unequivocal term to describe financial motivation. The next argument, in which the profit motive is introduced, is to be viewed as fully separate. It repeats the view introduced in the first passage that it is advantageous to swear an oath. It is for this reason, he suggests, that a bad person would swear an oath. It would be advantageous for him to be bad by swearing falsely, since he would win his case that way. The last argument, in which the saying of Xenophanes is used, suggests a challenge to a reciprocal swearing of oaths. For the analogy to the weak man and the strong man hitting each other suggests the conclusion that both of them punch. It is a moot question who does so first since in any case the stronger man will prevail. If the pious man and the impious man swear it is very

⁴⁴If he does not take [an oath himself, he can say] that an oath is a substitute for the necessary evidence; and that if he were a bad man he would have taken the oath; for it is better to be bad for some profit than for nothing, since [the one who] has sworn will win the case, but [the one who has] not sworn will not, and thus [a refusal] is because of virtue, not because of a [fear of] perjury. And Xenophanes' maxim applies, that the same challenge to take an oath is not equal for an irreligious man in comparison with a religious one; for it is much as if a strong man called on a weak one to hit or be hit.

similar. The pious man is always at a disadvantage, since the judges do not know that his opponent is impious.⁴⁵

3. εἰ δὲ λαμβάνει, ὅτι πιστεύει αὐτῷ, ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐ. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους μεταστρέψαντα φατέον οὕτως ἴσον εἶναι ἂν ὁ μὲν ἀσεβῆς διδῷ, ὁ δ' εὐσεβῆς ὁμνύῃ· δεινόν τε τὸ μὴ θέλιν αὐτόν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐκείνους ἀξιοὶ ὁμόσαντας δικάζειν.⁴⁶ (1377a21–25)

Again in the third passage, in which one offers to swear an oath, the first argument is very short: one trusts oneself but not one's opponent. Therefore one wishes to swear a one-sided oath. The Xenophanes' saying is also interpreted as one-sided, since it is supposed to be fair after all that the impious man allow the pious man to swear an oath. The last argument refers to the heliastic oath, as does the last argument of the first passage (1377a15) and of the next passage (1377a28–29): it would be terrible if one were unwilling to swear about something about which one demands that others give judgement according to an oath.

4. εἰ δὲ δίδωσιν, ὅτι εὐσεβὲς τὸ θέλιν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιτρέπειν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτόν ἄλλων δικαστῶν δεῖσθαι (αὐτῷ γὰρ δίδωσι κρίσιν), καὶ ὅτι ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ θέλιν ὁμνύναι περὶ ὧν ἄλλους ἀξιοὶ ὁμνύναι.⁴⁷ (1377a25–29)

The last passage, in which one challenges one's opponent to swear an oath, also consists of three arguments. First, one argues that it is pious to entrust the matter to the gods. Second, one argues that the opponent need call upon no other judges because one is willing to leave the decision up to him; his performance of the oath will decide the case. This argument is echoed at Demosthenes 52.15: a man who refuses to

⁴⁵There are further arguments against swearing an oath at Isocrates, *Dem.* 7.23 and Plato, *Laws* 12 948B–C.

⁴⁶If he takes an oath, [he can say] that he trusts himself, not his opponent. And by reversing the maxim of Xenophanes, one should say that in this way it is equal if the irreligious man gives an oath and the religious one swears it. And that it would be terrible for him not to want [to take an oath] on a matter on which he would think it right for the judges to decide only after being sworn.

⁴⁷If he gives an oath, he can say that it is pious to want to entrust the matter to the gods, and that there is no need for his opponent to demand any other judges; for [the speaker] is giving [the right to make] the decision to him. And that it would be out of place not to want to swear on a matter about which he would think it right that others swear.

swear refuses to become judge of his own case. Third, one argues much as above with the last argument of the preceding passage, but this time the role is reversed: "it would be peculiar (for you) not to be willing to swear about something about which you wish that others, i.e., the judges, should swear."⁴⁸ As said above, these are the strongest arguments in favor of the oath. On the other hand, they suggest a very poor position on the part of the speaker. For the challenge would only be turned down by the opponent if he already had an almost undefeatable case. He would refuse to swear the oath because he thought he could do better with the judges. One's offer is meant then only to be an embarrassment to him.

The arguments in the above passages refer again and again to the same themes: trust in oneself / distrust of one's opponent, the efficacy of the oath and the heliastic oath. The belief in the oath's efficacy is clear. For this reason, there is no treatment of the credibility of an oath itself. Only in the second part of the section—the *de* in 1377b3 answers the *men oun* in 1377a12—does the discussion shift to oaths that really have been sworn, but the discussion there assumes that the oath has been falsified; it is only a question whether the falsified oath constitutes perjury.

In the first sentence it is suggested that the opponent is using an oath sworn by the speaker that now turns against the speaker's case. The speaker must argue that it is not perjury, since he did not swear willingly, but because of compulsion or deceit. Against this position it is to be argued that the person who does not stay with his oath brings everything to ruin; not only the judges must act according to oath but also the litigants. Aristotle uses a very Aristotelian view about intentionality to explicate a situation not even suggested in the account of Anaximenes.

It was supposed at the beginning of this paper that the non-technical, or supplemental *pisteis* must have taken their form as rhetorical entities with the first instantiation of systematic rhetoric, since they can be traced right back to the earliest forms of judicial procedure. In the course of the dissemination of that rhetoric from Sicily to the rest of the Greek world, however, as well as the developments made in judicial procedure in the fifth and fourth centuries, the manipulation of these *pisteis* was transformed accordingly. Theodorus of Byzantium comes

⁴⁸Cf. [Dem.] 29.53.

forward as a likely candidate to have composed a handbook on them in the form "charge (*egklēma*), witness, *basanos*, oath" toward the end of the first quarter of the fourth century. But the structure of his account did not completely survive its adoptive parents, Aristotle and Anaximenes. Both the variation of the first element from the charge either into the opinion of the speaker or law and the addition of contracts in Aristotle's account are indications that despite a fundamental structure the elements were changed either according to the bent of the authors or because of continuing changes in judicial procedure.

Although the other elements appear to stir Aristotle's interest, his treatment of *basanos* is very formalistic. This is true of Anaximenes' entire account. Only with his treatment of the oath, however, does Aristotle make clear the second level of argumentation opened by the challenge (*proklēsis*). With it his creative energies seem to be roused. On the other hand, the differences between the two accounts are smaller than expected. It was shown, for example, that almost the same themes constitute the two discussions on witnesses. And the overlapping in the accounts of *basanos* is even greater.

There is much in this paper, especially in the analysis of Aristotle's section on oath, that must remain for the time being tentative. An in-depth study of the oath-challenge in the Athenian court, for example, would have to be completed before the interpretation given here could be confirmed.⁴⁹ It is hoped, however, that new insights into Aristotle's text have been offered beyond those in Grimaldi's recent commentary, that more light has been shed on Anaximenes, and that some of the links between rhetoric and law overlooked by legal historians might have been drawn clearer.⁵⁰

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⁴⁹A partial study will appear soon; see D. Mirhady, "The Oath-Challenge in Athens," *CQ* 41 (1991).

⁵⁰Research for this paper was conducted during a year's stay in Göttingen generously funded by the *Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst* (DAAD). Drafts of it were circulated there (in German) and I wish to thank Prof. Dr. C. J. Classen, Prof. Dr. U. Schindel, and Dr. M. Vielberg for their patience, helpful advice and hospitality. Prof. Dr. G. Thür (Munich) also read drafts in German and gave invaluable criticism especially for the section on oath. Translations of passages from Aristotle were prepared in consultation with Prof. G. Kennedy, who is preparing a complete translation of the *Rhetoric*. The translations of Anaximenes are my own.

PRISONERS, GUARDS, AND CHAINS IN PLAUTUS, *CAPTIVI*

The starting point of this article is a problem of Plautine staging: what action did Plautus intend should take place on stage during the opening scenes of *Captivi*? The attempt to answer this question will reveal a number of contradictory indications in Plautus' text. An explanation of these contradictions and a solution to the initial problem will be found in an hypothesis of changes by Plautus to his Greek model.

The play proper is preceded by an extra-dramatic prologue (1–68). As in a number of Plautus' plays, this is delivered by an impersonal *prologus*. He introduces the play but is in no sense part of it, differing from divine prologue-speakers who are involved in the action of the play, even if unperceived by the human characters (cf. *Aul.* 23–27; *Rud.* 68f.; *Trin.* 1–15).¹ Unusually, during this extra-dramatic prologue two characters of the play, the two prisoners-of-war Philocrates and Tyn-darus, after whom the play is named and who will play major rôles in it, are present on stage. Their dramatic function is here a purely passive one; they provide a visual aid to the explanations of the prologue-speaker, who points to them repeatedly (1 *hos quos videtis*, 4 *huius*, 10 *huiusce*, etc.). They are naturally unaware of the prologue-speaker, who does not belong to their world; the plot requires that they must not know what he reveals to the audience.² Since, however, they themselves are characters of the play, it is natural to regard their presence on stage as initiating the action of the play proper; the prologue-speaker implies that they are standing outside the house of Hegio, which forms the background to the play (4). The alternative, to suppose that their appearance during the extra-dramatic prologue is also somehow outside the play, as if they were illustrations in a modern theatre programme, seems much less likely. We are entitled then to expect some degree of realism in their behaviour, within the conventions of the *palliata*, and to infer from 113–15 that they are fastened together by a heavy chain and unable to walk about. How then did they come to be in their present position? Whereas a modern producer could reveal them already in position when the stage curtain rises, in the ancient theatre they would

¹ This seems to have been a Roman innovation; see R. L. Hunter, *The New Comedy of Greece and Rome* (Cambridge 1985) 26.

² K. Abel, *Die Plautusprologe* (Diss. Frankfurt 1955) 51.

have to take up their position in full view of the audience before the appearance of the prologue-speaker. This is in accordance with the conventions of the Greco-Roman theatre, however, and presents no problem. In fact, if they were led out of the house by slaves, who then chained them, this would be less unrealistic than the beginning of Aristophanes' *Clouds*, which opens with Strepsiades and Pheidippides in bed.

A problem arises, however, at the end of the prologue. Do the prisoners now leave the stage,³ or do they remain during the following monologue of Ergasilus?⁴ There are strong arguments for preferring the second alternative. The prologue-speaker announces his exit in 67, *abeo*, but there is nothing in the text or in logic to suggest that the prisoners leave the stage at the same time; and that they should do so is inconsistent with the later reference to their being attached to a heavy chain. Nevertheless they could well be thought dramatically redundant during Ergasilus' forty-line monologue. They perhaps continue to have some symbolic value in preparation for the action to come but they have little direct relevance to Ergasilus' monologue. Ergasilus speaks only in general terms of prisoners bought by Hegio (98-101) and, unlike the prologue-speaker, makes no explicit reference to them as visible in front of Hegio's house, even when he moves towards the door of the house (108); at most 98, *quaestum hunc*, may be accompanied by a gesture in their direction.⁵ Their presence while Ergasilus speaks of the capture of Hegio's son (92-95) has also been thought inconsistent with Philocrates' surprised question *captus est?* in 262,⁶ but one can perhaps invoke the well-known convention that, if the dramatist so desires, one character need not hear what another says.⁷

³E. A. Sonnenschein, *T. Macci Plauti Captivi*² (London 1880) on 125 (I 2. 16), 251 (II 2. 2); P. Nixon, *Plautus* I (London and Cambridge, Mass. 1916) 467; A. Ernout, *Plaute* II (Paris 1933) on 195.

⁴J. L. Ussing, *T. Macci Plauti comoediae* (Copenhagen 1875-92) II. 472; J. Brix, *Ausgewählte Komödien des T. M. Plautus. I. Captivi*⁴ (Leipzig 1884) on 1; W. M. Lindsay, *The Captivi of Plautus* (London 1900) on 252; F. Leo, *Plautinische Forschungen*² (Berlin 1912) 203. Leo compares the somewhat similar situations in Euripides, *Orestes* and *Troïades*, which open with a character asleep on stage throughout a prologue and following dialogue, but they differ from the *Captivi* in that the prologues are not extra-dramatic, although in the *Troïades* the prologue-speaker is the god Poseidon.

⁵Lindsay (note 4 above) ad loc.

⁶Abel (note 2 above) 121, n. 276.

⁷P. E. Legrand, *The New Greek Comedy* (London and New York 1917) 331f.; D. Bain, *Actors and Audience* (Oxford 1977) 156-71.

At 110 Hegio comes out of his house (108) and orders someone to remove the heavy chain from the prisoners and replace it with lighter ones; they are to be allowed to walk about, inside and outside the house, but carefully guarded. From the nature of the order and from the brief dialogue which follows (119–24), it is clear that Hegio is addressing one of his slaves. The scene-heading and a marginal attribution prefixed to 122 describe him as *lorarius*. This description, however, is of questionable authority. In fact the word never occurs in the text of any extant play but only in scene-headings and marginal *notae personarum* in the MSS.⁸ That it was used in antiquity to describe a slave in a play entrusted with the task of punishing delinquent fellow-slaves is confirmed by Gell. 10.3.19 *servorum vicem . . . tamquam in scaenicis fabulis qui dicebantur lorarii . . . vinciebant aut verberabant* and Don. *ad And.* 860. Such slaves appear not infrequently in Roman comedy, especially in Plautus, who, in keeping with his notorious predilection for the theme of slave-punishment, likes to give them colourful names, *Bacch.* 799 Artamo, *Capt.* 657 Colaphus, Cordalio, Corax, *Rud.* 657 Turbalio, Sparax.⁹ It is legitimate to regard the *lorarius* as a stock type of comedy, but it is not certain how far Plautus would have distinguished him from other slaves; there can hardly have been a clear distinction in real life. Scene-headings and marginal *notae personarum*, whether names or descriptions of anonymous characters, are unlikely to go back to the author and probably in all cases merely editorial additions, derived from the text; in any case they contain many inconsistencies and errors.¹⁰ We should for the present reserve judgement on the status of the slave in this scene.

It is generally supposed that he comes out of the house together with Hegio. Line 110, *istos captivos*, might suggest that he has been on stage guarding the prisoners (*istos* = “under your charge”);¹¹ but there has been no indication in the text of his presence, unless we adopt Köhler’s interpretation of 2, *illi qui(a) astant*, as referring to guards.¹²

⁸ *TLL* s.v., B. Bader, *Szenentitel und Szeneneinteilung bei Plautus* (Diss. Tübingen 1970) 150–52.

⁹ J. A. Barsby, *Plautus Bacchides* (Warminster 1986) 160.

¹⁰ J. Andrieu, *Le dialogue antique* (Paris 1954) 114–281; Bader (note 8 above) 109–47.

¹¹ Lindsay (note 4 above) *ad loc.*

¹² J. Brix, M. Niemeyer, O. Köhler, *Ausgewählte Komödien des T. M. Plautus. II. Captivi* (Leipzig 1930) *ad loc.* The line has been much discussed and variously emended. The interpretation of Lindsay (note 4 above) *ad loc.* seems the best but is by no means certain.

There was no need for guards while the prisoners were immobilized by a heavy chain, and Hegio's abrupt address to the slave *advorte animum sis: tu . . .* is more appropriate if the latter follows Hegio from the house than if he has been outside since the beginning of the play. Some editors (including Leo and Lindsay) punctuate 112f., *is indito catenas singulares istas, maiores, quibus sunt iuncti, demito*, and suppose that the slave has the lighter chains in his hands. This punctuation has the advantage of giving *istas* its full force;¹³ but the alternative punctuation, taking *istas maiores* together (so Brix, Ernout), can be defended by the analogy of 110, *istos captivos*.

In any case there are other problems of staging here. Are the prisoners present? In Hegio's orders there is nothing to prove it unambiguously, but nothing to rule it out. After some joking exchanges with the slave, Hegio reiterates his order in 125, *cura quae iussi atque abi*. He is then about to go to visit his brother's house, when he catches sight of Ergasilus; after conversing with Ergasilus, however, he decides to return home and do his accounts first (126–94). Are the prisoners present during the Hegio–Ergasilus dialogue? Again the answer is disputable. Line 169, *eccum hic captivom adolescentem Aleum*, has been taken to support their presence, but this is not conclusive, even if we reject Schoell's supplement (*intus*). On the other hand their presence could well be thought otiose or even distracting,¹⁴ but, as in the case of Ergasilus' preceding monologue, this argument is not conclusive either. Nor is the fact that Philocrates in 262 seems not to know of the capture of Hegio's son completely incompatible with his having been on stage in the background when Hegio and Ergasilus speak of the capture of Philopolemus in 144ff. When Hegio next comes out of his house in order to interrogate the prisoners (251), he states that he has ordered them to be brought out (252). When did he give this order? The most natural occasion would be just before coming out himself at 251, in readiness for the interrogation.¹⁵ That would imply that at 195 the slaves lead the prisoners out of the house and that none of them was on stage during the preceding scene. When then was the heavy chain removed, allowing the prisoners to walk? B. Dombart (cited by Brix on 125) suggested, as one possible staging, that the slaves removed the heavy chain imme-

¹³Lindsay (note 4 above) ad loc. "which you hold in your hands"; cf. on 38, 110.

¹⁴Leo, *Plauti comoediae* (Berlin 1896) on 169 "captivi a v. 126–194 certe non sunt in scaena."

¹⁵Brix–Niemeyer–Köhler (note 12 above) on 195ff.

diately after 125, took the prisoners into the house to fit the light chains and brought them out again at 195. This solution has some advantages but does not entirely square with Hegio's order in 125, *cura quae iussi atque abi*, which leads one to expect the slave to carry out the order completely on the spot before going away. A better solution is perhaps to suppose that the slave came out at 110 carrying the lighter chains, immediately after 125 quickly substituted them for the heavy chain, and led the prisoners into the house.¹⁶ If this was Plautus' intended staging, however, it is not explicitly indicated in the text. Others suppose that the prisoners remain on stage throughout Hegio's conversation with Ergasilus. Dombart's alternative suggestion was that the slave goes to fetch the light chains at 125, soon returns and fits them during the Hegio-Ergasilus dialogue; Lindsay supposes that the slave goes to fetch assistants and returns to fit the chains in 195ff. If, however, the prisoners are on stage continuously throughout 1-194, we can only interpret 252, *iussi huc produci foras*, as referring to a time before the beginning of the play.¹⁷ In that case why did Hegio show no desire to interrogate the prisoners when he first came out in 110ff.?

The exit of Hegio at 194 is followed by a dialogue between the prisoners and a slave (195-215; cf. 204 *nostrum erum*). The scene-heading before 195 includes LORARII; but the plural is in all probability based merely on references in the text to the presence of several slaves (210 *vos sinite*, 212 *detis*, 214 *nos concedamus*, 215 *ite* (?), 217 *vobis*, 218 *facitis*). It seems beyond reasonable doubt that only one slave speaks and that he is the same one who had a speaking role in 110-25. In 210-18 Tyndarus (in his assumed rôle of master) asks permission to have a private conversation with Philocrates out of hearing of their guards and this is granted. There is a difficulty, however, in 211, *ut sine hisce arbitris atque vobis nobis detis locum loquendi*. *Vobis* must refer to the slaves guarding the prisoners, including their spokesman. Who then are *hisce*? Other prisoners (Watling)? But there has been no mention of any others in Hegio's house, only in his brother's (126f., 458f.); there were clearly only two on stage during the prologue (1), Hegio refers to two in 110 and there is no justification for supposing that more suddenly appeared from the house. "Les esclaves au fond du théâtre" (Ernout)? But the audience must hear the dialogue and there would be no point in exclud-

¹⁶E. F. Watling, *Plautus. The Poet of Gold and Other Plays* (Harmondsworth 1965)

61.

¹⁷Lindsay (note 4 above) on 252.

ing slaves. Most commentators have supposed them to be other slaves, distinguished in some way from the *lorarii*, although we have seen that this distinction is a doubtful one. Sonnenschein (following Brix) takes them to be "domestic slaves of Hegio, who, out of curiosity, we may suppose, are standing about and watching the strangers"; this is less than convincing. Lindsay takes them to be "slaves whom the *lorarius* had brought with him to act as guards of the Captives, according to Hegio's orders (v. 115), and whom he leaves behind when he and his assistants (*vobis* v. 212) leave the stage (v. 215). It is they who are again addressed by Hegio in v. 456"; but it is hard to see how such a slave differed from a *lorarius* or an assistant *lorarius*. There is nothing in this section to indicate whether the prisoners and their guards have just come out of the house or whether they were on stage during the preceding scene. At least before 214 the prisoners have had the heavy chain exchanged for lighter ones, allowing them to move about. At 215 the speaking rôle of the slave ends; he may now make his exit, in fulfilment of Hegio's order in 125, but this is not explicitly indicated. Some slaves remain to guard the prisoners (254; cf. 115); in 354f. they are ordered by Hegio to remove the prisoners' chains altogether and are presumably still on stage to receive Hegio's order in 456, *servate istum sultis intus, servi*.

The upshot of this discussion is that the opening scenes of Plautus' play present a number of problems of staging, to which a variety of solutions has been proposed, but none altogether without difficulty. A plausible explanation of the obscurity surrounding the movements of the prisoners and their guards in these scenes is that it results from changes made by Plautus to his Greek model. The following hypothesis suggests itself. In the Greek play the prisoners did not come on stage until a point corresponding to *Capt.* 195, when, on Hegio's instructions (252), they were led out of the house by slaves to be interrogated; Plautus introduced them earlier, bringing them on stage for the prologue, keeping them there during the intervening scenes and transferring on stage the changing of their chains. A number of details of Plautus' text will fit the staging thus posited for Plautus' model better than any possible Plautine staging and can be explained as relics of the different situation in the Greek play. A general argument in favour of this hypothesis is that Plautus probably employed a similar technique elsewhere, introducing characters of his model into extra scenes, notably in *Rud.* 664ff. and 1045ff., where it has been convincingly argued

that Plautus introduced Palaestra and Ampelisca;¹⁸ during a series of scenes the girls, seeking refuge at the altar, form a sort of tableau in the background, not speaking or taking any part in the action and largely ignored by the other characters, at some cost to realism. We must now see how this hypothesis fits the text of *Captivi* in detail.

It is probable that the Greek original had a superhuman prologue. Otherwise, the audience could not know in advance the fact that Tyn-darus is in reality Hegio's son, and the dramatic irony which is such a feature of the play would have been impossible. The prisoners did not need to be present, however, while the audience was given the facts by the prologue, and that they were added by Plautus has been suggested by G. Jachmann.¹⁹ That Plautus should have made this addition in order to help an unsophisticated Roman audience grasp a rather complicated situation, as well as for the sake of the spectacle, is plausible enough. It is characteristic of Plautine prologues to spell out the exposition in such detail as to imply a low estimate of the audience's powers of comprehension.²⁰ The presence of the prisoners probably also serves to prompt an opening joke in 1-3, even if the point of the joke is not entirely clear.²¹

If the prisoners were not on stage during the prologue of the Greek play, they will of course not have been during the monologue of Ergasilus' Greek counterpart (assuming, as is probable, that a nucleus of Ergasilus' monologue and following dialogue with Hegio do derive from the Greek play).²² For Plautus, having introduced them before the prologue, it was easier to keep them on stage after it than to remove them; for him the incongruity of their presence during Ergasilus' monologue would not be an objection and the continuing tableau effect, comparable with the tableau of the girls clinging to the altar in *Rudens*, would seem a positive advantage. Thus any awkwardness in this scene can be regarded as a byproduct of an alteration by Plautus to his Greek model.

The Greek dramatist had no reason to bring the prisoners on stage when Hegio first appears at 110. There is no reason to doubt that his

¹⁸ See appendix below.

¹⁹ G. Jachmann, *Plautinisches und Attisches* (Problemata 3, Berlin 1933) 168, n. 1; cf. Abel (note 2 above) 51, K. Gaiser, *ANRW* I. 2 (1972) 1050.

²⁰ Lindsay (note 4 above) 115f.

²¹ See note 12 above.

²² Abel (note 2 above) 53f.

order to change their chains (110–15) derives from the Greek; it characterizes Hegio's kindly nature and at the same time would serve to prepare for the appearance of the prisoners outside the house. This order could very well, however, have taken the form of talking-back entrance lines, addressed to slaves inside the house. The description of the prisoners in 110f., *istos captivos duos, heri quos emi de praeda de quaestoribus*, rather than simply *hosce*, would in fact be more natural if they were still out of sight inside the house. The hypothesis that Hegio's order in 110–15 was in the Greek play addressed to a slave inside the house is supported by the fact that there are grounds for supposing 116–25, including the whole of the brief dialogue between Hegio and the slave, a Plautine insertion. The exchanges between master and slave on the theme of *fugere* are dispensable and typically Plautine. E. Fraenkel recognized 125, *sed sati' verborumst*, followed by a repetition of the order, "nach einem offenbar plautinischen Hin und Her von Skurrilitäten," as signalling a Plautine insertion.²³ The simile of the captive bird introduced at the beginning of the passage (116–18) is resumed at the end (123f.) and leads up to a threat to punish the slave with a *cavea*; on the way there is repeated play with the word *dare* (121–24). It is possible that the simile, easily suggested by the dramatic context, derives from the Greek and that only its elaboration in 119–25 is Plautine, but it is at least as likely that the simile is entirely Plautus' invention.

If neither prisoners nor their guards were on stage at Hegio's first entrance in the Greek play, the change of chains ordered by him will have taken place behind the scene. After giving his orders (110–15), Hegio will have met and conversed with the parasite (126–94) and during their conversation neither prisoners nor guards will have been present. After returning home (194), Hegio will have given his order for the prisoners to be brought out for interrogation. In accordance with this order the prisoners will have come out of the house to make their first appearance (195), soon followed by Hegio (251); it is likely that an act-division separated Hegio's exit from his re-entry. That the interrogation should take place outside was, of course, necessary in order that the audience might witness it, and that the prisoners should come out before Hegio in order that they might be seen rehearsing their scheme. They will have been accompanied by guards in accordance with Hegio's instruction (115), and the prisoners must secure their permission to have

²³E. Fraenkel, *Plautinisches im Plautus*, Philol. Untersuchungen 28 (Berlin 1922) 143, n. 3 = *Elementi plautini in Plauto* (Florence 1960) 136, n. 3.

a private conversation out of their hearing. It was not necessary, however, that any of the guards should speak. The essential action of 210–18 could have been satisfactorily performed if the slaves gave silent assent and stood aside in response to the request of Tyndarus as the prisoners' spokesman. It is a plausible hypothesis that that is what happened in the Greek play and that the slaves guarding the prisoners were mute extras. The dialogue between one of the slaves and the prisoners in 195–209 is dispensable, beginning with commonplaces on the duties of slaves and ending with the same *fugere* motif which was the theme of the probable Plautine insertion 116–25; nothing prevents us from supposing that 195–209 are also Plautine invention. The fact that this passage forms part of a polymetric *canticum*, which continues to 239, favours the hypothesis of substantial Plautine rewriting. Thus in the Greek play the slaves guarding the prisoners when they first come out of Hegio's house at 195 will have been the same household slaves who silently remove the prisoners' chains in 354ff., are ordered to guard Tyndarus in 456f., and summoned to punish him in 657ff.; there will have been no question of any separate category of *lorarii*.

The hypothesis that in the Greek play the prisoners were not on stage during Hegio's first appearance and meeting with Ergasilus (110–94) removes the objections to supposing that they were in Plautus' play. Line 252 can now be seen as a relic of Diphilus' staging. Plautus would not have been bothered by the fact that this detail was hardly consistent with his staging, nor by the awkwardness of having the prisoners present during the Hegio–Ergasilus dialogue. The parallel of the girls in *Rudens* proves that and suggests that Plautus would see a positive advantage in prolonging the spectacle provided by the chained prisoners. Moreover, it suggests that for the same reason Plautus deliberately put on stage the business of changing the prisoners' chains which in the Greek play had taken place behind the scene. If Plautus brought the prisoners on stage at the beginning of the play, that necessarily required some modification to the changing of their chains off stage; at least the heavy chain now had to be removed on stage. It seems much more likely that Plautus transferred on stage the whole business of replacing the heavy chain with lighter ones, than that he had the heavy chain removed on stage but the lighter ones fitted behind the scene (as Dombart suggested). Consideration of the rôle of the speaking *lorarius* supports this. The giving of a speaking rôle in two brief scenes to a slave with the functions of a *lorarius* is similar to Plautus' probable enlargement of the rôle of a pair of *lorarii* in two passages of *Rudens*, which I

discuss in an appendix below, and sufficiently justified by the associations of *lorarii* with the theme of slave punishment and thug comedy in general. It is probable that, whether or not Plautus would have used the word *lorarius*, he conceived this slave as a representative of the type. He is clearly associated with the specific task of removing the prisoners' heavy chain and substituting lighter ones; he is explicitly ordered by Hegio in 110–25 to see to this, his two stretches of speaking frame the execution of this order. Line 125, *cura quae iussi atque abi*, implies that he leaves the stage after carrying out the order and this is confirmed by the fact that the slaves who remove the lighter chains in 354ff. do not speak. If the changing of chains was to take place on stage, the lighter chains had to be brought out of Hegio's house; it seems probable that this happened at 110, or soon after, upon Hegio giving the relevant order, and that they were brought out by one or more slaves, including the one who has a speaking rôle. The Plautine changes posited thus form a coherent complex; the creation of a speaking *lorarius* in 110–215 was linked to the early introduction of the prisoners and to the changing of their chains on stage.

One problem remains, the interpretation of 211, *sine hisce arbitris atque vobis*. It is now possible to distinguish more clearly two categories of slaves of Hegio involved in the action of the play. *Vobis* must include the speaking *lorarius* who probably entered with chains at 210. We can infer from this line that he was accompanied by at least one other *lorarius*; we may guess that there was one for each prisoner. It seems that Plautus does treat these *lorarii*, his own creation, as distinct from Hegio's other slaves. The others, to whom *hisce* must refer, will be the other slaves (another pair?) who remain on stage when the *lorarii* make their exit soon after 215 (probably carrying with them the heavy chain). The difference between the two categories of slaves is dramatic rather than social. Did the other slaves enter with the *lorarii* at 210? Or, perhaps more likely, were they on stage from the beginning of the play guarding the prisoners, not strictly necessary but adding to the spectacle? A certain answer is hardly possible.

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APPENDIX

On the *lorarii* of the *Rudens*

H. Drexler convincingly showed that the presence of Palaestra and Ampelisca in *Rud.* 664–882 is in all probability an innovation of Plautus.²⁴ His arguments have been conveniently summarized by Gaiser²⁵ and need not be repeated here. In effect Plautus duplicated the motif of the girls seeking sanctuary, transferring it from inside the temple to the altar on stage. The result was to present the girls' predicament more vividly before the eyes of the audience, first in a paratragic *canticum* (664–705), then by their silent presence in the background through several scenes while a battle for their safety is being waged between their owner Labrax on the one hand and Daemones, Plesidippus and allies on the other (706–882).

Drexler also suggested that the two slaves of Daemones who appear in this section of the play, Turbalio and Sparax (designated *lorarii* in scene-headings and marginal *notae personarum* of the MSS), might be a Plautine addition, perhaps replacing Sceparnio. It would be economical that the same slave of Daemones who had appeared earlier should reappear here, and it would fit Daemones' life of poverty (38, 764, 928, 1234) that he should have only two slaves, Sceparnio and Gripus.²⁶ In any case the hypothesis that it was Plautus who gave one, or perhaps both, of these *lorarii* a speaking rôle, and that in Diphilus' play their dramatic function was performed by one or more mute slaves,²⁷ can be supported by other arguments. (1) The hypothesis will help to account for the breaches in these scenes of the three-actor rule, the general application of which in New Comedy increasingly seems probable.²⁸ The possibility that a New Comedy dramatist could, like

²⁴H. Drexler, *Die Komposition von Terenz' Adelphen und Plautus' Rudens*, *Philologus* Supp. 26, 2 (Leipzig 1934) 46–63.

²⁵Gaiser (note 19 above) 1075f.; cf. E. Lefèvre, *Diphilos und Plautus. Der Rudens und sein Original*, Abh. Akad. Mainz, geistes- u. sozialwiss. Kl. 1984, 10 (Stuttgart 1984) 17.

²⁶Drexler (note 24 above) 59.

²⁷Compare the rôle of Parmeno in Ter. *Ad.* 155–96, derived from another play of Diphilus.

²⁸Gaiser (note 19 above) 1038, 1073; F. H. Sandbach in *Le monde grec—hommages à Claire Préaux*, ed. J. Bingen, G. Cambier and G. Nachtergaele (Brussels 1975) 197–204.

Aristophanes,²⁹ occasionally give a small speaking rôle to an extra cannot be ruled out, but no indisputable case has yet turned up in the recovered texts of Menander. (2) Plautus evidently liked the thug comedy associated with *lorarii* and probably introduced them elsewhere. We shall see that he very probably did so in 1049–51, and it has been persuasively argued that in *Bacch.* 794ff. he introduced Artamo and the binding on stage of Chrysalus.³⁰ In *Capt.* 658, *Men.* 1015f. and *M.G.* 1424 a *lorarius* is given a few words in scenes which involve three other speaking characters; it is likely that the Greek originals used mute extras.³¹ That the speaking *lorarius* of *Capt.* 110–23 and 195–215 is a Plautine creation has been argued above. (3) For long periods the Plautine *lorarii* are silent, during their first brief appearance in 657f., in their final brief reappearance in 1049–51 (discussed below), and throughout 706–820 and 839–81, with the exception of 879b–80a and possibly 764 and 881c. (4) What they do say is dispensable, is in part linked with the presence on stage of the girls and can all plausibly be attributed to Plautus. The MSS attribute 764, *nullum habemus ignem, ficis victitamus aridis*, to Daemones, but Saracenus' attribution of the humorous remark to a *lorarius*, adopted by most editors, is an improvement, if not absolutely necessary.³² This line, however, belongs to a passage in which Labrax proposes to burn the girls at the altar and which Drexler convincingly argued to be a Plautine addition.³³ One of the *lorarii* certainly speaks 879b–80a, *equidem suadeo ut ad nos abeant potius, dum recipis*, and perhaps 881c, *quid, fures? rape* (but Plesidippus is also a possibility); again both of these utterances relate to the removal of the girls from the altar into the house of Daemones and, if the girls were not here on stage in Diphilus' play, must be Plautine additions. Only in 821–

²⁹T. Gelzer, *RE Supp.* XII. 1514f.

³⁰Lefèvre, *Hermes* 106 (1978) 530f.; A. Primmer, *Handlungsgliederung in Nea und Palliata*, Öst. Ak. Wiss. phil.-hist. Kl. Sitzungsber. 441 (Vienna 1984) 76f., 79.

³¹On *M.G.* 1424 see Gaiser (note 19 above) 1074; J. C. B. Lowe, *BICS* 32 (1985) 84. The slave who speaks one sentence in *Pseud.* 159 is probably a Plautine creation (Fraenkel [note 23 above] 143–46 = 136–39), but there is no justification for calling a slave with the task of chopping wood (158) a *lorarius*. Nothing in the text suggests that any *lorarii* appeared on stage in this scene and their inclusion in the scene-heading was no doubt based on a misunderstanding of Ballio's many references to punishing his slaves and his actual use of a whip on one (154f.). With even less justification the MSS designate as a *lorarius* the slave who speaks two words in *Merc.* 282 (cf. Bader [note 8 above] 141).

³²See F. Marx, *Plautus Rudens*, Abh. Sächs. Ak. Wiss., phil.-hist. Kl. 38, 5 (Leipzig 1928) ad loc.

³³Drexler (note 24 above) 56.

38, in a short dialogue with Labrax, does one of the slaves have a somewhat more substantial speaking rôle (there is no need to accept the MSS' attribution of 828b to the other one, although it cannot be ruled out). His curt utterances, however, consist merely of explicit or barely veiled threats. It is not difficult to suppose that in the Greek play a monologue of Labrax (from which 824f. may derive), punctuated with dumb show by the slave(s), served to fill the interval between the exit of Daemones and the return of Trachalio with Plesidippus.

Before Drexler, Jachmann had already argued that Plautus was responsible for the presence of Palaestra and Ampelisca in 1045–1128.³⁴ Apart from 1048b, *miserae perimus*, they do not speak, and Palaestra's silence during the argument over the contents of the trunk, on which her fate depends, is highly unrealistic.³⁵ The joking to which the girls' silence gives rise in 1113–16 provides no explanation of it but rather draws attention to the lack of realism. On the other hand, since Palaestra has a substantial speaking rôle in 1129–83, the scene again requires at least four actors. Moreover the manner of the girls' entry is strange. 1045–47 suggest that they are forced to leave the house because of the jealousy of Daemones' wife, although logically this should require the removal of either Daemones or the girls, but not both. In 1048 they are urged to take refuge again at the altar, although the danger from Labrax is now over. The brief appearance of Turbalio and Sparax in 1049–51 is even stranger.³⁶ The two *lorarii* follow the girls out, but are immediately sent in again by Daemones on the grounds that the girls will be safe in his presence. Has Daedalis' jealousy been forgotten, what is now the danger, and why does the dramatist unnecessarily bring the *lorarii* on stage, only to send them off again immediately? It seems clear that it was Plautus who introduced for a second time the tableau of the girls at the altar, presumably to underline the significance of the arbitration scene, and employed a threadbare pretext to bring them on stage. The brief appearance of the *lorarii* is obviously connected and must therefore also be attributed to Plautus; its dramatic effect was to provide a reminder of the earlier scene and probably some visual comedy. W. H. Friedrich wished to attribute this momentary comic effect to

³⁴Jachmann (note 19 above) 44–54; cf. Drexler (note 24 above) 64f., Gaiser (note 19 above) 1076.

³⁵P. Langen, *Plautinische Studien*, Berliner Studien 5 (Berlin 1886) 211f.

³⁶This is admitted even by A. Thierfelder, *Gnomon* 11 (1935) 133, although he rejects most of Jachmann's arguments.

Diphilus,³⁷ but Plautine authorship is at least as likely, and Friedrich himself recognized that the *Soldatenspiel* of 1051, *ite . . . ex praesidio praesides*, has a very Roman ring.

On Drexler's hypothesis Plautus' introduction of Palaestra and Ampelisca in 664–882 and 1045–1128 was connected with other changes to the action of the Greek play in this section of *Rudens*. These other supposed changes are open to serious objections and this no doubt explains why Drexler's more cogent arguments have not been generally accepted. It is possible, however, to modify his hypothesis so as to meet the objections. If Plautus introduced Palaestra and Ampelisca in 664ff., it follows that he is also responsible for their exit into Daemones' house with the *lorarii* at 882. What then were their movements in the Greek play? Drexler supposed that they remained in the temple until Palaestra was summoned to identify her *crepundia* in 1129ff. Following Jachmann,³⁸ Drexler believed that the references in 895f. and 1045–47 to the jealousy of Daemones' wife Daedalis, caused by the presence of the two girls in the house, were Plautine invention and their only purpose to motivate the entrance of the girls in 1045ff. It was rightly objected, however, that the irony of Daedalis' showing hostility to her own daughter is a fine touch, which is more likely to go back to the Greek play than to have been invented by Plautus.³⁹

An important link in Jachmann's argument is his discussion of the problematic little scene, 892–905, where the jealousy motif first appears. This scene, in which Daemones comes out of his house without a clear motive, delivers a brief monologue and then goes back in again, has long since attracted justified criticism.⁴⁰ Jachmann was right that its dramaturgical clumsiness is more easily laid at Plautus' door than at Diphilus'.⁴¹ He came to the conclusion, accepted by Drexler, that Daemones' appearance at this point in the play was an innovation of Plautus, his monologue partly Plautine invention and partly transferred from later in the Greek play; the references to Gripus' fishing trip in 897–903 were supposed originally to have motivated Daemones' ap-

³⁷W. H. Friedrich, *Euripides und Diphilus*, *Zetemata* 5 (Munich 1953) 188f. Friedrich's idea that the slaves ogle the girls would no doubt commend itself to a producer, but it is not supported by the text.

³⁸Jachmann (note 19 above) 45f., 69–80.

³⁹Friedrich (note 37 above) 189f.

⁴⁰C. C. Coulter, *CPh* 8 (1913) 58; H. W. Prescott, *CPh* 11 (1916) 127.

⁴¹Jachmann (note 19 above) 70f.

pearance at 1045, where Plautus substituted the jealousy motif. It would be possible to show that Jachmann's detailed arguments contain flaws,⁴² but it is sufficient to observe that he failed to consider other possible explanations of the peculiarities of 892–905. Whereas he supposes the scene entirely a Plautine creation, it is equally if not more plausible to suppose that Plautus has merely modified a scene of Diphilus.

Gaiser offers an alternative hypothesis which goes some way towards explaining the peculiarities of 892–905. He supposes that in Diphilus' play *Daemones* here came out of his house to visit the girls in the temple.⁴³ This hypothesis provides a satisfactory motive for *Daemones*' entrance, while saving the jealousy motif for Diphilus; it assumes that *Daedalis* was jealous because of *Daemones*' efforts on behalf of the girls while they were in the temple. It must be objected, however, that the references to *Daedalis*' jealousy in Plautus unequivocally imply the presence of the girls in the house and that the irony is more effective if *Palaestra* is an unwelcome guest in her parents' home.

I suggest that the following hypothesis is preferable. In Diphilus *Daemones* returned to the girls in the temple at 820, leaving his slave(s) to guard *Labrax*, and at 892 brought the girls from the temple to his house. This course of action is arguably more natural than that he should abandon the girls in the temple and go home alone without any particular reason. Plautus will of course have had to modify *Daemones*' monologue in 892–905 to fit his revised staging. We may suppose that he omitted a few lines at the beginning in which *Daemones* sent the girls into his house. The reference to *Daedalis*' jealousy in 895f. will be a Plautine addition here, to provide a minimal motivation for *Daemones*' appearance, borrowed from 1045ff., where the motif motivated his entrance (alone) in the Greek play. Otherwise most of the monologue, perhaps all of it, may in substance follow the Greek; even 905 would be in order here as preparation for *Daedalis*' jealousy later. Plautus'

⁴²It is not necessary to see the Roman concept of *clientela* in 892–94; the basic idea would be intelligible in an Attic context (A. Klotz, *RhM* 95 [1952] 300f.). Nor is it necessary to infer from 897–903 that *Daemones* has come out with the intention of looking for *Gripus* (Marx, *Rudens* on 897 and Thierfelder, *Gnomon* II [1935] 139, aptly compare *Aul.* 696–700); these lines prepare for *Gripus*' appearance in the next scene (Marx [note 32 above] on 892), but can have been separated from it by an act-division in the Greek play (so probably after *Aul.* 700).

⁴³Gaiser (note 19 above) 1076.

changes will also have affected the movements of the *lorarii*, who in the Latin play escort the girls into the house at 882 and reappear with them in 1049–51. It seems most likely that the corresponding slave(s) in the Greek play went home on Plesidippus' arrival, in accordance with Daemones' instruction in 818f.; alternatively, they could have followed Plesidippus to the town at 882 as an escort for Labrax, if 818f. are Plautine preparation for the rôle of the *lorarii* in 879f. and 1049–51.

CUR ME QUERELIS (HORACE, *ODES* 2.17)¹

Why do you frighten² me to death with your moaning?
It is no wish of the gods or of myself that you should die
before me, Maecenas. You are my crowning glory,
the roof-tree of my house.

But if some blow strikes you first and carries off
the half of my life, what is there to keep
the other half here? I like it less.

What survives is damaged. That day

will bring ruin to us both. I have sworn allegiance and I
will not be false. We shall go, yes,
we shall go whenever you take the lead. We are comrades
and ready to take the last road together.

Neither the fiery breath of the Chimaera
nor hundred-handed Gyges if he rose again
would ever tear you from my side. That is the resolve
of mighty Justice and the Fates.

Whether Libra turns its aspect on me
or terrifying Scorpio, the more violent part
of my horoscope, or Capricorn,
the tyrant of the western wave,

our two stars are wondrously in conjunction:
your protector Jupiter blazed back at impious Saturn
and rescued you from him, slowing
the wings of Fate,

when the people in the crowded theatre
three times gave their glad applause;
the tree would have fallen on my head
and carried me off, if its blow

¹This is a version of a part of a paper read to the Annual General Meeting of the Classical Association at Sheffield in April 1989.

²*exanimare* occurs four times in Horace. In two of the passages fear is explicitly mentioned (*Odes* 3.12.2 and *Sat.* 1.4.127). *exanimis* occurs twice. In each case fear is explicit (*Sat.* 1.1.76 and 2.6.114). For other examples of this collocation see *TLL* 2.1176.76ff.

had not been lightened by the hand of Faunus,
 the guardian of Mercury's men. Do not omit to offer
 sacrifices and build a votive temple;
 we shall kill a little lamb.

Three beliefs lie behind most of the writing on this ode:

- (1) that "Maecenas was a notorious hypochondriac" (Quinn).
- (2) that Horace did not know or care about his own horoscope.
- (3) that the poem conveys criticism of Maecenas, with some asperity or impatience.

The purpose of this article is to argue that all of these three beliefs are false.

THE HYPOCHONDRIA OF MAECENAS

Four pieces of evidence are cited. First, Pliny the Elder 7.51.172 tells us that Maecenas suffered from continuous fever, *perpetua febris*, and did not have an hour's sleep in the last three years of his life. But *perpetua febris* is not hypochondria and the state of Maecenas' health in the last three years of his life, 11–8 B.C., can have *nothing* to do with an ode published in 23 B.C. The second piece of evidence is a citation from the works of Maecenas: *ne exequias quidem unus inter miserrimos viderem meas* (Quintilian 9.4.28). As Nisbet and Hubbard write, "In an obscure prose fragment he contemplates his own obsequies." But what the fragment seems to say is "I would not be one of the gloomiest people even at my own funeral." He is arguing for the normal Epicurean view of death, and the tone is robust. He is saying precisely what he says in another fragment, *nec tumulum curo: sepelit Natura relictos* (Sen. *Ep.* 92.35, cf. D.L. 10.118). This is not hypochondria. Seneca *de providentia* 3.10 provides the third item on the indictment. There the philosopher extols Regulus whom the Carthaginians tortured by not allowing him to sleep and derides Maecenas who was so distressed by his wife's daily refusals that he tried to put himself to sleep by having music played in the distance, *Feliciorem ergo tu Maecenatem putas, cui amoribus anxio et morosae uxoris cotidiana repudia deflenti somnus per symphoniarum cantum ex longinquo lene resonantium quaeritur?* It may be weakness in a man so to desire his wife, and foolishness to divulge it, but it is not hypochondria. It is a common experience in

matrimony. The fourth and final proof of hypochondria is again provided by Seneca, in *epistulae morales* 101.11:

debilem facito manu,
 debilem pede coxo,
 tuber adstrue gibberum,
 lubricos quate dentes:
 vita dum superest, benest;
 hanc mihi, vel acuta
 si sedeam cruce, sustine.

Here Maecenas is saying that he would wish to go on living no matter what physical disabilities he suffered from. Seneca finds this craven and contemptible. The poem, or fragment, is worth reading with some care, the anaphora of *debilem*, the assonance of *tub-* and *lub-*, the pleonasm of *tuber* and *gibberum*, the internal echo of *superest* and *est* in line 5, the climactic resolution of the basis *si sede-* in the last line, all this and a general coarseness of language and of metre (the alternating Glyconics and Pherecrateans constitute the Priapic metre),³ make this a piece of gross doggerel, a challenge to any translator:

Maim my hand and
 lame my foot,
 stick a hump upon my back,
 rot my teeth and make them slack,
 but one thing give—just let me live.
 Give me that and I don't give a toss
 if you make me sit on the prong of the cross.

How could anyone except a philosopher take this seriously? The tone of the piece is unmistakably satirical. Whether it is a whole poem or a fragment, whether it is spoken *propria persona*, in which case Maecenas is mocking himself, or in impersonation of someone whom Maecenas is satirising, the thrust of it is to mock the man who is excessively attached to life, the φιλόζωος who has already been impersonated and mocked by Lucretius at the end of his third book. But even if it were to

³ At Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1322, Aeschylus, criticising Euripides, opens a Glyconic with an anapaestic basis, περιβαλλ' ὃ τέκνον ὠλένας and comments ὀρθῶς τὸν πόδα τοῦτον; Catullus (17 and frag. 1) and Horace never begin Glyconics or Pherecrateans except with a disyllabic basis. Here *si sede*, the dactyl, is a crashing climax.

be taken solemnly, is this piece evidence for hypochondria? A hypochondriac is one who is morbidly interested in his own health. The speaker of this doggerel is so reluctant to die that he would prefer to endure abject physical distress. There is no connection.

The modest negative purpose of this section has been to argue that there is no external evidence to support the view that Maecenas was a hypochondriac. Of course he *may* have been, and scholars *may* be right to find a corresponding criticism of Maecenas in the poem, but we should argue about the poem from the poem and not from non-existent external evidence. We should also remember that the poem was written to a friend and munificent patron at the centre of a group of poets amongst whom the ruling tones were affection, cheerful badinage and tactful praise. The correspondence and aphorisms of Augustus bear this out, as does the tone of Horace's allusions to Maecenas in the first three books of odes and in earlier poems. In the third Epode, published in 30 B.C., Horace addresses his patron as *iocose Maecenas* in a poem which is a violent attack on garlic. These men had a highly developed sense of humour.

HORACE'S KNOWLEDGE OF HIS OWN HOROSCOPE

Almost all commentators (Syndikus is an exception) would agree with Nisbet and Hubbard: "If (Horace) had known his own horoscope he would not have offered us three alternatives (17ff.) with such indifference." But this is to misunderstand the Latin in two or perhaps three ways.

(1) How can Horace be ignorant of his horoscope if he tells us that Scorpio is the more violent part of it? Is it the other part that he did not know?

(2) *aspicit* is present tense. Horace is *not* referring to the position of the constellation at his birth. What he says he does not know is which of these three constellations is looking at him *now*. At this point the reader has to realise that the disposition of the constellations at a man's birth helps to determine the time of his death, as Manilius explains in the opening to his fourth book (having given the detailed calculations at 3.560–617):

fata regunt orbem, certa stant omnia lege
longaque per certos signantur tempora casus
nascentes morimur, finisque ab origine pendet.

(4.14–16)

The Fates rule the world. All things stand firm by a fixed law and the long passage of time is marked by fixed settings. At the moment of our birth we are dying. Our end hangs upon our beginning.

Presumably a sign which governed Horace's birth may well for all he knows, as he writes, be looking at him (*aspicit*)⁴ and calling for his death.

(3) *horae*, taken strictly, refers not to the horoscope in the modern sense of the "relevant celestial phenomena at the moment of birth," but to the sign of the Zodiac which is rising above the eastern horizon at the moment of birth, the Ascendant (ὁ τὴν ὥραν σκοπῶν).

How then is this stanza to be understood? First a few technicalities. In ancient terms the total of the relevant celestial phenomena at the moment of birth is the *genitura*. Among these there are three signs of the Zodiac of great importance. The Ascendant has just been defined. This changes twelve times in every twenty-four hours as the twelve signs of the Zodiac appear to move daily round the Earth. The Moon sign is the sign of the Zodiac in which the Moon resides at the moment of birth. The Sun sign, the governing sign in modern journalistic astrology, is the sign with which the Sun appears to go round the Earth for the whole of the month during which the birth takes place. In many ancient systems the Ascendant and the Moon sign are of crucial importance. Indeed, when Manilius expounds the characteristics of the twelve signs at 4.122–291, Goold notes "one might think it reasonable to assume . . . that these effects are produced by the horoscoping signs . . . Nevertheless . . . we should accept Housman's considered opinion that, if the poet has chosen his words carefully, he must mean us to understand that the influences ascribed in this chapter to signs . . . depend on the Moon's presence therein at the natal hour."

Given these technicalities, an easy solution presents itself: Horace was born at a time of day or night when Libra was just clearing the horizon and the next sign Scorpio just about to rise, on the cusp between the two, at a time when the moon was in Capricorn. The beauties of this thesis are the prime importance in ancient theory of these two

⁴The aspect of two heavenly bodies is the angle they subtend at the observer. It therefore does not make sense in technical astrological terms to say "whether Libra or Scorpio or Capricorn aspects me." It takes two to make an aspect. This seems therefore to be a technical term used in a non-technical way, "Whichever of these two signs has its eye on me" meaning "is in a decisive position in the sky."

signs, the Ascendant and the Moon sign, and the fact that any month of the year might meet this prescription.

But it is only one possibility. Another,⁵ which seems to go better with the argument of the poem, seems to be to take Libra/Scorpio as the joint ruling signs of Horace's *genitura*, let us say his Ascendant, and Capricorn as the ruling sign of Maecenas. The run of the sense will then be: "(We shall die together). Whether my Ascendant Libra/Scorpio is looking at me and exerting its power to end my life and with it yours, or your Ascendant Capricorn is looking at me demanding your death and therefore mine, our two signs (taking *astrum* as referring to the Zodiacal sign with Nisbet and Hubbard) are in wondrous conjunction. How can that be? Because when you were ill and Saturn was exerting his malefic influence on Capricorn, Jupiter appeared opposite (*refulgens*) and countered that influence; just so, when it seemed from the indications of my signs, Libra/Scorpio, that I was going to be killed, my protecting planetary deity Mercury intervened to save my life."⁶ These powers of the planets are well known, as summarised by Housman: "a man's natal sign determines his character and pursuits, but for accidents or escape from accidents he must thank the planets."

This article is not attempting to discover the moment of Horace's birth or the celestial phenomena that attended it. But the ruling interpretation of lines 17–20 posits that Maecenas is interested in astrology and that Horace is here showing an indifferent or cavalier or hostile attitude to Maecenas. Without accepting that Maecenas is any more interested in astrology than Horace is, I have been arguing that there is no trace of indifference in this stanza. He knows his own *genitura* and everything he says is perfectly possible astrologically.

⁵T. Nicklin offers yet another, *CR* 28 (1914) 273.

⁶In line 25 Nisbet and Hubbard take the view that "Maecenas recovered from illness at the same time that he himself escaped from a falling tree." But what Horace says is "Our two stars are in wondrous conjunction: Jupiter saved you; Mercury saved me." There is nothing to suggest that the two events occurred in the same year. Syndikus argues that Maecenas' recovery from illness must be recent since an interval would not be allowed to elapse before the fulfilment of the vow, but *Odes* 3.8 shows that Horace had a penchant for such anniversary celebrations. The point Horace is asserting is the favour of the benefic planetary deities, not the contemporaneity of its manifestation.

THE TONE OF THE POEM

The colloquial *exanimas* in the first line is elusive. Does it carry a hint of impatience or distaste? Or is it a cheering, rallying, sally to comfort a worried friend? The rest of the poem may guide us. The first stanza continues with Horace expressing the pride he takes in Maecenas' friendship and his gratitude for his support. Stanzas two and three declare his love and loyalty. Exaggeration enters with the striking conceit where Horace thinks of his surviving self as being half, or perhaps less than half of his own soul.⁷ It continues with the promise to go with Maecenas on the journey of death, which Horace well knows is an impossibility, and rises to a mythological flight in the suggestion that not even the fire breathed by the Chimaera or the hundred hands of Gyges will tear him from the side of Maecenas. Readers must always be on the alert for irony in words addressed by Horace to Maecenas, but it would make nonsense of the poem if Horace diminished the sincerity of his message at this point. Any lightness in the tone is to be explained in terms of Horace's desire to cheer his friend and express love without solemnity. If there is a trace of a smile it is wiped off by the gravity of *sic potenti Iustitiae placitumque Parcis*. In lines 17–23 there is a dense cluster of astrological terms. The tone is difficult to assess. We have tried to show that the passage about the three signs of the Zodiac is not foolish or disdainful or disparaging, but perfectly sound astrology, but there may be a touch of levity at *formidulosus* alluding to the fearsomeness of Scorpio (for which see Manilius 2.213, *acri Scorpius ictu*, and 4.220). There may also be a whiff of mock-heroic in the allusion to Capricorn as the tyrant of the western wave (the domain of this goat with a fish's tail included water, in particular the oceans of the west, *Hesperia quid Capricornus aqua*, Prop. 4.1.85–86). All in all, it seems as though the tone of the poem up to this point is sincere and serious, but not solemn.

⁷In line 6 the MSS offer *quid moror altera*? "Why should I, the other half linger?" "Yet it is clumsy and complicated" say Nisbet and Hubbard, "for Horace to identify himself so explicitly with one part of his own soul." They therefore favour Burmann's conjecture *alteram* as does Shackleton Bailey in his Teubner. But surely the lingering in *moror altera* is in polar tension with the premature snatching of *rapit maturior vis*, a typical Horatian thought pattern destroyed by Burmann's conjecture "What do I care about the other half?" The MSS reading is to be seen not as "awkward and complicated" but as an imaginative extension of a familiar conceit.

At line 27 we leave Maecenas and turn to Horace. Instantly the tone changes. *Cerebro sustulerat* is colloquial and perhaps there is a surrealist twinge at the claim that a falling object would have lifted him up (so *fulmine sustulerit caduco* 3.4.44 and cf. 1.21.9 and 2.4.11). We have left the world of Maecenas, of Jupiter, Saturn and *volucres Fatum*. Horace's protector Mercury and his agent Faunus are small beer, amiable but disreputable rogues by comparison. Faunus is not an astrological entity at all, but is dragged in because Mercury is the Latin Hermes, and Pan is the son of Hermes. Therefore enter Faunus as the son of Mercury. This prepares us for the delicious *diminuendo* in the last stanza, well-caught by Nisbet and Hubbard. "For a private citizen to build a temple to Jupiter would be absurdly ostentatious. The pomposity is sustained by the formal *memento*." Indeed all five words *reddere victimas aedemque votivam memento* have an odour of sanctity (for *reddere* cf. *sollemnia vota reddemus Nymphis*, *Ecl.* 5.75). The vows of Maecenas are to be paid to Jupiter; we are invited to relish the contrast with Horace's humble lamb.

So the poem opens with an expression of earnest gratitude and devotion. It develops an astrological argument of some complexity and with a touch of levity, modulating into Horatian self-depreciation delicately judged to cheer, to show respect and tease with masterly lightness. It is therefore highly unlikely that in the first line *exanimas* should hold the slightest nuance of irritation. This is loving banter and we are in the presence of a master of it. Because of that, we can go no further. It is a measure of the quality of this utterance that we feel uncertain of its exact tone from one reading to another. But there is no criticism of Maecenas, no mockery of his beliefs, no reservation. This is pure love, good sense and tact. What else would one expect from Horace to Maecenas?

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IMITATION AND ALLUSION IN THE
ACHAEMENIDES SCENE (VERGIL, *AENEID* 3.588–691)

Three months after Ulysses' adventure with the Cyclops, the Trojans happen to land on the same island. Achaemenides, one of Ulysses' comrades who had inadvertently been left behind, rushes towards them, already stretching out his arms imploringly while still far away. He hesitates when he recognizes his enemies, but then proceeds. Confessing that he had once fought against Troy, he profligates himself at their feet, embraces the knees of Anchises, and begs to be taken with them, even if they should kill him later on. The Trojans receive him kindly and ask his name and origin; Anchises immediately assures him of his safety by proffering his hand. Achaemenides narrates his fate, repeating his plea to be taken aboard at any cost. At the appearance of the Cyclops the Trojans, taking the Greek with them, hasten to flee from the island.

This scene of the *Aeneid* has attracted scholarly attention mainly because of the abundance of its referential features.¹ The primary referent is of course the Cyclops adventure of Ulysses in the *Odyssey*.² The details of the story, however, and the person of Achaemenides, who seems to be Vergil's own invention,³ owe little to Homer's scene. Other influences have left their traces here. The most noticeable characteristic of our passage is a close similarity to the Sinon scene in A. 2, which manifests itself not only in an analogous structure,⁴ but also in a large number of verbal parallels. This feature, which Highet termed "an un-

¹The scene was the subject of the following studies: A. G. McKay, "The Achaemenides Episode; Vergil, 'Aeneid' III, 588–591," *Vergilius* 12 (1966) 31–38; E. Römisch, "Die Achaemenides-Episode in Vergils Aeneis," in *Studien zum antiken Epos*, ed. H. Görgemanns and E. A. Schmidt, Beiträge zur Klassischen Philologie, 72 (Meisenheim am Glan 1976) 208–27; T. E. Kinsey, "The Achaemenides Episode in Virgil's Aeneid III," *Latomus* 38 (1979) 110–24; P. V. Cova, "Achemenide," in *Enciclopedia Virgiliana*, 1 (Rome 1984) 22–23.

²See G. N. Knauer, *Die Aeneis und Homer; Studien zur poetischen Technik Vergils mit Listen der Homerzitate in der Aeneis*, Hypomnemata, 7 (Göttingen 1964) 148.

³This adventure of the Trojans was not, as far as we know, part of the Aeneas myth before the *Aeneid*. See R. B. Lloyd, "Aeneid III and the Aeneas Legend," *AJP* 78 (1957) 382–400.

⁴P. V. Cova, *L'omerismo alessandrino dell'Eneide* (Brescia 1963) 87.

comfortable resemblance to the story of Sinon,"⁵ was adduced in the scholarly discussion as evidence for the sequence of composition of the *Aeneid* and its alleged unfinished state. The parallels appeared too extensive; it seemed that Vergil had re-used the material from the other scene with only minimal changes. In consequence, while the Sinon scene, relating a central event of the Trojan War, was clearly indispensable within the *Aeneid*, ours was seen as merely derivative, with little intrinsic value. It was even assumed that, in a final editing process, the poet would either have recast one of the scenes thoroughly (presumably the shorter and less elaborate Achaemenides encounter) or else deleted it altogether.⁶

The opposite stance was taken primarily by Heinze, who understood the reference to the Sinon scene as accentuating the moderation of the Trojans' behaviour towards a Greek enemy. He pointed out that their humaneness appears all the more remarkable against the background of their earlier negative experience with the *ars Pelasga* of Sinon and Ulysses (A. 2.106).⁷ Heinze's interpretation has been widely accepted; but difficulties remain, which lead to the charge in the recent study of Kinsey that Vergil lacked clarity in the introductory verses of our scene.

Apart from these similarities, scholars have traced many parallels to earlier poetry, especially in Achaemenides' supplication. Many scenes of which Vergil might have imitated individual features have been mentioned. As there did not seem to exist a closer relationship to any one scene in particular, recent commentators have left the question with a cautious *non liquet*.⁸

⁵G. Highet, *The Speeches in Vergil's Aeneid* (Princeton, N.J. 1972) 28–29, n. 20. More neutral is R. Heinze, *Virgils epische Technik*, 3rd ed. (Berlin 1915) 112–13: "Die Ähnlichkeit mit der Sinonszene ist von Virgil eher betont als verhüllt." Similarly E. A. Hahn, "Vergil and the 'Underdog,'" *TAPA* 56 (1925) 200.

⁶J. W. Mackail, ed., *The Aeneid; With Introduction and Commentary* (Oxford 1930) 516.

⁷Heinze (note 5 above) 112–13; see also R. T. Bruère, rev. of Williams (note 8 below) *CP* 58 (1963) 185. Similar interpretations were given by W. F. G. Knight, *Roman Vergil*, 4th rev. ed. (Harmondsworth 1966) 356, and M. A. DiCesare, *The Altar and the City; A Reading of Vergil's Aeneid* (New York 1974) 65–66.

⁸The difficulties are summed up by R. D. Williams, ed., *P. Vergilii Maronis Aeneidos Liber Tertius; With a Commentary* (Oxford 1962) 182, in his commentary on A. 3.588f.: "Virgil may have owed something to the rather similar situation of the meeting of the Argonauts with the sons of Phrixus . . . or possibly to the meeting of Theoclymenus

The interpretations of these two groups of verbal (and semantic) similarities are largely interdependent. I will first discuss our scene's relationship to the Sinon scene in A. 2 as well as two other references to it within the Dido story. These considerations will make way for a reappraisal of scenes in earlier works to which Vergil's shows a resemblance. The similarities will be evaluated with respect to their degree of intentionality; I will distinguish in order of increasing intentionality between accidental similarity (resulting, e.g., from the necessities of context or the accidents of textual transmission), imitation of older literature (*aemulatio* of larger literary patterns as well as variation of small units of text), and allusion proper (the reference to earlier events to signify meaning within the story).⁹

Scholars have stressed the importance of our scene within A. 3.¹⁰ Proceeding from these observations the recent study by Kinsey discussed our scene with respect to the interior development from the Trojan to the Roman Aeneas. The verbal similarities to the Sinon scene, on the other hand, seemed in his view largely due to similar subject

and Telemachus. . . . In general appearance and plight Achaemenides reminds us of Sophocles' Philoctetes."

⁹I owe much to the terminological considerations of K. Friis-Jensen, *Saxo og Vergil; En Analyse af 1931-Udgavens Vergilparalleler* (Copenhagen 1975) 15–23; also useful is W. A. Camps, *An Introduction to Virgil's Aeneid* (Oxford 1969) 105–7. Intentionality is discussed in W. Füger, "Intertextualia Orwelliana. Untersuchungen zur Theorie und Praxis der Markierung von Intertextualität," *Poetica* 21 (1989) 179–200. It should be added that the terminology I am using in dealing with similarity argues the case from the point of view of the later text. The same relationships are examined from the point of view of the imitated (i.e., earlier) text, in G. Hermerén, *Influence in Art and Literature* (Princeton 1975). Terminology which proceeds largely from the nature of the imitated text was proposed by R. F. Thomas, "Virgil's *Georgics* and the Art of Reference," *HSCP* 90 (1986) 171–98. See also H. Fränkel's critical remarks in his review of *Vergils Aeneis und die hellenistische Dichtung*, by M. Hügi, *Gnomon* 25 (1953) 387–89; A. König, *Die Aeneis und die griechische Tragödie; Studien zur imitatio-Technik Vergils* (Diss. Berlin 1970) 17, 25; Knauer (note 2 above) 38–39 and n. 5; J. Glazewski, "The Integration of Epic Conventions into the Narrative Development of the Aeneid" (Diss. New York 1970) 8–20 (a survey of ancient imitation theory).

¹⁰R. B. Lloyd, "Aeneid III: A New Approach," *AJP* 78 (1957) 137, 142 pointed out structural and verbal relations to the Polydorus episode in A. 3.13–68, further discussed by Kinsey (note 1 above) 116–17; B. Otis, *Virgil; A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford 1963) 262–64 related our scene to the subsequent death of Anchises; Kinsey (note 1 above) 117–20 added the Harpies scene. The structure of A. 3 was elucidated by G. E. Duckworth, *Structural Patterns and Proportions in Vergil's Aeneid; A Study in Mathematical Composition* (Ann Arbor 1962) 92, 181–82.

matter, and consequently negligible for the interpretation.¹¹ They are, however, too numerous to be ignored:¹²

Similarities in the words spoken by Achaemenides (or the narrator of A. 3) and Sinon, respectively:

A. 3.595 (words of the narrator) *quondam patriis ad Troiam missus in armis* + 3.613–15 (words of Achaemenides) *comes . . . Ulixi . . . Troiam . . . profectus—2.86–87 illi me comitem . . . in arma pater primis huc misit ab annis.*

3.599–600 *per sidera testor, per . . . hoc caeli spirabile lumen*¹³—2.141 *per superos, et conscia numina veri* + 2.154–55 *vos, aeterni ignes, et non violabile vestrum, testor, numen.*

3.602–3 *scio me Danais e classibus unum et . . . Iliacos fateor petiisse penatis—2.77–78 cuncta . . . fatebor . . . neque me Argolica de gente negabo.*

3.604–5 *si sceleris tanta est iniuria nostri, spargite me in fluctus—2.102–3 si omnis uno ordine habetis Achivos . . . , sumite poenas.*

3.614–15 *genitore . . . paupere—2.87 pauper . . . pater.*

3.615 *mansissetque utinam fortuna—2.110 fecissentque utinam* (cf. 2.79 *fortuna*).

3.646–47 *vitam in silvis . . . traho—2.92 vitam in tenebris . . . trahebam.*

3.653–54 *satis est + animam . . . absumite leto—2.103 sat est + sumite poenas.*

Similarities in the words of Aeneas, the narrator on both occasions:

¹¹ See Kinsey (note 1 above) II, n. 5.

¹² No complete collection of the *loci similes* between the two scenes has been compiled so far. Part of the material was listed by Mackail (note 6 above) 516–17, and Hahn (note 5 above) 200, nn. 106–9. In addition, G. K. Galinsky, "Aeneid V and the Aeneid," *AJP* 89 (1968) 163 connected A. 3.629 *discrimine* and 2.98 *criminibus*. The verse repetition A. 2.76—3.612 found in medieval manuscripts, on which argument in older literature was sometimes based, has been recognized as interpolation in A. 2; see J. Sparrow, *Half-lines and Repetitions in Virgil* (Oxford 1931) 132 and U. Knoche, "Zur Frage der Properzinterpolation," *RhM* 85 (1936) 37.

¹³ The textual problem of *lumen/numen* in A. 3.600 is discussed thoroughly by Williams (note 8 above) ad l. Although *numen* in 2.155 (not mentioned by Williams) complicates the case, Ov. *Met.* 14.175 and A. 6.363 remain decisive.

3.591 *ignoti . . . viri*—2.59 *se ignotum*.

3.608–9 *fari, quo sanguine cretus, hortamur*—2.74 *hortamur fari, quo sanguine cretus*.

3.610 *ipse . . . Anchises*—2.146–47 *ipse . . . Priamus*.

My study will expand Heinze's observations by relating these similarities to the intricate narrative situation created in our passage by Vergil. Within the text three layers of narration must be distinguished:¹⁴ an outer one, the authorial level, where the author presents his text to the reader, then an intermediate one with Aeneas narrating his adventures to Dido and the courtiers, and finally an inner one with the actors on the shore, Achaemenides and the Trojans. As is evident from the above list, the complex narrative structure is precisely retained in the references between the two scenes. There are only references between corresponding elements (Sinon to Achaemenides, narrator in A. 2 to narrator in A. 3), but no cross-imitations (e.g., narrator to Sinon, Achaemenides to narrator). The one similarity between the words of the narrator in A. 3 and those of Sinon (the first example in my list) has a particular function in the course of the narrative which will be discussed below.¹⁵

Previous scholarship has concentrated on the authorial level of our text, without defining it as such. The similarities were seen as allusions to the former incident. For example, the verse repetition *fari quo sanguine cretus hortamur* (A. 2.74—3.608–9) was understood as a

¹⁴'Author' etc. in the following designates the 'abstract author' as supreme instance of the text, 'reader' means an ideal construct possessing the qualities necessary for the understanding of a specific text (e.g., knowing the Greek epics by heart). The actual narrative instances of the *Aeneid* ('narrator' and 'narratee') in Aeneas' narrative are adopted by Aeneas and the Carthaginian audience, respectively. In addition, we will be dealing with the zero-level of our text (the concrete author Vergil) when we discuss signs of the unfinished state of the *Aeneid*. For the relevant theory and terminology see J. Lintvelt, *Essai de Typologie Narrative: Le "Point de Vue". Théorie et Analyse* (Paris 1981). The concept of "point of view" together with a survey of earlier literature has recently been discussed by G. B. Conte, *The Rhetoric of Imitation; Genre and Poetic Memory in Virgil and Other Latin Poets*, C. Segal, ed. (Ithaca, London 1986) 154–55, n. 10. Some comments also in D. Clay, "The Temple to Juno in Carthage," *CP* 83 (1988) 201, nn. 19 and 21.

¹⁵It is remarkable that the inner level of the story does not participate in this system of allusions. The striking similarity of Achaemenides' words to Sinon's remains unnoticed by the Trojans on the shore. The text gives no indication that they are in any way affected by, or even aware of, the rather unfortunate choice of words of the refugee.

means to alert the reader to the similarity of the Trojans' behaviour on both occasions, and Achaemenides' invocation of the divine powers of heaven and the stars was to recall Sinon's treachery. The question remains whether the presence of the Carthaginian audience affects Aeneas' narrative in any way. Or are the Carthaginians expected to ignore the similarity which the reader is clearly intended to perceive? Although the author himself does not intervene in our passage, evidently some of the parallels are aimed directly at the reader, excluding the Carthaginian audience. For example, the verse repetition can be appreciated as an element of epic style only by the reader, while for the Carthaginians the concept of epic style was naturally meaningless.¹⁶ Equally the adroitness of Vergil's re-use of A. 2.86f. in two different ways can be admired as an artistic feat only by the literary audience. The similarity between Achaemenides' and Sinon's words can be considered intentional only at the authorial level: the author heightens Achaemenides' predicament by making him plead with a markedly Greek text, i.e., Sinon's words; he then indicates his 'conversion' to a Trojan by making him warn his rescuers with the Trojan Polydorus' words (which were, of course, unknown to Achaemenides).¹⁷

But even these referential elements are part of Aeneas' narrative and reach the reader only via the Carthaginian audience. To explain how they are perceived by the Carthaginians, it will be necessary to examine Aeneas' narrative from their point of view. The narrator Aeneas (as opposed to the author) has only limited control over the text. He can present his interpretation of the events and influence his audience only by means of his own phrasing. Only textual similarities within his own words are perceived by the Carthaginians as intentional. Unless he were telling lies, Aeneas would not alter Achaemenides' words when relating them in direct speech.

The Carthaginians are hearing Aeneas' adventure for the first time and, unlike the reader, will hear it only once. Therefore, if we consider how little information they possess at the beginning of the story, we might expect some confusion on their part. They have been told on

¹⁶Cf. F. Gladow, "*De Vergilio ipsius imitatore*" (Diss. Greifswald 1921) 39; O. Thaler, "Die Stellung des Irrfahrtenbuchs in Vergils Aeneis" (Diss. Würzburg 1937) 22; W. Moskalow, *Formular Language and Poetic Design in the Aeneid*, *Mnemosyne Suppl.*, 73 (Leiden 1982) 123–24.

¹⁷A. 3.639–41 *sed fugite . . . fugite . . . nam* recalls 3.44–45 *heu fuge . . . fuge . . . nam* and ultimately Hector's *heu fuge* (2.289).

which island the Trojans had landed (A. 3.369), and Aeneas seems to expect them to be familiar with the menacing nature of the Cyclopes. Not a Cyclops appears, however, but a humble suppliant. What happens then is largely an outcome of Ulysses' adventure, which is unknown to the Carthaginians; they depend entirely on the narration for their understanding of this unexpected turn of the story. Aeneas is therefore free to present his version of the events. By alluding to his account of the Sinon encounter Aeneas implies from the very beginning that the events are repeating themselves: another *vir ignotus* like Sinon approaches the Trojans, they display the same kindness as on the former occasion, and Anchises, like Priam, intercedes for the defenceless man. Thus, before Achaemenides has said much, the focal point of the encounter is clearly defined by the narrator: the events present an opportunity for revenge on a Greek, but the Trojans, despite their hatred for Ulysses (cf. A. 3.273), prefer to act moderately. That Achaemenides expresses himself like Sinon confirms the impression Aeneas is trying to create. As it is clear that Achaemenides would not intentionally allude to the former's lies, he appears as potentially treacherous like Sinon. It is all the more impressive that the Trojans succor a Greek even when he reminded them of Sinon.

Central to Aeneas' presentation of the encounter is a passage which has puzzled commentators.¹⁸ Having described the pitiable appearance of Achaemenides, Aeneas remarks: *at cetera Graius et quondam patriis ad Troiam missus in armis* (A. 3.594–95), a phrase, which recalls Sinon's similar words in A. 2.86f. Does Aeneas' remark mean that the Trojans had already assessed his person correctly, before Achaemenides started to speak? Reasons for this instant recognition are not easy to find, since Aeneas had just stated that Achaemenides was unknown to the Trojans. Indeed, Kinsey suggested that Vergil "retreats into a certain vagueness because he was not visualizing anything clearly."¹⁹ It was proposed that Achaemenides' armour was still in recognizable shape, and that Vergil visualized it as distinctly different from the Trojans' arms.²⁰ But Aeneas explicitly states that Achaemenides' *tegimen*, his only piece of clothing, was some foliage. Nothing identi-

¹⁸See Kinsey (note 1 above) 110 and nn. 2 and 3.

¹⁹Kinsey (note 1 above) 111.

²⁰See A. Forbiger, comm., *P. Virgilii Maronis opera. Pars II Aeneidos L. I–IV* (Leipzig 1837) 344. He cites A. 3.306 and 2.389 for a difference between Greek and Trojan armor. Similarly, Römisch (note 1 above) 215.

fied the approaching man as a Greek. But Aeneas is not relating the thoughts of the Trojans while Achaemenides was approaching; he is anticipating what was said subsequently.²¹ This anticipation is not primarily aimed at the reader. He (like, e.g., the modern Vergil scholar) will be familiar with the events from previous reading; no preparatory comment is needed to make him aware of the complexities of the evolving scene. Rather, Aeneas' remark increases the effectiveness of his "oral" narrative, preparing the Carthaginians for a cunning enemy. Aeneas is paraphrasing Achaemenides' explanation, which he subsequently relates in direct speech. The similarity of his words to Sinon's noted above results from the phrasing of Achaemenides, which is similar to Sinon's.

All these similarities urge the Carthaginians to compare the present encounter to the scene that had led to Troy's destruction, and, consequently, to admire the Trojans' restraint. How they actually reacted to the Achaemenides story is not reported in the *Aeneid*. That they did comprehend its subtle implications appears from an allusion to our scene in one of Dido's soliloquies (A. 4.600–601 *undis spargere . . . absumere ferro*—3.605 *spargite me in fluctus* + 3.654 *absumite leto*).²² The queen accuses her absent lover of breaking the trust entered upon when she received the shipwrecked Trojans in Carthage, and contrasts Aeneas' treacherous behaviour with her own moderation: "Could I not have torn his body apart and strewn it into the floods? Could I not have killed his comrades, even Ascanius, with the sword and served him for his father to eat?" (A. 4.600–602). Dido is referring to Medea's brother Apsyrtus, and to Thyestes' sons; she seems to be imagining concrete situations in which she might have applied the atrocious mythological

²¹ Aeneas' comment has already been qualified as an anticipation by R. Sabbadini, ed., comm., *Virgilio, Eneide, libro terzo; Introduzione, commento e note di R. S. Revisione di C. Marchesi*, repr. (Torino 1987) 55f. ad l. The anticipation continues in the following verses. The Trojans on the shore would not have known that the as yet unknown man approaching them was terrified by the Trojan arms; now, however, the reasons for his hesitation are clear to the narrator.

²² The second phrase recurs in A. 9.494 *me . . . absumite ferro*, spoken in a similar situation by the mother of Euryalus confronting the enemy. The position within the verse is identical in all three instances. Both parallels have been recorded by many commentators, but no explanation has been offered so far. See, e.g., J. Conington, ed., *P. Vergili Maronis opera; The works of Virgil with a Commentary*, 4th ed. H. Nettleship, ed. vol. II (London 1884) 314 ad l.; A. S. Pease, ed., comm., *Publi Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus* (Cambridge, Mass. 1935) 479 ad l.; R. G. Austin, ed., comm., *P. Vergilii Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus* (Oxford 1955) 175 ad l. Sabbadini (note 21 above) 60 ad 3.605.

examples. Since Ascanius had often been alone with Dido (A. 1.718; 4.84–85), it would have been easy for her to inflict the fate of Thyestes' sons on him. How any of the Trojans could have met a fate like Ap-syrtus' in Carthage is less evident: Trojans and Carthaginians never were, as far as the reader of the *Aeneid* knows, together on high seas. However, Dido's choice of words indicates that she is thinking of Aeneas' arrival, comparing it with Achaemenides' rescue. She uses the story which had been meant to highlight Aeneas' magnanimity against him, as it were. In Dido's final analysis Aeneas, unlike Achaemenides, had not kept faith after being rescued by a potential enemy.

Dido's viewpoint is incorporated into the referential structure when it reappears in the encounter between Dido and Aeneas in A. 6. At his last meeting with the queen in Carthage Aeneas had rejected her charge of treacherous behaviour (A. 4.338–39). He again tries to refute it in the Underworld. In defending his sudden departure, Aeneas appeals to the stars: *per sidera iuro, per superos, et si qua fides tellure sub ima est* (A. 6.458–59). Both types of exclamations (*per . . . , si qui(s) . . .*) are common formulae.²³ But *fides* from Aeneas evokes a sequence of specific associations. First Aeneas' words are reminiscent of Achaemenides' plea *per sidera testor, per superos* (A. 3.599f.).²⁴ But for Dido the reference to Achaemenides can no longer be evidence of the Trojan's humaneness. Instead Sinon's treachery comes to mind: *per si qua est . . . fides* (A. 2.142f.). Since Dido herself had used this formula during the nocturnal preparations for her funeral (*testatur . . . deos et . . . sidera; tum si . . .*, A. 4.519ff.), it is not at all surprising that Aeneas' excuses are utterly ineffective towards the queen, who simply departs without another word. Aeneas' words merely remind her that her charges against him were all too well-founded.

But Aeneas' words are not only a case of unfortunate phrasing. The complex referential structure is also functioning on the authorial level. It again expresses a semantic perspective diametrically opposed to the focalisation of our text on Aeneas as the central character, which is latent throughout the Dido episode.²⁵ At the conclusion of the Dido

²³ Cf. the immediately preceding words of the shadow of Palinurus, A. 6.363, or the exclamation of Euryalus' mother, A. 9.493.

²⁴ Aeneas' (i.e., Vergil's) words are also a tribute to Catullus (66.39). See the brief discussion in E. Norden, *P. Vergilius Maro, Aeneis Buch VI*, 2nd ed. (Berlin 1916) 254.

²⁵ The simultaneous presence of contradictory semantic perspectives in this and other passages of the *Aeneid* was recently discussed by Conte (note 14 above) 141ff., esp.

story the reader is once more confronted with the unresolved conflict between Aeneas' obligation towards Dido and the *force majeure* of his *fata*, and has to evaluate Aeneas' behaviour for himself. As the reactions of commentators have shown, Aeneas' self-justification is not necessarily accepted.²⁶

Some verbal parallels do not seem integrated into the narrative structure outlined above.²⁷ They can be seen as evidence for the alleged use of identical textual material in both the Sinon and Achaemenides scenes by Vergil. There is, e.g., the curious importance attached to Achaemenides' father. That he should be mentioned at some point is plausible enough, but the details given, such as his name and his poverty, seem unnecessarily abundant. Verbal similarities point towards the Sinon scene. There, albeit fictive, the circumstances of Sinon's life, especially his father's alleged poverty, have an important function in the impostor's narrative. They explain why he was helpless in the face of Odysseus' intrigues. The same details in Achaemenides' account seem superfluous. There could be various explanations for their presence. As a remark on one's father's wealth is in accordance with epic tradition (cf. *Od.* 14.200, 15.426), Vergil might be varying a well-known theme. Besides, as La Cerda pointed out, to the Roman mind poverty and military service were connected to some extent from the experience of daily life.²⁸ Or has Vergil simply taken a detail appropriate in the original place in *A.* 2 and re-used it in a less suitable context? This impression is deepened by Achaemenides' further words *mansisset . . . utinam fortuna* (3.615). They seem to prepare the way for a story of vicissitudes, which does not ensue. No particulars of his former life are given. Sinon's similar words *fecissent . . . utinam* and his reference to his *fortuna* (*A.* 2.79–80) are much better incorporated into their context.

156ff. Incidentally, our interpretation of the encounter between Dido and Aeneas in the Underworld substantiates his theoretical considerations concerning that scene (p. 163, n. 15). See also R. F. Thomas, "Tree Violation and Ambivalence in Vergil," *TAPhA* 118 (1988) 261–62 and n. 5 (with further literature).

²⁶See, e.g., W. Clausen, *Virgil's 'Aeneid' and the Tradition of Hellenistic Poetry*, Sather Classical Lectures, 51 (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1987) 48–49 and 83.

²⁷Despite Kinsey (note 1 above) III, n. 5.

²⁸I. L. de la Cerda, *P. Virgilii Maronis Aeneidos, Bucolica et Georgica; Argumentis, Explicationibus et notis illustrata* (Cologne 1642) 358, cites Pl. *Trin.* 595–96; Ter. *Ad.* 384–85 (wrongly attributed to *Hau.*, where 59–60 furnishes another example); Hor. *carm.* 1.12.42–43; 3.2.1–2.

An unsatisfactory impression is also left by the repetition of Achaemenides' wish to die (A. 3.605 and 654). While it illustrates his despair the first time, the repetition concluding his narration, formulated like Sinon's (A. 2.103), is unnecessary, if not ill-suited to his situation. Sinon, implying that the Trojans were condemning him prematurely, was still threatened by them. Achaemenides' safety had already been guaranteed by Anchises. At worst the Trojans might have refused to take him with them. It is unthinkable that they would kill him after the *receptio in fidem*.²⁹

From these parallels we may conclude that in the composition of the Sinon and Achaemenides scenes Vergil made use of the same textual material, even where no allusion was intended. It may be due to the unfinished state of the epic that this fact can still be discerned. In the two instances mentioned it seems clear that the Sinon scene is the earlier and ours the later.³⁰ With other parallels, however, especially because they are usually well-integrated into their respective contexts, the evidence is much less clear-cut and does not warrant any such conclusions.³¹ In fact, this very ambiguity suggests that in the process

²⁹For a further discussion see, e.g., M. Wigodsky, *Vergil and Early Latin Poetry*, Hermes Einzelschriften, 24 (Wiesbaden 1972) 87-88 and n. 433, and G. Freyburger, *Fides; Étude sémantique et religieuse depuis les origines jusqu'à l'époque augustéenne* (Paris 1986) 146.

³⁰I am applying a principle formulated by E. Löfstedt, "Reminiscence and Imitation; Some Problems in Latin Literature," *Eranos* 47 (1949) 148, thus: "... that an expression ... which in its original place is ... well motivated, usually becomes somewhat peculiar ... or less suitable, when borrowed or imitated by another author." See also B. Axelsson, "Lygdamus und Ovid. Zur Methodik der literarischen Prioritätsbestimmung," *Eranos* 58 (1960) 110. The sequence of composition of A. 2 and 3 is discussed by M. B. Ogle, "On Some Theories Concerning the Composition of the Aeneid," *AJP* 45 (1924) 260-75; C. Saunders, "The Relation of Aeneid III to the Rest of the Poem," *CQ* 19 (1925) 85-91; W. H. Semple, "A Short Study of the Aeneid, Book III," *BRL* 38 (1955-56) 225-40; G. d'Anna, *Il problema della composizione dell'Eneide*, Nuovi Saggi, 19 (Rome 1957) 76-79; *Idem*, *Ancora sul problema della composizione dell'Eneide*, Quaderni della Rivista di cultura classica e medioevale 3 (Rome 1961) 11-49; Knauer (note 2 above) 55, n. 1; G. S. Romaniello, *Interpolazioni e contraddizioni nel testo dell'Eneide* (Rome 1975) 61-75; T. Berres, *Die Entstehung der Aeneis*, Hermes Einzelschriften, 45 (Wiesbaden 1982) 141-68. Further literature is mentioned by M. W. Schiebe, "Der Black-out des Aeneas. Zur Frage der Diskrepanz zwischen zweitem und drittem Buch der Aeneis," *Eranos* 81 (1983) 113-16. The sources of the Sinon scene were discussed, e.g., by Heinze (note 5 above) 79-80; König (note 9 above) 32-43, and B. Manuwald, "Improvisi aderunt; Zur Sinon-Szene in Vergils Aeneis (2.57-198)," *Hermes* 113 (1985) 183-208.

³¹E.g., 3.646-47 *vitam in silvis . . . traho*-2.92 *vitam in tenebris . . . trahebam*. Here Achaemenides' words, applying the phrase *vitam trahere* in its proper usage relat-

of composition the poet reformulated both scenes interdependently to some extent.

The Achaemenides scene presupposes the *Iliupersis* in A. 2. The significance of our scene can only be fully appreciated if it is seen against its counterpart in A. 2, whereas the Sinon scene is self-contained. Nevertheless our passage is not simply a double; it has a distinctive character of its own. This holds true especially for the description of the supplicant's behaviour and the Trojans' reaction. These details have scarcely any counterpart in the Sinon scene. For similar features we have to look at earlier epic and, to a lesser extent, tragic poetry. Numerous passages have been suggested as sources or parallels for parts or the entirety of Achaemenides' supplication and rescue.³²

The archetypal passage for the whole story, Ulysses' adventure on the same island (*Od.* 9.252–370), contains only few similar details.³³ There is a supplication, with Ulysses' embracing the knees of Polyphemus (*Od.* 9.266); a further parallel could be Polyphemus' request for the suppliant's name (*Od.* 9.355) and Ulysses' response (*Od.* 9.366).³⁴

ing to his corporeal existence *in silvis*, might be considered the earlier passage. But Vergil could equally well have re-used Sinon's *in tenebris*, which figuratively refers to his obscure social position, *remota metaphora*. See G. Giangrande, "'Arte Allusiva' and Alexandrian Epic Poetry," *CQ* N.S. 17 (1967) 85–97, esp. 87, on a similar usage in Apollonius.

³²The material for our comparison comes mainly from Greek literature; very little has been preserved of possible Latin sources (e.g., the Latin rendering of the *Odyssey* by Livius Andronicus, of Euripides' *Medea* by Ennius, of Apollonius' *Argonautica* by Varro Atacinus, or Naevius' *Bellum Poenicum*, see note 41). As a starting point for the following survey I used the comprehensive lists in Knauer's book (note 2 above). Following his suggestions (p. 62–106) I extracted further material from the early commentaries of Ursinus (note 46 below), Germanus (note 36 below), and La Cerda (note 28 above). I used the copies in the Herzog August Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel. Most of the Homer–Vergil parallels can be found in Knauer's lists, a few additional ones come from the Parapomene of Germanus' commentary (p. 590–630), which seem not to have been included in Knauer's collection.

³³See Knauer (note 2 above) 148 and F. Klingner, *Virgil; Bucolica, Georgica, Aeneis* (Zürich, Stuttgart 1967) 431–34. In general the two scenes contrast with each other, e.g., Ulysses pretended to be shipwrecked, while Achaemenides really cannot leave the island; the Cyclops showed a cynical disregard for the customs of hospitality, while the Trojans are immediately willing to help their former enemy.

³⁴La Cerda (note 28 above) 357 on A. 3.613 suggested a "latens Euripidis imitatio in Cycl." (presumably he meant vv. 275ff.). Vergil's verses, however, do not have any details in common with Euripides' account, which could not have been derived from Homer's. See J. Glenn, "Polyphemus and Mezentius; A Study in Homeric and Vergilian Characterization" (Diss. Princeton 1970) 140–53 for a survey of the Polyphemus myth in literature.

Another scene of the *Odyssey* frequently mentioned in connection with ours is *Od.* 15.256–86.³⁵ Telemachus, who is about to leave Pylos, takes the seer Theoclymenus on board. The latter, having killed someone, is fleeing from the dead man's relatives. This scene, however, is brief and lacks sufficient detail for a comparison.

Parallels have been drawn to *Il.* 21.284–86 by Germanus; in particular he compared *A.* 3.610–11 to *Il.* 21.286.³⁶ There, when Achilles is in danger of being drowned in and by the river Scamander, Poseidon and Athena come to his aid immediately (*Il.* 21.284) and steady him with their hands. At first glance a comparison of this gesture to Anchises proffering his hand to Achaemenides seems hardly warranted, since in Homer the gesture of the gods brings actual help. But the scholia stress the symbolic implications: the proffering of the hand is taken either specifically as confirmation of the gods' words (*P. oxy.* II 221 col. 14.28–30: διὰ δεξιᾶς πίστιν ἐποιήσαντο τῶν λόγων) or generally as guarantee of rescue and safety (cf. b: ἔθει γὰρ ἀρχαιοτέρῳ οὕτως εἰς βεβαίωσιν ἀληθῆ ἐπεστοῦντο ἀλλήλους. *Genev.* 44: πίστιν τῆς σωτηρίας ἔδωκαν).³⁷ As Vergil was well-acquainted with the 'secondary literature' of his time on Homer, he might have been aware of such scholarly comments on this scene.³⁸

We find all these elements rearranged, as it were, in *Il.* 24.471–677, describing the meeting of Priam and Achilles. Priam, coming as suppliant, embraces the knees of Achilles (*Il.* 24.478) and utters his plea. The Greek immediately responds reassuringly (*Il.* 24.515). After they have agreed on the restitution of Hector's corpse, Achilles seizes Pri-

³⁵ See Knauer (note 2 above) 522; the similarity to the Achaemenides scene was proposed by F. G. Eichhoff, *Études grecques sur Virgile ou Recueil de tous les passages des poètes grecs imités dans Les Bucoliques, les géorgiques et l'Énéide, avec le texte latin et des rapprochements littéraires* (Paris 1825) II, 223; later, e.g., by F. Rütten, "De Vergilii Studiis Apollonianis" (Diss. Münster 1912) 56 and Williams (note 8 above). Cova (note 4 above) 88 speaks of a "lontana derivazione dal Teoclimeno omerico."

³⁶ *P. Virgilius Maro, Et in eum Commentationes et Paralipomena Germani Valentis Guelli, P.P.* (Antwerp 1575) 252.

³⁷ I cite cod. b from H. Erbse, ed., *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem (Scholia Vetera)*, (Berlin 1977) vol. 5: *Scholia ad libros Y–Ω continens*; cod. *Genev.* 44 from J. Nicole, ed., *Les Scolies Genevoises de l'Iliade* (Geneva 1891).

³⁸ R. R. Schlunk, *The Homeric Scholia and the Aeneid: A Study of the Influence of Ancient Homeric Literary Criticism on Vergil* (Ann Arbor 1974); Heinze (note 5 above) 496, s.v. "Homerscholien"; Knauer (note 2 above) 356. n. 1.

am's hand to confirm the agreement and encourage him (*Il.* 24.671–72).³⁹

La Cerda directed attention to Sophocles' *Philoctetes*. He specifically compared A. 3.601 to *Ph.* 468–506, where Philoctetes implores Neoptolemus to rescue him from the island and take him home.⁴⁰ We can easily augment the list of similarities: the enquiry after Neoptolemus' origin (*Ph.* 220–23), a reference to the arriving stranger's clothes (*Ph.* 223–24, cf. the *Dardani habitus* of A. 3.596), the granting of help without hesitation (*Ph.* 519, 525, 527), the handshake of the heroes to confirm Neoptolemus' promise not to abandon Philoctetes while the latter is asleep (*Ph.* 813).

The Achaemenides scene also has been compared to two passages in Apollonius' *Argonautica*. Rütten drew attention to the Phineus incident.⁴¹ He related the description of the seer's appearance to that of Achaemenides, and connected Achaemenides' plea to the Trojans (A. 3.599–602) with Phineus' to the Argonauts (A.R. 2.215–20), and Anchises' gesture with a similar one in the same scene (A.R. 2.243). Heinze compared our scene to the passage which describes the rescue of the shipwrecked sons of Phrixus.⁴² But aside from the differences between the two in dramatic structure (which were stressed by Heinze), this scene lacks detail; Apollonius gives solely the narrative of the shipwrecked and Jason's answer. The latter grants help immediately and asks their names (A.R. 2.1136–39), but otherwise treats their misfortune only cursorily.

Epic supplication culminates in another scene of the *Argonautica* which commentators have not mentioned so far, although it offers striking parallels to ours: Medea's flight from Colchis, as described at the

³⁹Germanus (note 36 above) 252 compares *Il.* 24.671–72 to Verg. A. 3.610–11. This gesture certainly expresses reassurance (cf. the scholia in T). K. Fittschen, *Untersuchungen zum Beginn der Sagendarstellung bei den Griechen* (Berlin 1969) 55 prefers to see the gesture "auch als, freilich sehr intensiver Abschiedsgestus," despite the fact that Priam does not decide to depart until the next morning. *Ibid.* 55, n. 289, *Ilias* Σ 671 should be corrected to Ω 671.

⁴⁰La Cerda (note 28 above) 355 on A. 3.601, Eichhoff (note 35 above) 224.

⁴¹Rütten (note 35 above) 56–57. It is impossible to establish how much Vergil owes to the Latin translation of the *Argonautica* by Varro Atacinus, as only a few fragments have survived. Rütten (note 35 above) 12–15 makes it appear probable that he used both the Latin and the Greek.

⁴²Heinze (note 5 above) 112, n. 4: "Äusserlich ist die Verwandtschaft unverkennbar"; reiterated by Rütten (note 35 above) 56 and W. W. Briggs, "Virgil and the Hellenistic Epic," in *ANRW*, II, 31/2 (Berlin, New York 1981) 974.

beginning of the fourth book. The outlines of the two plots are similar. The characters, unaware of impending danger, are warned by someone who is already fleeing. They leave, taking the refugee with them. Especially close to our story is the Colchian princess' supplication. Medea amplexes the knees of Jason and the sons of Phrixus (A.R. 4.81–82 ἡ δ' ἄρα τούσγε γούνων ἀμφοτέρῃσι περισχομένη προσέειπεν, cf. A. 3.607–8 *dixerat et genua amplexus genibusque volutans haerebat*).⁴³ She warns her rescuers to flee before an enemy (A.R. 4.85–86); her speech is frightened (A.R. 4.92 ἴσκειν ἀκηχεμένη, cf. A. 3.612 *ille haec deposita tandem formidine fatur*). Jason, who promises to marry Medea, confirms his promise by taking her by the hand (A.R. 4.99–100). Apollonius stresses the fact that Jason's reactions are immediate (A.R. 4.93 αἴψα, 99 παρασχεδόν). Though not in the supplication itself, the Medea story also contains a parallel to Achaemenides' wish to be taken aboard, even if only to be killed later on, rather than be left behind. When the pursuing Colchians manage to overtake the Argonauts, they demand that Medea be handed over. In the ensuing argument between Jason and Medea, the Colchian princess finally demands to be killed rather than to be handed over to the Colchians (A.R. 4.370–74).

That this scene might have influenced ours in some details is *prima facie* not unlikely in view of the general impact of Apollonius (and his Medea) on Vergil.⁴⁴ But there are considerable divergences between the two stories, which make us hesitant to assume a close relationship. Neither Medea and Achaemenides nor Argonauts and Trojans have much in common. Unlike Achaemenides, Medea does not arrive in rags. She might with reason expect to be welcome to the Argonauts, and especially to her lover Jason, while Achaemenides is facing his enemies. Medea's social status is equal to that of the leader of her rescuers, whereas Achaemenides is just a common soldier. Furthermore, the fleeing Argonauts deserve the enmity of the Colchians, whereas the Trojans only suffer from the Cyclops' misanthropy.

Our collection of parallels for the various elements of Achaemenides' supplication is far from complete; individual similarities can be found in many other texts. But quite clearly Vergil did not allude to any of these. Our scene would not have gained in significance from the evocation of the meetings between Priam and Achilles, Theoclymenus

⁴³ Here as well as in the Achaemenides scene there is a certain vagueness as to who is actually appealed to.

⁴⁴ See Briggs (note 42 above) 959–69.

and Telemachus, the sons of Phrixus and Jason, or any other scene mentioned above. Nor is it necessary to assume that the Achaemenides scene imitated or emulated a particular passage in earlier literature. Even if the poet had combined several different sources, he could have extracted the single elements only in a most laborious and on the whole unlikely procedure. Achaemenides' plea was Vergil's own creation. The scenes collected above are, however, not irrelevant to our purpose. They reveal that Vergil, without recurring to any specific exemplar, used a literary pattern established by the Homeric epics and exemplified variously in subsequent literature. An outstanding example was Medea's flight in the *Argonautica* which provided a comprehensive example of a 'Homeric' supplication in 'modern' (i.e., Hellenistic) literature.⁴⁵ The main elements of an 'epic' supplication were the following: the plea for help, supplemented by amplexing the knees of the person appealed to,⁴⁶ and the immediate reaction of the latter, who proffers his hand to the suppliant to relieve him of his fears.⁴⁷ This formulaic skeleton was open for additional material, leaving scope for the poet's creative ability. Some features were determined broadly speaking by the context and do not necessarily indicate allusion or imitation. Since the Achaemenides scene was set on an island like Ulysses' adventure, the Trojans would naturally arrive and depart by ship, quite independently from the similar means of transport of Telemachus and others. Since a stranger was involved, asking the latter's name was only natural, thereby invoking another typical epic situation, the hospitable recep-

⁴⁵Our scene betrays a thoroughly Hellenistic form. Hellenistic features are, e.g., the moral sentiment expressed by alluding to the Sinon scene, the high pathos of Achaemenides' appearance and pledge, and the detailed psychological observations concerning his behaviour; see E. S. Duckett, "Influence of Alexandrian Poetry upon the Aeneid," *CJ* 11 (1915-16) 336-37. Of course the high degree of referentiality is in itself typically Hellenistic. See Giangrande (note 31 above).

⁴⁶See La Cerda (note 28 above) 356. A passage frequently mentioned in connection with ours is Thetis pleading to Zeus in *Il.* 1.500-501. But the goddess' similar gesture is significant as a parallel only in this general sense. On the other hand, despite the topical character of this gesture actual derivation can be shown in a few cases. There is an example from Livius Andronicus, first cited by Fulvius Ursinus, *Vergilius collatione scriptorum Graecorum illustratus, opera et industria F. Ursini* (Antwerp 1568), Andr. poet. 19: *utrum genua amplexens virginem oraret*, taken from *Od.* 6.142. A similar case is A. R. 4.1012-13 (Medea pleading for Arete's protection), certainly re-using *Od.* 7.142 (Odysseus pleading for Arete's protection).

⁴⁷See La Cerda (note 28 above) 357, Germanus (note 36 above) 599, and Knauer (note 2 above) 385.

tion of a stranger.⁴⁸ In our scene Vergil augmented the traditional pattern by adding two elements not yet discussed: Achaemenides' poor clothes and his first gesture.

Achaemenides' appearance was briefly mentioned above in connection with Phineus. There is in fact a long tradition of similar descriptions which can still be traced in part. The archetype is Odysseus' unkempt appearance before Nausicaa and her maidens (*Od.* 6.128–29). The same hero, when returning to Ithaca, wore beggar's rags (*Od.* 13.413–38). The figure of Philoctetes was important in the history of the motif. Aeschylus' play about him is lost. Of the beginning of Euripides' tragedy the prose paraphrase by Dio Chrysostomus preserved a few details describing Philoctetes' dilapidated appearance (D. Chr. 59.5). La Cerda drew attention to Sophocles' play (the last of the three) with two brief references to the shabbiness of the hero's clothes (*S. Ph.* 272 and 309).⁴⁹ Two 4th-century tragedies and a play by Accius about the same hero may have elaborated the motif. In Euripides' *Telephus*, and presumably in two other plays of the same tetralogy, the hero appeared in rags (*Telephus*' clothes are referred to in a fragment of the prologue preserved on papyrus).⁵⁰ The dramatic potential of a hero reduced to utter destitution can be appreciated from the first example with more detail: the seer Phineus (A.R. 2.197–205). Rütten even suggested that Vergil's description of Achaemenides was influenced by an explanation preserved in the scholia on Apollonius' verses.⁵¹ The similarity is indeed striking, but not conclusive, since we can show that early Roman tragedy had already taken up the motif. Cicero (*Tusc.* 3.26) cites a few lines of Pacuvius' *Medus* (*trag. inc.* 189–92 = *frag.* 253–56 Warmington), containing a pitiful portrait of Aeetes, which is also similar to Vergil's description of Achaemenides.⁵² Achaemenides' appearance is thus another example of Vergil's use of traditional literary images, without reference to any one text in particular.

⁴⁸ As exemplified, e.g., in the encounter between Ulysses and the Cyclops, who mocks the obligations of hospitality; see the analysis by Clausen (note 26 above) 67–68 in connection with the meeting of Euander and Aeneas.

⁴⁹ See note 40.

⁵⁰ *Telephus* was mentioned in connection with Achaemenides by McKay (note 1 above) 32. However, he favoured the Euripidean Philoctetes as source of Vergil's inspiration.

⁵¹ Rütten (note 35 above) 56. Similarly E. S. Duckett, *Hellenistic Influence on the Aeneid*, Smith College Classical Studies, I (Northampton, Mass. 1920) 32.

⁵² See Conington–Nettleship (note 22 above) II 233 on A. 3.593.

When Achaemenides first sees the Trojans, he stretches out his hands imploringly while hurrying towards them (A. 3.592).⁵³ To the modern reader this gesture seems natural enough, but Greek parallels for it are scarce. There is no such gesture in Homer or Apollonius.⁵⁴ The only literary testimony for it seems to be Th. 3.58.3, mentioning the Greek custom not to kill enemies who surrender with their arms stretched out.⁵⁵ The scarcity of Greek literary evidence may be attributed partly to the accidents of transmission; Greek vase paintings of Priam's supplication do show stretched-out hands as well as the gesture described in the *Iliad*.⁵⁶

The open-handed gesture of supplication was certainly well-known in Roman literature and art. The *Aeneid* has four examples, including ours. Two are connected with defeat in battle (A. 10.595–96, 12.936), significantly, the third occurs in the description of a picture on the temple wall in Carthage showing Priam as a suppliant before Achil-

⁵³F. A. Sullivan, "Tendere Manus," *CJ* 63 (1967–68) 358–62, collects all similar gestures occurring in the *Aeneid*, distinguishing two groups: the larger one comprising supplication gestures to heaven, usually linked with a prayer, the second gestures towards men, expressing either desire (between persons of equal status) or supplication. For gestures towards gods there was ample precedent in Greek epic (e.g., Achilles' pledge to Thetis *Il.* 1.351, Chryses' to Apollo *Il.* 1.450, etc.). Latin examples are found as early as Enn. *Ann.* 49–50 (further parallels are listed by Sullivan, *ibid.* 361, n. 12 and 362, n. 13 and F. Bömer, *P. Ovidius Naso, Metamorphosen; Kommentar* [Heidelberg 1969–86] on *Met.* 2.580 and 9.175). Sinon's gesture in A. 2.153 belongs to this group. See also the comment of C. M. Kalke, "The Language of Power and Submission in Vergil's 'Aeneid'" (Diss. Detroit 1980) 63, n. 1. As a gesture of desire we find it in: *Il.* 4.523 (the dying Diomedes stretches out his arms towards his comrades) and 22.37 (Priam reaches out towards Hector when he begs him not to fight). *Od.* 11.392 (Agamemnon tries in vain to embrace Ulysses in the underworld) provided the model for A. 6.685 (Anchises stretches out his hands towards Aeneas in the underworld). To the same group belongs Medea's gesture of despair (leaving Colchis with the Argonauts, she stretches out her hands towards the shore, A.R. 4.106–7) and Vergil G. 4.498 (Eurydice stretches her hands in vain towards Orpheus, after he has turned around to look at her).

⁵⁴For Medea's gesture in A.R. 4.106–7 see note 53.

⁵⁵J. Henry, *Aeneida, or Critical, Exegetical, and Aesthetical Remarks on the Aeneid* (Dublin 1878) II, 498–99.

⁵⁶Cf. a hydria in the Fogg Art Museum: D. M. Buitron, *Attic Vase Painting in New England Collections* (Cambridge, Mass. 1972) 80–81, no. 37. The gestures even occur jointly, Priam touching the knees of Achilles with one hand and stretching out the other, on a cup in Munich: D. Ohly, *Die Antikensammlungen am Königsplatz in München* (Waldsassen, n.d.) 27; a description of the cup is given in O. Jahn, *Beschreibung der Vasensammlung König Ludwigs in der Pinakothek zu München* (Munich 1854) 136, no. 404. I thank A. Seeböhm for these references.

les, *tendentem . . . manus Priamum . . . inermis* (A. 1.487).⁵⁷ There is ample further Roman material. Parallels in literature are numerous.⁵⁸ In Roman art men's hands stretched out towards the emperor usually indicated the subjection of defeated barbarians.⁵⁹ Achaemenides' initial gesture, if we are right in interpreting it as an essentially Roman element in our scene, may stem from the author's social experience, or, given today's fragmentary state of preservation of early Latin literature, from Roman literary tradition.

This study has uncovered a web of similarities between the Achaemenides scene and other parts of the *Aeneid* and of older literature. Apart from accidental similarities, we have distinguished two main directions: allusions to the Sinon scene, with further references in other scenes of the *Aeneid*, and imitation or emulation of earlier literature following an epic 'grammar' of supplication. In the former category we distinguished two functional groups: the allusions either express the intention of the narrator or speaker, or belong to a 'meta-narrative' supporting or opposing the story being told, and thereby revealing the full meaning of the text.

The Achaemenides scene remains a remarkable achievement of Vergil's poetic skill. It not only presents an ingenious continuation of one of Odysseus' most dramatic adventures, but raises it to an entirely new level. The beauty and importance of our scene lie in the convergence of a multitude of relationships, giving it a significance considerably exceeding its superficial importance for the plot of the *Aeneid*.⁶⁰

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⁵⁷For further discussion of the pictures described by Vergil see R. G. Austin, ed., *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Primus; With a Commentary* (Oxford 1971) 162–63 on A. 1.483; and Knauer (note 2 above) 350, n. 1.

⁵⁸E.g., Cic. *Font.* 48; *Catil.* 4.18; *Caes. Gall.* 2.13.2; 7.48.3; and *Liv.* 3.50.5.

⁵⁹See R. Brilliant, *Gesture and Rank in Roman Art*, *Memoirs of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 14 (New Haven, Conn. 1963) 74, on a Boscoreale cup depicting the submission of barbarians to Augustus, and *ibid.* 122–24, on a similar scene on Trajan's column. The Roman gesture indicating the submission of barbarians would be all the more appropriate if we were to interpret the scene as a symbol of Parthian defeat, as proposed by McKay (note 1 above) 36–37.

⁶⁰I would like to thank A. Seebohm and K. Friis-Jensen for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. An earlier version was presented at the Annual Conference of the Classical Association of Canada in Québec in 1989.

ETYMOLOGICAL PLAY ON INGENS IN OVID, VERGIL, AND OCTAVIA

Recent scholarly attention to Ovidian etymologising has shown that his sophisticated etymologies do not merely reflect the abstruse erudition of a Hellenistic poet, but enhance the meaning of their narrative context.¹ The conclusion of the Medea episode in the *Metamorphoses* furnishes another example of Ovid's skill. His account of Medea's career focuses on her mastery of witchcraft (7.159–293) and her murderous nature: he reviews Medea's primary role in the deaths of Pelias (343–49), Jason's second bride (7.394–95), and her own children (7.396–97), and concludes the narrative with her flight from Corinth to Athens, where she marries Aegeus (7.402–3). The stage is set for another family murder.

At this juncture Theseus arrives in Athens, and Medea prompts Aegeus, who does not realise that Theseus is his son, to give Theseus a cup of poison (7.404–7). In the following lines Ovid pointedly directs attention to the familial relationship between Aegeus and Theseus.

. . . ea coniugis astu
ipse parens Aegeus nato porrexit ut hosti. 420
sumpserat ignara Theseus data pocula dextra,
cum pater in capulo gladii cognouit eburno
signa sui generis facinusque excussit ab ore.
effugit illa necem nebulis per carmina motis.
At genitor, quamquam laetatur sospite nato, 425
attonitus tamen est, ingens discrimine paruo
committi potuisse nefas . . . (Met. 7.419–27)²

The density of words denoting family relationship in these lines is striking and underlines the complete ignorance on the part of both Aegeus

¹ See, in particular, F. Ahl, *Metaformations: Soundplay and Wordplay in Ovid and Other Classical Poets* (Ithaca 1985); P. Knox, *Ovid's Metamorphoses and the Traditions of Augustan Poetry* (Cambridge 1986) index rerum s.v. word-play; S. E. Hinds, *The Metamorphosis of Persephone: Ovid and the Self-conscious Muse* (Cambridge 1987) index s.v. etymological word-play; and J. C. McKeown, *Ovid: Amores* Vol. I (Arca 1987) 45–62.

² All quotations from the *Metamorphoses* are taken from the newly revised Loeb edition of G. P. Goold, *Ovid III, Metamorphoses I* (Cambridge, Mass. 1977).

and Theseus of their close kinship. Aegeus is *parens*, *pater* and *genitor*; while Theseus is twice called *natus*; their relationship is further underscored by the phrase *sui generis* (7.423). In this way Ovid dramatises his characters' ignorance, as well as the magnitude of the crime which Aegeus almost commits, *ingens discrimine paruo . . . nefas* (7.426–27).

W. S. Anderson has noted the play on *ingens* . . . *paruo*, but an etymological word-play on *ingens* here seems to have gone unremarked.³ Ovid suggests an etymological derivation for the adjective *ingens* from the preposition *in*, bearing both its senses of 'within' and 'against' (equivalent in the latter sense to the preposition *contra*), in combination with the noun *gens* equivalent here to *familia* in the sense of 'family'.⁴ This implied etymology for *ingens* is glossed by the preceding *generis* (423), *genitor* (425), and (*g*)*natus* (420, 425).⁵

Etymological discussion of *ingens* does not, of course, originate with Ovid, nor is his derivation of *ingens* from *in* + *gens* unique in antiquity. Ancient etymological theory, attested by Paul the Deacon citing Festus, derived *ingens* from *in* ("intensive") and *gens*:

ingens dicitur augendi consuetudine, ut 'inclamare, inuocare': quia gens populi est magnitudo ingentem per compositionem dicimus quod significat ualde magnum. (Paul. Fest. 114)

Although we have no extant evidence that Varro had offered such an etymology for *ingens*, it is very likely that the conservative etymological tradition of antiquity here preserves an etymology older than Festus. Ovid's etymological play on *ingens* would thus stand squarely within the etymological tradition which derives *ingens* from *in* + *gens*, but he has given a new twist to the traditional derivation by multiplying the meanings available from the two components of the adjective.

Among Ovid's poetic predecessors, Vergil is the most prominent

³W. S. Anderson, *Ovid's Metamorphoses Books 6–10* (Norman 1972) 289. Bömer's commentary is silent about ancient etymological discussion of *ingens* and its possible significance here: see F. Bömer, *Ovidius Naso, Metamorphosen buch VI–VII* (Heidelberg 1976) 306.

⁴For *in*, equivalent to *contra*, see TLL 7.1.749.10; for *in* in the sense of 'within' see TLL 7.1.769.24; for *gens* meaning *familia* see TLL 6.2.1845.63.

⁵For *natus* < *gnatus*, zero-grade of **gen-*, see A. Ernout & A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Latine* (Paris 1979) 429–30, s.v. *nascor*. The ancient grammarians were aware of the etymological relationship: see G. Funaioli, ed., *Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta* (Leipzig 1907) 378.19.

exponent of etymological plays on *ingens*. J. W. Mackail has demonstrated that Vergil often implies an etymology of *ingens* with the sense of 'innate' and sometimes even of 'native', as though from an aorist participle **ingenens* (from a posited **ingigno*).⁶ This play is nicely illustrated by an example at *Georgics* 3.14, *montes per altos ingentem ceruum*, which Mackail translates as a stag "native to, or grown to his full size among" the high hills.⁷ Two other Vergilian examples are also of interest: for *argumentum ingens* (*Aen.* 7.791), of Turnus' shield, Mackail translates, his "ancestral" device, while *ingens Amiterna cohors* (*Aen.* 7.710), of the Italian army, Mackail suggests might almost be translated Amiternum's "native band."⁸ These three examples are drawn from passages in which Vergil dwells lovingly on an explicitly Italian setting and character, and the etymological play underscores the "national" themes of both *Georgics* 3 and *Aeneid* 7.

Prof. Mackail denied any latent etymological significance to the other Latin poets' usage of *ingens*.⁹ Yet Ovid's play at *Met.* 7.427 indicates an interest in etymologising *ingens* which similarly reveals narrative purpose. Ovid immediately precedes his account of Medea's attempt on Theseus' life, first with the murder of Pelias by his daughters at Medea's instigation, and second with Medea's own murder of her sons at Corinth. The thematic insistence on violence within the family, perpetrated upon a family member by another family member, pervades Ovid's conclusion of the Medea narrative and is complemented by the sophisticated etymological play on *ingens* in Medea's final appearance, the account of Aegeus' averted murder of Theseus. In the context of Medea's earlier career Ovid's etymologising deftly underscores her murderous dealings with the families to which she has personal ties, neatly evoking her bloody trail through the narrative.¹⁰

It is beyond the scope of this note to trace the Vergilian etymological tradition further, but there is some evidence to suggest that the

⁶J. W. Mackail, "Virgil's Use of the Word *Ingens*," *CR* 26 (1912) 251-55; cf. now also D. O. Ross, Jr., *Virgil's Elements* (Princeton 1987) index s.v. *ingens*.

⁷Mackail (note 6 above) 253.

⁸Mackail (note 6 above) 254.

⁹Mackail (note 6 above) 251, 254: "In Livy and Ovid, and in post-Augustan Latin, whether prose or poetry, [*ingens*] is freely used, but I have not found any trace of its implying anything more than the *valde magnus* of Festus."

¹⁰Dr. S. E. Hinds suggests to me that the play on *ingens* / *paruo* is not exhausted by the etymologising of *ingens*, noting that *discrimine* differs from *crimine* only in the addition of the small prefix *dis-*.

Ovidian play is not unique in antiquity, and I would like to conclude by briefly considering a passage from the tragedy *Octavia*. Conventionally dated soon after Nero's death, *Octavia* concerns the murder of Octavia on Nero's orders and mentions several times in passing the previous murders within the imperial family (Claudius by Agrippina, Britannicus by Agrippina, Agrippina by Nero).¹¹ In the first choral ode, the Chorus, horrified at the rumor of Nero's impending marriage to Poppaea, reflects upon his bloodthirsty nature by reviewing the murder of Agrippina.

Quid tibi saeui fugisse maris
 profuit undas?
 ferro es nati moritura tui
 cuius facinus uix posteritas,
 tarde semper saecula credent. 360
 Furit ereptam pelagoque dolet
 uiuere matrem
 impius ingens geminatque nefas:
 ruit in miserae fata parentis
 patiturque moram sceleris nullam. ([Sen.] *Octavia* 356–65)

The chorus accuses Nero of *ingens . . . nefas* (363), the murder of his mother, echoing the Ovidian tag in which a father nearly kills his son. In this subsequent *ingens nefas* too we are surely invited to see not only Nero's "great crime" but also his "crime against and within the family."

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¹¹ On the vexed questions of the dating and authorship of *Octavia*, see R. Helm, "Die *Praetexta Octavia*," *Sitz.-Ber.* (Berlin 1984) 283–347 and C. J. Herington, "Octavia praetexta: a survey," *CQ* n.s. 11 (1961) 18–30. For the murder of Claudius by Agrippina, see *Oct.* 41–43, 91–93, 112, 164–65, etc.; for the murder of Britannicus by Agrippina and Nero, see *Oct.* 46, 111–14, etc.; for the murder of Agrippina by Nero, see *Oct.* 44, 165–66, 310–76, etc.

PROPERTIUS' HYMN TO BACCHUS AND CONTEMPORARY POETRY

One of Propertius' most successful experiments in expanding the range of his love elegy in his third book is the amusing hymn to Bacchus (3.17).¹ The stricken elegiac lover's request for wine with which to drown his sorrows takes the form of an elaborate prayer to the wine-god in which Propertius vows a detailed poetic celebration of the god as payment for the requested soporific gift. He also playfully promises to take up viticulture. The "poet in search of subjects"² in Book 3 thus incorporates yet another new topic into his increasingly more impersonal love elegy at the same time that he gently mocks the erotic topos³ that serves as the poem's premise. Such, in general terms, is the poem's relationship to the Latin elegiac tradition. Yet this elegy also asserts more specific relationships with contemporary poetry, with that of Horace and of Propertius' fellow elegist Tibullus. The role of allusion in charting these relations—and in the aesthetic experience of the poem—has been relatively unexplored.

Several scholars have suggested that Propertius drew his inspiration for this hymn, as for much else in Book 3, from Horace's great collection of odes. Margaret Hubbard expresses what is becoming a *communis opinio* on the matter: "The hymn to Bacchus (3.17) is an elegiac rehandling of themes in Horace's two Bacchic poems [i.e., *Odes*

¹The best analysis is that of R. J. Littlewood, "Two Elegiac Hymns: Propertius, 3.17 and Ovid, *Fasti*, 5.663–692," *Latomus* 34 (1975) 662–74. On the handling of the hymnic form see M. Swoboda, "De Propertii elegiis hymnos imitantibus," *Eos* 65 (1977) 131–36; on the basically humorous thrust of the elegy, a fact sometimes not appreciated, see the perceptive brief remarks of R.O.A.M. Lyne, *The Latin Love Poets from Catullus to Ovid* (Oxford 1980) 138.

²W. A. Camps, *Propertius. Elegies Book III* (Cambridge 1966) 2.

³The common sympotic motif of drowning one's sorrows in wine is given a specifically erotic twist in Hellenistic epigram (G. Giangrande, "Sympotic Literature and Epigram," in *L'Épigramme grecque*. Fondation Hardt Entretiens 14 [Vandœuvres–Geneva 1967] 129, n. 1): Asclepiades, *Anth. Pal.* 12.50, Meleager, 12.49. Roman elegy follows the Alexandrians: Tib. 1.2.1–4 (on which see below); 1.5.37; Ovid *Her.* 16.231–32; *Ars* 1.238; *Rem.* 809–10; Lygdamus 6. For a comparison of Meleager's epigram with our poem and Tib. 1.2 see F. Jacoby, "Zur Entstehung der römischen Elegie," *RhM* 60 (1905) 89–96 (= *Kleine philologische Schriften* [Berlin 1961] 2.108–14).

2.19 and 3.25].”⁴ One must admit that most of the Bacchic themes shared with Horace—especially with *Odes* 2.19, which, as a hymn, would be the primary Horatian stimulus—are conventional in literary treatments of the god.⁵ Nevertheless, the view of Horatian influence is made likely by the manifold response to *Odes* 1–3 elsewhere in Book 3, as well as by the fact that 3.17 is Propertius’ first published attempt at a sub-genre (the hymn) so frequently found among Horace’s lyrics. This view gains a philological justification from the verbal echo of Horace near the end of the elegy—an echo not of the hymnic *Odes* 2.19, but of the other Bacchic ode, 3.25:

haec ego non humili referam memoranda coturno,
qualis Pindarico spiritus ore tonat: (3.17.39–40)

nil parvum aut humili modo,
nil mortale loquar. (*Odes* 3.25.17–18)

There should be no doubt that Propertius here imitates Horace.⁶ Both poets conclude extended addresses to Bacchus with announcements of a grand poetic composition to come, although the subjects of the two prospective encomia differ—Horace will honor Caesar Augustus (cf. *Odes* 3.25.4–6), Propertius the god Bacchus himself. The assertion occurs at exactly the same point in the two texts, i.e., four verses from the end. Moreover, Propertius’ reference to the lyric poet Pindar seems to gloss the allusion to his own lyric contemporary. The promise to sing in the thunderous manner of Pindar, in fact, makes the whole couplet strongly redolent of *aemulatio* rather than a simple acknowledgement

⁴*Propertius* (New York 1975) 72. Cf. D. Flach, *Das literarische Verhältnis von Horaz und Properz* (Giessen 1967) 86, and B. Józefowicz, “Die literarischen Beziehungen zwischen Properz und Horaz,” *Eos* 62 (1974) 89–92. More generally, Littlewood (note 1 above) 674 notes “some resemblance to the humorous and semi-humorous hymns of Horace.” Cf. also Camps (note 2 above) 2–3.

⁵Ample collections of pre-Augustan parallels are offered by R. G. M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book II* (Oxford 1978) 314–17 and P. Fedeli, *Properzio. Il Libro Terzo delle Elegie* (Bari 1985) 512–15.

⁶Although not one of the Propertian commentators even lists the passage as a parallel. See Józefowicz (note 4 above) 90–91. A. La Penna discounts the similarity in phrasing on the following grounds: “che la divinità dovesse essere cantata con tono sublime, era motivo derivato dall’innografia” (“Properzio e i poeti latini dell’età aurea,” *Maia* 3 [1950] 222). But the grand style of Horace’s work in progress is not simply suggested by its encomiastic nature, as in the case of Propertius’ promised composition, but more forcefully by his Bacchic inspiration.

of the Horatian precedents for a Latin poem about Bacchus. The elegist's grand Bacchic poem to come—perhaps a dithyramb is meant⁷—will rival Horace on the latter's own poetic ground. This no doubt also suggests that the hymnic elegy now ending has itself been an attempt to best the lyric poet.

The present emulation of Horace actually carries the greater weight, since Propertius' pledge of a sonorous Pindaric offering is, in real terms, obviously a disingenuous fantasy, humorous bombast that adds to the already comically extravagant manner of the suffering love elegist. We more frequently hear Propertius rejecting the thunder of high style (cf. 40 *tonat*) in assertions of his elegiac identity. The image occurs in his refusal to compose epic in Elegy 2.1, where he refers directly to the source for the idea, his mentor Callimachus:⁸ *sed neque Phlegraeos Iovis Enceladique tumultus / intonet angusto pectore Callimachus* (2.1.39–40). At the start of a later book, the prohibition against thunderous words will be attributed to another figure full of Callimachean associations: *tum tibi pauca suo de carmine dictat Apollo / et vetat insano verba tonare Foro* (4.1.133–34). In both of these (and other) situations, the actual or enjoined rejection is not only of the grand style, but of topics that demand such a style, most conspicuously the achievements of Augustus.⁹ And the latter sort of refusal is, in a sense, exactly what the present passage effects vis à vis Horace. The lyric poet comments to his inspirer, Bacchus, on the "not humble manner" of a contemplated encomium of the Princeps: *egregii Caesaris . . . / aeternum meditans decus! stellis inserere et consilio Iovis* (*Odes* 3.25.4–6). Propertius replaces this political subject with the god Bacchus himself in his announcement of a future poem *non humili . . . co-urno*, and thereby obliquely expresses his typical stance (before Book 4) of eschewing praise of Augustus.¹⁰ This Bacchic poet will sing of Bacchus, not Caesar. The associations of *tonare* in poetic contexts with

⁷F. Cairns, *Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry* (Edinburgh 1972) 97.

⁸Call. *Aet. frag.* 1.20 βροντᾶν οὐκ ἐμόν, ἀλλὰ Διός.

⁹2.1.25–34, 41–42; 2.10.3–4, 13–18; 3.9.53–56. In 4.1, where the Apolline advice cited by Horos is no longer rigorously heeded, the Augustan dimension of the topics surveyed by Propertius is implicit but obvious.

¹⁰It is true that already in Book 3 Propertius is flirting with Augustan or national themes. His treatment thereof is sometimes ironic (e.g., 3.4), sometimes apparently not (e.g., 3.11, but cf. H.-P. Stahl, *Propertius: "Love" and "War"* [Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London 1985] 234–47). But his programmatic stance of distancing himself from Augustus (cf. 3.1.15–18; 3.4; 3.9) has not changed from that of Book 2.

the *recusatio* help to activate for the reader this gesture of distancing embedded in the imitation. The echo of Horace is thus an allusion in the full sense of a reference to the context of the passage imitated.¹¹ Propertius' engagement with that context, no less than with the question of genre, is fundamentally agonistic. As elsewhere in Book 3, the elegist alludes to Horace as much to differentiate himself from his contemporary as to signal a poetic debt.¹²

For the reader coming to 3.17 fresh from Propertius' responses to Horace earlier in Book 3, the Horatian background may well be brought to mind before its ratification near the end of the elegy. Such a reader may even be struck, at the elegy's outset, by the verbal correspondences with the start of *Odes* 3.25:

Nunc, o *Bacche*, tuis humiles advolvimur aris (3.17.1)

Quo me, *Bacche*, rapis tui (*Odes* 3.25.1)

But such similarities remain coincidental,¹³ not part of Propertius' imitative design. As the elegy opens, our literary orientation is emphatic-

¹¹See, for example, G. Pasquali, "Arte allusiva," in *Stravaganze quarte e supreme* (Venice 1951) 11 = *Pagine stravaganti* (Florence 1968) 2.275 and R. Thomas, "Virgil's *Georgics* and the Art of Reference," *HSCP* 90 (1986) 177.

¹²See, for example, F. Solmsen, "Propertius and Horace," *CP* 43 (1948) 105-9 = *Kleine Schriften* (Hildesheim 1968) 2.278-82, W. R. Nethercut, "The Ironic Priest: Propertius' 'Roman Elegies', III, 1-5: Imitations of Horace and Vergil," *AJP* 91 (1970) 385-407, J. F. Miller, "Propertius 3.2 and Horace," *TAPA* 113 (1983) 289-99, with further bibliography on the subject. In 3.9, the most elaborate Propertian response to Horace's lyrics, the elegist more directly uses a Horatian foil in turning away from encomia of the Princeps. The poetic program that Propertius tells Maecenas that he will pursue represents "a philosophy of temporal and universal power" clearly inspired by Horace's 'Roman Odes' (D. O. Ross, *Backgrounds to Augustan Poetry: Gallus, Elegy and Rome* [Cambridge 1975] 126-27). Even though that program in some respects anticipates that of Propertius' own 'Roman Elegies' in Book 4, it is wittily rejected here by being predicated on the impossible notion of Maecenas changing his mode of life—another idea that may derive from Horace! (see J. E. G. Zetzel, "The Poetics of Patronage in the Late First Century B.C.," in *Literary and Artistic Patronage in Ancient Rome*, ed. B. K. Gold [Austin 1982] 97, with reference to S. Commager, *A Prolegomenon to Propertius* 55f. and note 42; in the same volume, B. K. Gold, "Propertius 3.9: Maecenas as *Eques*, *Dux*, *Fautor*," 108-10 concurs on the force of the crucial phrase *te duce* in verse 47).

¹³I.e., the collocation *Bacche* + the second person adjective or pronoun is a common hymnic pattern found in any number of situations: cf. Tib. 2.1.3; 2.3.63-64; Virg. *Georg.* 2.2 and 388, etc.

cally elegiac. The speaker now groveling before Bacchus' altar is preoccupied with the elegiac lover's usual concerns: a scornful mistress, and the rage and anxiety that she causes (3–4 *insanae Veneris . . . fastus; curarum*), and from which he here seeks alcoholic relief. More specifically, we see that Propertius is thinking of an elegiac predecessor, Tibullus 1.2, which begins with a lover requesting wine (here from an attending slave) for exactly the same reason:

tu potes insanae Veneris *compescere* fastus
curarumque tuo fit medicina *mero*. (3.17.3–4)

adde *merum* vinoque novos *compesce* dolores,
occupet ut fessi lumina victa sopor. (Tib. 1.2.1–2)

Commentators regularly cite these passages as parallels to one another, contemporary instances of an already stock erotic motif (see above, note 3) such as often occur in Augustan elegy with no question of influence or allusion. However, the combined similarities of situation, phrasing,¹⁵ and placement in the poem's opening movement surely make the Propertian couplet a reference to his elegiac confrère, to a poet to whose first book he responded on earlier occasions.¹⁶ The fact that the verbal reminiscence is slight (as in the case of Horace discussed above) need not tell against an allusive force. Some remarks by G. B.

¹⁴On the proper meaning of this difficult phrase, whose density is typical of Propertius, see D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Propertiana* (Cambridge 1956) 190 and L. Richardson, Jr., *Propertius. Elegies I–IV* (Norman, Okla. 1976) 387. *Fastus* refers not to Propertius', but to his mistress's scorn, which will be "subdued" once he has been released from the thought of her by his alcoholic stupor. *Insanae* applies to the love-crazed Propertius.

¹⁵M. Rothstein, *Die Elegien des Sextus Propertius* (Berlin 1924) on 3.17.3: "Im Wortlaut wie in der Situation erinnern diese Worte an den Anfang der Elegie I 2 des Tibull . . . und an ein Gedicht des Lygdamus (Tib. III 6)." The parallel with Lygdamus is very suggestive, since he too directly summons Bacchus to remove his erotic woes. But the still open question of Lygdamus' *floruit* makes it impossible to assert that his poem had an impact on Propertius; he may be writing after the time of Ovid. Moreover, the similarity with Lygdamus is only one of situation; that with Tibullus is both situational and verbal. See A. Cartault, *Tibulle et les auteurs du Corpus Tibullianum* (Paris 1909) 114.

¹⁶For some notable examples see F. H. Sandbach, "Notes on Propertius II, 16 and III, 7," *PCPhS* 185 (1958–59) 4–5; F. Solmsen, "Propertius in his Literary Relations with Tibullus and Vergil," *Philologus* 105 (1961) 273–81 = *Kleine Schriften* 2.299–307; in general, Cartault (note 15 above) 103–16 and La Penna (note 6 above) 223–36, both of whom, however, are concerned with establishing instances of the more passive phenomenon of influence rather than with exploring the dynamics of literary allusion.

Conte on the dynamics of poetic allusion in general are particularly apposite:

allusion will occur as a literary act if a sympathetic vibration can be set up between the poet's and the reader's memories when these are directed to a source already stored in both. Reference should be made to a poetic *setting* rather than to individual *lines*. A single word will often be enough to condense a whole poetic situation and to revive its mood.¹⁷

The operative word in the present instance is *compescere*. Its nearly identical metrical position in the two verses is merely coincidental,¹⁸ but the occurrence of the verb with analogous objects in the two lover's calls for wine is not. Furthermore, the informed reader's recall of the Tibullan text has been prepared by Propertius' imitation of another portion of the same Tibullan poem in the just concluded Elegy 3.16.¹⁹

What is more, Propertius' address to Bacchus closes with a second echo of the very Tibullan couplet referred to at the start:²⁰

tu modo servitio vacuum me siste superbo,
atque hoc sollicitum vince sopore caput. (3.17.41–42)

adde merum vinoque novos compesce dolores,
occupet ut fessi lumina victa sopor. (Tib. 1.2.1–2)

It is well known that Propertian elegies frequently end by echoing and/or restating their beginnings.²¹ The 'ring composition' here is more complex than most. The lover's wish to be freed *servitio* . . . *superbo* rephrases his concern with *Veneris* . . . *fastus* at the outset. This follows immediately upon the elegant reversal in the penultimate couplet's

¹⁷*The Rhetoric of Imitation. Genre and Poetic Memory in Virgil and Other Latin Poets* (Ithaca and London 1986) 35.

¹⁸Forms of *compescere* always straddle the fourth and fifth feet of a hexameter in Augustan elegy: Tib. 1.4.11; Prop. 1.5.1; 1.13.11; 1.16.31; Ovid *Ars* 2.97; 3.501; *Rem.* 69.

¹⁹Compare Prop. 3.16.11–20 with Tib. 1.2.25–40; see Solmsen's discussion (note 16 above) 277–81 = *Kleine Schriften* 2.303–7.

²⁰Although the idea is an old one (cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 912), the poetic "formula" (Fedeli) *sopore vinci* does not appear in extant Latin verse before its occurrence in these two lines. Note, too, that both times the words are juxtaposed in the second half of a pentameter.

²¹D. R. Shackleton Bailey, "Some recent experiments in Propertian criticism," *PCPhS* 182 (1952–53) 18 and note 1.

verbal repetition of the opening line: the lowly (1 *humiles*) suppliant before Bacchus promises to sing the god's praises in an elevated manner (39 *non humili . . . coturno*). Complementing these closural touches is the renewed reference to Tibullus 1.2.1–2. The pattern of allusion thus participates in the designed frame of the entire elegy.

But what, apart from this structural role, is the function of the Tibullan echoes? In formal terms, they may have something of the force of the Horatian allusion, hinting at Propertius' *aemulatio* of his poetic contemporary. Tibullus 1.2 is a complex poem, so complex that modern scholars have puzzled over its scenario.²² The agonized lover's wish for sleep from wine, apparently spoken at table, serves only as a point of departure for an extended complaint imagined to be taking place before the *puella*'s house. Perhaps Propertius wants his own innovation to be read against the background of Tibullus' ambitious production. Where Tibullus boldly linked the symposiast's call for *sopor* with a paraclausithyron, Propertius uses the former motif as a point of departure for a hymn to Bacchus.²³ In Propertius' case, however, as we have noted, the hymnic elaboration is largely a burlesque of the *amator*'s request for lethean wine. Quite aside from any possible formal resonance, therefore, allusion to Tibullus here has a force that is in some sense parodic. For Propertius here gives a comic turn to an elegiac situation that he identifies as Tibullan. The Tibullan reference at the elegy's start not only assists in anchoring the text in the elegiac tradition; it also sets up a specific poetic referent as a foil for Propertian humor. This evocation of Tibullan poetry for humorous effect is validated in the course of the poem.

If the Bacchic aretalogy and the promise of a high-sounding poem to come look in certain respects to Horace, the Propertian lover's other,

²²The latest discussion of the issue is that of W. Wimmel, *Tibull und Delia. Zweiter Teil. Tibulls Elegie 1,2* (Wiesbaden 1983) 67–81, with references to earlier scholarship; add G. Williams, *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (Oxford 1968) 499, a clear presentation of what I think is the correct view.

²³Since *imitatio* by a *doctus poeta* is characterized by linguistic as much as by conceptual play, it is not farfetched to interpret the much greater complexity of the phrase *insanae Veneris compescere fastus* in comparison with its Tibullan equivalent (*compesce dolores*) as part of Propertius' rivalry of his predecessor. Conversely, at the end of the poem he simplifies the Tibullan collocation *lumina victa sopor*—which compresses a logically coordinate verb into a perfect participle—in his own more direct expression (*sopore vince*).

more outrageous, vow to the god has a distinctly Tibullan ring. His first promise is to serve Bacchus as a vine-grower (15–18):

ipse seram vitis pangamque ex ordine collis,
 quos carpant nullae me vigilante ferae,²⁴
 dum modo purpureo spument mihi dolia musto,
 et nova pressantis inquinet uva pedes.

R. J. Littlewood calls these verses “an idyllic pastoral scene with evocative rural detail worthy of Tibullus.”²⁵ We can be more precise about a Tibullan coloration. The movement opens with what can only, after the Tibullan atmosphere a dozen lines earlier, be taken as a reference to the personal credo of Tibullus found at the start of his first book’s programmatic elegy (1.1.7–8):²⁶

ipse seram teneras maturo tempore vites
 rusticus . . .

The motif of the lover–poet involved with viticulture is thus explicitly marked as a Tibullan idea. And there is, in fact, nothing more perfectly at home in the world of Tibullan elegy than the poet’s fond imagined engagement with such details of agricultural life. Hence the prominence given to this nexus of motifs in the first book’s introductory poem. Yet nothing could be further from the mind of the Propertian persona whom we have come to know for two and a half books than planting vines and a grape harvest. The vigil of the Propertian lover can be spent in a lonely forest (1.18), but certainly never among vineyards warding off hungry

²⁴I adopt Camps’ punctuation (followed by Richardson and Fedeli). But whether 17–18 go with 15–16 or, as most editors take the couplet, with 19–20 does not greatly affect the present argument.

²⁵Littlewood (note 1 above) 667. The term “pastoral” is problematic here, as in its frequent application to Tibullus.

²⁶Propertian commentators regularly cite the Tibullan verse as a parallel to refute Guyet’s proposed inversion of the accusative nouns in line 15. Rothstein judges the echo to be unintentional but “bemerkenswert” nonetheless. Cf. La Penna (note 6 above) 225: “Reminiscenza tibulliana . . . indubbia”; Cartault (note 15 above) 115: “Il serait toutefois étonnant que les deux hémistiches fussent nés indépendamment l’un de l’autre.” With 3.17.17–18 compare Tib. 1.5.23–24 *aut mihi servabit plenis in lintribus uvas / pressaque veloci candida musta pedes*.

beasts.²⁷ Hence the immediacy with which the present lines conjure up Tibullus' poetic persona, and hence the humor of the motif in the mouth of Propertius. Here the elegiac contemporary's heartfelt aspiration to enjoy the rural pleasures of his vineyard²⁸ is transmuted into a comic vow to Bacchus for wine-induced sleep.

Back in Elegy 2.5, as Friedrich Solmsen convincingly argued,²⁹ Propertius criticizes Tibullus rather sharply on another issue of *rusticitas* in the latter's poetry. Propertius contrasts his own threatened poetic revenge on Cynthia with less dignified ways of berating a mistress pictured by Tibullus (apparently) in a rustic setting: *rusticus haec aliquis tam turpia proelia quaerat, / cuius non hederæ circuire caput* (2.5.25–26). Even if, as some think,³⁰ the Tibullan passage in mind (1.10.53ff.) is not firmly situated in the countryside, the ivy-crowned poet's dismissal of *rusticus aliquis* makes a pointed reference to Tibullus. The implication that the elegist "who stoops to such matters," as Solmsen put it, "is a *rusticus*" in a transferred sense of the word builds in part upon recall of the fact that that poet characteristically imagines himself literally as a *rusticus*. In the hymn to Bacchus, the earlier critique has mellowed into a comic twist on the same aspect of Tibullan elegy. Propertius now amusingly styles himself a prospective Tibullus *rusticus*. Both the poem's premise, then, the wish for release from love's torments via wine, and a part of its humorous complication—the pledge to serve Bacchus as a vine-grower—are suffused with a Tibullan coloration.

All in all, in 3.17 Propertius engages in a true "inner dialogue"³¹

²⁷The notion of protecting the vines from *feræ* is itself a comic exaggeration, since the usual threat was from domestic animals like goats. Note, too, the irony of *me vigilante* (16) occurring only two lines after Propertius' first explicit reference to the requested *somnus* (14).

²⁸There are of course comic and ironic dimensions to Tibullus' own treatment of rustic motifs (see H. C. Gotoff, "Tibullus: *Nunc Levis est Tractanda Venus*," *HSCP* 78 [1974] 232–40, who somewhat overstates the matter). However, the deep Tibullan attachment to the *rus* expressed at the start of 1.1 is hardly ironic at all.

²⁹Solmsen (note 16 above) 273–76 = *Kleine Schriften* 2.299–302.

³⁰E.g., J. Griffin, *Latin Poets and Roman Life* (Chapel Hill 1986) 85: "no definite setting"; contra Solmsen (note 16 above) 275, n. 1 (= *Kleine Schriften* 2.301), who finds particular significance in the *rusticus* of verse 51.

³¹The term is F. Klingner's, used of Virgil's complex response to Lucretius in the *Georgics* (Virgil [Zurich and Stuttgart 1967] 209).

with two of his poetic contemporaries. He turns to Tibullus and Horace for new ideas for his poetic experiment, but in each case ultimately distances himself from his fellow poets. The allusive echoes of contemporary poetry which commentators and critics have tended to view here as mere parallels or slight traces of influence—or have failed to note at all—are actually focal points in a meaningful intertextual discourse.³²

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³²For their valuable suggestions I would like to express my gratitude to the late Friedrich Solmsen, the referees, and the Editor.

THE MYSTERIOUS WOMAN OF KLEITOR: SOME CORRECTIONS TO A MANUSCRIPT ONCE IN PLUTARCH'S POSSESSION

One grants that the fifth or fourth century "historian" Stesimbrotos may have been capable of historical error, outright lying, maliciousness—since Plutarch says so, in supplying us with what we possess of his *On Themistokles*, *Thoukydides* [*Melesiou*] and *Perikles*. This amounts to eleven fragments in Jacoby's collection (*FGrH* 107), all from Plutarch's *Themistokles*, *Kimón*, and *Perikles*, except an inconsequential entry at Athenaeus 589d–e giving the title which Plutarch as usual omits. Without really wishing to enhance Stesimbrotos' credibility as an historian or biographer, it is worth suggesting that three of Stesimbrotos' "mistakes" may be the result of serious orthographic errors in Plutarch's copy of his book, these errors in turn providing *ignes fatui* for modern scholarship. Two of these ms. errors involve Kimon, one Perikles, and their brushing-aside may add something to the precious little we know of the opening of the Peloponnesian War. Or rather, we may come to understand what Stesimbrotos really wrote, then decide whether to believe him.

I. KIMON'S WIFE

There has been much confusion over the names and numbers of Kimon's wives and children, and it would be wise to outline the intractable nature of the evidence before suggesting its remedy.

A. In a general discussion of Kimon's philo-Spartan behavior, Plutarch says (*Kim.* 16.1 = *FGrH* 107 F 6) that Kimon was a philolakon from the start,

καὶ τῶν γε παίδων τῶν διδύμων τὸν ἕτερον Λακεδαιμόνιον ὠνόμασε, τὸν δ' ἕτερον Ἠλεῖον, ἐκ γυναικὸς αὐτῷ κλιτορίας (Κλειτορίας, *em.* Corais) γενομένου ὡς Σησίμβροτος ἱστορεῖ· διὸ πολλάκις τὸν Περικλέα τὸ μητρώιον αὐτοῖς γένος ὀνειδίζειν.

And of his twin sons, he named one Lakedaimonios, and the other Eleios, born to him by a woman *klitorias* (of Kleitor, *em.* Corais) as Stesimbrotos attests; for which reason often Perikles blamed them for their mother's family.

But, continues Plutarch immediately, Diodoros the Periegete (4/3 cent. B.C., *FGrH* 372 F 37) said that these two and the third of Kimon's sons, Thessalos, were born of Isodike, daughter of Eurypolemos, son of Megakles.

Diodoros wrote a book titled *Peri mnēmātōn* and evidently claimed to have taken his information from gravestones themselves, but elsewhere Plutarch questions his accuracy on the site of Themistokles' tomb ("as if he were guessing rather than knew," *Them.* 32.4 = *FGrH* 372 F 35), and mistrust may be the reason why Plutarch does not stop here (*Kim.* 16.1) to decide which of the two authors is correct about the names of Kimon's sons. Yet it is clear that the text of Diodoros, too, had the incorrect "Eleios." For according to inscriptional evidence Kimon's son was not named Eleios but Oulios.¹

Why would Kimon marry a woman of Kleitor, a town of only local interest in northern Arkadia? Normal as it may be for historians now to find political or dynastic reasons for marriage among the Athenian elite of the sixth and fifth century,³ no explanation for this marriage has ever been proposed and we are either left to accept the Kleitorian bride as a real but personal caprice of Kimon (Isodike being a second, later wife) or to deny the marriage altogether.⁴

¹ On the inscriptions reading "Oulios Kimonos," see J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families 600–300 B.C.* (Oxford 1971) 307, and *IG* ii² 1388.81–82, 1400.66, 1447.16, 1451.66 a Hekatompedon inventory listing a dedication by *Kleitō Aristokratous tou Ouliou tou Kimonos gynē*; 1602.17 (end of the fourth c. and not Kimon's son); *Agora* 15.49.7.

² See R. Geiger, "Kleitor," *RE* 11.1 (Berlin 1921) 661–65.

³ There were marriages undeniably based on political motives, but they were perhaps less common, and more inconvenient, than imagined now; see recently C. Cox, "Incest, Inheritance and the Political Forum in Fifth-century Athens," *CJ* 85 (1989) 34–46.

⁴ Denying Stesimbrotos, supporting Diodoros Periegetes (e.g.): F. Jacoby, *FGrH* 107 Stesimbrotos F 6 Komm. (Leiden 1927–30); J. K. Davies (note 1 above) 304, 377; P. Bicknell, *Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy* (Wiesbaden 1972 = *Historia Einzelschr.* 19) 89–95. Accepting Stesimbrotos (e.g.): Ed. Meyer, *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte* 2 (Halle 1899) 48–49; H. T. Wade-Gery, "The Question of Tribute in 449/8 B.C.," *Hesp.* 14 (1945) 221, n. 1; F. Schachermeyr, *Stesimbrotos und seine Schrift über die Staatsmänner* (Vienna 1965 = *SAWW* 247) 17; W. R. Connor, "Two Notes on Cimon," *TAPA* 98 (1967) 67–75; Cl. Meister, "Stesimbrotos' Schrift über die athenischen Staatsmänner und ihre historische Bedeutung," *Historia* 27 (1977) 280; L. Piccirilli, "ΓΥΝΗ ΚΑΕΙΤΟΡΙΑ, ΚΑΕΙΤΟΡΙΑ, ΑΛΙΘΡΙΑ, moglie di Cimone?" *RFIC* 110 (1982) 278–82; S. Fuscagni, *Vite parallele: Plutarco, Cimone* (Rome 1989) 172, n. 39 (conditionally); P. Stadter, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles* (Chapel Hill 1989) 269.

B. At *Per.* 29.1–3 Plutarch says that (in 433/2) Perikles sent out Lakedaimonios to help Corcyra with only ten ships, a kind of insult, hoping to make him perform badly and discredit him; Lakedaimonios went against his will. “And generally Perikles used to check them as not legitimate citizens (*gnēsioi*) in their names, but ethnic and foreign (*othneious*, *xenous*), since one of Kimon’s sons was named Lakedaimonios, one Thessalos, one Eleios. And they are all supposed (*edokoun*) to have been born from a woman of Arkadia.”⁵

In synopsisizing here what he writes at *Kim.* 16.1—carelessly as if from memory—Plutarch accepts the worse source (Stesimbrotos) over the better (Diodoros). No new information—rather, extrapolation from *Kim.* 16.1—but (1) Plutarch’s context in idly citing this pale reflection of Stesimbrotos’ passage is the start of the Corcyran campaign in 433 which led directly to the Peloponnesian War, and (2) at least in naming “Arkadia” he shows that his own ms. of Stesimbrotos cited at *Kim.* 16.1 read “Kleitōr,” justifying Corais’ emendation *Kleitōrias* and eliminating the possibility that Stesimbrotos meant to joke *sensu obsceno*.⁶

Per. 29.3 also eliminates a suggestion first made in 1876, supported in 1897 by Busolt, that Kimon’s first wife was named Kleito, a name perhaps deliberately twisted by Stesimbrotos’ malignity into “Kleitōr.” This explanation was based on a fragmentary Hekatompedon inventory of 398/7 (*CIA* 2.652 = *IG* ii² 1388.81–83) in which a polychrome chest and gold signet-ring were dedicated to Athena by Κλειτῶ Ἀριστοτο[. . . 10 . . .] το Κίμωνος γυνή. But discovery of more such entries later made it clear that Kleito was merely the wife of Kimon’s grandson, Aristokrates Oulios, although as Raubitschek remarks, the unusual inclusion of a grandfather’s name in the inscription proves that we deal here with none other than the great general.⁷

⁵ Arguing against Plutarch’s account of Perikles’ motives, P. Stadter, “The Motives for Athens’ Alliance with Corcyra,” *GRBS* 24 (1983) 131–36; and *Commentary on Plutarch’s Perikles* (note 4 above) 266.

⁶ *Sensu obsceno* at Plut. *Kim.* 16: “Κλειτορία pro Κλειτῶ nomine substitutum, obscenitatis et contumeliae causa,” Hiller, *IG* XV.2 (1913) 85, who assumes both that Kimon married a woman named Κλειτῶ (see note 7 below), and that κλειτορίς somehow derives from κλείω; Hiller’s *sensu obsceno* is followed by A. Raubitschek, “Oulios,” *RE* 18.1 (1942) 2000, in turn accepted by J. K. Davies (note 1 above) 304, but Raubitschek abandoned it in “The Ostracism of Xanthippos,” *AJA* 51 (1947) 260, n. 13. Since no citation seems to exist where the names “Kleito” or “Kleitōr” are confused with κλειτορίς, this explanation is unlikely, especially at *Kim.* 16.1.

⁷ G. Loeschke, *De titulis aliquot atticis* (Diss. Bonn 1876) 30 (*non vidi*); G. Busolt,

Still, one may, enticed by the likeness of "Kleito" to "Kleitōr," go further than Busolt and argue a hypothesis that Kimon's grandson married a first cousin, a daughter of one of Kimon's sons, named Kleito for her grandmother, Kimon's first (hypothetical) wife. The pattern of such cousin-marriages was to skip a generation by marrying outside the family, the next generation usually marrying within: an antecedent "Kleito," if extant, would fit this pattern.⁸ Yet "Kleito" was a not uncommon woman's name in Athens, and it is methodologically unsound to multiply hypothetical persons without any other proof of existence, particularly when other evidence denies that existence altogether by offering the correct data. And Diodoros Periegetes wrote that Kimon's three sons all were Isodike Euryptolemos Megakleous' children. Diodoros Periegetes, Heliodoros, and others in recording or claiming to record the inscriptions of *ta Kimoneia mnēmata* evidently saw no other wife set down but Isodike.⁹

As for Kimon's sons being foreigners, or even open to canards on the subject, it is easily indicated from records of their public service that all three—Lakedaimonios, Oulios, Thessalos—were full citizens, *gnēsioi*.¹⁰ This "woman of Kleitor" therefore seems ever more mysterious, less substantial.

C. At *Kim.* 4.8–9 Plutarch discusses Kimon's appetite for women. In an elegy addressed to Kimon, the poet Melanthios celebrated Kimon's affairs with an Asteria of Salamis and a Mnestra otherwise unknown. Yet, says Plutarch here (again), Kimon's legal wife (*kata nomous*) was Isodike, daughter of Euryptolemos Megakleous. Kimon loved her exceedingly, and an elegy written to assuage him at her death was extant which Panaitios credited to Archelaos Physikos' authorship. Plutarch, who does not say that he has read the elegy but was wont to question Panaitios' *personalia* (cf. *Arist.* 1.6–7; 27.3), has consulted his chronologies and agrees that an attribution to Archelaos is at least possible. One trusts that Plutarch does not date his calculations from Ki-

Griechische Geschichte 3.1 (Gotha 1897) 12, citing Loeschke; Raubitschek (note 6 above [1942]) 1999; on the inscriptions, note 1 above.

⁸Name "Kleito": F. Bechtel, *Die Attische Frauennamen* (Göttingen 1902) 20. The pattern: M. Broadbent, *Studies in Greek Genealogy* (Leiden 1968) 13, 30, 154.

⁹The Kimonian graveyard: Hdt. 6.103.3; Plut. *Kim.* 4.2; 19.4; Mark., *Vit. Thuc.* 17, 31–32, 55; *Suda* s.v. *Kimoneia leipsana*; Phot., Hesych., s.v. *Kimoneia ereipia*; Kratin. F 160 K.–A. (= Σ *Lucian Alex.* 4, p. 181R); Ar. *Ran.* 422; cf. *IG* ii² 6630 (3rd c.) for Miltiades Ophelou Lakiades, found at Rhente between Athens and Peiraieus.

¹⁰Davies (note 1 above) 306–7.

mon's own death (450), but thought he knew approximately the date of Isodike's death and computes from that. Yet considering how carefully the Athenians concealed the personal lives of respectable women, it is hard to believe that such knowledge was available to him.

Plutarch became rather fascinated by Kimon's sexual behavior. He reverts to the subject at *Kim.* 4.5–9; 14.3–4; 15.3; 16.1; *Comp. Luc. et Cim.* 1.4, 6. But Kimon was famous for sexual appetite while alive (rumors of incest with his half-sister Elpinike may be reflected on an unpublished Kerameikos ostrakon, probably of 461, ordering "KIMΩN MIATIAΔO EΛΠΙΝΙΚΗΝ ΛΑΒΩΝ ΙΤΩ"¹¹); in comedy they continued after his death; in the first century A.D. Antipater of Thessalonike compared Kimon to Priapos (*AP* 11.224); and an Imperial-era romance recites a virtual Ephesian tale of his elaborate debauchery, with locales of Troy, the Skamander, and Epidamnos (*Ps.-Aischin., Ep.* 10).¹²

Odd, that in Melanthios, Archelaos, in ostraka, in the obscenities of comedy, from obscure Antipater, in Plutarch's gossip (and evidently Panaitios' genealogical research), including *Ps.-Aischines'* scenario of international locale, there is no further *sensu obsceno* over "Kleitor," no Arkadia or Arcadienne.

D. At *Kim.* 14.2 Plutarch says that in defending himself against Perikles' attack in 463 Kimon explained to his jury that he was not a proxenos of Thessalians or Ionians who were wealthy, but of Lakedaemonians. Meanwhile a scholiast to Aristeides (3.515 Dind.), amid a welter of misinformation, says that Kimon "took as wife Isodike. . . . And Ephoros in his first book says that Kimon paid the fifty talents [of his father Miltiades' fine], marrying a wealthy woman. And he had six sons, of whom three were named for peoples of whom he was the proxenos Lakedaemonios, Eleios, Thettalos, and three from the names of relatives Miltiades, Kimon, and Peisianax."¹³

These last three sons are unattested elsewhere but (aside from the egregious blunders of "Eleios" and "proxenies") by including the rare

¹¹ Found May, 1969; F. Willemsen's date, partly because of the Ionic script: *Lecture*, Athens 1973. On the basis of another ostrakon (c. 486?) calling Megakles Hippokratous *moixos* (Willemsen, *ibid.*), one would say that sexual behavior counted as much with voters then as now. The level of the modern water-table made stratigraphy in excavating these ostraka difficult, and dating waits upon final publication.

¹² See C. Stöcker, "Der 10. Aischines-Brief," *Mnemosyne* 33 (1980) 307–12.

¹³ Ephoros *FGrH* 70 F 64. The scholiast to Aristeides cites as source, particularly on Elpinike, "the comic poets, especially Eupolis in *Poleis*." Tzetzes, *Chil.* 1.590 has much the same confusion.

name Peisianax, a name also found in Isodike's family, credibility seems given the whole list.¹⁴ This scholiast, whose source may or may not be Ephoros, assigns all six sons to the only wife he knows, Isodike.

The knot at *Kim.* 16.1 may be cut simply by reading ΑΛΕΙΘΗΠΙ- for ΚΛΕΙΤΟΠΙ-. The initial corruption was the easy collapse of "Α" into "Κ," then the "Η" of Stesimbrotos' Ionic script into "Ο," an easy "correction." Since Plutarch paraphrases (ἐκ γυναικὸς αὐτῷ plainly is Plutarch's construction, not Stesimbrotos'), we do not know into what case Stesimbrotos initially set the word.

It has been clear since the publication in 1947 of the metrical inscription cast in the ostracism of 484 against Xanthippos (married to an "accursed" wife) reading ΑΛΕΙΤΕΡΟΝ, and confirmed in a Kerameikos ostrakon of c. 486 against Megakles Hippokratous "ΑΛΕΙΤΕΡΟΣ," that contemporaries spelled the word not ἀλιτήριος but ἀλειτηρός.¹⁵

Almost any mention of *alitērios* in fifth century Athenian political propaganda referred to the "Curse of the Goddess" levied on the *oikia* of the Alkmeonidai and their supporters in the 630's for the liquidation of the Kylonian conspirators, and never entirely evaded by them or their supporters afterwards. To go no earlier, it conveniently entangled Sparta in the expulsion of Kleisthenes and his supporters in 507/6, involving two attacks which ended badly for the Spartans (Hdt. 5.70-72). In the ostracism of c. 486 voters wanted to evict Megakles Hippokratous "*aleitēros*" (as above), one or two ostraka specifically attaching to his name "*Kyloni*";¹⁶ Thucydides devotes pages to its reprise by Sparta in 432 (1.126-28), while Aristophanes' *Eq.* 445 of 424 B.C., the last contemporary reference to these *alitērioi*, proves that the issues of

¹⁴Davies (note 1 above) 305; W. R. Connor (note 4 above) 68.

¹⁵A. Raubitschek (note 6 above [1947]) 257-62; R. Meiggs-D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford 1969) 42; generally, P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris 1983 [1968]) s.v. ἀλείτης, adding (on the etymology of *aleitērios*) R. Merkelbach, "Das Distichon über den Ostrakismos des Xanthippos," *ZPE* 4 (1969) 201-2, and L. Threatte, *The Grammar of Greek Inscriptions I* (Berlin/New York 1980) 394 who believes the Xanthippos ostrakon's *aleitēron* a "poetical variant for ἀλειτήριος"; but the unpublished Kerameikos ostrakon's spelling *aleitēros* is not part of a verse (F. Willemssen, lecture: note 11 above); cf. also Soph. *O.C.* 371, καὶ ἀλειτηροῦ (supposing a form ἀλειτηρός, and regularly emended).

¹⁶Dating remains quite uncertain (see note 11 above), but ostraka naming Megakles, Kimon, Themistokles, and Aristides may all come from the same pot; Megakles Hipp.'s name is also linked with an ostrakon for Kallias Hipponikou: lecture, F. Willemssen (note 11 above).

432 were still alive five years later. Since Kimon's wife Isodike was of the Alkmeonid *oikia*, his sons had inherited the curse.¹⁷

Perikles thus accuses not Kimon but his sons of being *alitērioi*, "accursed," through their mother's *oikia*, the Alkmeonidai. A. E. Raubitschek's epigraphic intuition must be credited with this emendation of *alitērios* at Plut. *Kim.* 16.1, left obscure and undeveloped in a footnote in 1947, and unnoticed or ignored since for a single reason.¹⁸ One logically may ask why Perikles would attack Kimon's sons for a curse on their mother's side, when Perikles bore the same curse from his own Alkmeonid mother—as Herodotos goes out of his way to emphasize (5.70; 6.131). Yet there was a time when Perikles might use his own curse as a stick with which to beat Kimon's sons for being Alkmeonid descendants also.

The only moment at which such a charge made sense was when Perikles himself was under attack as *alitērios* and his problem simultaneously was the Curse of the Goddess, Sparta, Kimon's philolakonic tradition as represented by his son Lakedaimonios, and his other sons, but principally by Kimon's weaker political heir and relative, Thoukydides Melesiou (he figures in the title of Stesimbrotos' book but in none of its fragments), who probably recently had returned from ostracism.

The date of this attack by Perikles on Lakedaimonios will have been early 432 when the Spartans and their symmarchy already had declared war but needed time to mobilize. The Spartans sent an embassy to Athens, as Thucydides says, "ordering the Athenians to drive out the curse of the goddess. . . , knowing that Perikles son of Xanthippos was attached to the curse on his mother's side and supposing that with Perikles expelled their plans would more easily succeed with the Athenians. They did not indeed so much expect him to suffer this fate as they expected the accusation to be borne against him that he was in great part the occasion of the war" (Thuc. 1.126.2–127.1; cf. 139.1; Plut. *Per.* 33.1.).

The purpose of this Spartan demand was to remind Athenians of the oligarchic/democratic contrast of 507/6: Isagoras, "Friend" of the Spartan King Kleomenes, and his 300 partisans, "his Athenian faction"

¹⁷ Her father nevertheless is difficult to place accurately on the Alkmeonid stemma: Davies (note 1 above) 377; P. J. Bicknell, "The Euryptolemos at Xenophon *Hell.* i 3.12–13," *Mnemos.* 24 (1971) 390–91, and *id.*, "Peisianax of IG i² 1022," 392–95.

¹⁸ A. Raubitschek (note 6 above) 260, n. 13; rejected by P. Bicknell (note 4 above) 90, n. 15 and L. Piccirilli (note 4 above) 281.

(Thuc. 1.126.12), against anyone not wanting oligarchy. The first Spartan attempt to evict the "accursed" resulted in Kleomenes' imprisonment on the Akropolis and evacuation, with Isagoras, under truce; Sparta then mounted her entire Peloponnesian symmarchy to subdue Athens, with help from Eretria and Boiotia (Hdt. 5.72, 74). It may have been at this moment, needing a new army and having just evicted or massacred Isagoras' 300 oligarchs, who would have made up its hoplite core, that Athens instituted Kleisthenes' democracy and the ten tribes.¹⁹ Fortunately the Spartan side of the attack collapsed through disagreement between the two kings and with Corinth. From late 506 until 499 we hear nothing of Kleomenes, as the ephors busied themselves reorganizing the Peloponnesian symmarchy and evicting his fellow king, while Athens consolidated its version of democracy: both states, then, had just engaged in constitutional revision. Bringing up the *alitērioi* in 432 therefore was more than simply an attack on Perikles, it was a reminder of Spartan tenacity in achieving her goals, of four previous Spartan attacks (Anchimolios against Hippias in 511, a failure; in 509 Kleomenes evicted Hippias; in 508 Kleomenes and a small army for Isagoras against the *alitērioi*, a failure; in 507/6 the full attack of the symmarchy, a failure).

To conjure with the Spartan propaganda of *alitērios*, Perikles only needed to remind the Spartans and his Athenian opposition that if he were to be exiled, Kimon's progeny must be exiled as *alitērioi* also. Through Isodike they had inherited the same curse from the crime of the same family. One may assume that Stesimbrotos gave the twins' names, but one need not, from the information which Plutarch transcribes from Stesimbrotos, also assume that Perikles attacked Kimon's sons for unpatriotic—"foreign"—names, or declared them non-citizens (*othneioi*). This is Plutarch's own inference built (1) on the information given by Diodoros Per., who was wrong in supplying the name "Eleios," and (2) on the ms. error in his copy of Stesimbrotos, reading "kleitor—" instead of "aleitēr—." Plutarch could scarcely guess that "the Curse of the Goddess" was at issue when his own copy of Stesimbrotos only spoke to him of an Arkadian woman.

¹⁹Date, Pollux 8.110. The military necessity for the democratic reforms, as contrasted with explanations built about "factions," was explored by P. Siewert, *Die Trittyen Attikas und die Heeresreform des Kleisthenes* (Munich 1982 = *Vestigia* 33) 157–59, preceded by H. van Effenterre, "Clisthène et les mesures de mobilisation," *REG* 89 (1970) 190–94.

By reading *aleitērios* for *kleitorias* it is possible to make clearer the events of the opening phase of the Peloponnesian War. There is no question that the Spartans told the Athenians to evict the *alitērioi*, but now we see how Perikles used that charge to demoralize the opposition by reminding Athenians that the chiefs of the philolakonian party were just as much *alitērioi* and polluted as he and his supporters (it is often overlooked that the charge of *alitērios* afflicted those associating with "the accursed" also²⁰). There also remains open the question of whether Perikles really was hostile to Lakedaimonios as Plutarch attests; we see now that, according to Stesimbrotos, he was as hostile as circumstances required.

On these points, perhaps it is best to believe Stesimbrotos' testimony. Not the best of sources, but this time consonant with what else we know of events and feelings in 432.

II. ELEIOS OR OULIOS?

A part of Stesimbrotos' entry, then, was to record an attack by Perikles on the maternal family of Kimon's sons. By deliberately adding Thessalos to the discussion, Plutarch makes it clear that Stesimbrotos mentioned Kimon's twins, and one suspects that he gave their names. But did he write "Oulios," or did he write "Eleios" and include "foreign names" as a separate, second point of Perikles' attack?

The anthroponym Olios/Oulios is rare, but given the wide latitude of meaning and pattern for Greek names, not odd or otherwise unusual. Quite aside from how the codd. treat the name, we deal with a complex of several independent roots of very different meaning: (1) εἰλέω, (2) ὄλλυμι, (3) a Karian root, and probably (4) the Thracian anthroponym "Oloros," one of Oulios' ancestors. An analogical view of life allowed the Greeks to employ these roots creatively as needed, careless of "correct" etymology.

No trouble need be caused by the fact that the name of Kimon's son is spelled Ὀλιος even in the Ionic alphabet of one of the fourth century Hekatompedon inventories attesting it (*IG* ii² 1400.66, later always Oulios): it was the man's name, that is how he spelled it. More trouble is given by the ms. tradition of Pherekydes, probably a contem-

²⁰F. Bourriot, *Recherches sur la nature du genos* (Paris 1976) 317–25, 598–99, 718–25 (Alkmeonidai), 1270–1301 (Bouzyges, "Philaidai").

porary of Kimon,²¹ which in giving the family's genealogy down to Miltiades (d. 489) spells the name of his mythical ancestor "Ολιος (son of Agenor), a reading now regularly emended to Οὔλιος. Pherekydes wrote in Ionic and should have written "Oulios," and the ms. tradition itself should have regularized into "Oulios": Pherekydes perhaps kept the Athenian spelling.

Oulios' name derives from εἰλέω and means 'curly'. He was a baby with a thick, wooly head of hair, perhaps also a stout frame. This was a physical feature of his father Kimon who was described by his associate Ion the poet as μέγας, οὔλῃ καὶ πολλῇ τριχὶ κομῶν τὴν κεφαλὴν (Plut. *Kim.* 5.3). It was customary to name a child for a relative, but many children were named for a prominent physical feature instead, sparing no part of the body.²²

The word ὄλος (Att.), Ion. οὔλος, in its primary sense of 'entire', 'intact', *solidus*, probably was also understood in the name Oulios, perhaps with the same etymology as 'curly' or 'wooly'. As such it might mean 'compact of body', a feature of Kimon also to be inferred from Ion's description. One may compare the salutation οὔλε καὶ μέγα χαῖρε (*Od.* 24.402), the word οὐλή ('cicatrice, healed wound') and the insistence of the ancients that the theonyms "Oulios," "Oulia" derive from a word meaning 'to heal' rather than from *ollumi*, 'destroy'. Or rather, if the theonym is derived from Karian, it may have been etymologized thus by analogy with Greek *oulos*.²³

Yet Aristophanes at *Eq.* 407 puns on the name of Kimon's son, showing its usefully vague meaning. At 407 the codd. call him Ἰουλίου . . . γέροντα πυροπλήτην, "Ioulios the old grain-procurer." This ought not to be routed as a Roman-age ms. corruption from "Julius" and replaced by Οὔλιον *vel. sim.* (cf. Raubitschek, Bothe, Coulon, Sommerstein), because ὁ λουλός was a sheaf of barley, the first "shear-

²¹G. Huxley, "The Date of Pherekydes of Athens," *GRBS* 14 (1973) 137-43.

²²Other examples, F. Bechtel, *Die historischen Personennamen des Griechischen* (Halle 1917) 479-96: parts of body, tall and short, wide and thin, robust and weak.

²³Etymology, Chantraine (note 15 above) s.v. ὄλος. "To heal," Str. 14.1.6 (635); Luc. *De laps.* 6; Hesych. s.v. οὔλειοιεν; Cramer, *Anec. gr. par.* 3.211, 20; Sud. s.v. *Oulios*; Macrobian *Sat.* 1.17.21. Chantraine and others, acknowledging difficulties in etymology, would have it derive from *ollumi*, and cannot explain the contradiction in meaning: "Ainsi apparaît une contamination entre οὔλος et certaines formes de ὄλος." But Apollo is god of health, also bringer of plague: the *Suda* notes that Oulios is an epithet of Apollo as healer, "but it also means *olethrios*." Note the possibility of Karian derivation in the SE Aegean, note 27 below.

ings" of the field, associated with Demeter Ἰουλώ.²⁴ Aristophanes' joke involving "old Ioulios" concerns his being *pyropipēs*, a procurer of grain to the Prytaneion: his name is "Oulios," but it is here metrically lengthened to make a pun (cf. the name of the recently deceased poet Ion > "Aoion" = the morning star, *Pax* 835, 421 B.C.). There is a second pun: *ioulos* was the first growth of the beard, its first gleanings (Aesch. *Sept.* 534). Thus Ioulios is "Peachfuzz, the aged grain-procurer" who also became a boy-procurer, *paidopipēs*, disgraceful at his age.²⁵ The name Oulios seems uncomfortably plastic; but Isodike's Oulios could expect still worse.

But is Oulios' name Athenian propaganda of Empire, linking Athens to Ionians (convenient, with a twin named Lakedaimonios)?²⁶ While it is true that "Apollo Oulios" often is found in Ionian setting, the cult is also Dorian; the name Ouliades is common in Ionian environs, but also in Dorian Halikarnassos. Regardless how the Greeks interpreted the word, one reason for this ubiquity may be that in the SE Aegean the root *ouli-* and its cognates sometimes are not Greek but Karian.²⁷ Therefore, as with so many hypotheses of "political propaganda" built on prosopography, once etymology and word-frequency are taken into account the "evidence" weakens considerably. Nor does the name "Oulios" seem of sufficient mythological notoriety that Ionians and Athenians immediately would recognize in it a complimentary "propaganda," as they might for "Lakedaimonios." One should not, without better evidence, suppose the name "Oulios" Athenian imperial propaganda.

For there were other nuances in "Oulios" less fortunate in Athens or Ionia. Oloros was Oulios' great-grandfather, a Thracian king and

²⁴ Athen. 618d = Page, *PMG* 849 (carm. adesp. 3), following on the topic of wool-shearings. The etymology of *ioulos* has given some trouble (for the accent, see Chantraine [note 15 above], s.v. ἰουλός; cf. Att. αἱ ὀλαί, barleycorns sprinkled on a victim's head, a rural rite (Σ Aristoph. *Eq.* 1164).

²⁵ *Paidopipēs*, an epithet for Oulios from a play of Aristophanes or Kratinos (= F 484 K.-A.) preserved by the scholiast to this line in explaining the meaning of *pyropipēs*.

²⁶ J. K. Davies (note 1 above) 306-7. G. Huxley (note 21 above) 141, with particular emphasis on "Ouliades."

²⁷ Karian: W. Haedicke, *RE* 18.2 (1942) 1998, s.v. "Ouliades." Ionian: Miletos, Delos, Str. 14.1.6; Dorian Lindos, *IG* XII.1.834. The form "Ouliades" is a normal patronymic and attests a father named Oulios; both names would appear Greek rather than Karian because "plus ou moins adaptés et grécisés . . . pourvus de suffixes grecs" (O. Masson, "Notes d'anthroponymie grecque et asianique: IIIA. Noms cariens et noms grecs à Halicarnasse," *BN* 10 [1959] 164).

non-Greek name; it was the name of the father of Oulios' relative and younger contemporary, the historian Thucydides.²⁸ It was common for a father to use the root of his own name and by some slight alteration of suffix or prefix bestow it on a son or daughter,²⁹ and whatever the meaning of the name "Oloros," "Oulios" probably is meant in a vague but satisfactory way to do it honor. Still, it is not a patriotic, Athenian name.

But another "oulios" derives from ὄλλυμι and means dread, disastrous, ruinous, destroyer, an epithet applied to Achilles and Ares.³⁰ An "Oulios" would be a formidable child even for General Kimon, but as Chantraine observes, personal names very clearly derived from *ollumi* are unknown.³¹

For a man named Oulios was always open to jokes declaring him accursed, *oulomenos*, a meaning derived from the curse ὄλοιο, ὄλοιτο.³² Isodike's son Oulios would not be amused. If the point of Perikles' attack was that his mother bore the Alkmeonid curse, word-play on his personal name Oulios was meant to drive a stake through his heart.

²⁸ See Davies (note 1 above) 233 adding the speculations of L. Piccirilli, "La prima moglie di Milziade," *Serta historica antiqua: Pubbl. dell'Istituto di Storia Antica* 15 (1986) 69–83.

²⁹ E.g., Nikeratos Nikiou *PA* 10741, Nikoptoleme Nikokleous Hekalethen *IG* ii² 6551.

³⁰ Chantraine (note 15 above), s.v. *oulos* (3).

³¹ Chantraine (note 15 above), s.v. *ollumi*.

³² E.g., Soph. *OT* 645, 1349; *Ph.* 961, 1019, 1285. The degree of efficacy of such curses seems to have depended on the religious standing of the curser; see R. Parker, *Miasma* (Oxford 1983) 191–206. There is of course a difference between the prayer creating the curse (*ara*, this specific prayer taking the form *oloio*, *oloito*), the curse itself (*agos*), the condition of being accursed (*enagēs*), the oath that might be sworn to enforce its consequences (*horkos*), and the ruin brought upon the person cursed, the *oulomenos*. For some of these terms see Aischin. 3.111–23, but imprecision is one of the strengths of religious vocabulary. Would a reminder of the curse on Kimon's sons be particularly appropriate issuing from Perikles, member of the priestly clan Bouzygai, charged with cursing? On the possibility that Perikles belonged to a priestly family named Bouzygai, itself responsible for cursing those who pass by a body without ritually burying it (*Σ* Soph. *Ant.* 256, which speaks however of a *logos* in which the mythical Bouzyes himself did the cursing, mentioning no family), see Bourriot (note 20 above) 1272–90, that the word Bouzyges denominates a religious function, not a member of a clan; and that the evidence that Perikles belonged to "le prétendu génos" is specious; see also Davies (note 1 above) 459, on Perikles' non-membership in a family named Bouzygai.

Did Stesimbrotos say, then, that Perikles attacked the names of Kimon's sons as "foreign and strange," or is this Plutarch's personal gloss on something he read and scarcely understood, because not very understandable? His manuscript of Stesimbrotos perhaps carried "Eleios," though the point seems beyond proof. Able to corrupt ALEITERI- into KLEITORI-, it might well replace OΥΑΙΟΣ (or better, if Ionian Stesimbrotos kept the Attic spelling as Pherekydes probably did, ΟΑΙΟΣ) with ΗΑΕΙΟΣ ("O" to "H" with inserted "E" for correct spelling), although Stesimbrotos seems capable of inventing such a charge as much as Diodoros Periegetes seems able to make his own mistakes. Yet it appears that according to what Stesimbrotos really wrote, Perikles attacked Kimon's sons for the curse they bore through Isodike, and that he cited Perikles' special attention not to the name "Eleios" but to "Oulios" as "accursed." It is unlikely that Stesimbrotos brought up "foreign" names because he did not also mention Kimon's son Thessalos, a name that Plutarch expressly says (*Kim.* 16.1) he is adding from Diodoros. Yet it would be a natural inference by Plutarch himself to suppose that Perikles had attacked Kimon's sons for their foreign names, for with *alitērioi* nowhere visible in his text, and misled by a woman of "Kleitorian" family, the thought of "accursed" never would occur to him.

Stesimbrotos' text, then, referred to 432 B.C. (further proved by Plutarch's context for "Kleitor" at *Per.* 29.1-3, also 432). It reported a speech in which Perikles moved from defence to attack. It was scarcely a long passage, in proportion to the trouble it has caused. Perikles merely was made to say something like, "Let the Spartans demand that Kimon's sons Oulios and Lakedaimonios be cast out also, for are they not *oulomenoi*, born of a woman of *oikia* (or *genos*) *alitērion*?" As for the seriousness with which the Athenians took the Curse of the Goddess in 432, apparently emphasized after Perikles' death by Aristophanes' reference to "τῶν ἀλιτηρίων" at *Eq.* 445, one has only to recollect that the Athenians elected the mainline Alkmeonid Megakles Megakleous as secretary to the Treasurers of the Goddess in 428/7, and ambassador c. 425.³³

³³ Megakles' posts: see Davies (note 1 above) 381.

III. SAILING TO CYPRUS

In addition to *kleitorias*, there may have been yet another mistake in the ms. of Stesimbrotos that Plutarch used. Thucydides (1.116.3) says that during the siege of Samos, Perikles, hearing that the Phoenicians were sailing against his forces, quickly sailed ἐπὶ Καύνου καὶ Καρίας. In fact this is what most authors say, adds Plutarch (*Per.* 26.1), except Stesimbrotos, who is unbelievable when he writes that Perikles set out for "Kypros." While Plutarch's condemnation now is taken as one more proof of Stesimbrotos' general unreliability, some modern ingenuity has gone into proving that Stesimbrotos nevertheless was historically accurate.³⁴ Surmise would be unnecessary if for KYΠΠΟΣ one simply assumes that Stesimbrotos wrote KAYNOS. The *ratio corruptelae* would depend rather obviously not on whether Stesimbrotos wrote in nominative or oblique case but crucially in the root KYΠP-. *Alpha* and *kappa* often look very alike in careless uncial handwriting (in Plutarch's ms. it already accounts for the confusion of ΑΛΕΙΤ- > ΚΑΕΙΤ-), and a scribe faced with a dittographic KKYNOS would drop a *kappa*, yielding KYNOS (the same reading would result if a scribe simply had dropped A). The next step is to correct the hasta on the "collapsed" N to Π, supply the missing *rho*, and thus eliminate the *lectio difficilior*. Faced with a ms. reading of KKYNOS, an Alexandrian-age transcriber of Stesimbrotos would be apt to correct to KYΠΠΟΣ rather than KAYNOS, and unapt to check the sources that Plutarch checks, who inherited this scribe's mistakes.

If Plutarch's ms. were written from dictation, the error would be due to mere carelessness of the reciter or inattention of the scribe. Yet it is easier for us to assume that Stesimbrotos wrote KAYNOS and that the word was corrupted in ms. transmission, than to assume that he wrote KYΠΠΟΣ, then to try to prove him historically accurate. Granted, Stesimbrotos was capable of having written KYΠΠΟΣ. After all, Kypros was Kimon's last campaign (Plut. *Kim.* 19.1) and an author expecting no more chronological recollection in his readers than he does in himself may once again have confused events (see Plutarch's comments at *Them.* 2.3).

³⁴E.g., Cristina Corbetta, "La fallita spedizione di Pericle a Cipro del 440-439," *RIL* 111 (1977) 156-66; very different is the reconstruction of Silvio Accame, "Stesimbrotos di Taso e la pace di Callia," *MGR* 8 (1982) 125-52.

Was Stesimbrotos a valuable source for the internal politics of Athens in the fifth century? One would much rather trust him for evidence of how the Athenian empire was regarded by its subjects, or a certain class of its subjects, Thasians of oligarchical opinion. To that degree one must agree with Meigg's judgment of *On Themistokles, Thoukyides and Perikles*, that "very little of this survives, and that little may give an unfair impression of Stesimbrotos' work. . . . Our loss may be serious."³⁵ In addition to our present loss, it seems that Plutarch was reading a ms. defective at several points. And if letters were dropped or altered, why not whole lines and passages?

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³⁵R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 15.

PLUTARCH AND JUSTIN ON ARISTOTIMUS OF ELIS

The tyranny of Aristotimus in the Peloponnesian city of Elis in 272 B.C. is in the ancient sources a paradigm of cruelty and bad government. Our knowledge of this tyrant is essentially based on a long, dramatic account in Plutarch's *Mulierum virtutes* 15; the only other references are some lines in Justin's Epitome of Trogus and a pair of brief allusions by Pausanias in his description of the region.¹ Therefore all our facts, few as they are, come mainly from Plutarch's novelesque report, possibly laced with fictive elements and tending to exaggerate certain stereotypes such as the enormous cruelty of the tyrant or the heroism of women, the true aim of Plutarch's story. Very probably the primary source for both Plutarch and Trogus was Phylarchus, particularly in view of the basic similarities between both texts, a certain implied anti-Macedonianism since Aristotimus ruled with Macedonian support, and the obvious traces of Phylarchus' historical method, such as the dramatic tone used in the pathetic description of the death of the tyrant's daughters or the presence in the narrative of prodigies, including a dream and an omen that prove decisive in the developing events.² All Plutarch's interest is focused on the heroic role of the Elean women, particularly the two protagonists, Micca and Megisto. He describes the brutality of the regime Aristotimus imposed on the Eleans with the consent of the Macedonian king, Antigonos Gonatas, and the practical support of a troop of barbarian mercenaries, responsible for every kind of insolence and offence against the citizens.

Plutarch begins by relating the death of young Micca at the hands of one of these mercenaries, by name Leukios, whose fancy was taken by the girl and who killed her because she would not accept his attentions. Next he mentions the massive exile of citizens and details the trick played on their wives by the tyrant. Although Aristotimus had publicly proclaimed the women free to leave the city with all their be-

¹ Plut., *Mul. virt.* 15 (Mor. 250F–253F); Justin 26.1.4–10; Paus. 5.1, 6.14.11.

² P. A. Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods: An Analysis of the Mulierum Virtutes* (Cambridge 1965) 86–89 and 128–29 (with earlier bibliography); H. D. Richter, *Untersuchungen zur hellenistischen Historiographie* (Frankfurt 1987) 125–26. On Phylarchus' historical method see E. Gabba, "Studi su Filarco: Le biografie plutarchee di Agide e di Cleomene," *Athenaeum* 35 (1957) 3–55 and 193–239; G. Marasco, *Commento alle biografie plutarchee di Agide e di Cleomene* (Rome 1981) 24–42.

longings, they were stopped at the city gates, stripped of all their goods, and finally imprisoned. From then on, unrest caused by this cruel behavior of the tyrant spread among the Eleans. First, a group of women consecrated to Dionysus, apparently forming a *Thyiad*,³ protested, but the tyrant scorned them. Immediately plots to depose Aristotimus began to be woven. At the head of these was a certain Hellanicus, an older man who according to Plutarch was above suspicion since he had already lost his two sons, possibly as the result of the tyrant's repression. Thus he had no way to carry out his revenge. At the same time, the exiles, assisted by the Aetolians, began a movement from the outside to regain their native land. Alarmed by these circumstances, in particular the external menace, Aristotimus tried to bully the exiles' captive womenfolk into writing their husbands and asking them to cease activities against him. Next follows the description of the heroic refusal of the women, led in this by Megisto. Aristotimus' irate reaction was only checked by the moderation of Cylon, one of his collaborators who was apparently playing a double game, since he was also in collusion with the conspirators. The two omens referred to earlier now take place: the appearance of an eagle to the tyrant and the dream of Hellanicus, whose own dead son goads him to act against Aristotimus. Finally, faced with the tyrant's confidence in the imminent arrival of Macedonian reinforcements, the conspirators decide to act and kill Aristotimus while he is walking in the agora without his bodyguard. They call the rest of the citizens to "Freedom" and this is followed by the moving death scene of Aristotimus' daughters. Hounded by the crowd, they are, however, allowed at Megisto's request to take their own lives.

Justin's *Epitome* adds little to this narrative except for suggesting the strategy used by Hellanicus to move the conspirators to take decisive action. Fearing their faint-heartedness, he warns the tyrant of a conspiracy hatching among his associates and thereby precipitates the action of the irresolute to take the decisive step: *incipiti periculo circumventi* (26.1.10). From all these elements it is not easy to ascertain the specific character adopted by the regime imposed by Aristotimus, nor the forces, if any, that supported him within the city, unless we accept the rather stereotyped, and therefore doubtful, picture given us by Plutarch.⁴ Our doubts about the historical reliability of the foregoing

³ Stadter (note 2 above) 85, 191n.

⁴ On the *topos* of the tyrant see C. Mossé, *La tyrannie dans la Grèce antique* (Paris 1969) 133–45, and D. Asheri, "Tyrannie et mariage forcé: Essai d'histoire sociale grecque," *Annales E.S.C.* 32.1 (1977) 21–48.

tale are increased if we take account of some significant clues in the text.

The rebellion against the tyrant presents all the appearance of an aristocratic conspiracy, plotted and hatched in aristocratic circles. Only at the end was it possibly shared in by the general population of Elis, and then only after the *fait accompli* of Aristotimus' death. The measures initially taken by the tyrant seem to have been directed exclusively against the local aristocracy. This is indicated by the number of exiles, the goods robbed from their womenfolk in the thwarted departure from the city, and lastly in the testimony of Justin, who expressly mentions (26.1.5) that the victims were *ex primoribus*. This also seems to be the status of Hellanicus, whom Justin calls *eorum princeps*, a man with apparently a certain charisma among the Eleans.⁵ There does not appear to be much room for doubt as to the aristocratic status of Micca, the first woman Plutarch mentions. Putting aside the moral qualities that may be implicit in the Greek terms *gennaia* and *megalophrōn*, with which she is adorned by Plutarch, the apparent position of her father, explicitly named, and her own inclusion at the beginning of the story, followed by the bare mention of the other victims and exiles, fit in with the summary by Justin and constitute significant support for her nobility. Moreover, Plutarch cites the number of eight hundred exiles and further on that of over six hundred women who remained behind in the city, numbers which would correspond more with a good part of the ruling classes than with a massive exile of the population. The city of Elis, in fact, possessed a flourishing aristocracy, as is revealed by frequent victories in the Olympic Games, where they lead the overall victory count throughout the fourth and third centuries B.C.⁶ We also know from Pausanias (6.26.6) that Elean territory was rich and productive, and that the city itself contained important buildings, among them a sanctuary of Athena housing a chryselephantine statue (6.25.1). Elis had a glorious past and was mentioned by Homer as one of the four or five most important cities of the Epeans, and as such is named by Justin *Epiorum urbs*, perhaps a reflection of the existing awareness and pride of its ancient lineage among its aristocracy. The territory was densely populated, as has been proven by modern archaeological findings, with

⁵ Justin 26.1.8. On the necessary reservations as to the precise meaning of the term, see J. Briscoe, "Rome and the Class Struggle in the Greek States, 200–146 B.C.," *Past and Present* 36 (1967) 6, 17n. and P. S. Derow, rev. in *Phoenix* 26 (1972) 305–11.

⁶N. B. Crowther, "Elis and the Games," *L'Antiquité classique* 57 (1988) 301–10.

a continuous and intense long-term occupation.⁷ In view of these facts, the idea that those eight hundred exiles might belong entirely to the local ruling class is not preposterous.

The whole process of the conspiracy itself has all the airs of an aristocratic plot. Plutarch (252D) even uses the specific term for this kind of attempt, *synōmosia*, and there is no doubt as to the words used in this respect by Justin: *contractos domum fidissimos amicorum in vindictam patriae hortatur* (26.1.9). Everything takes place on a reduced scale, practically in Hellanicus' house—*arcessitis servis iubet osserari fores* (26.1.9)—and in connection with close associates of Aristotimus himself—*coniuratos apud se*—a circumstance that describes at least two of the assassins of the tyrant, Cylon, already mentioned, and a certain Thrasybulus.⁸

The first clear manifestation of discontent comes from a religious group whose members surely belonged to the aristocracy, which had always retained this kind of religious tradition and more especially in a place with such aristocratic resonances.⁹ Just their presence inspired respect, even from Aristotimus' barbarian mercenaries, and as a group they were fined two talents for their impertinence (Plut. 251F), a sum befitting their high status. The movement of female reaction was headed by Megisto, whose leading position is explained by the importance of her husband, Timoleon, who apparently belonged to the ruling elite of the city, as Plutarch explicitly mentions (252B). In fact, it seems as though the imprisoned women formed a group apart which, even at the moment of their liberation, attends the triumphal reception of the conspirators as a special body. The crowd remained in the background and only at the end, at the moment of special brutality that must be checked by the moderation and magnanimity of Megisto—another significant gap with the multitude—does the crowd participate in some way.¹⁰ Un-

⁷Polybius 4.73.7: "The country of the Eleans was, in fact, very populated and surpassed the rest of the Peloponnesus in the number of slaves and material goods." See N. Yalouris, s.v. "Elis" in *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites*, ed. R. Stillwell (Princeton 1976) 299–300.

⁸Cylon was one of the associates of the tyrant according to Plut., *Mor.* 252D; Thrasybulus may have been the soothsayer whom Aristotimus consulted, see Stadter (note 2 above) 85, 192n.

⁹W. Burkert, *Greek Religion* (Oxford 1985) 278–81 and J. Ferguson, *Among the Gods* (London 1989) 48–53.

¹⁰Plut., *Mor.* 253C. Cf. W. W. Tarn's comment, *Antigonos Gonatas* (Oxford 1913) 188: "But the populace of Elis gave a signal illustration of how a democracy can vie even with the worst of tyrants."

til the tyrant's death, hardly any kind of discontent is cited except that caused by his brutalities, and these apparently affect only a small part of the population. It does not seem that Aristotimus was generally unpopular when he dared to walk about in the agora without his bodyguard, even if he was awaiting the arrival of reinforcements. In fact, the crowd had to be expressly convened by Hellanicus and his followers after the tyrant had been killed, as Plutarch (253B) tells us in an apparently clear narrative of events.

Given the efforts of Hellanicus to stir up the plot, going as far as telling the tyrant that he was being plotted against, and the apparent lack of precautions by the tyrant himself, walking alone about the agora, it seems very probable that internal conditions of peace and calm reigned in Elis, at least relatively. The mercenary troop does not appear to have been an insurmountable obstacle to the conspirators; no mention whatsoever is made in our sources of any kind of resistance on its part after the death of the tyrant, and the existence of the troop itself is lost in the jubilation of the final victory. This is perhaps especially noteworthy given the "heroic" character of the Plutarchean story. Moreover, there are several hints of the possible popularity of Aristotimus' regime. One is tempted to speculate that he was in the custom of imposing confiscations, since Plutarch tells us that after sacking the women's personal possessions, the barbarians took them to Aristotimus instead of dividing them up among themselves. There is also a suggestive parallel with the contemporary tyrant of Cassandrea, Apollodorus, who was also supported by a troop of mercenary barbarians and adopted revolutionary measures.¹¹ Furthermore, it is a fact that the rest of the known tyrants at that time who counted upon Macedonian support and were at the head of their respective states had unquestionable popular favor. That is the case with Aristomachus of Argos, for example, who founded a dynasty of tyrants only expelled from power by an aristocratic plot supported by the conservative Achaean Confederation. Another instance is that of Aristodemus of Megalopolis, known as the "Good" (*chrēstos*) because of the caliber of his rule.¹²

Perhaps in the beginning this was also the condition and true cir-

¹¹ Stadter (note 2 above) 89 notes this parallelism. On the tyranny of Apollodorus see H. Breve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen* (Munich 1967), II, 391-92 and F. J. Gómez Espelosín, *Rebeliones y conflictos internos en las ciudades del mundo helenístico* (Alcalá de Henares 1985) 31-33.

¹² Tarn (note 10 above) 280. On the tyranny in Argos see J. Mandel, "A propos d'une dynastie de tyrans à Argos (III siècle avant J.C.)," *Athenaeum* 57 (1979) 293-307.

cumstances of Aristotimus' government in Elis. He was probably an aristocrat. Justin calls him *princeps*, and the same status can be deduced from some aspects of the Plutarchian account, including the reprimand Cylon, his collaborator and then betrayer, gives him for his irate reaction to Megisto's answer, unsuitable for a person of noble rank, or the fibre shown by his daughters at the moment of their death, according at least to the tone of the Plutarchian words.¹³ Aristotimus may have come to power in the turbulent circumstances of the Peloponnesus at that time—the first quarter of the third century B.C.—as Justin explicitly mentions at the beginning of his narration: *inter hunc turbatarum provinciarum motum*. . . . He may even have been supported by a part of the ruling class. Both Cylon and Thrasybulus were originally on his side, and only the final measure taken by Hellanicus seems to have tipped the balance. To judge by the epigraphic testimonies, they seem to have enjoyed some democratic esteem afterwards.¹⁴ However, things were drastically changed by the open intervention of Aetolia, which abetted the exiles from the beginning and encouraged their attempts to reinstate themselves in the country as a way of challenging Macedonian hegemony in the Peloponnesus.¹⁵ Actions of this type must have undermined the stability of Aristotimus' regime and may have aroused his ire against the exiles' womenfolk, increasing the repression in all directions, but the sequence of events would have been a bit different from the one we can imagine from Plutarch's narrative. There would have been no sense at all to permitting the mass exit of so many women with their belongings, for instance. The harshness of the repressive actions, perhaps in an attempt to cut off at the roots any support, even moral support, for the attacking exiles may have provoked discontent in some of the tyrant's collaborators and prompted a decision to act on the part of others, like Hellanicus, who had nothing to lose.

Even at that moment the circumstances were not wholly clear, as could well be shown by the doubt and delay to which Justin refers, *cunctantibus privato periculo publicum finire et deliberandi spatium postulantibus*, and by the strategy used to set the events in motion. Dissensions and distrust arose around the tyrant, and the external pres-

¹³Justin 26.1.4: *ab Aristotimo principe*; cf. Plut., *Mor.* 252D. It is also significant that, when answering the tyrant, Megisto alludes to the possibility of persuading the attacking exiles, perhaps in the awareness that they were peers, and so to reach an agreement, Plut., *Mor.* 252C.

¹⁴Stadter (note 2 above) 85, 192n, and 87, 198n.

¹⁵Plut., *Mor.* 252A; see R. Flacelière, *Les Aitoliens à Delphes* (Paris 1937) 194.

sure precipitated the events. In the final assessment Aristotimus may perhaps have been no more than another victim of the historical circumstances in this critical moment. Everything had begun to be ruled by the exterior interest of the great powers of the time, and Elis was just one more piece on the board in the fight between Macedonia and the powerful Aetolian Confederation, trying hard to obtain the support and friendship of the Eleans.¹⁶ Only a biased tradition against tyrants selected his name among others like Phalaris or the above-mentioned Apollodorus to figure as the paradigms of cruelty and bad government in classical literature.¹⁷

Plutarch is our main source about the events in Elis, but he concentrates on certain aspects that he uses to his own ends, which are none other than emphasizing the bravery and heroism of women, including the daughters of the "abominable" tyrant himself. Plutarch enjoyed history and knew it well, but he adapted it to his moral and aesthetic goals. In stories like *Mulierum virtutes* he appears, as P. A. Stadter has written, "more as a storyteller than historian,"¹⁸ and he never hesitated to select those aspects that were more significant to the theme of his work and to concentrate all the narrative attention on them. As he himself stresses at the end of the episode (253E), "I shall write *without a set order* of acts of individual valor and as I see fit." It is probable that our attempt to correct Plutarch's narrative falls fully within the dangerous territory of mere speculation and risky hypothesis, but our principal purpose, different from that of our author, is no other than to map the most probable and historically plausible course of events behind the literary conventions and imperatives of dramatic action: an attempt, in short, to reenact history, not to recreate moral portraits.

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¹⁶On the confusing circumstances of the moment see G. Marasco, *Sparta agli inizi dell' età ellenistica: Il regno di Areo I (309/8–265–4 A.C.)* (Firenze 1980) 63–90 and E. Will, *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique*, (2nd ed. Nancy 1979) I, 216–19. On the later importance of Elis in her relations with Aetolia see also Gómez Espelosín, "Estrategia política y supervivencia: Consideraciones para una valoración histórica del fenómeno etolio en el siglo III A.C.," *Polis* 1 (1989) 63–80, and for the Macedonian side, N. S. Depastas, "L'imperialisme du roi Philippe V et les Eliens (220–205 av. J.C.)," *EHM* 4 (1984–86) 81–129.

¹⁷Sen., *De ira* 2.5.1; *De benef.* 7.19.7; Dio Chrys. 2.76; Plut., *Mor.* 555B. On this topic see Breve (note 11 above) 391.

¹⁸Stadter (note 2 above) 138.

WILAMOWITZ TO MAX POHLENZ ON EDUARD SCHWARTZ

Max Pohlenz (1872–1962), author of numerous studies in the intellectual and cultural history of Greece, and arguably the most influential teacher of classics at Göttingen 1906–*ca.* 1960, is forgotten today. In the book-length history, “Die Klassische Altertumswissenschaft an der Georg-August-Universität” published in 1989 to celebrate the 250th jubilee of the University, C. J. Classen allows him a relative clause.¹ “Max Pohlenz . . . der seinerseits (seit 1906 a.o. Professor, 1906–1937 o. Professor) eine große Zahl von Lehramtskandidaten [= Studenten] und ein umfangreiches wissenschaftliches Werk schuf, u. a. eine Darstellung der stoischen Philosophie.” A loyal student has assembled his selected *Kleine Schriften*² with portrait and a brief biographical introduction. Kurt Person has contributed a welcome bibliography of 237 items.³

Pohlenz is in good company. His teacher at Göttingen, the greatest classical scholar who ever taught there and the leading Hellenist of modern times, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1848–1931), is denied a chapter in the same history of Göttingen classics. The deservedly forgotten Wilhelm Meyer, an embarrassment to Althoff, Mommsen, and Wilamowitz, contrarily has his chapter. The unexpected reason given for the omission of Wilamowitz is the breadth of his achievement!⁴ One might compare a history of physics at Berlin without a chapter on Einstein; of psychoanalysis at Vienna without Freud. Pohlenz’ writings on Wilamowitz are known.⁵ He has himself attested a correspondence with his teacher: “‘Sie wissen, ich bin meiner Religion nach Platoniker’

¹ *Göttinger Universitätsschriften Serie A: Schriften 14: Die Klassische Altertumswissenschaft an der Georg-August-Universität Göttingen: Eine Ringvorlesung zu ihrer Geschichte*, ed. Carl Joachim Classen (Göttingen 1989) 238. There is a bit more at Cornelia Wegeler, *Die Universität Göttingen unter dem Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Heinrich Becker, Hans-Joachim Dahms and Cornelia Wegeler (Munich 1987) 252. For this latter book see the review by Alessandra Bertini Malgarini, *La Cultura* 27 (1989) 177–86.

² Max Pohlenz, *Kleine Schriften*, ed. Heinrich Dörrie, 2 vols. (Hildesheim 1965); see earlier Heinrich Dörrie, “Max Pohlenz,” *Gnomon* 34 (1962) 634–36.

³ Kurt Person (note 2 above) xiii–xxxi.

⁴ C. J. Classen (note 1 above) 237.

⁵ I note especially Max Pohlenz, “Ulrich v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf,” *NGG Geschäftliche Mitteilungen 1931/32* (1932) 74–85. Regrettably this essay is omitted from Pohlenz’ *Kleine Schriften*.

schrieb er mir einmal."⁶ No letters of Pohlenz to Wilamowitz survive in the Göttingen *Nachlaß*. They have shared the fate of those after the letter N.⁷ No letters of Wilamowitz to Pohlenz had been known to have survived. This situation has now changed. On 29 October 1989 Professor Dr. Manfred Lossau (Klassische Philologie, Universität Trier) informed Calder *per litt.* that he had discovered in a book of the Bibliotheca Pohlenziana a letter of Wilamowitz. He generously presented the letter to Calder on 3 December 1989.⁸ The evidence that the letter is addressed to Pohlenz is 1) its provenance and 2) the reference "in Ihren Tusculanen." That Pohlenz had placed the letter in one of his books (Schwartz's *Thukydides*?) suggests that he did not preserve his correspondence systematically. This would account for the lack of a *Nachlaß*.

The letter deserves publication for two reasons. We have for the first time a document by Wilamowitz illustrating his nearness to Pohlenz. Ernst Vogt in his fundamental study "Wilamowitz und die Auseinandersetzung seiner Schüler mit ihm" could only list Pohlenz as one of the six great students of Wilamowitz during the Greifswald and Göttingen periods.⁹ The candor and trust with which he expresses an opinion that could be damaging if made public are the best proof of the teacher's regard for his student. Further we have for the first time a criticism of Eduard Schwartz by Wilamowitz. Schwartz must have sent Wilamowitz a copy of his *Thukydides* in 1919 and Wilamowitz would have responded after reading the book. But this letter is lost.¹⁰ A text with commentary of the new document follows.

⁶Pohlenz (note 5 above) 8. Compare his admission on his sixtieth birthday to Eduard Norden "Fidem profiteor Platoniam": see Eduard Norden, *Kleine Schriften zum Klassischen Altertum*, ed. Bernhard Kytzler (Berlin 1966) 668.

⁷They were burned in the winter 1945/46 in Berlin: see Schwester Hildegard von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff *apud* "Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Selected Correspondence 1869-1931," ed. William M. Calder, III, *Antiqua* 23 (Naples 1983) 7 = *Emerita* 48 (1980) 215.

⁸Calder has presented the letter to the Handschriften-Abteilung of the Göttingen Library where it is now part of the Wilamowitz *Nachlaß*.

⁹Ernst Vogt in William M. Calder, III, Hellmut Flasher, Theodor Lindken, *Wilamowitz nach 50 Jahren* (Darmstadt 1985) 614.

¹⁰See note 15 *infra*.

II.

3 III 19

Hochgeehrter Herr College

Das ist ja abscheulich. Mein Platon ist also nicht in Ihre Hände gekommen¹¹—Zeichen der Zeit! Was mussten Sie denken, da ich ihn angekündigt hatte und Sie Anspruch vollauf hatten. Ich will sehen, den Verlust zu ersetzen. Arnim¹² hat mir nicht darauf geschrieben: vielleicht ist er in gleichem Fall.

Schwartz Thuk.¹³ ist gewiß geistreich, und wie sollte er nicht, und er ist als ἐνστατικός¹⁴ höchst verdienstlich. Aber wo ich die Conjecturen geprüft habe, waren sie falsch,¹⁵ und Sie sagen mit recht, auch dieser Editor ist so unmöglich wie seine Homerflickschuster.¹⁶ Zwei

¹¹ Clearly Wilamowitz had instructed Weidmann to send a review copy of *Platon*, 2 vols. (Berlin 1919) to Pohlenz, who indeed reviewed the book at *GGA* 183 (1921) 1–30 = Max Pohlenz, *Kleine Schriften* I, ed. Heinrich Dörrie (Hildesheim 1965) 559–88. Although not published until 1921, Pohlenz notes (588): “Diese Besprechung wurde im Sommer 1919 der Redaktion eingereicht.”

¹² Wilamowitz’ doctoral student, Hans von Arnim, reviewed *Platon* twice: see *DLZ* 41 (1920) 38–42 and *Intern. Monatsschrift* (1920) 1–30.

¹³ Eduard Schwartz, *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides* (Berlin 1919). For the reception of this famous book by those most entitled to judge see Calder–Fowler, eds., “The preserved letters of Ulrich von Wilamowitz–Moellendorf to Eduard Schwartz,” *SBAW* 1986, 1 (München 1986) 9, n. 13.

¹⁴ Sc. “addicted to controversy” (*LSJ* s.v., III), with surely a reference to οἱ ἐνστατικοί “the grammarians who started difficulties in Homer” (see K. Lehrs, *De Aristarchi Studiis Homericis*³ [Leipzig 1882] 197–221, a book long known to Wilamowitz).

¹⁵ Schwartz had certainly sent a copy of his book to Wilamowitz, whose letter of thanks has been lost: see Calder–Fowler (note 13 above) 19, n. 65 and 107–8. His remarks here are the more valuable as well because addressed to a third person. *Conjecturen* mean hypotheses.

¹⁶ *Homerflickschuster* recalls Goethe’s *Homer wieder Homer* (*Goethes Werke* I.III [Weimar 1890] 159):

Scharfsinnig habt ihr, wie ihr seid,
Von aller Verehrung uns befreit,
Und wir bekannten überfrei
Dass Ilias nur ein Flickwerk sei.

The poem was well known to Wilamowitz: see William M. Calder, III, “‘Ein Übles Flickwerk,’” *CP* 64 (1969) 35–36 and for the background Joachim Wohlleben, “Goethe and the Homeric Question,” *Germanic Review* 42 (1967) 251–75. Wilamowitz presumably has

Probleme sind: die Chronologie von I und das athen. spartanische Bündnis. Für das zweite gibt Schw. eine *mögliche* Lösung.¹⁷ Für I ist die Behandlung der Reden für mich noch nicht befriedigend.¹⁸

Leos Metrik¹⁹ wird doch *nur* für enge Kreise möglich sein: da ist noch Chaos, und jeder Tag bringt neue Versuche, wie Heinze,²⁰ Fränkel²¹ und das was hinter meinem Kerkidas²² auch liegt. Ob ich's noch auspreche? Von Berlin hört man Kanonenschüsse. Wir sind auf das Äusserste gefasst.²³

Zur Entspannung habe ich in Ihren Tusculanen²⁴ gelesen; ich kannte die Überlieferung nicht. Sie zeigen, daß sie einmal nicht so monoton ist, wie meist im Latein, und ich freue mich an Ihrer Kritik.

Mit ergebensten Grüßen Ihr
UvWilamowitz.

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Schwartz' recent review of *Ilias und Homer*: see Eduard Schwartz, *Gesammelte Schriften II Zur Geschichte und Literatur der Hellenen und Römer* (Berlin 1955) 25–41, first at *DLZ* 39 (1918) 355–62, 379–86. His edition of *Iliad* would not appear until 1923; one year later came *Odyssey*.

¹⁷See Schwartz, "Das spartanisch-attische Bündnis," (note 13 above) 46–62.

¹⁸See Schwartz, "Die Reden in der spartanischen Ekklesie und auf der peloponnesischen Tagsatzung," (note 13 above) 102–16.

¹⁹Friedrich Leo, "Die beiden metrischen Systeme des Altertums," *Hermes* 24 (1889) 280–301. Wilamowitz recalls the article in his *Kerkidas* (note 12 above): see *KS* 2.153.

²⁰Richard Heinze, "Die lyrischen Verse des Horaz," *SBakadLpz phil.-hist. Kl.* Bd. 70, H. 4 (1918).

²¹Eduard Fraenkel, "Lyrische Daktylen," *RhM* 72 (1918) 161–97, 321–52 = *Kleine Beiträge zur Klassischen Philologie I* (Rome 1964) 165–233.

²²Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, "Kerkidas," *SitzPreußAkadWiss* (1918) 1138–64 = *Kleine Schriften II* (Berlin 1971) 128–59, 279–80.

²³On 3 March 1919 was the "Generalstreik" in Berlin: see Harry Graf Kessler, *Tagebücher 1918–1937*, ed. Wolfgang Pfeiffer-Belli (Frankfurt/Main 1982) 145 (*Berlin, 3. März 1919, Montag*) for an eyewitness account.

²⁴*M. Tulli Ciceronis Tusculanae disputationes*, ed. Max Pohlenz, Editio maior (Leipzig 1918).

BRIEF MENTION

HEATH ON *UNITY* AND DAITZ'S *LIVING VOICE*

Unity in Greek Poetics by Malcolm Heath (Oxford 1989) deserves a glance by most students of classical literature. It is more wide-ranging than the title indicates, discussing not only aspects of the history of literary criticism in antiquity, but commenting on texts from Homer to tragedy to Hellenistic and Latin poetry, with chapters on "Epic after Aristotle," "Dionysius and Historiography," "The Homeric Scholia," and Neoplatonism. Heath has a cause to plead, which is that efforts to see modern conceptions of unity in most classical texts are invalid, for ancient writers took a pleasure in episodic treatment and digression, which we have forgotten how to appreciate. Episodic composition, as practiced by classical writers, requires an identifiable taking-off point to link it with the narrative, but is otherwise centrifugal. The beginnings of centripetal readings, the fallacy of "thematic unity" that attempts to find subtle patterns of structure and imagery in such texts as Euripides' *Suppliants* or Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, are traced back to August Boeckh in nineteenth-century Germany, and a number of its modern practitioners, including Peter Burian, Jasper Griffin, Michael Putnam, and even myself in one (early) article are held up to scorn. Perhaps we may yet see dissertations under the direction of Professor Calder on the debt of Michael Putnam to August Boeckh.

Heath is so out of touch with modern criticism that he does not seem to realize that the real impulse for the search for thematic unity in classical texts came from Anglo-American New Criticism of the 1940s and 1950s. He either does not know, or regards as too absurd even to mention, the first generation examples of this approach, such as Robert Goheen's *The Imagery of Sophocles' Antigone* (Princeton 1948), Bernard Knox's *Oedipus at Thebes* (New Haven 1957), and Cedric Whitman's *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (Cambridge 1958). New Criticism, approaching a text as an artifact and prioritizing unity of structure, imagery, and allusion, was an exciting stance at the time that seemed to offer new things to say about major texts and new ways to teach them that students could practice. The effort still goes on, as seen in numerous articles submitted to the *Journal* (though not always accepted), and now more often colored by a different understanding of the

nature of language, by more sensitivity to ideology and social forces, and by a greater awareness of the assumptions of the critic.

I know I do not very well understand how poems are written, but I don't think Heath understands it at all. He makes no allowance for the fact that artistic composition is not entirely a conscious process and for what poets themselves generally acknowledge: that they write what sounds and feels right within the codes of the language. In rereading a text, as Winkler has shown in the case of that apparently episodic work *The Golden Ass*, patterns and new meanings emerge that are in the text whether or not the writer was fully conscious of putting them there. What the modern critic does is to seek to recover a feeling for the linguistic and cultural codes at work in ancient minds.

I have had some doubts over the years about the value of my article on Isocrates' *Helen* in *TAPA* in 1958, where I approached the speech in terms of panhellenism. It remains the case, however, that Isocrates himself does introduce that theme toward the end, that it was a theme already played upon by Gorgias and other sophists, and that it was consistently in Isocrates' mind as seen in his work as a whole. That an ancient reader might have perceived this is not improbable, and that a modern reader might is almost a necessity.

Heath does not understand how texts are written and he does not understand how texts are read. The writer can be said to be engaged in a process of dialogue with the text as it is composed, in which various voices and sounds are in the background, and the reader engages in a dialogue with the text in which there are even more voices and sounds from knowledge of later texts. A "monoglottal" (Bakhtin) or "lisible" (Barthes) text, without such dialogue, is not very interesting from a literary point of view. Further, the study of classics is the study of a history of interpretation that continues the original text and gives it meaning to us. Christian study of the Old Testament is the most extreme case of the process. Heath could, however, have found some support for the centrifugal force in texts in post-structuralist theories of language, though he does not notice that; this is always more or less in conflict with the desire for control, unity, and meaning by both writers and readers. The Alexandrian critics constantly wrestled with the problem in their own terms, as do modern critics.

Readers interested in an introduction to modern literary theory might like to look at *Critical Terms for Literary Study*, edited by Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago 1990). Though not ostensibly concerned with classical studies, there are more references in

it to Plato and Aristotle than to any other critics except Jacques Derrida. The title suggests a kind of hand-list, but the book consists of readable essays on twenty-two topics of interest to contemporary theorists and critics, with suggested additional readings. It thus provides an entry into current views of "representation," "structure," "narrative," "canon," "gender," and other topics. I had not expected much of Stanley Fish on "rhetoric," but was pleasantly surprised. Heath might also take some satisfaction in the definition of "unity" offered by McLaughlin on p. 4: "a coercive reading strategy, requiring us to impose unity on texts—like Blake's *Marriage of Heaven and Hell*—that seem to be blasting to smithereens."

A totally different approach to texts is being encouraged by Stephen Daitz, who in a series of recordings entitled *The Living Voice of Greek and Latin* is now engaged in a reading of the entire *Iliad* in Greek (*The Iliad of Homer*, Part I: Books 1–6 [Guilford, CT.] 1990). It is a truism that ancient poetry was intended to be heard, and Daitz, who has considerable dramatic ability, makes that possible to a degree, though he makes it clear that he aims at the experience of hearing a rhapsode of the classical period, not an early Greek bard. The project might be compared to the "original instrument movement" in current musicology, and is open to the same objection, that it breaks the chain of continuity between past and present. As my colleague Jay Bolter remarked to me, the modern musical performer believes he can understand music because he is part of a direct chain of performance that extends back to Beethoven or Schubert, and Socrates' acquaintance Ion seems to have felt the same way.

Many of us probably regard such performances of classical texts as curiosities, of occasional classroom use, but if I understand him correctly Daitz is making a more general claim: that he is in some way recovering "meaning" based on his extensive scholarship of how Homeric texts were actually uttered in antiquity, and that something important is learned from listening to them that cannot be apprehended in any other way. Again, the experience might bring some comfort to Heath, for the result is not thematic unity; at best, the mind of the hearer is swept along by the movement of the text, without an opportunity to reflect. Given a link to the narrative, and an initial motivation whether in thought or sound, episodic treatment creates no intellectual problem. This, of course, was one of the things Plato objected to in rhapsody.

Since Plato and Aristotle, it does not seem to me possible for many of us to be thoroughly satisfied with "interpretation" of texts that

does not intellectualize the process. There is, perhaps, some merit in being reminded that this was not the original experience of the Greeks. Unfortunately, for most audiences it will not be possible to understand Daitz's renditions without following the printed text or translation, which he provides. Thus the experience will often still be fundamentally one of visual reading. For a Greek audience, at least until the fourth century B.C., the opposite was true, but some readers even then had begun to reread and question texts, and to lay the ground for the later commentaries we have inherited.

The not too gentle reader might reasonably see in this Brief Mention an ambiguity or inconsistency of reaction on my part: desire for unity and closure, frustrated by the centripetal effects of language and dialogue, especially in performance. That, however, is the way things are.

G. A. K.

BOOK REVIEWS

ALFRED HEUBECK, STEPHANIE WEST, and J. B. HAINSWORTH. *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey*, Vol. I: Introduction and Books I–VIII. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988. Pp. x + 398. \$86.00.

ALFRED HEUBECK and ARIE HOEKSTRA. *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey*, Vol. II: Books IX–XVI. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989. Pp. 300. \$85.00.

Oxford University Press has performed a great service in issuing an English version of the *Odyssey* commentary first published in Italian by Mondadori in 1981–1987. The first two volumes, containing Books 1–16, dispense with the Greek text and facing translation; divergences from Allen's text are discussed in the notes. The original project was undertaken as an international effort by six different scholars from six countries. In the event, Douglas Young had to be replaced by Stephanie West, and Heubeck completed the work of Fernández-Galiano. Since a good number of the contributions were originally in English, it is good to have the *ipsissima verba*.

Let it be said at the outset that this work will be the standard commentary on the *Odyssey* for years to come; it offers thorough and helpful discussions of grammatical, dialectal, and metrical problems as well as up-to-date information on etymology and all aspects of Homeric *Realien*: archeology, geography, and religious and domestic practices. The contributions of West and Hainsworth have been revised to include scholarship that has appeared subsequent to the Italian edition. While there is some cross-referencing, especially in the first volume, uniformity of approach and format has not been imposed. In fact, the editors, whose contributions to Homeric studies are well-known, represent a wide range of positions on fundamental issues as emerges from their introductory essays, which in turn reveal the general principles underlying their respective commentaries.

In the General Introduction, Heubeck succinctly treats the main coordinates of the Homeric Question as they bear on the *Odyssey* (Vol. I, 3–23). Heubeck marks out his own position, which can be characterized as a conservative Continental unitarianism, while balancing it with references to alternative approaches. Thus, in summarizing the analyst-unitarian debate, he declares himself “fully committed” to the latter view. For him, both *Iliad* and *Odyssey* betray few signs of the free improvisation that Heubeck postulates as the hallmark of oral composition; rather, the poems are characterized by a “harmonious and balanced structure, in which each episode and scene has its proper place, in which nothing can change places and nothing can be added or left out.” Accordingly, both poems were composed with the aid of writing, whose adoption Heubeck dates to the beginning of the eighth century. Heubeck does not

take into account the work of Ruth Finnegan and others who offer alternatives to Parry's Yugoslav analogy with examples of oral poetry characterized by a high degree of premeditation and planning.

In his essay on "The Epic Dialect" (Vol. I, 24-32), Hainsworth offers an admirably compressed and lucid survey, both synchronic and diachronic, of the epic *Kunstsprache* and warns against editorial attempts to regularize the resulting amalgam. He then turns to the question of composition where, following the Anglo-Saxon tradition, he postulates a fluid period of oral composition (*aoidē*) followed by a period of rhapsodic transmission that was only fixed into a written text (presumably via dictation) in sixth century Athens by the organizers of Homeric recitations at the Panathenaea.

West's piece on the "Transmission of the Text" (Vol. I, 33-48) "is intended to alert the reader to the critical phases and major hazards in the *Odyssey's* transmission." Like Heubeck, she believes that the length and careful structuring of the Homeric poems indicate written composition but that the text continued to fluctuate until the Peisistratean recension, which "must be regarded as the archetype of all our Homeric MSS." The Peisistratean recension has made a striking comeback of late, despite Davison's exhaustive examination of the evidence some 35 years ago (*TAPA* 1955). And one can understand why: for those, like Hainsworth, who insist on the continuity of the oral tradition into the historical period, the Panathenaic rule seems to offer the first available and clearly datable moment for the fixation of the text. Heubeck, of course, has no need for it. West's hypothesis gives some weight to the elusive evidence for an Athenian edition without saddling the Peisistratids with the burden of producing the first written text of Homer.

West goes on to provide a clear exposition of the subsequent transmission of the text, and offers an assessment of the principles and methods of the great Alexandrian scholars (where she gives rather more weight than usual to the activity of Zenodotus) and the establishment of the vulgate sometime after 150 B.C. through the book trade. Hoekstra's Introduction to Books 13-16 (Vol. II, 147-60) in fact constitutes an essay on the origins and development of the epic dialect, focusing on its pre-history and thus complementing Hainsworth's piece. Although he notes that the old techniques required by improvising oral poets are modified in Homer and exploited for stylistic effects, Hoekstra says nothing explicitly about the role of writing.

In her workmanlike Introduction to the first four books (Vol. I, 51-66), West surveys the main problems and controversies of the Telemachy, including Penelope's status, the role of Athena, the integration of the *nostoi* traditions, and the poet's knowledge of Ithacan and Mediterranean geography. She cautiously states her belief that the Telemachy was originally an independent narrative, but I have always found it hard to conceive of Telemachus as a hero of his own epic. What would its climax have been?—unless, of course, he were to kill his father by mistake along the lines of the belated *Telegony*.

While West rejects the notion of the Telemachy as a *Bildungsroman*, she

tends to underestimate its political aspects. Thus, at 1.386–87, she claims that “the political implications of the hero’s return are hardly regarded” at the very moment that the first speech by a suitor deals with the kingship in Ithaca. Similarly, she asserts at 2.26–27: “the fact that no assembly has been held for nearly twenty years indicates that the poet regarded the institution as peripheral to the political organization of Ithaca”; and at 2.44 Telemachus’ denial of the public nature of his troubles “well illustrates the *Odyssey*’s tendency to minimize the political implications of the situation.” But the political ramifications for the whole community are well brought out in Mentor’s speech (2.229–41), while the political significance of Telemachus’ journey emerges from Noemon’s speech (4.649–56) and the suitors’ reactions.

After a brief introduction to each book, West launches into the commentary proper, discussing, where necessary, chunks of text (e.g., the proem) before taking up matters of detail. Admirably clear and helpful are West’s notes on typical welcoming scenes and *xenia* (1.113ff.), the location of Pylos (3.4ff.), Homeric fishing (4.368); and she shows good sense in handling the problems of the speech of Athena–Mentes (1.269ff.). She is sometimes disappointing on certain important Homeric terms, for instance on *ἱερός* (1.2), *φίλος* (1.60, 123–24); we find nothing on *ἰσόθεος φῶς* (1.324) nor on *λαός* (2.41). West glosses the *κλέος* Athena intends to confer upon Telemachus (1.95) by saying he “will be praised for his exertions”; and Penelope’s *κλέος* at 2.125 receives no comment. *μῶμος* (2.86) is rendered as “trivial fault-finding, niggling criticism, malicious gossip”; and *ψεύδομαι* is misinterpreted at 4.140 and *ἐτήτυμος* at 3.241.

Given West’s interests and expertise, it is not surprising to discover a certain “textual” orientation to her comments; moreover, she tends to give more credence than her fellow commentators to Alexandrian athetesis, although she admits that a certain degree of “imprecision is a common enough feature of oral style” (4.458). For example, she detects a “slight distraction” in the athetized lines 2.19–20. But this rare authorial intervention describing the sons of Aegyptius makes clear how Odysseus’ prolonged absence has fragmented the whole of Ithacan society: while two sons continue about their business, one was eaten by the Cyclops, and another has joined the suitors. On similar grounds, West wrongly suspects 1.238 (cf. 4.490; 15.368), which may simply mean that Odysseus died among friends—not necessarily kin—on his way home. (At 4.490, *φίλων ἐν χερσίν* surely does not allude to “murder at the hands of one’s kin.”) West is also “inclined to follow Aristarchus in suspecting interpolation” at Telemachus’ “adolescent rudeness” to Penelope at 1.356–59; and her doubts are enhanced by her suspicion of an (inappropriate) allusion to *Il.* 6.490. Yet all the passages involving this formula have a slight edge to them. Hector is responding specifically to Andromache’s tactical suggestions (6.433–39; compare his response at 6.441); Alcinoos insists that he, not Arete, is in charge of arranging Odysseus’ *pompē* (11.352–53); and at 21.352–53, Telemachus tells Penelope in no uncertain terms that she should not meddle in the bow-contest. As the context in Book 1 reveals, Telemachus is not making “the

outrageous claim that speech is not women's business," but he does insist that decisions about what kind of story-telling (*mūthos*) is permissible in his own house is his prerogative. Finally, West believes that 4.514–20 "must be an interpolation, based on a version of Agamemnon's homecoming otherwise unknown to us." One can, however, make sense of the passage as it stands. When, presumably in the wake of the storm that killed Ajax, Agamemnon was approaching Malea, he was suddenly blown ἀγροῦ ἐπ' ἐσχατιήν to the home of Aegisthus. Wherever that was, Agamemnon did not want to be there (cf. βαρέα στενάχοντα, 516). Yet, ironically, there he would have found a safe return (νόστος ἀπήμων, 519), since Aegisthus was already ensconced in Mycenae. The gods, however, who evidently had it in for Agamemnon, changed the winds again and brought him home with the inevitable consequences. Agamemnon's story offers both a parallel and a contrast to Odysseus' *nostos*. Odysseus arrives on a deserted part of Ithaca where he learns of the situation at his palace from Athena, and he proceeds ἐπ' ἐσχατιήν to Eumaeus', thereby avoiding the disastrous fate of Agamemnon.

Hainsworth's contribution offers perhaps the most attractive format with a four to five page introduction and a brief bibliography preceding each book. His commentary on Books 5–8 is molded by the conviction that the *Odyssey* was orally composed and provides a sustained analysis of the narrative structuring thought appropriate to this kind of composition. As a result, his analysis focuses on the construction of episodes by type scenes, recurrent themes and sequences, doubling, compression, elaboration, and ring-composition. Hainsworth freely admits, however, that these narrative building blocks are not static entities and that "analysis into themes, therefore, may legitimately vary from one critic to another" (Vol. I, 250).

Hainsworth, then, offers an excellent example of the thematic approach and reveals both its virtues and its limitations. Much of the wrangling of the analysts and unitarians can be dispensed with, but what is interesting are the problems that remain unresolved. In the face of the controversial second council of the gods that opens Book 5, Hainsworth reverts to the old views of Kirchhoff and Page and rejects Reinhardt's suggestion of "deliberate allusion." Elsewhere, too (for example, at 6.232–35), he denies that one can find significant or conscious repetition in the poem.

A good example of the confrontation between the new and traditional criticism is provided by Hainsworth's discussion of 5.85–96. There, it is maintained that the narrative inconsistency does not arise from interpolation (and Hainsworth locates the problem at line 86 rather than 91), but from the careless use of conventional verses and a possible "overlap between 'messenger' and 'visit' scenes." But the situation is both more complex and more interesting. Lines 5.89–90 occur only when one god visits another (cf. *Il.* 14.195–96; 18.425–26). Divinities have no need for introductions, "since they are not unknown to each other" (5.79–80); hence their etiquette differs from that of mortals, where inquiries concerning the purpose of the visit are delayed until after the meal. In another case, Hainsworth admits with the scholiast that 5.105–11 "contradict

the story," but here he cannot appeal to Homeric conventions and notes only that "Hermes speaks generally, not to say loosely."

In his introduction to Book 6, Hainsworth underlines the parallel sequence of themes in Odysseus' landing on Phaeacia and his later arrival on Ithaca. Here, the application of "a general concept" "to a particular instance" introduces "minor incongruities" in the narrative. Not all, however, would agree that the initial hostility of the Phaeacians, Athena's intervention, or Odysseus' concealment in mist are "superfluous." For these motifs, which reinforce each other, introduce a certain tension into the Phaiakis and are bound up with the question of Arete, on which Hainsworth is non-committal. Yet if there is a recurrent motif in the *Odyssey*, it involves the hero's encounters with powerful and somewhat mysterious women who have the capacity both to help and to harm him. The tensions surrounding the Phaeacian queen are not resolved until the notorious Intermezzo when she finally claims Odysseus as *her xenos* (11.338). Hainsworth's conception of Homeric composition precludes for the most part subtleties of characterization and long-range foreshadowings. Thus, for example, amid all his useful notes on the "Lay of Ares and Aphrodite," he forebears to suggest that the story might have a thematic relevance to the plot of the *Odyssey*. I am also unhappy to find a statement like "the epic has no diction to describe a person's mental state" (8.18-20), or "the trivial motivation [of the Cyclops' curse] is not untypical of primitive thought" (5.284).

In the tradition of Reinhardt and other German unitarians, Heubeck approaches Books 9-12 with a rather different set of pre-suppositions. For him, the poet's genius resides precisely in his deliberate planning, adumbrations, references both forward and backwards, linkages, and subtle developments of themes and characterizations, for example in the gradual emergence of the companions' insubordination and the development of the parallels between the companions and the suitors. The resultant complex texture of the poem allows Heubeck to appreciate Odysseus' opening remarks in Book 9 on the pleasures of the feast as a "visible sign of a stable and peacefully ordered community" in contrast to "the disorder at present prevailing in Ithaca" (9.5-11). One might contrast this observation with Hainsworth's remark that he can find no clear point to the Phaeacian *agora* that opens Book 8 (1-61). Heubeck, on the other hand, has no difficulty in discovering an "intended parallel" between 10.539-40 and 4.389-90 or intentional irony in the repetition of 4.538-41 at 10.496-99.

Believing it was the *Odyssey* poet himself who joined the hero of the *Iliad* to the adventures of 9-12, adapted perhaps from Heracles' *catabasis*, a pre-Homeric Argonautica, and folk-tales, Heubeck discerns the poet's special skill in the ordering of the adventures. The first set, from the Cicones to Laestrygonia, has the hero in command of his fleet, while the second group extends from Circe's to the complete loss of his men. But Heubeck admits that the poet fudges along the way: the Cyclops episode is only possible with a small band of men; hence "the brilliant invention of the Island of the Goats." Likewise, in Aeolia, "the poet was skillful in disguising the difficulty that the internal logic of

this story really requires it to be told by the captain of a single ship"; and the decisive Laestrygonian adventure "is narrated with surprising brevity" (Vol. II, 9). These observations immediately raise further questions. Suffice it to note that, as he tells it, Odysseus cannot possibly know what transpired in Laestrygonia.

Frequently provocative, Heubeck nevertheless skirts or softens some real difficulties. For instance, at 9.550–55, when Zeus rejects Odysseus' sacrifice, Heubeck asserts that "there is no question here of Zeus being hostile to Odysseus." Consider also his remarks on Zeus' role in the Helios episode (12.385–88): "Their [the companions'] crime was provoked by Zeus, but they themselves were wholly responsible for its perpetration; the punishment is both justified and part of Zeus' plan." Nor will all readers be convinced by Heubeck's unitarian defense of the Catalogue of Heroines and Heroes.

In accord with his assessment of the *Odyssey* poet's relation to the *Iliad*, Heubeck believes that the Circe episode, including Odysseus' encounter with Hermes, is modelled on the Book 24 of the *Iliad* (10.266–69). Even single lines are said to be based on Iliadic passages (10.514, 10.481; 12.350–51). At 12.157, Heubeck states that "the poet deliberately introduces a quotation from the *Iliad*, whose language is here out of place." But, then, what is one to make of 12.350–51, likewise "modelled on *Il.* 15.511–12"? If one concedes an allusion to Ajax's heroic resolve, does that throw into question the usual interpretation of the companions as fools and sinners who get what they deserve?

Hoekstra's contribution on Books 13–16 is for me the most disappointing. That is not to say that his coverage of historical, archeological, and geographical matters is in any way inadequate. On the contrary, some of his discussions, for example on $\kappa\omicron\rho\eta\delta\epsilon\mu\nu\alpha$ at 13.388 (although I missed a reference to Nagler's work), are magisterial; on epic diction as a historical continuum, he is indeed impressive, clearly setting out the criteria for earliness and lateness. However, on issues of narrative structure and interpretative problems, he is singularly reticent, often simply referring the reader to scholarship without providing a summary. Tellingly, only two and a half pages of his introduction are devoted to the contents of Books 13–16, and he provides no introduction to individual books. This state of affairs may be deemed all the more unfortunate since, with the possible exception of Book 13, this part of the *Odyssey* has not received the attention it deserves. The slowing down of the action, the leisurely interest in domestic details and characterization may, as Hoekstra states, "be typical of a later stage of epic narrative" (Vol. II, 149), but it may also require different strategies of interpretation and appreciation.

Hoekstra's discussions of the traditional problems in this part of the poem are quite terse and frequently non-committal. In the passage planning for the removal of the armor, he focuses on lines 16.295–98, which he rightly doubts can be an interpolation, but believes were "created at . . . a partial performance" and "preserved by accident." Yet he does not expand on the implications of that statement. His treatment of Odysseus' transformation is similar. Concerning the vexed question of the introduction of Theoclymenus, Hoekstra feels that

"the length of the digression is out of proportion" and that "the poet dwells upon genealogy for its own sake" (15.223–81). But if the Melampus story is told not once but twice and in such an elusive (and allusive) manner that it presupposes the audience's knowledge of the tale, one suspects that it may have some function in the overall economy of the poem. Here I may tentatively suggest that the climax of the story—Melampus' prophecy of the collapse of the house of Phylacus and its fulfillment (curiously not mentioned)—prefigures Theoclymenus' prophecy in Book 20 and its fulfillment in the destruction of the suitors.

At many points, Hoekstra withholds full comment. For example, on the odd *hapax*, παρατεκμήναιο (14.131), he says only that it looks like a late formation; he is silent on the remarkable "reverse" simile at 16.17–21; nor does he explain why Eumaeus should feel *aidos* in naming Odysseus (14.144). At 15.55, Hoekstra notes that several characters in Homer are apostrophized, but he mentions only Patroclus and does not direct the reader to discussions which might provide a complete list. At 16.438–44, Hoekstra delivers himself of the bombshell that the poet of the *Odyssey* was not only "familiar with the details of Achilles' μῆνις as told in the *Iliad*," but "possibly identical with its creator." However, at 14.156, in his lengthy comment on the Gates of Hades, although he cites the parallel to *Il.* 9.312, he says nothing further about it.

I must pause here a moment to say a word about the production of these volumes. They would have been handsomer and easier for the reader to use if general discussions of sections of the text had been set off typographically from detailed comments as is done in Kirk's *Iliad* commentary and M. L. West's *Theogony*. In addition the text is marred by numerous misprints, some serious enough to confuse the reader. I would estimate their frequency at about one for every 10 pages—surely not up to Oxford's usual standards. Finally, my review copy was flawed, as is the copy at the Duke University library. What has happened to quality control?

Be that as it may, let me again emphasize that the contributors are all highly conscientious in their exegesis of metrical and syntactical irregularities and dialect forms. There is a wealth of information here based on recent scholarship on all aspects of the Homeric world. We shall all be using these volumes as *Hilfsmittel* as we make our way through the poem. But a commentary, however objective, inevitably incorporates an interpretive stance that determines not only what does or does not receive comment, but also the very terms of the discussion. I have dwelt, perhaps excessively, on the divergent approaches of the editors and on the problems their respective methods raise. The very absence of a consensus on fundamental questions will doubtless stimulate further discussion. But the present work signals the emergence of a fragmenting trend, attested also by the *Iliad* commentary in progress from Cambridge. Thirty years ago Stanford produced a commentary on the *Odyssey* marked by his personality and literary convictions. Will we see such a work again?

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HERBERT BANNERT. *Formen des Wiederholens bei Homer: Beispiele für eine Poetik des Epos*. Vienna, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1988. Pp. 182. DM 50. (Wiener Studien, Beiheft 13)

Bannert has published a number of articles in the past dozen years, most importantly on Homer and mostly in *WS*; the present book is a revision of his Vienna dissertation from 1983, and he incorporates here updated versions of two of those articles (on the "bird-forms" of gods and on Patroklos' spear). Those discussions are at home here, for the book is really a collection of brief studies of a wide variety of subjects in both *Iliad* and *Odyssey* which in one way or another involve "repetitions"—Helenos and Poulydamas scenes, rebukes of Odysseus, the Funeral Games of Patroklos, the "three times . . ." motif, and others. The common thread is the author's desire to show the organizing, narrative-structure-disclosing role he believes is played by the recurrence of certain type-scenes, verses, and even individual formulas. His announced goal is to pursue a line of thought suggested by Karl Reinhardt in *Die Ilias und ihr Dichter*: "As verses and motifs are taken up and repeated, they become transformed. The goal to have in mind . . . would be a kind of catalogue and, along with it, a presentation which would make clear the *transformations* involved when the same element recurs [die Verwandlungen in der Wiederkehr des Gleichen]." But how far he has succeeded in this pursuit is open to doubt.

Opening with a general discussion of his methods and assumptions, Bannert points to predecessors who have argued that repetition of a narrative motif can help to give shape to epic narrative: Armstrong and Patzer on the Arming Motif, Reinhardt on the repeated chariot-mountings in *Iliad* XI, Schwabl (Bannert's teacher) on the theme "clothes for Odysseus" in the *Odyssey*. He shows an awareness of the work of Parry and his successors, and he accepts that repeated elements serve the practical need of describing repeated actions; but he believes they can be much more than that, that they can be a poet's way of marking important points in his story, so that a series of intentional repetitions—even far separated from one another—can form a marked chain of events (a "Geschehenslinie") which helps convey the story's structure, and also its meaning, to listeners or readers. One of the examples he offers is that of the formulaic language used for the gathering of a public assembly in *Odyssey* II and XXIV ("am Anfang und am Ende") and which also appears in the Phaiakian story in VIII ("in der Mitte des Gedichtes"). One begins to suspect that Bannert is prepared to find large-scale structural significance in the simple recurrence of formulaic language associated with a typical scene. He does not do this with every typical scene, of course, but he is ready to do so for repetitions which strike him as occurring at important moments in the story. He builds on Minton's discussion of "appeals to the Muse" in the *Iliad*, believing them to mark decisive turning-points in the story; but most of his own candidates for verbal markers of narrative structure are not at all so striking in themselves as those appeals, nor do they call attention to the narrator's voice and role as those appeals do.

So one wonders how an audience is to know just *which* verbal repetitions carry structural meaning, and what sort of meaning—other than *der Wiederkehr des Gleichen*—it is supposed to be. Bannert agrees that some repetitions are just repetitions (sometimes a cigar is just a cigar), but he wants to show us that others, the ones he has selected for study, imply the story's organization and even foreshadow coming events for an audience familiar with epic conventions. I have to confess that none of his examples seems to me convincing. He argues, for example, that the five occasions when a spear or arrow misses its intended victim and hits a charioteer instead form a significant series—culminating in XVI 608 when Hektor throws at Idomeneus and hits Koiranos—and jointly implying the incompleteness or superficial character of Hektor's success in battle. Yet three of the seven instances in the group (which extends from VIII to XVI) are cases in which Hektor himself is missed and his charioteer is struck. Another group of passages which Bannert discusses at length is that of the motif "Three times . . . , but when the fourth time . . .", and he argues that this verbal motif makes of them a structured sequence extending through the *Iliad* and linking Diomedes in V with Patroklos in XVI and Achilles in XX and XXII. The first two of these do share some striking parallels, but when Bannert finds interdependence and deliberate cross-referencing among all the occurrences of this rhetorical motif—indeed he says the repetitions make apparent the structure of the whole poem—I cannot follow him. Similarly, when he reads structural significance into the drawing of lots which precedes the first and the last of the contests in the games for Patroklos, and argues that this framing repetition refers us to the framing role of lot-drawing before the duels in III and VII (which begin and end the first day's fighting), I can only say that these cigars are just cigars: each contributes to its context in the poem, but they are simply not a significant series.

Nor are the six bird-references which accompany the arrival or departure of gods in the *Odyssey*. Bannert finds them to link the scenes in which they occur in a noticeable "Geschehenslinie" leading up to Odysseus' vengeance on the Suitors. But the partial similarities in these passages (problematic, as Bannert knows) are simply not enough to support the idea—especially since, here as elsewhere, Bannert thinks the implication of narrative structure is effected by the verbal repetitions themselves independently of any features of their contexts. And his arguments have the character of interpretive hunches which, instead of being examined (For example, why are just *these* repetitions significant? Why should we not see them as verbal reflexes of motifs individually appropriate to their contexts?) are set down as facts—and then supported by pointing to similarities which, even when real, do not establish what the author thinks they do. In place of the arguments one would like, Bannert devotes much of his text to summary of the stories of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in order to remind his readers of the separate locations of the verbal tags he groups together. Sometimes a scholar feels that he is establishing meaning by retelling the story; but only poets are allowed to do that. For example, Bannert takes four pages to paraphrase the events of Agamemnon's episodic mustering in *Iliad* IV and then

simply says that the repeated formulas and verses in this episode "become scene-typical and indicate steps in a development: beginning and end of individual sections are thus exactly indicated." This is hardly a useful conclusion; but at least in this instance he does not claim more than his evidence permits.

So, as must be clear by now, I think Bannert has not succeeded in what he set out to do. Pursuing Reinhardt's goal is in any case a dangerous mission, not only because it is the rare student of Homer who will carry conviction, as Reinhardt could, with the method of anti-Analyst critique so brilliantly pressed by Schadewaldt in his *Iliasstudien* of 1938, but also because it can involve one—as it still sometimes involves Bannert—in needless specific rejoinders to Wilamowitz. It would be more useful to explore the question implicit in Reinhardt's words when he spoke of "the *transformations* involved when an element recurs"—the question of how an audience responds to repeated elements in Homer. We need to understand more sensitively how not only formulas and verses but also repeated motifs accumulate overtones, extra significance, as they recur in differing contexts and so somehow convey increasing amounts of 'meaning' (not simply reminders of their earlier occurrences) in their resonance with new contexts. This is, of course, an old-fashioned goal of literary criticism, but it has a rather special character in Homeric studies. It is the goal pursued, for example, by Cedric Whitman in his discussion of fire-imagery in the *Iliad*, by Sheila Murnaghan in her treatment of recognition-scenes in the *Odyssey*, and by Michael Nagler in his *Spontaneity and Tradition*.

(Two minor slips I noted: p. 55 line 4: not the Achaean camp but Achilles' shelter; and p. 62 line 28: not Mentor but Medon.)

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ANTON POWELL, EDITOR. *Classical Sparta: Techniques Behind Her Success*. Foreword by Paul Cartledge. University of Oklahoma Press, 1989. Pp. xiv + 196. 1 fig. 3 tables. Cloth, no price stated. (Oklahoma Series in Classical Culture, Vol. 1)

This is a very interesting, and often original, collection of seven essays which deal with various aspects of Classical Sparta. The authors are all established scholars with credentials appropriate to contribute to such a project as this. The essays originated in seminars of the London Classical Society which the editor organized to explore this idea: "since Sparta's enduring difficulties were great, (in particular the problem posed by the helot threat, as de Ste. Croix and others have argued), and yet her success (considering her size) was extraordinary, unusual and effective procedures among the Spartans are worth looking for." Paul Cartledge, in his Foreword, identifies "two broadly distinguishable planes" on which Spartan success can be located: "the ideological and the

institutional." The concept of a volume dealing with the reasons behind Sparta's success is felicitous, and I know of no such recent collection, or single work, precisely on this topic. In fact, much recent scholarship dealing with late classical Sparta has tended to emphasize the reasons for the *failure* of Sparta; thus, such an enterprise as this is all the more welcome. The execution of the idea, however, is at times a bit flawed. The essays are rather loosely tied together, and the introductory remarks by Cartledge seem sometimes to stretch a point to establish why *these* particular pieces are included here. In fact he attributes more unity to the book than it possesses. Two additional points should be noted here. First, it is rather surprising that no essay was commissioned on the political techniques of Spartan success, i.e., the political institutions, mechanisms, and practices which characterized classical Sparta. Aspects of this question are touched on, but only incidentally, in the essays by Hooker, Parker, and Powell. Furthermore, the individual pieces are not uniform in length, and they differ in style; while most, for example, contain standard notes, Griffiths' also includes a short bibliography and refers to modern works by author's name and date of publication, within parentheses, in the text, and there is no consistency in transliteration of Greek to English (cf., e.g., Kleomenes in Griffiths, Cleomenes in Hooker). The editor should have worked to produce greater consistency and uniformity. Several essays, moreover, are rather tentative in character and either appear to be, or are admittedly, "work in progress." So much for style; now to the content of the book.

The first two essays, "Laughter in Spartan Society" by Ephraim David and "Drink, *Hybris* and the Promotion of Harmony in Sparta" by N. R. E. Fischer, share some common elements. Both attempt to address social practices which were employed to regiment society in Sparta, and they overlap in discussions of the *syssitia*. David's is quite original, interesting, and germane to the general topic of the book. He asks why the Spartans revered the goddess of Laughter. His analysis, grounded largely in Plutarch and making good use of comparative material, demonstrates that the Spartans ritualized laughter and employed it to control numerous aspects of their society. Teasing, combining friendliness and antagonism, mirrored the virtues of cooperation and competition found among the Spartan citizen class, while jesting contests were held to determine the potential of future leaders. The helots were often made drunk in order to give the spectators a sense of social solidarity vis-à-vis the objects of their derision. Bachelors and other unsocial or nonconformist Spartans were also subjected to derisive laughter, while malicious mockery could drive one's enemies to suicide, as happened to Antalcidas at the hands of Agesilaus' supporters. It is not surprising that the cult of Laughter was attributed to Sparta's mythical lawgiver, Lycurgus. Fischer's essay is more tentative and, despite its title, focuses largely on the *syssitia* and its role in promoting harmony. He explores the idea that authors of the fifth and fourth centuries support the close connection between strict control over drunkenness and hybristic behavior, and Sparta's success in avoiding social tensions, disruptions and stasis. But, at

Sparta, it is drunkenness, not drink, which is prohibited, and the Spartans committed plenty of hybristic acts, although they would not so describe their behavior, and they were not considered illegal in Sparta. Fischer finds that the official Spartan myths and memories of their leaders paid more attention to breaches of the rules of sobriety, austerity and harmony between the equals than to maltreatment by Spartan officials of other Greeks, and he is correct in this conclusion. These two studies shed important light on aspects of the social controls exercised within Sparta to maintain the equilibrium of their peculiar *politeia*.

"Was Kleomenes Mad?" by Alan Griffiths is, in some respects, the best essay of the lot, but unfortunately it relates least well to the book's main themes. Griffiths is witty and literate, but his piece would be better suited to a collection of *Herodotforschung* than to this one. It is thoughtful and insightful, but I fail to see how it advances our understanding of the reasons for Sparta's success. What he has done is to analyze the traditions (mostly from Herodotus, but also with a late account from Stephanos of Byzantium) about the later stages of the career of Cleomenes, and especially the allegation that he was "mad." He tries to investigate "the conditions in which myths, folklore, popular narratives and rumours circulate." By close examination of the tradition, and especially by comparison between Herodotus' versions of the careers of Cleomenes and Cambyses, Griffiths argues that typical anti-tyrant material has crept into the tradition recorded by Herodotus and colored it significantly.

The fourth essay, and the longest, is Stephen Hodkinson's "Inheritance, Marriage and Demography: Perspectives upon the Success and Decline of Classical Sparta." This is an important, original, but somewhat speculative piece. Hodkinson advances certain hypotheses about the nature of inheritance among Spartan women which, given the nature of our evidence, cannot be proven, and his further argument is based on them. He attempts a computer-generated analysis of population patterns which is certainly novel, and welcome as an application of recent techniques of historical analysis from other areas of history to the ancient world. His conclusion, that a significant decline in the citizen population from the late fifth century onwards resulted from economic causes and the hardening of attitude of an elite within Sparta, must remain rather tentative, intriguing though it is. His essay is well integrated into the entire collection and makes a valuable contribution to it.

In "Spartan Propaganda," J. T. Hooker examines the uses of propaganda in Sparta, and he begins by distinguishing between "state" and "non-state" varieties. The essay ranges over a wide period of time, beginning with Kings Cleomenes and Demaratus in the late sixth century, and reaching the reforms of Agis and Cleomenes in the third. Among the "non-state" types of propaganda, Hooker discusses the cases of Cleomenes, Pausanias the regent, the conspiracy of Cinadon, and the "pamphlet" of King Pausanias. He demonstrates that propaganda was often used by individuals, or competing interests, within

Sparta to advance their own ends. As for "state" propaganda (what one might call the "official" variety), he again makes a distinction between a more ephemeral type, "sustained by slogans, which emerged in respect of a particular situation and fell into disuse once the situation had changed," and another, more permanent type, which "enshrined convictions, deeply held by the regime in power and probably by the Spartiate class as a whole, about the image of Sparta which it was thought desirable to project." This latter type, of course, gave rise to what Ollier called "le mirage spartiate." Hooker argues that, despite some evidence to the contrary, Sparta was never opposed to tyranny on principle, and she did not receive universal acclaim as "the enemy of tyrants." Propaganda to this effect was ephemeral and tied to Spartan expansion in the sixth and early fifth centuries. As for more permanent elements in state propaganda, he identifies and explores three images of Sparta: as the Dorian city par excellence, entitled to the hegemony of the Peloponnesus; as the model of stable government and of institutions which guaranteed virtue in its citizens; and as the paragon of military prowess. These images constitute primal elements of the Spartan myth, and Hooker's analysis, in fact, seems almost self-evident to the scholar.

Herodotus remarked that the Spartans were a very religious people, and Robert Parker's "Spartan Religion" seeks to explore this aspect of the state. His is a good essay, contributing something which is often only alluded to or touched on rather briefly in studies of Sparta. His approach is, in part, a comparative one, using the far better known area of Athenian religion as the touchstone for measuring Spartan religious practices and attitudes. Parker reviews various cults in Sparta as well as the use of oracles and divination. His conclusion, not surprisingly, is that "the gods were at the top of the chain of command that ran down through Spartan society. Their traditional rules, about festivals and sanctuary and the like, were there to be obeyed without question; and amid life's contingencies it was constantly necessary to seek further specific instructions through divination supervised by the humans just below them in the chain of command."

Powell contributed the final essay, "Mendacity and Sparta's Use of the Visual." The idea of examining mendacity and deliberate manipulation of belief through visual techniques as a way of trying to understand the secrets of Sparta's success, as well as of understanding how other Greeks were "fooled" by Sparta, is original, and it ties in well with several of the other essays. Powell argues persuasively that the Spartans were not stupid, although some ancient authors give that impression; on the contrary, they were often very clever in their use of deceit and trickery to attain their objectives, political, military, or ideological. This piece, however, is a bit discursive, and it does not offer the reader a general conclusion.

This book makes a useful and original contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of ancient Sparta. It will be of greatest use to classical scholars,

particularly those with an interest in the subject matter, but it is not beyond the comprehension of the general reader. For all its limitations, it is a welcome addition to Greek history and historiography.

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JEAN-LOUIS FERRARY. *Philhellénisme et impérialisme: Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique*, Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome 271. Rome, 1988. Pp. xvi + 690.

This is a large and important book on a large and important topic: how, as the Romans came to dominate the Hellenistic world in the course of the second century B.C., they represented themselves to the Greeks—that is, how they wished their policies to be interpreted by a culture they realized was intellectually more advanced than their own; and how, conversely, Greek intellectuals reacted to this new situation, the domination of their world by a single great state and one that was not even Hellene. The result, as Ferrary says, was the evolution of a “dialogue” between the conquerors and the conquered, traces of which remain and rightly fascinate modern scholars. The problem of course is the correct interpretation of these traces of dialogue, in order to reconstruct the basic thrust of an ancient intellectual interaction which has largely disappeared from our view. This is Ferrary’s purpose, and he proposes significant new ideas about the central texts which survive. He thus helps the modern debate move forward (though some of his conclusions will, I think, be controversial—see below).

The period covered is from the first appearance of Roman power among the Greek states in the mid-third century down through the great crisis of 91–88, the Mithridatic War which shook Roman domination of the eastern Mediterranean to its core. Within the bounds of this crucial period Ferrary seeks to demonstrate two basic ideological trends.

First, Roman philhellenism was more than a cultural phenomenon, an attraction to Greek ideas and *paideia*; rather, it also resulted in symbolic Roman gestures, and significant Roman policies, which rendered Roman domination more acceptable to the Greeks. The emphasis on Hellenic traditions—most importantly, the dissemination of a propaganda stressing Rome as protectress of “the freedom of the Greeks”—was strongest under T. Quinctius Flamininus in 198/197–194. But the theme of “the freedom of the Greeks” persisted (with variations) for more than a century in the East as an important element in Rome’s self-portrayal—and eventually it undergirded Rome’s definitive support for the rule of local city aristocracies (“freed” from the threat of demagoguery and tyrants). Similarly, the ostentatious display by Roman *principes* of respect for Greek high culture and its human representatives had an impact in the

Hellenic world which is not to be underestimated; and the Roman desire to display benevolence and esteem could also result, as a practical matter, in the survival of great Greek cities: Syracuse (in 211), Alexandria (after Actium).

Ferrary's second trend derives directly from the sincere and somewhat effective Roman attempt to come to terms with the Greek world in this period: a comparative lack of hostility among Greek intellectuals toward Rome and Rome's domination (as far as we can tell from the surviving material). The Greeks, of course, had always been suitably impressed by great power, even that of foreigners. And they were suitably impressed by Rome's power. But it helped in creating the eventual Greco-Roman synthesis that even relatively early on, some Romans—such as Scipio Aemilianus, weeping and quoting Homer before the walls of burning Carthage—represented themselves recognizably as Hellenes—of-a-sort, and could be sincerely portrayed in that fashion. (On this, see also the cogent comments of A. Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom* [Cambridge 1975] 22–25.) It also helped that Greek intellectuals apparently felt free enough with the Romans to warn them constantly of the temptation toward *philarchia* and *pleonexia* inherent in Rome's possession of such enormous power.

Amid Ferrary's very wide-ranging and detailed discussion (a discussion, one must say, which is in general too diffuse and unstructured), there are many individual instances of excellent historical interpretation and analysis; I will only point to a few. Ferrary's summarizing portrait of Titus Flamininus (110–12) is very fine: insightful both about the man and his world. In Greece in the 190s, Flamininus eventually pursued glory not only in Roman terms (i.e., by means of military success outside the city leading to increased *auctoritas* within the senatorial aristocracy), but, more than any of his contemporaries, in Hellenistic terms as well—by seeking the sorts of honors from Greek states which they traditionally bestowed upon important benefactors. Yet to have these honors and signs of approval considered meaningful constituted in turn a crucial political resource for the smaller states, preventing them from sinking into the status of non-entities in the international arena; this was a vital element in the "tone" of traditional Hellenistic politics, which Flamininus accepted. It was ignored by men like Hannibal and even Scipio Africanus, for whom considerations of *Machtpolitik* (important enough to Flamininus) seem to have meant everything.

Equally instructive, both about individuals and broader issues, is Ferrary's section on the extent—and the limitations—of Hellenization in Roman Republican culture (517–26). Certain aspects of Hellenization deemed indispensable by modern scholars—formal Greek-style education; an interest in Greek-style (nude) athletics; in short, the physical and intellectual life of the gymnasium—were only very slowly and partially adopted in Republican Rome. Even if important Romans were prepared to recognize the intellectual superiority of Greek culture, and to accept its influence, they were not prepared to identify with Hellenism to the point of total assimilation. After all, unlike so many of the Hellenized, the Romans were not the conquered but the con-

querors; why should the conquerors deny their own identity? Thus Hellenization at Rome always meant, at best, partial Hellenization, and for a Roman to live too much *à la grecque* always made one liable to severe criticism: as Scipio Africanus and (170 years later) M. Antonius discovered. Yet there remains persistent ambiguity: from the late third century onward, the desire of many important Romans to do well in Greek eyes.

An example of how difficult but how important it can be to disentangle Roman thought from its Greek influences is Ferrary's interesting argument (363–81) that the moral justification for empire given by Cicero to Laelius in Book 3 of *De re publica* comes not from any Greek source but from Cicero himself, in a personal elaboration of previous Greek thinking on imperial expansion. This is suggested by the fact that whereas Greek theory found a moral justification for empire in "the rule of the better over the inferior," it typically relied on the argument that some peoples were suited to subjection on grounds of their lack of intelligence; but Laelius in Cicero does not argue in that fashion. Instead, the moral justification he gives for empire is founded on the fact that some peoples would invariably do injustice if they were not controlled: not lack of intelligence but sheer moral degeneracy, evil, is the basis of their subjection (cf. *De rep.* 3.36–37; *Aug. Civ. Dei.* 19.21). Thus perhaps we should see in *De re publica* an expression of a truly fundamental difference in world-view between Romans and Greeks—overlooked in our obsession with finding Greek sources for Roman thought, even about empire. (Still, one needs to consider very carefully here the existence of Diod. 27.18.2, with H. Volkmann, *Hermes* 82 [1954] 465–76.)

Other sections of the book are less successful. Ferrary's depiction of the early development of Roman policy in the East (24–95) is too orderly and legalistic. It is not likely, for instance, that the Greek towns taken into Roman *fides* during the First Illyrian War of 229–228 were from the start viewed as legally *in dicione populi Romani*: Polybius (2.11–12) certainly does not imply this, and Appian (*Illyr.* 8) clearly indicates the opposite. Similarly, it is not likely that Titus Flamininus' ultimate diplomatic goal was the establishment of Rome at the head of an informal but nevertheless functional "Hellenic Symmachy" somewhat parallel to the system around which Antigonos III Doson had organized Greece in the 220s. We have no evidence for such an extraordinarily far-reaching goal, and it is very hard to believe that Polybius or Livy would not have mentioned it. On the contrary: the Romans for a long time seem not to have constructed *any* sort of consistent or coherent policy in the East—to the frustration of some of their more fervent Greek supporters (see Polyb. 24.8–9). And to return to the *De re publica*: Ferrary also argues (351–63) that the savagely cynical interpretation of Roman imperial expansion which Cicero places in the mouth of L. Furius Philus (and to which Laelius' later moralizing interpretation is a direct response) comes from Cicero himself, not from any Greek. Yet it is hard to get around Philus' insistent declarations that what he has to say on the expansion of Rome is not his own opinion but that of Carneades, the famous master of the

Academy who had visited Rome in 155 (*De rep.* 3.8 and 9): why should Cicero have made this up? Ferrary's denial of Carneades' criticism of Rome is part of his general thesis that heavy criticism of Rome was lacking among major Greek intellectuals in the second century; but he probably goes too far here.

Finally, Polybius: as the most fully preserved Greek intellectual of the second century, and a close associate of many Romans (including Scipio Aemilianus), he naturally must take center stage in any discussion of Greek intellectual reaction to the rise of Rome. Students of Polybius will especially profit from Ferrary's examination (306–18) of the fragments of Books 30–33 of *The Histories*. Here Ferrary argues powerfully against F. W. Walbank's thesis that Polybius in 30–33 displays a "detached and cynical" attitude toward Roman international policies. Ferrary shows instead that in several important passages (31.2.1; 31.11.11; 31.21.6) Polybius clearly accused the Romans of violating justice, τὰ δίκαια. One may say that these passages serve to demonstrate the depth of Polybius' moral concern in the last ten volumes of his *Histories*—as well as his intellectual independence. Ferrary goes on to conclude that, nevertheless, Polybius' overall evaluation of Rome's policies between 168 and 150 is favorable (118). Not everyone will accept that hypothesis: E. S. Gruen, in a less detailed discussion, reached exactly the opposite conclusion (*The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, I [Berkeley/Los Angeles 1984] 346–47). But what is more important for our purposes is Ferrary's implication that Polybius in Books 30–33 was examining Rome within a framework of quite traditional Greek moral categories (on this, see also K.–E. Petzold, *Studien zur Methode des Polybios* [Munich 1969] 53–64).

Greek intellectuals, in other words, soon came to view Romans and the Roman state not as ineluctably alien but rather as familiar and human phenomena. This was a process greatly facilitated by Roman *principes* who took care to display suitable respect for Greek high culture and for Greek intellectuals; but those who wished to be viewed as Hellenes—of-a-sort were entering into a dialogue in which they would be so judged. This crucial early interaction between Roman aristocrats and Greek intellectuals stands at the origin of the eventual Greco-Roman synthesis, and it is the topic of Ferrary's wide-ranging and valuable book.

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HARTMUT ERBSE. *Thukydides—Interpretationen*. Berlin and New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1989. Pp. xiii + 191. (Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte, 33)

Patiently building its case through interpretation of problematic passages, the book contributes to an understanding of Thucydides as an historian and an

author. This approach, and the conclusion to which it leads, has been anticipated by Connor (1984), but Erbse's method is totally different and, as he takes the reader through some difficult and unfamiliar passages, a genuine reinterpretation of Thucydides emerges.

In his opening chapter, of 82 pages—the entire book, exclusive of indices, is only 183—E. takes issue with the conventional view that Book 8 is an unrevised essay, a preliminary draft with many details ill-adjusted to context. Detailed discussion of 28 passages, cited, mainly in Andrewes' final volume of the Gomme Commentary, as evidence of the unfinished nature of the book, shows them to be entirely consonant with Thucydidean style and method of composition. The apparent lack of revision, which has long impressed Thucydideans, arises, in E.'s opinion, from the diverse nature of the material: the war in Ionia, factions in Athens, the competing aims of the Spartan admirals, the duplicity of Tissaphernes, Alcibiades' promotion of various schemes. This does not lend itself to a ready synthesis, but Thucydides produces what E. calls "interpretierte Geschichte" (65), even "ein Meisterwerk," in part fully as good as the best of 1–7 (66).

The emergence of Alcibiades as the key figure in Book 8 leads to the next chapter, reprinted with some revision from a Festschrift for N. Himmelfmann-Wildschütz (Mainz 1989), on Thucydides' judgment of Alcibiades. It analyzes thoroughly his speech at Sparta (6.89–92), in light of the estimate of Pericles (2.65), and shows that Alcibiades' concept of patriotism (φιλόπολις), in its identification of personal ambitions with political interests, recalls, but is entirely different from, that of Pericles (2.60.5). In this speech and in another observation on Alcibiades (6.15.4), Thucydides suggests that his life style alienated the Athenians and caused them, fatally, to forsake his leadership. E. hints that Thucydides, consistent with his attitude to Alcibiades throughout the history, saw the ambivalence of Athens toward its brilliant young general as a significant factor in its ultimate defeat.

The third chapter, too, takes its point of departure from Alcibiades: his dealings with Tissaphernes in 8.45–46. Erbse surveys the many examples in Thucydides of Greek factions or political leaders who align themselves with non-Greeks in order to further their goals.

The final two chapters, on power and the aims of the history, are more general. Power is discussed in terms of the relation of Athens to its allies, with particular reference to ideas in the Athenian speech at Sparta in 432 (cf. 1.75–77) and in Pericles' funeral speech. A detailed discussion of 1.22, on speeches and purpose, leads to wider consideration of Thucydides' ideas (τὸ σαφές, τὸ ὠφέλιμον, etc.) in the rest of the work. In sum, this is a book for a working reader, philologically engaged, but the reward is a stimulating appreciation of Thucydides, which will have to be confronted by anyone who deals with the passages, especially in Book 8, which Erbse has seen fit to discuss.

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JOHN MATTHEWS. *The Roman Empire of Ammianus*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. Pp. xiv + 608. 8 maps. 4 figs. 1 chart. Cloth, \$55.00.

In 1975 John Matthews presented a fine analysis of the relations between emperors and their nobles (*Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court A.D. 364–425*). The book became a milestone in the scholarship on the later Roman empire. Now, fourteen years later, Matthews' second book promises to become another landmark amidst the important studies on late antiquity.

Starting in 96, perhaps where Tacitus had left off, Ammianus Marcellinus, the subject of M.'s study, embarked on an account of the history of the Roman empire down to the death of Valens in 378. At its completion, he humbly describes himself as "miles quondam et Graecus" (31.16.9). The irony of this brief phrase, as well as the courage of its author, is twofold. It defies the assumption that only men of action and of high station, like the senators Tacitus and Dio Cassius, could write an acceptable large-scale history. And it also asserts that such a project can be written in a language other than one's mother-tongue.

M. has undertaken the study of both the author and the empire which he describes in the surviving books (A.D. 353–78). This is an ambitious project which M. is well qualified to deal with. He divides his study into two main sections: first, a roughly chronological narrative of the years 353 to 378, and second, an analysis of the themes with which historians of late antiquity have been dealing for years but focused here largely on the evidence of Ammianus. These include the office of the emperor, the structure of the government, seen through the functioning of its individual officials, "enemies of Roman order" (to use MacMullen's phrase) including barbarians and outlaws, Roman social relations, cityscape and the countryside, religion and philosophy.

Appropriately, M. starts with an analysis of the process of composition (ch. 2: Ammianus and his History). The problems are evident: on what scale did Ammianus treat the history of the second and third century in the lost first thirteen books, if in the surviving eighteen he covers only twenty-five years (353–78)? Why did he start with the death of Nerva? How far did he intend to carry his narrative? How did he plan to cover the east and the west when they were ruled by different emperors? In other words, how could a unity and thematic cohesion of the work be achieved? After analysis of various factors, including Ammianus' own research, M. concludes that A. chose 337 as the opening date for a detailed narrative. This means that some forty years received close coverage, and nearly 250 years were treated as prelude. M. is right in rejecting the assumption that the period from the accession of Nerva to Constantine was covered in a separate work of comparable dimensions to that which has survived.

The last chapter of the book ("The Roman and the Greek") can be read both as a sequel to the initial analysis of the compositional structure in chapter II and as a conclusion to the whole work. It attempts to answer the most interesting questions relating to A. the historian: why, in the first place, did A. decide

to write a history? Why on this scale? And why would a Greek from Antioch write in Latin?

For M. it was the brief and tumultuous reign of Julian which explains the scale of A.'s work (p. 468). There is no doubt of the importance of Julian for Ammianus. It goes, in fact, far beyond what M. stresses in answering the question of why A. conceived of writing on an uneven scale. Indeed, the figure of Julian supplies the clue to A.'s "conversion" from a soldier into a historian. Statistics alone show that the bulk of the surviving books (15.8 to 25.5) is devoted to the six years of Julian's political career (357-63). From this central point of departure it made sense to start with Constantius II, who had been responsible for Julian's early career (and his best, *pace* M.) and to end with Valens' death on the battlefield of Hadrianople, a dramatic and fatal consequence of rash decisions, not unlike Julian's last march to war.

On a careful and repetitive reading of M.'s text and notes all the arguments outlined above may be gathered. But they are often hinted rather than stated. Indeed, one of the few weaknesses of this impressive study is that while M. hardly ever fails to ask the right question he often supplies the answers out of sequence. The reader may not only have to stay close to A.'s text (as M. himself warns at the beginning) but also to put together the numerous ideas and arguments which are dispersed throughout the book.

"*Res Gestae*," the title of Ammianus' history and of M.'s first division, is concerned with "great deeds, heroic and ingenious exploits, violent emotion and suffering" (p. 60). M.'s chapters on Constantius correctly assess A.'s far from complimentary description of this emperor as due to A.'s adoption of his patron's point of view. His patron, Ursicinus, a high army officer, had occasion to taste both the emperor's favor and displeasure, as well as to figure in several major campaigns. A.'s loyalty resulted, as M. points out, in several omissions. Even more significantly, the relations between A. and Ursicinus point to A.'s chief limitation as a historian, namely his distance from the centers of power. As a "protector" A. was not important enough to participate in decision making processes. Hence, the tendency to absorb the viewpoints presented by his sources, and the partisan account, for example, of the senatorial "persecutions" under Valentinian I.

Leaving Constantius II and before turning to Julian, M. inserts a chapter on the background of Ammianus in which he considers Antioch, A.'s family, and the first beginnings of his military career. M. places A. within a military and administrative system which, owing to the constant expansion of the imperial bureaucracy, had come to acquire a position of social prominence.

The chapters on Julian (6-8), can be read as the rise and fall of an emperor who captured the imagination of the ancients as much as he has that of later times. It seems ironic that his crucial years in Gaul (357-60) were so well recorded by a man who had left Gaul soon after Julian's arrival there. A.'s account is constantly compared with Julian's own version in his "Letter to the Athenians," with interesting results. The account of Julian's Persian expedition is

enriched, in M.'s pages, with descriptions of the geography, making use not only of reports of nineteenth-century travellers but also of contemporary Jewish sources, above all, the Babylonian Talmud. He also enlarges, correctly, on Ammianus' personal comments on an expedition which was nothing less than a "march of folly."

In between the rise and fall of Julian, M. pays homage to ancient and modern historians who have insisted on evaluating Julian in terms of his religious convictions and politics. In this, M. must rely on sources other than Ammianus. While no one will deny the influence of philosophy on the mind of the young Julian, the question remains: if a shrewd historian such as Ammianus treated religious factors as less than secondary in the formation of imperial politics, how important were they? This is far from an idle question. In fact, religious developments in the fourth century have often provided scholars with the only measure of unity for an overall account. Ammianus' history is a salutary reminder that such accounts may err in placing too great an emphasis on the role of religion in daily life at all levels of society.

Ammianus may have initially concluded his history with the usurpation of Procopius (p. 204) to which M. devotes a chapter and some penetrating remarks. Once the plan was extended, A. got perilously close to his own time, and M. is on familiar ground (*Western Aristocracies*). Here M. surveys the notorious trials at Rome and Antioch in which the issue at stake appears to have been not so much treason and adultery as the behavior of imperial officials, above all, the assumption of independent authority by unscrupulous imperial agents far from the watching eyes of the emperor in the imperial court.

The second half of M.'s study opens with discussion of the office of the emperor, in which he deals with the public image of the emperor, the imperial system, and A.'s views on the personality and the behaviour of individual emperors. M. then (ch. 12) turns to "the character of the government" as seen through imperial legislation and the atmosphere of "intimidation and violence" so evident in both the laws and A.'s account (cf. G. de Bonfils, *Ammiano Marcellino e l'imperatore* [Bari 1986]). M. is sensitive to the language of imagery and the visual effects conveyed by Ammianus. Turning to offices, M. analyzes the role of the empire's financial officers (the *rationales*) and the emperor's counsellors (the *consistorium*), evoking the daily functions of each and their relations with the population of the empire.

Not surprisingly, the bulk of the second part of M.'s "Roman Empire" is devoted to matters of war and the enemies of Rome. Recent studies of Ammianus as a military historian (p. 520, n. 1) have concluded that in spite of his army experience A. shows only a limited knowledge and understanding of warfare. This appears particularly in his descriptions of artillery. It is of some interest to note that Ammianus' description of *malleoli* (or fire darts, 23.4.14) is closely based on that given by the third-century historian Eusebius (Müller, *FHG* V 22). Yet, A.'s attention to details of topography is masterly.

The enemies of the Roman empire in the fourth century were the new

Persian empire in the east and the barbarian tribes along the northern frontiers. In his analysis of the "ethnic" digressions of A. on the Alammani, the Goths, the Huns and the Alans, M. is impressive in his use of archaeological evidence to assess A.'s breadth and accuracy. He also places each digression within a historiographical tradition of descriptions of non-Roman societies. In addition to these tribes, the Isauri and the Moors, who were a major source of internal disorder, are analysed. In spite of living in the heart of the empire in Asia Minor, the Isauri remained on the outskirts of Roman society, an object of fear and war. Their raids into "Roman" territory can be largely ascribed to economic causes. The leaders of the Moorish rebels in northern Africa, on the other hand, had been romanized to an unusual degree, made friends with Roman officials, and even adopted the religion of the emperor. The problems which they caused to the Roman government, first under the leadership of Firmus and then under Gildo (the latter outside A.'s and M.'s scope), were largely due to their familiarity with Roman politics. From "barbarians and bandits" M. turns to the "physical background" (ch. 15) in which he surveys A.'s and other evidence for urban politics and the relations between the city and the countryside in the fourth century, and to social relations (ch. 16).

A historian dealing with the fourth century, even when focusing on Ammianus, or perhaps because of it, cannot afford to neglect his author's religious views, particularly on Christians and Christianity. These are considered together with acceptable and unacceptable forms of divination. M. is right in asserting that A. allowed religious factors "their (appropriate) role in the events" (p. 439), while his personal biases led him to favor a completely secular version of the events. Overall A. is certainly more balanced and much more subtle than either the "pagan" historians of the period, like Eunapius, or their Christian counterparts. One example suffices: reporting the negotiations which preceded the Gothic entry into the empire in 376 Ammianus does not say a word about conversion. On the basis of other contemporary accounts, particularly ecclesiastical histories, it has been assumed that the conversion of the Goths to Christianity formed an essential part of the agreement between the Roman government of Valens and the Goths in 376. But this in itself is unlikely. Such stipulations had never been part of Roman foreign policy nor was Valens likely to have set a precedent. A. was right to ignore this. Had it been part of imperial politics vis-à-vis the Goths, Theodosius the arch-orthodox would not have remained indifferent. The conversion of the Visigoths to Arianism must be sought in the history of Christianity in Gothia and in their first years on Roman soil.

The book contains several good maps, though northern Africa is mysteriously excluded. The bibliography is divided into three sections: works bearing directly on A.; works on other late Roman authors; and general works on the period. I found this division unnecessary and somewhat irritating. The index is excellent and the subheadings particularly useful.

By his own admission, M. set out to write a "slim and elegant volume."

Elegant it certainly is, and with welcome flashes of humor. Slim it is not. Indeed, a small volume could not have done justice to Ammianus' work and the Roman empire of the fourth century, nor to M.'s erudition, and the wealth of information and ideas which his study contains. If our impression at times is of being overwhelmed, M. himself advises the reader (p. xi) that each chapter can be read for itself or as a part of a thematic whole. Although it is not easy to do justice to such a vast undertaking, M.'s study of Ammianus is bound to become the standard work on the subject for many years to come.

HAGITH S. SIVAN

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ON READING HOMER ALOUD: TO PAUSE OR NOT TO PAUSE¹

There are two basic assumptions that underlie this article. My first assumption is that poetry is akin to music in having as its esthetic basis patterns of sound and rhythm. There is a further kinship between music and poetry. When Schubert composed his songs and when Homer composed his poetry, it is certain that their primary intention was that the compositions be *performed*. (Because of its oral nature, it is probable that the processes of composition and performance of Homeric poetry occurred *simultaneously*.) It is equally certain that harmonic and rhythmic analysis of the musical work, that translation, rhythmic and literary analysis of the poetic work, important as these may be for modern students of music and poetry, were not part of the creative intentions of either Schubert or Homer. To paraphrase Hamlet, the *performance* is the thing! A poem, like a work of music, cannot be fully experienced unless it is *heard*.

My second assumption is that in order for the esthetic experience of a poem to be genuine, it is necessary that its performance be as linguistically and metrically accurate as possible. In music, a song of Schubert performed consistently with wrong notes and faulty rhythm will not give the listener a true experience of Schubert's music. Likewise, a performance of Homer with consistent mispronunciation of vowels and consonants, accents, and rhythm will not give the listener a true experience of Homeric poetry.

This article will consider one aspect of the performance of Homeric poetry, the question of pause at various points in the recitation

¹This article is a revised version of a paper delivered at the 1989 annual meeting of the American Philological Association in Boston.

and the possible effects that pause can produce on the listener's perception of the poetic rhythm.²

If one were to read aloud the first line of the *Odyssey* following the punctuation marks of Nicanor, the second century Greek grammarian, there would be a pause of four morae *before* the word Μοῦσα, there would be a pause of four morae *after* the word Μοῦσα, and a pause of one mora before the word ὅς.³ The line would be rendered:

ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε ~ ~ ~ Μοῦσα ~ ~ ~ πολύτροπον ~ ὅς μάλα πολλά

Now while such a rendition perhaps produces grammatical clarity, it certainly produces poetic travesty. Rhythmical regularity and recognition in such a reading are so distorted as to be virtually obliterated. It is unfortunately this type of grammatical and rhetorical punctuation that has completely permeated our classical texts down to the present day.⁴

A preliminary survey of the Oxford Classical Text of Homer reveals that at least 50% of the printed punctuation in this text is wrong or misleading. (The same would be true of any standard text of Homer.) I say "wrong or misleading" from the viewpoint of the original medium of performance of the Homeric poems, the *oral* medium. If, in reading Homer aloud from our printed text, we follow the performance practices that we have been taught to use at commas, semi-colons, periods, and question marks, namely, to make a pause, and, conversely, *not* to

²By "pause," I mean a temporary interruption of phonation by the performer which is perceived by the listener as a temporary silence. "Pause" does not mean a "catch breath," which is normally not perceived by the listener. In this article, the terms "verse" and "line" are used synonymously.

The actual nature of Homeric delivery has been widely discussed. In the earlier performances of Homeric poetry, the performer clearly accompanied himself with a lyre or with a similar stringed instrument. In the classical period, the Homeric rhapsode recited the poetry with a staff in his hand rather than a lyre. Presumably the delivery had changed from singing or from an instrumentally reinforced chanting to a more declamatory style. In addition to Plato's *Ion*, see M. L. West, "The Singing of Homer," *JHS* 101 (1981) 113-29; J. Herington, *Poetry Into Drama* (Berkeley 1985) 10-15; G. Danek, "Singing Homer," *WHB* 31 (1989) 1-15.

³See D. L. Blank, "Remarks on Nicanor, the Stoics, and the Ancient Theory of Punctuation," *Glotta* 61 (1983) 48-67.

⁴Nicanor (quoted by T. Stinton, *CQ* 27 [1977] 30) recommends the following delivery of *Il.* 2.498 (/ = pause): Σχοῖνόν τε / Σκῶλόν τε / πολύκνημόν τ' / Ἑτερονόν. Such a delivery, apart from doing metrical violence to the verse, ignores the metrical impossibility of pause after elided τ'.

pause where there is no punctuation, we will in many instances distort the poetic rhythm and violate basic phonetic principles of the Greek language. We will, in other words, be giving an inaccurate and un-authentic rendition of Homer.

Even in English, printed punctuation can often be misleading from the viewpoint of actual performance. A simple sentence like "Tell me, John, when did you arrive?" is printed with commas before and after the word "John" to indicate the vocative case, but no native speaker of English would say, "Tell me (pause) John (pause) when did you arrive?" All native speakers of English will make no pause *before* "John," few will pause *after* "John," because our instinctive feel for the sound patterns of English makes us ignore these commas, which serve the purpose of grammar, not of performance.⁵ But with ancient Greek, where few of us can claim to possess within ourselves the linguistic instincts of native speakers, we must seek help on the question of pause from external sources. Fortunately, such sources do exist.

There are two basic questions concerning pause in the oral rendition of the Homeric hexameter. 1) Should the reader *always* make a pause at the *end* of the verse (what I term an "external pause"), even when there is no sense boundary at the end of the verse, i.e., in a situation of enjambement? (Such enjambement can be found at the end of the first verse of the *Odyssey*, printed at the end of this article.) 2) Should the reader *ever* make a pause *within* the verse (what I term an "internal pause"), even when there is a sense boundary within the verse, a situation referred to as a "break" or a "stop"? Should there be an automatic pause at caesura? (An example of such a break can be found in the first verse of the *Odyssey* before the word Μοῦσα; an example of a break combined with caesura occurs after the word Μοῦσα.)

Evidence that a pause was originally made at the end of each hexameter is quite strong. First, the quantity of the last syllable of the verse is indifferent, i.e., it may be long, or it may be short, as it is at the end of the first line of the *Odyssey* (πολλὰ). Quintilian, whose metrical observations apply to Greek as well as to Latin poetry, specifically

⁵Likewise in song, despite the printed punctuation, no American singer of the "Star-Spangled Banner" will sing "Oh, (pause) say can you see" any more than a Frenchman will begin the "Marseillaise" by singing "Allons, (pause) enfants de la patrie." (In the latter case, the liaison between "allons" and "enfants" occurs precisely because there is no pause.)

explains that a short syllable at verse end is in effect lengthened by the external pause (*vacans tempus*), so that a final trochee in effect becomes a spondee.⁶ Secondly, many verses that end with a vowel are followed by a verse that begins with a vowel, e.g., *Od.* 1.8/9 ἡέλιοιο / ἥσθιον. If there were no external pause, we would often have hiatus at verse juncture. Third, the normal coda of the dactylic hexameter in the fifth and sixth measures has the rhythmic pattern of - ~ ~ ~ -. If external pause was not normally practiced by the performer, the coda by itself would be insufficient to mark the end of verse since the rhythmic pattern of the coda can occur earlier in the verse. It is the combination of the coda rhythm *with* pause that gives to the listener the unmistakable signal of verse end.

A well-known passage of Cicero (*De Or.* 1.61.261) indirectly assumes, I believe, the normal practice of external pause:

. . . et coniectis in os calculis, (Demosthenes) summa voce versus multos uno spiritu pronuntiare consuescebat. . . .

. . . and with pebbles inserted into his mouth, he (Demosthenes) grew accustomed to declaim, at the top of his lungs, many verses on a single breath. . . . (trans. Daitz)

Cicero is here describing several unusual procedures that Demosthenes supposedly employed in order to improve his oratorical delivery. Just as Cicero implies that practicing declamation with pebbles in the mouth and at maximum volume were unusual procedures, so does he also imply that reciting more than one verse on a single breath was unusual. It therefore seems reasonable to infer that the usual mode of poetic delivery was to recite the verses without pebbles in the mouth and at moderate or varied volume. Should we not equally infer that the usual practice was to recite, not *many* verses on a single breath, but a *single* verse on a single breath? This in turn implies a pause for breath at the end of each recited verse.

Finally, it should be recalled that in Homer, unlike Vergil, there are

⁶Quint. 9.4.93 “. . . in fine pro longa accipi brevem, quia videtur aliquid vacantis temporis ex eo quod insequitur accedere.” “. . . A concluding short syllable is usually regarded as equivalent to a long because the time-length which it lacks appears to be supplied from that which follows” (trans. Butler).

no hypermetric verses, a phenomenon which requires the elimination of external pause. (There are twenty hypermetric verses in Vergil.)

I should like to conclude this discussion of external pause with one general consideration. If, in an oral reading of poetry, there originally was no regular pause at the end of each verse, there would be no reason, when writing the verses, to start each verse on a new line. If dactylic hexameters were written continuously as prose, i.e., *not* beginning each verse on a new line, this would not alter the dactylic rhythm of the words. But it would obscure the identity of the six measures of the hexameter. For the visual reader, the fact that each verse begins on a new line visually establishes the identity of the hexameter. For the listener, the pause at the end of each verse in performance accomplishes the same purpose aurally. However, in chronological terms, it is the earlier performance practice of pausing at the end of each verse which comes first, and this is then later reflected in the written practice of beginning each verse on a new line.

It is true that the Timotheus *Persians* fragment, found in a fourth-century B.C. papyrus, although poetry, was written continuously as prose. But in this document there is omitted not only verse separation, but also word separation, accents, and breathing marks. In other words, this written document was not intended to reflect completely what the listener heard. But written documents never do. Even modern written texts reveal nothing about the dynamics, the tempo, the pitch changes, and emphases that the performer should use. It is for this reason presumably that Aristophanes of Byzantium introduced the separation of verses (colometry) along with the accent and breathing marks. He wished to make the written text reflect somewhat more accurately the oral performance.

The question of internal pause is more complex. Since ancient Greek rhythm is based upon patterns of syllabic quantity rather than patterns of syllabic stress (as in English poetry), we have in Greek poetry a form of rhythm which, like that of sung music, is dependent for its effect upon the patterned time duration of long and short syllables. As in music, a pause or silence of one or more morae alters the rhythmic pattern of the verse as perceived by the listener. An internal pause of one or more morae after a short syllable in order to accommodate punctuation, will in effect render the short syllable long, and thereby dislocate the rhythm. Such rhythmic distortion, transforming a dactyl (- ~ -) into a palimbacchius (- - -) or into a cretic (- ~ -), would pre-

sumably not have been tolerated by keen-eared ancient audiences.⁷ Quintilian, in discussing the metrics of clausulae, clearly corroborates his former statement that a short syllable is lengthened by a pause (*inane, mora, intervallum*) after that syllable.⁸ Cicero, in the *Orator*, implies that poetry was normally read without internal pause, (*intervallum*), even at sense boundary.⁹ And so the clear inference is that, contrary to the printed punctuation and contrary to the recommendation of Nicanor, we should read the first line of the *Odyssey* without pause before or after *Μοῦσα*.

Perhaps more important even than the testimonia of Cicero and Quintilian is the linguistic and metrical evidence of the poetry itself for limiting internal pause. This evidence involves the phenomena of syllabic liaison, of elision, and of epic correption.

It is an accepted linguistic principle of Greek and Latin that in syllabic division, a syllable must begin with a consonant if there is an available consonant preceding the vowel of that syllable. If, however, we pause at printed punctuation, this principle of syllabic liaison will

⁷Cf. Cic., *De Or.* 3.196: "si paulum modo offensum est ut aut contractione brevius fieret, aut productione longius, theatra tota reclamant." "If even a small mistake is made, e.g., (a syllable or vowel) made too short by cutting it off, or too long by prolonging it, the whole theater shouts its disapproval" (trans. Daitz).

Cf. also the scornful reaction of the Athenian audience to the actor Hegelokhos' mispronunciation in Eur., *Or.* 279. For details, see S. G. Daitz, *CQ* 33(i) (1983) 294-95.

In English poetry, where rhythm is based upon stress patterns, internal pause does not necessarily upset the rhythm since a pause does not affect the number of stresses per line or their position in the line.

⁸Quint. 9.4.108: "Sed hic est illud inane quod dixi: paulum enim morae damus inter ultimum atque proximum verbum (turpe duceret), et 'turpe' illud intervallo quodam producimus." "This example also illustrates the 'inane' I spoke of above, since we put a brief pause between the last two words (*turpe duceret*) and lengthen the last syllable of 'turpe' by a kind of pause or delay in utterance" (trans. Cunningham).

⁹Cic., *Or.* 66.222: "Ex hoc genere illud est Crassi: 'missos faciant patronos; ipsi prodeant'—nisi intervallo dixisset 'ipsi prodeant', sensisset profecto se fudisse senarium." "An example of this type may be cited from Crassus: 'missos . . . prodeant'. If he had not paused before (the words) 'ipsi prodeant', he would have immediately recognized that he had produced a senarius" (trans. Cunningham).

The clear implication of this passage is that the only element which identified Crassus' words as prose rather than poetry was the internal pause (*intervallum*) he had made at sense boundary. Hence we may conclude that in Cicero's time, poetry was normally not recited with internal pause at sense boundary. If avoidance of internal pause was the normal practice of Cicero's day, I think it is safe to assume that this was the traditional Greek practice, since we know that the Romans adopted Greek poetics virtually *in toto*.

often be violated. This can be seen in line 9 of the *Odyssey* after the first word, ἦσθιον. If there is a pause at the punctuation, not only does the last syllable of the word in effect become long through closure, making the rhythm - ~ -, i.e., a cretic instead of a dactyl, but also, the following syllable cannot begin with a consonant.¹⁰

We know that both Greek and Latin poetry tend to avoid or to minimize hiatus. Homeric poetry, probably as a concession to the practical difficulties of oral, improvised composition, compromised on hiatus by normally, in the case of short vowels, entirely eliminating hiatus through the process of elision, and, in the case of long vowels and diphthongs, by diminishing the hiatus through the process of correption (the reduction of the long element from two morae to one). The practical function of elision and correption from the viewpoint of poetic composition was to eliminate an extra syllable or mora from the verse, and so maintain the regular quantitative pattern, a pattern which would have been distorted by an extra syllable or mora at vowel juncture. This is also the function of the less frequent phenomena of synizesis and krasis.

There are many cases in Homer where elision occurs at a full stop (period or semi-colon), e.g., *Il.* 1.52 βάλλ' αἰεὶ δὲ. . . . If the line is to be read with the correct rhythm, the performer can make no pause at the elided sense boundary. A pause of one mora after βάλλ' will have the effect of adding a syllable to the line, defeating the purpose of the elision.¹¹

In the case of epic correption, the poet's aim is to reduce the quantity of a long syllable to that of a short syllable. But if we make a pause for punctuation after syllabic correption, the syllable is in effect lengthened, nullifying the correption. This can be seen in line 2 of the *Odyssey* after the first word, πλάγχθη. The second syllable is shortened by correption, but if we pause for the comma, we lengthen the syllable, making the rhythm a palimbacchius (- ~ ~) instead of a dactyl (~ ~ ~).

¹⁰In those cases where we have a sequence of final consonant + punctuation + initial vowel, it is possible to pronounce this sequence in such a way that a word boundary is perceived after the final consonant (i.e., pronounced with external transition), but without making a rhythmically distorting pause. This can be accomplished by making a glottal stop between the final consonant and the initial vowel.

¹¹The same phenomenon is found not infrequently in Vergil, e.g., *Aen.* 1.48 . . . ger(o). et. . . .

A careful examination of the rhythmic and linguistic effects of internal pause at sense boundary suggests the following conclusions: 1) There are relatively *few* situations where internal pause is recommended. Such recommended pauses would be made primarily to avoid hiatus or to handle *brevis in longo*.¹² (There are, however, numerous examples of hiatus and of *brevis in longo* that occur where there is *no* sense boundary.) 2) There are a somewhat larger number of situations where internal pause may be considered optional. Such optional pauses could come after certain long syllables and could be used for expressive purposes. (An example of such an optional pause can be seen in the tenth line of the *Odyssey* after the word θεά.) 3) There are by far the largest number of situations where internal pause, despite sense boundary and despite the printed punctuation, is to be avoided. These include primarily pause after a short syllable, after elision, or after a long vowel affected by corruption or syllabic liaison, e.g., *Od.* 1.1 ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα (short syllable); *Il.* 1.52 βάλλ'· αἰεὶ δὲ (elision); *Od.* 1.2 πλάγχθη, ἐπεὶ (corruption); *Il.* 1.4 ἡρώων, αὐτοὺς (syllabic liaison).

I believe that these observations concerning internal and external pause in the hexameter are applicable to other poetic meters in Greek and Latin literature.

At this point, someone might ask, given the necessity of regularly making an external pause, and of sharply limiting the number of internal pauses, does this not mean that an oral rendition of Homer would drone on monotonously, somewhat like metronomic doggerel? My answer is, absolutely not, particularly if we remember the testimony of Plato's rhapsode, Ion, about the powerful emotional effects his recitations of Homer aroused amongst his listeners. First of all, the external pause will vary from a relatively short to a relatively long pause, depending upon whether the verse ends with enjambement or with a sense boundary. Secondly, in addition to the variety produced by the occasional recommended and optional internal pauses, the oral reader has at his disposal variations of dynamics, of tempo, and of tessitura to achieve his individual interpretive goals. For example, the performer can effectively signal a sense boundary to the listener by subtly slowing the tempo of his delivery just before reaching the sense boundary, a procedure comparable to musical *rallentando*. This *rallentando* can be combined with a lowering of the pitch (a procedure that Quintilian frequently refers to as *deponere vocem*). By using *rallentando* and pitch

¹² Avoidance of hiatus: *Il.* 23.727 ἐξοπίσω· ἐπὶ
Brevis in longo (= ~) *Il.* 16.269 Μυμίδονες, ἔταροι

modulation, the performer can convey the effect of sense boundary without interrupting the rhythmic flow. The listener in turn can follow the sense of the words without being rhythmically jarred.¹³

One might reasonably wonder, given the frequent incompatibility of rhetorical punctuation with poetic rhythm, how it happened that this rhetorical punctuation so thoroughly invaded our poetic texts and ultimately affected their oral rendition. While a general discussion of ancient punctuation is beyond the scope of this article, a few basic considerations may provide a tentative answer.¹⁴

Punctuation in the classical period of Greece was apparently both scarce and irregular. With the systematic inquiry into language begun by Aristotle and his followers, accompanied by the increasing influence of rhetorical studies, punctuation gradually emerged as one of the important subjects treated by Hellenistic grammarians such as Dionysios of Thrace (II cent. B.C.). The marks of punctuation used by these grammarians (στιγμή, ὑποστιγμή) were intended as separators: they separated sentences, clauses, phrases (and even words where there might be confusion, e.g., ἔστιν ἄξιος vs. ἔστι Νάξιος). In other words, the original aim of punctuation was syntactical analysis and semantic clarity, and had nothing to do either with poetic rhythm or with poetic performance.¹⁵

This is made abundantly clear by Dionysios of Halikarnassos (*De Comp.* 26, ed., trans. Roberts) who distinguishes sharply between rhythmical colometry and rhetorical colometry. In discussing Simonides' Danaë poem, Dionysios says:

ἀναγίνωσκε κατὰ διαστολάς, καὶ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι λήσεται σε ὁ ῥυθμὸς τῆς ᾠδῆς καὶ οὐχ ἔξεις συμβαλεῖν οὔτε στροφὴν οὔτε ἀντίστροφον οὔτ' ἐπωδόν, ἀλλὰ φανήσεται σοι λόγος εἰς εἰρόμενος.

. . . read the piece carefully by (rhetorical) divisions: you may rest assured that the rhythmical arrangements of the ode will escape you, and you will be unable to guess which is the strophe or which the antistrophe

¹³G. Nussbaum, in private correspondence, aptly terms the effect of rallentando a "trompe-l'oreille." The effect of tempo and pitch modulation in indicating a sense boundary to the listener is reinforced by the large number of connectives in ancient Greek (particles, conjunctions, relatives, etc.), each of which immediately sends a signal to the experienced listener that a sense boundary has been or is being crossed.

¹⁴An informative summary on the subject of ancient punctuation, with additional references, can be found in E. G. Turner, *Greek Manuscripts of the Ancient World*, 2 ed., revised by P. J. Parsons (London 1987) 8–10.

¹⁵For the Stoic influence on punctuation, see D. L. Blank (note 3 above).

or which the epode, but you will think it all one continuous piece of prose.¹⁶

Dionysios then quotes the Simonides text, dividing it into rhetorical divisions corresponding to grammatical clauses or phrases, presumably with a pause at the end of each division (i.e., at each sense boundary). Since Dionysios states that an oral rendition of the poem according to the rhetorical divisions (with a presumed pause at the end of each division) will obscure the poetic rhythm, it is difficult not to conclude that *rhythmic* divisions will have pauses (presumably at verse end) which are frequently different from those of the *rhetorical* divisions. The inescapable conclusion of Dionysios' testimony here is that the rendition of a poem according to rhetorical divisions (i.e., rhetorical punctuation) robs the poem of the most defining feature of its poetic form, its recognizable rhythm.¹⁷ Unfortunately, Dionysios does not tell us whether such rhetorically punctuated renditions were usual or unusual in his day, or whether he was just making a theoretical point in his discussion of how verse can resemble prose.

Somewhere, however, in the transmission of poetic texts and poetic performance, the marks of punctuation, which were originally invented to aid rhetorical analysis and pedagogy, gradually came to be used also for the performance of poetry in disregard of the rhythmic consequences. Rhetoric overcame rhythm, with the poetically disastrous results noted by Dionysios. Exactly when this development occurred is uncertain, but there is some indication that it may have happened between the age of Cicero and that of Quintilian. We saw above (note 9) that in the time of Cicero (fl. 60 B.C.), poetry was usually read without internal pause. We have also seen that Dionysios of Halikarnassos (fl. 20 B.C.) speaks of the *possibility* of reading poetry with internal (rhetorical) pause. Quintilian (fl. 75 A.D.), however, clearly recommends an internal pause (*distinctio*) at *Aen.* 1.3 after the first word, *litora*, because he feels that there is a sense boundary at this point (11.3.37). This *distinctio* is clearly a mark of rhetorical punctuation. It is not unique among Quintilian's recommendations for pauses in the read-

¹⁶In *De. Comp.* 22, Dionysios had already drawn attention to the distinction between the metrical colometry of Aristophanes of Byzantium and the syntactical colometry of the rhetoricians.

¹⁷Cf. Gorgias, *Enc. Hel.* 9: τὴν ποίησιν ἅπασαν καὶ νομίζω καὶ ὀνομάζω λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον. "I consider and define all poetry as (prose) speech with meter" (trans. Daitz).

ing of poetry aloud, and is similar to the rhetorical punctuation given by Dionysios in the Simonides poem and by Nicanor for Homer (see note 4). Quintilian has apparently ignored his own previous statements (see notes 6, 8) that a pause after a short syllable (here the last syllable of *litora*) lengthens that syllable. We are thus presented with an anomalous contradiction between Quintilian's prosodic theory and his oral practice. As with Dionysios' remarks on the rhetorical reading of Simonides, it is not clear whether Quintilian's rhetorically punctuated rendition of Vergil was idiosyncratic or was, by his time, a common practice, thus representing a radical departure from the practice of Cicero's day.¹⁸ What is clear is that the rhetorical punctuation of poetry, originating in Hellenistic Greece, then adopted by the Roman grammarians and rhetoricians, was eventually transmitted to our medieval and modern texts. What began as a scholarly procedure for semantic and grammatical analysis was imperceptibly and unhappily transformed into a performance practice for Homer and for later classical poetry.

And so the diverse elements of the picture seem to cohere. In the Homeric hexameter we have a form of poetry in which each verse was originally felt to be an integrated unit, centripetal in nature, knit together by the procedures of elision, correction, consonantal assimilation, and syllabic liaison. This poetry was normally read without pause from the first to the last syllable, but with a pause after the *last* syllable of each verse, and with sufficient flexibility of tempo and pitch to clearly convey meaning and expression without distortion of the rhythm. The overall aural effect would come closer to the rhythmic regularity and strictness of music than we are used to hearing in modern renditions of poetry. It would therefore be further removed from the rhetorical cadences of prose which we are accustomed both to hear and to see reflected in the printed punctuation of our texts, and which we unconsciously and erroneously tend to employ in our reading of ancient poetry.¹⁹

¹⁸W. S. Allen has suggested in private correspondence and has also implied in his book, *Accent and Rhythm* (Cambridge 1973) 335–42, that Latin poetry, and particularly the hexameter, was read aloud as *prose*. This would accord with Quintilian's suggestions for reciting Vergil with pauses appropriate to prose, but would be at variance with Cicero's observation (see note 9).

¹⁹This polemic against the misuse of printed punctuation does not necessarily mean that I advocate that all punctuation be summarily expunged from our printed Greek and Latin texts. It does mean that the modern oral reader of classical poetry must resolutely *ignore* printed punctuation that distorts the rhythm of the poetry.

At this point it would be proper to put the above theoretical views to the aural test of performance. Unfortunately, most scholarly journals are not yet accompanied by recordings. I therefore offer below a text of *Odyssey* 1.1–10, marked with my performance suggestions. (Of the ten internal punctuation marks, nine are ignored, while one, in line 10, θεά, is considered optional.) Readers are invited to read these verses aloud, rhythmically, in two ways: first according to the printed punctuation, and then in accordance with the suggested markings. To readers who have been willing to accept this invitation, I can only then conclude with Lysias: ἀκηκόατε . . . ἔχετε. δικάζετε.

— = no pause

' = relatively short pause

| = relatively long pause

Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, δὲ μάλα πολλὰ
 πλάγχθη, ἐπεὶ Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον ἔπερσε.[|]
 πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω.[|]
 πολλὰ δ' ὃ γ' ἐν πόντῳ πάθεν ἄλγεα ὃν κατὰ θυμόν,[|]
 ἀρνύμενος ἥν τε ψυχὴν καὶ νόστον ἐταίρων.[|] 5
 ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὥς ἐτάρους ἐρρύσατο, ἰέμενός περ.[|]
 αὐτῶν γὰρ σφετέρῃσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὄλοντο,[|]
 νήπιοι, οἳ κατὰ βοῦς Ὑπερίονος Ἡελίοιο[|]
 ἦσθιν, αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖσιν ἀφείλετο νόστιμον ἥμαρ.[|]
 τῶν ἀμόθεν γέ, θεά, θύγατερ Διὸς, εἰπὲ καὶ ἡμῖν.[|] 10
 (*Odyssey* 1.1–10)

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A WISH FOR OLYMPIAN VICTORY IN PINDAR'S TENTH *PYTHIAN*

The account of Perseus' visit to the Hyperboreans that occupies the center of Pindar's tenth *Pythian* is brought to a close by means of an elaborate "break-off" passage (48ff.) that culminates in a programmatic comment on the need for variety of subject-matter in encomiastic poetry (53–54 ἐγκωμίων γὰρ ἅωτος ὕμνων / ἐπ' ἄλλοι' ἄλλον ὅτε μέλισσα θύνει λόγον). Heeding his own prescription, the laudator opens the last triad of the ode with a new topic of discourse:

ἔλπομαι δ' Ἐφυραίων 55
 ὅπ' ἀμφὶ Πηνειὸν γλυκεῖαν προχεόντων ἑμάν
 τὸν Ἴπποκλέαν ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον σὺν αἰοιδαῖς
 ἕκατι στεφάνων θαητὸν ἐν ἄλιξι θησέμεν ἐν καὶ παλαιτέροις,
 νέαισιν τε παρθένοισι μέλημα. καὶ γὰρ
 ἑτέροις ἑτέρων ἔρωτες ἔκνιξαν φρένας· 60

τῶν δ' ἕκαστος ὁρούει,
 τυχὼν κεν ἀρπαλέαν σχέθαι φροντίδα τὰν παρ ποδός·
 τὰ δ' εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἀτέκμαρτον προνοῆσαι.¹

I hope, as the Ephyraians pour forth my sweet voice beside the Peneios, to render Hippokleas, by means of song, still more wondrous for his crowns amid his age-mates and elders, a concern as well to maidens. Desires for different objects excite the hearts of different people. Whatever each man strives for, the immediate thought that he has when he obtains it is a coveted one; things that may happen in a year's time cannot be perceived in advance.

Farnell declares, in commenting on the first five of these lines, that "this hope of Pindar's cannot refer to some future contingency, Hippokleas winning more crowns and commissioning Pindar to celebrate new triumphs; the clause must refer to the present occasion and to the triumph

¹The text of Pindar used is that of B. Snell, *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis* (Leipzig 1980). Scholia are cited from the three-volume edition by A. B. Drachmann, *Scholia vetera in Pindari carmina* (Leipzig 1903, 1910, 1927). I would like to thank William H. Race, Joel B. Lidov, and *AJP*'s anonymous referee for their valuable comments and suggestions.

just won. . . ."² Farnell's view has been shared by the great majority of scholarly commentators over the past two centuries;³ its status as *communis opinio* is reflected in the unemphatic certitude with which Kirkwood informs the readers of his recent commentary that in *P.* 10.55–58 "[t]he reference is to the present ode."⁴ According to this consensus, therefore, the laudator is referring to the effect that the ode's performance is sure to have in enhancing the young victor's appearance and appeal in the eyes of others, making him "even more to be marveled at" than the fact of his victory alone has done. Starting from this premise, commentators have tended to find the train of thought in the subsequent lines perplexing, particularly those who understand the maxim on the variety of human desires in line 60 as an elaborative comment on the erotic implications of the immediately preceding phrase νέαισιν τε παρθένοισι μέλημα. Thus Burton speaks of "difficulties . . . of thought-connexion" in the passage as a whole, while the transition effected by the καὶ γάρ of line 59 is characterized by Schroeder as "mehr gewandt als tiefsinnig," by Farnell as "somewhat incoherent," and by Kirkwood as "somewhat oblique."⁵

All that is required to achieve unexceptionable coherence of thought throughout the passage, however, is to assume that the futurity signaled by ἔλπομαι . . . θησέμεν is an actual and not merely a conventional futurity,⁶ that what the laudator is entertaining in prospect is thus the probability of an occasion of victory (ἔκατι στεφάνων) and celebra-

²L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar*, Vol. II (London 1930) 219.

³E.g., A. Boeckh, *Pindari opera quae supersunt*, Vol. II, 2 (Leipzig 1811–21) 336; F. Mezger, *Pindars Siegeslieder* (Leipzig 1880) 259; B. L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (New York 1890²) 355; G. Fraccaroli, *Pindaro: Le odi e i frammenti*, II (Milan 1914) 169; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Pindaros* (Berlin 1922) 125; O. Schroeder, *Pindars Pythien* (Leipzig 1922) 98; W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des Pindarischen Epinikion* (Halle 1928) 301; R. W. B. Burton, *Pindar's Pythian Odes* (Oxford 1962) 11; E. Thummer, *Pindar: die Isthmischen Gedichte*, Vol. I (Heidelberg 1968) 92, note 72.

⁴G. Kirkwood, *Selections from Pindar* (Chico, California 1982) 243. That the reference is to a future re-performance of the present ode is the view of C. O. Pavese, "La decima e la undecima Pitica di Pindaro," *Studi triestini di antichità in onore di Luigi Achillea Stella* (Trieste 1975) 242.

⁵Burton (note 3 above) 12, Schroeder (note 3 above) 98, Farnell (note 2 above) 219, Kirkwood (note 4 above) 244.

⁶On the conventional "encomiastic" future that does not point beyond the ode itself see E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica*, Vol. I (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1962, repr. 1986) 20–22; W. J. Slater, "Futures in Pindar," *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 86–94.

tion (σὺν ἀοιδαῖς) *beyond* the one commemorated in the present ode, and that the lines should thus be classified among those passages in the odes of Pindar and Bacchylides that articulate a hope, wish, or prayer for the athlete's continued success in competition.⁷ Raised as a possibility by an ancient scholiast⁸ and explicitly espoused by Heyne at the end of the eighteenth century and by Christ at the end of the nineteenth,⁹ this line of interpretation has otherwise not found much favor among scholars; it is supported, however, by a number of parallels in diction and theme that are revealed when the passage is examined in the light of three undisputed *Siegeswünsche*, *O.* 1.106–11, *N.* 10.29–33, and *O.* 13.101–6.

In the final triad of *O.* 1, having just proclaimed Hieron's superlative qualities in ringing terms (verses 100–105), the laudator addresses Hieron directly with the following words:

⁷Setting aside certain general prayers which may be assumed, in context, to include further athletic success in their purview (e.g., *O.* 4.12–13; *O.* 8.84–85), there are eight Pindaric passages and one from Bacchylides that make specific and unambiguous reference to hoped-for victories in the *laudandus'* future: *O.* 1.106–11; *O.* 13.101–6; *P.* 5.122–24; *N.* 2.6–10; *N.* 29–33; *I.* 1.64–67; *I.* 6.7–9; *I.* 7.49–51; Bacch. 8.26–32. That the verb-forms in the last-cited passage are to be restored as optatives and the passage as a whole understood as a *Siegeswunsch* is well argued by H. Maehler, *Die Lieder des Bacchylides: Erster Teil*, Vol. II (Leiden 1982) 141. On *P.* 8.67–78 as a hitherto unrecognized *Siegeswunsch*, see A. M. Miller, "Apolline Ethics and Olympian Victory in Pindar's Eighth Pythian 67–78," *GRBS* 30 (1989) 461–84.

⁸In the course of a *zetesis* concerning the identity of the Ἐφυραῖοι mentioned in *P.* 10.55 one scholiast remarks: "Agestratos says that they are the Corinthians . . . and he explains the meaning in this way, that the victor will win at the Isthmus and be hymned by the Corinthians. But that is ridiculous. For, if in fact he *is* praying, why does he not rather pray to be victorious at the Olympian games?" (Σ 85a ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀγέστρατος τοὺς Κορινθίους φησὶν . . . καὶ ἀποδίδωσι τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως, ὅτι νικήσει ὁ νικηφόρος Ἴσθμια καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Κορινθίων ἀνυμνήθησεται. γελοῖον δέ. τί γὰρ μᾶλλον, εἴπερ εὐχεται, μὴ τὸν Ὀλυμπιακὸν εὐχεται ἀγῶνα νικήσεν;).

⁹C. G. Heyne, *Pindari carmina et fragmenta*, Vol. 1 (Göttingen 1798) 394–95 ("multis adhuc hymnis materiam per novas victorias supeditabis"); W. Christ, *Pindari carmina prolegomenis et commentariis instructa* (Leipzig 1896) 221 ("certamina etiam Olympica ad exemplar patris subire Hippocleam meditatum esse poeta significat"). Neither, however, develops the interpretation in detail. Heyne 395 notes and then rejects the view that lines 55ff. refer to the present ode, correctly remarking that such an interpretation creates problems of logical coherence with what follows ("Verum reliqua minus conveniunt"). In this century the view that the lines allude to future victory and celebration has been advanced, without elaboration, by J. Sandys, *The Odes of Pindar* (London 1919²) 287 and S. Gzella, "Self-Publicity and Polemics in Greek Choral Lyric," *Eos* 58 (1969–70) 174.

θεὸς ἐπίτροπος ἔων τεαῖσι μήδεται
 ἔχων τοῦτο κᾶδος, Ἰέρων,
 μερίμναισιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ λίποι,
 ἔτι γλυκυτέραν κεν ἔλπομαι

σὺν ἄρματι θεῷ κλειῖξειν ἐπίκουρον εὐρῶν ὁδὸν λόγων
 παρ' εὐδείελον ἔλθων Κρόνιον.

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A god acting as your guardian and having this as his concern takes thought for your ambitions, Hieron; and provided he does not suddenly abandon you, I have hopes of celebrating a yet sweeter [victory] with the swift chariot, having discovered a path of words to assist me when I come to the sunny hill of Kronos.

The μέριμναι for which Hieron's guardian deity takes thought are, in Pindar's characteristic vocabulary, his agonistic "concerns," "preoccupations," or "ambitions."¹⁰ For all its splendor, the current victory achieved by his race-horse Pherenikos is evidently not enough to satisfy Hieron's desire for glory; for this reason the laudator avers that, if the divine favor enjoyed by the king hitherto continues, he has hopes of celebrating the "still sweeter" triumph which a victory in the more prestigious chariot-race (σὺν ἄρματι θεῷ) would represent.¹¹ When these lines are juxtaposed with *P.* 10.55–63, three points of similarity immediately emerge. First, in each passage the laudator uses the verb ἔλπομαι with a complementary infinitive (θησέμεν ~ κλειῖξειν¹²) in order to make a statement about his intentions vis-à-vis the *laudandus*. Second, in each passage these intentions are to be achieved through the laudator's speech or song (σὺν ᾠοδαῖς ~ ἐπίκουρον εὐρῶν ὁδὸν λόγων). Third, in each passage the end in view involves the heightening of a desirable quality presently in existence, a heightening signified by an adjective in the comparative degree together with one or more intensifying adverbs (ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον . . . θαητόν ~ ἔτι γλυκυτέραν).¹³ Taken

¹⁰On μέριμνα as "studium gloriae futura victoria parandae" cf. Boeckh (note 3 above) 320, Burton (note 3 above) 190, Thummer (note 3 above) II 130, W. J. Slater, *Lexicon to Pindar* (Berlin 1969) s.v.

¹¹For a discussion of the syntax and reference of γλυκυτέραν see D. E. Gerber, *Pindar's Olympian One: A Commentary* (Toronto 1982) 164, and W. J. Verdenius, *Commentaries on Pindar II* (Leiden 1988) 47–48.

¹²Or κλειῖζειν; see the discussion by Gerber (note II above) 166 and Verdenius (note II above) 49.

¹³For the pleonastic combination of intensive ἔτι and adverbial καί in *P.* 10.57

together, these parallels constitute *prima facie* evidence that in *P.* 10.55–59 no less than in *O.* 1.109–10 the laudator's purpose is to express his hopes for the victor's further agonistic career by alluding to his own projected role as commissioned encomiast on some future occasion of renewed success. At that time, he says, he will through his praise make Hippokleas "even more an object of wonder" among his age-mates and elders than he is at the present moment by reason of his current success. The reference to future time in ἔλπομαι θησέμεν finds reinforcement, moreover, in the final addendum to the sentence, νέαισιν τε παρθένοισι μέλημα. At the moment Hippokleas is still a παῖς (cf. verse 9 ὑπατον παίδων, 11–12 νεαρόν . . . υἱόν) and thus not yet, like Tele-sikrates of Cyrene on the occasion of his Pythian victory (*P.* 9.97ff.), an object of special interest to marriageable young women. He is evidently maturing apace, however, and *mox virgines tepebunt*; by the time he has achieved the further success (or successes) projected for him by the laudator, an object of interest to eligible *parthenoi* is precisely what, through the agency of encomiastic song, he will become.¹⁴

As for lines 60–63, whose connection in thought to 55–59 has proved problematic on the traditional view of the passage, examination reveals that they too contain motifs familiar from *Siegeswünsche*. The first of these motifs is represented by the maxim on human ἔρωτες in line 60. For clarification of Pindar's point here we can turn to *N.* 10.29–33, where the laudator interrupts the catalogue of Theaios' victories to deliver himself of the following apostrophe:

Ζεῦ πάτερ, τῶν μὰν ἔραται φρενί, σιγᾷ οἱ στόμα· πὰν δὲ τέλος
ἐν τὴν ἔργων· οὐδ' ἀμόχθφ καρδίᾳ προσφέρων τόλμαν 30
παραιτεῖται χάριν.

γνώτ' αἰίδω θεῶ τε καὶ ὅστις ἀμιλλᾶται πέρι
ἔσχατων ἀέθλων κορυφαῖς. ὑπατον δ' ἔσχεν Πίσσα
Ἥρακλέος τεθμόν.

("still even more") cf. *Il.* 22.235; 23.386, 429; Hes., *Theog.* 428; Herod. I.65.3. Adverbial καί (in the sense, however, of "also" rather than "even") is used to stress the wished-for augmentation of the victor's glory in other *Siegeswünsche* as well (*I.* 1.65 καὶ Πυθῶθεν; *I.* 7.51 καὶ Πυθόϊ; Bacch. 8.26f. καὶ ἐπ' ἀργυ]ροδίνα / δχθαισιν Ἀλφειοῦ).

¹⁴The relevance of Hor., *Carm.* I.4.19–20 is noted by Schroeder (note 3 above) 98; Gildersleeve (note 3 above) 355 sees in line 59 a "hint that Hippokleas is passing out of the boy-stage." If the future victory that the laudator has in view is in fact an Olympian (see below), Hippokleas will have to be at least two years older than he is at present.

Father Zeus, what in his heart he passionately longs for, his mouth keeps silent about; but the consummation of every enterprise lies within your power. Not with a heart unused to toil does he beg this favor, bringing courage to bear as well. What I say is understood by the god and by any man who competes for superiority in the ultimate athletic contest; it was, after all, Heracles' loftiest institution that Pisa gained.

In the context of Theaios' athletic record hitherto, detailed in lines 24–28, the laudator's intention in invoking Zeus, the patron deity of the Olympian festival, is clear not only (as he says) to the god himself and to any athlete who, like Theaios, has pursued his career to its final, culminating stage, but also to the audience at large; it is all that they require in order to decipher the unspoken prayer of Theaios' heart, which is to be allowed to complete the περίοδος of Panhellenic contests.¹⁵ The point specifically to be noticed is that the as-yet-unsatisfied agonistic ambition upon which all victory-wishes are necessarily predicated, an ambition which, we noted, is in *O.* 1.106ff. designated by the words τεᾷσι . . . μερόμναισιν, in *N.* 10 finds expression in the language of *eros*: τῶν μὲν ἔραται φρενί, σιγᾷ οἱ στόμα.¹⁶ In *P.* 10.60 the same sort of language is used to the same purpose, but instead of applying it specifically to Hippokleas the laudator draws back from the particularities of his client's situation in order to generalize about the diversity of human longings. Formally, the proposition ἐτέρους ἐτέρων ἔρωτες ἔκνιξαν φρένας constitutes the foil of a "summary priamel" in which the capping element, while remaining unexpressed, can readily be supplied in thought from the general context: while different people are excited by different objects of desire, it is athletic success that Hippokleas has fallen in love with.¹⁷ Thus the explanatory force of the introductory καὶ γὰρ bears not, as the shared erotic language has suggested to some, on νέμειν τε παρθένοισι μέλημα alone but rather on the preceding sentence as a whole: the laudator entertains expectations

¹⁵Cf. Σ 53a (commenting on the words Ζεῦ πάτερ, τῶν μὲν ἔραται): διὰ τούτων φανερόν, ὅτι περὶ τῶν Ὀλυμπίων λέγει, φάμενος αὐτὸν ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ τοῦτον τὸν στέφανον λαβεῖν, ἵνα ἐκπληρώσῃ τὴν περίοδον.

¹⁶On Pindar's use of erotic motifs in referring to the athlete's desire for victory and glory see, e.g., K. Crotty, *Song and Action: The Victory Odes of Pindar* (Baltimore and London 1982) 93–96.

¹⁷Cf. Σ 93b καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοις τι οἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄλλων πραγμάτων ἔρος ὑπεκίνησε τὰς φρένας· καὶ οὗτος οὖν ἡράσθη τοῦ ἀθλεῖν. On the "summary priamel" see Bundy (note 6 above) 7–10.

of enhancing the victor's status through future celebration precisely *because* he knows that the young athlete's craving for agonistic glory, too passionate to be lastingly satisfied by his current Pythian triumph, will sooner or later impel him to seek further crowns through further competition.¹⁸

In elaboration of this implicit point the laudator goes on to adumbrate, in lines 61–62, the psychological dynamic whereby one triumph gained whets the appetite for another. When due weight is given to the predicate position of ἀρπαλέαν and to the emphasis that τὰν παρ ποδός derives from its postponement to the end of both its syntactical and its metrical unit, the sense of the two lines can be paraphrased as follows: if a man obtains (τυχών) what he sets his heart on (τῶν δ' ἕκαστος ὁρoύει), the thought that he conceives (κεν . . . σχέθoι φροντίδα)¹⁹ as a result of his success is of a highly desirable sort (ἀρπαλέαν)—as regards the present moment (τὰν παρ ποδός), that is to say.²⁰ It seems likely that the *phrontis* to which successful striving gives rise is the thought of the achievement itself, just as the “sweetest thoughts” at issue in *O.* 1.18–19 εἰ τί τοι Πίσας τε καὶ Φερηνίκου χάρις / νόον ὑπὸ γλυκυτάταις ἔθηκε φροντίσιν are thoughts of Pherenikos' victory at Pisa; the content of such a thought is perhaps most pithily paraphrased as “I did it, I did it!”²¹ By inevitably calling to mind a *phrontis* that

¹⁸Cf. the paraphrase offered by Heyne (note 9 above) 395: “spero te multas adhuc victorias esse consequuturum: est enim hoc studium certaminum in te maximum . . .” (emphasis added).

¹⁹For the meaning of σχέθoι here cf., e.g., *Od.* 14.490 ὁ δ' ἔπειτα νόον σχέθε τόνδ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ (“and then he conceived this thought/intention in his heart”).

²⁰In the effect of qualifying after-thought that its position creates τὰν παρ ποδός resembles ἀέθλων γ' ἔνεκεν in *O.* 1.97–99: “He who is victorious enjoys honey-sweet fair weather for the rest of his life—at least as far as contests are concerned” (cf. Gerber [note 11 above] 150). While in *O.* 1.97ff. ἀέθλων γ' ἔνεκεν delimits the scope of the victor's mental and emotional *eudia* after λοιπὸν ἀμφὶ βίoτον has explicitly asserted its permanence, in *P.* 10.62 τὰν παρ ποδός casts doubt on the permanence of the *phrontis* after its desirability has been emphasized by the predicate position of ἀρπαλέαν. Both the implication of impermanence and the force of the predicate position (though not, I think, the meaning of φροντίδα) are well represented in a scholiastic paraphrase: “When a person achieves the ambition that occupies his thoughts, his condition continues to be a pleasant one *for the time being*” (Σ 95a τὴν μέρμιναν τις, περὶ ἧς ἕκαστος φροντίζει, τελειώσας ὑπὸ τὸν καιρὸν ἐκείνον προσηγῶς διάγει).

²¹Cf. Heyne (note 9 above) 395, who paraphrases line 62 as “*sensum praesentem* (praesentis felicitatis) *teneat vividum*.” If φροντίς is taken concretely as = μέρμινα (Σ 95a), μέλημα (Gildersleeve [note 3 above] 355), “heart's desire” (*LSJ*, Farnell [note 2



is *not* "immediately to hand," however, the qualifying τὰν παρ ποδός draws attention to the fact that by reasons of temperament or circumstance (or both) the reflection "I did it, I did it!" can often, and in the case of Hippokleas evidently will, soon give way to a quite different thought, namely, "What next?"²² It is precisely the laudator's prevision of this latter thought and its effect in impelling Hippokleas toward further competition that has prompted him, in lines 55–59, to articulate his hopes for a role in future celebration.

Yet whether the athlete's hopes for the future, and thus the hopes expressed by the laudator on his behalf, will come to fruition is something that cannot be known in advance—and so we come to another motif typical of victory-wishes, the idea that in an inherently unstable and uncertain world human beings must depend upon the divine for the fulfillment of their plans and purposes. The point can be made in several different ways. In *O.* 1, for example, we find the laudator's expression of hope for Hieron's future success qualified by the proviso that the king's guardian deity continue to exert his influence (108 εἰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ λίπτοι). In *N.* 10 mention of Theaios' silent prayer for Olympian victory prompts the laudator to issue the chastening reminder that "every con-

above] 220, Burton [note 3 above] 12), "Gegenstand der Sorge" (Mezger [note 3 above] 259), "object of one's thoughts" (Slater [note 10 above] s.v.), then σχέθαι φροντίδα merely restates, redundantly, the idea just expressed by τῶν . . . ὁρούει, τυχών. On either interpretation, however, the general point remains the same so long as due regard is given to the emphatic position of τὰν παρ ποδός: if you attain your heart's desire, that heart's desire is highly welcome—for the moment (i.e., until you conceive a *new* heart's desire).

²²The psychological process through which the exultation produced by present achievement is transmuted into aspiration for still greater achievement in the future is one vividly set forth in *P.* 8.88–92:

ὁ δὲ καλὸν τι νέον λαχὼν
 ἀβρότατος ἐπὶ μεγάλας
 ἐξ ἐλπίδος πέταται
 ὑποπτέροις ἀνορέαις, ἔχων
 κρέσσονα πλούτου μέριμναν.

"He who has obtained some recent success" (ὁ δὲ καλὸν τι νέον λαχὼν ~ *P.* 10.61–62 τῶν δ' ἕκαστος ὁρούει, τυχών) and enjoys the "luxurious" sense of well-being that results (ἀβρότατος ἐπὶ μεγάλας ~ *P.* 10.62 ἀρπαλέαν σχέθαι φροντίδα) feels himself impelled by hope toward further tests of prowess, "entertaining an ambition superior to wealth" (μέριμναν ~ *P.* 10.60 ἔρωτες).

summation of enterprise" lies within the power of Zeus (29–30 πᾶν δὲ τέλος ἐν τὴν ἔργων). The most elaborately qualified of all *Siegeswünsche* in this respect is to be found in *O.* 13.101–6, where mid-way through his catalogue of Oligaithid victories the laudator looks forward to further triumphs at Olympia for the clan:

τὰ δ' Ὀλύμπια αὐτῶν
 ἔοικεν ἤδη πάροιθε λελέχθαι.
 τὰ τ' ἐσσόμενα τότ' ἂν φαίην σαφές.
 νῦν δ' ἔλπομαι μὲν, ἐν θεῷ γε μὰν
 τέλος· εἰ δὲ δαίμων γενέθλιος ἔρποι,
 Δι τοῦτ' Ἐνναλίφ τ' ἐκδώσομεν πρῶσσειν. 105

It seems that their Olympian victories up to now have been mentioned before, and as for future events, I shall be in a position to speak of them clearly at such time as they occur. At the moment I am in a state of hopeful expectation, but of course consummation lies with God. If the family *daimon* should remain in attendance, however, we shall be able to leave that matter to Zeus and Ares to accomplish.

Here as in *O.* 1.108 a conditional clause is used to predicate future success on the continuing influence and protection of a god (εἰ δὲ δαίμων γενέθλιος ἔρποι ~ εἰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ λίποι);²³ here as in *N.* 10 we find human expectation and/or desire (ἔλπομαι ~ ἔροται) counter-balanced by the absolute sufficiency of divine power (ἐν θεῷ γε μὰν τέλος ~ πᾶν δὲ τέλος ἐν τὴν ἔργων). In addition, however, we find an implicit avowal of epistemological limitations which exhibits a close similarity to *P.* 10.63 in diction (τὰ τ' ἐσσόμενα ~ τὰ δ' εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν) and thought (τότ' ἂν φαίην σαφές [= "it is unclear now"] ~ ἀτέκμαρτον προνοῆσαι).²⁴ The laudator's underlying point in stating that "there is no means of perceiving ahead of time what will happen in a year's time" is identical to that made, by various means, in the three other passages: man pro-

²³ Cf. also *N.* 2.6f. πατρίαν εἵπερ καθ' ὁδὸν νιν εὐθυπομπὸς αἰὼν . . . δέδωκε κόσμον Ἀθάναις, where Timodemos' personified αἰὼν is functionally equivalent to a θεὸς ἐπίτροπος or a δαίμων γενέθλιος. In *P.* 5.22f. Zeus's continuing friendly interest in Arkesilas' fortunes is expressed in a non-conditional form through the gnomic statement Διὸς τοι νόος μέγας κυβερνᾷ δαίμον' ἀνδρῶν φίλων.

²⁴ The parallel between *P.* 10.62 and *O.* 13.103 tells against the view, advanced by Burton (note 3 above) 12, that the line is unlikely to have "anything to do with the future desires of either Hippocleas or Pindar himself" but is added merely "to balance the thought" of what precedes and so satisfy a "Greek liking for contrasts."

poses, God disposes. The athlete can entertain hopes and ambitions and the poet can articulate them on his client's behalf, but neither athlete nor poet has the power to ensure that those hopes and ambitions will be successfully translated into action, for that power belongs to divinity alone. What absolutely *can* be relied on, however, (and here the theme of uncertainty signaled by ἀτέκμαρτον is neatly and suddenly converted into foil for the next topic, allowing the laudator to flit bee-like from one *logos* to another) is the kindly hospitality of Thorax, which, tested and proved golden on the present occasion, is certain to discharge the terms of any future commission with equal princeliness if the laudator's, and the athlete's, hopes should in fact be realized.²⁵

If, as the various parallels indicate, *P.* 10.55–63 should be added to the roster of *Siegeswünsche*, two final—and, as it happens, inter-related—questions remain to be addressed: what is the *specific* achievement that the laudator is projecting on Hippokleas' behalf, and why does he express himself with such inexplicitness that the intention of the passage has by and large gone unrecognized by modern readers? From the rank-ordering of items in victory-catalogues, which typically exhibit a movement from more or less prestigious contests, a well-defined *cursus honorum* of Panhellenic competition emerges, one which, in its fullest form, begins at Nemea, moves on through the Isthmus and Pytho, and culminates at Olympia.²⁶ Examination of the various victory-wishes in the epinician corpus reveals that the object regularly held in view is the next highest prize in this *cursus honorum*, or, when two *desiderata* are specified instead of one, the next two highest, listed in order of ascending value.²⁷ This pattern suggests that if Hippo-

²⁵ On the implicit movement of thought from ἀτέκμαρτον to πέποιθα cf. Schroeder (note 3 above) 98, Farnell (note 2 above) 220, Thummer (note 3 above) I 137. Schadewaldt (note 3 above) 301 calls line 63 "Folie" . . . für das Lob des Thorax."

²⁶ For a convenient summary of Pindar's victory-catalogues see Thummer (note 3 above) I 27–28. The only exception in the epinician corpus to the rule that Isthmian victories are listed before Nemean is found in Bacch. 8.18.

²⁷ Isthmian and Pythian victories (in that order) are requested after the winning of a Nemean in *N.* 2.6ff.; Pythian after Isthmian in *I.* 7.49ff., Pythian and then Olympian after Isthmian in *I.* 1.64ff.; Olympian after Pythian in *P.* 5.122ff., Olympian after Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean in *N.* 10.29ff. and Bacch. 8.26ff. Because those who are already Olympian victors have no further rungs to climb as far as athletic festivals are concerned, all that can be anticipated on their behalf is simply more of the same (cf. *O.* 13.101ff.), perhaps with an upgrading of prestige in the specific event involved (cf. *O.* 1.106ff., from horse-race to chariot-race). The only *Siegeswunsch* to skip an entire step in the *cursus* is

kleas, in the aftermath of his Pythian triumph, is contemplating further Panhellenic competition, it is to the Olympian Games that his thoughts will naturally be turning.²⁸ Earlier in the ode, moreover, the laudator is at pains to stress that Hippokleas has an οἰκεῖον παράδειγμα within his own family to give such thoughts encouragement: his father Phrikias, in whose "footsteps" the young athlete is treading, was twice victorious as a *hoplitodromos* at Olympia (12–14 τὸ δὲ συγγενὲς ἐμβέβακεν ἵχνεσιν πατρός / Ὀλυμπιονίκα δις ἐν πολεμαδόχοις / Ἄρεος ὅπλοις).²⁹ In addition, the summary praise of Phrikias' agonistic career, which included a Pythian triumph as well as the two gained at Olympia, immediately gives rise to a general prayer that his family's wealth may be "brought to noble bloom in days to come" through continued, unbegrudged attainment of the "pleasures in Greece" (19 τῶν δ' ἐν Ἑλλάδι τεργνῶν)—a phrase which can only signify the rewards to be won through Panhellenic competition, for which wealth was a *sine qua non*.³⁰

Thus although the marked circumspection of manner exhibited in *O.* 13.101ff. and *N.* 10.29ff. is carried to an extreme in *P.* 10.55ff., and although the latter passage lacks such explicit clues to the intended point as are provided in the former (e.g., by τὰ δ' Ὀλυμπία αὐτῶν in *O.* 13 and by the invocation of Zeus in *N.* 10), Pindar's original audience would still have been in a position to discern in the lines a tactful allu-

that in *I.* 6.7ff., where, however, the desired leap from Isthmian directly to Olympian status finds poetic justification in the conceit of the "triple libation" poured out in turn to Nemean Zeus, Poseidon, and Zeus Soter (see below, note 31).

²⁸Taken literally, the words τὰ δ' εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν would seem to point to the Nemean games, which, being held in the second and fourth years of each Olympiad, followed the Pythian by some eleven months. Not only does the highly generalized language of the immediate context (60 ἑτέροις ἑτέρων, 61 ἕκαστος) both invite and authorize a more general interpretation (= τὰ μέλλοντα), but the marked difference in status between the Pythian and the Nemean festivals seems inconsistent with both the strongly emphasized enhancement of the victor's glory projected in lines 57ff. (see above, note 13, on ἐτι καὶ μᾶλλον) and the elaborate indirection of the laudator's manner throughout the passage (see below).

²⁹The motif of the relative as a role-model whose "footsteps" are being followed appears also in *P.* 8.35 and *N.* 6.15f.; in the former passage it is associated, as in *P.* 10.12, with the motif of inherited ability (φυά, τὸ συγγενές), illustrated by the Amphiaraios/Alkman myth in 39ff.

³⁰For this interpretation of line 19 see Christ (note 9 above) LXXXV and 218, H. Bischoff, *Gnomen Pindars* (Würzburg 1938) 129, and cf. *P.* 11.50; *P.* 12.6; *N.* 10.25; *Πα.* 4.23.

sion to Hippokleas' Olympian ambitions. Inasmuch as the Olympian Games were overwhelmingly the most important and most prestigious of the athletic festivals of the Greek world, it is not surprising that they especially should on occasion have engendered reticence and caution in a professional encomiast's expression of hope for his client's continued success.³¹ It is easy to imagine in Hippokleas, his family, and his friends a degree of diffidence about the youngster's Olympian prospects which, though less extreme than that demonstrated by the parents of Aristagoras of Tenedos (*N.* 10.22–32), whose "too hesitant hopes" (ἐλπίδες ὀκνηρότεραι) and "undaring spirit" (θυμὸς ἄτολμος)³² prevented their son from competing at Delphi and Olympia, would still have deprecated any too overt a public announcement of their hopes for glory at the ἐσχαίων ἀέθλων κορυφαῖς.

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³¹By no means *all* Olympian victory-wishes are veiled or understated, of course; nothing could be more bald and blunt, for example, than *P.* 5.124 εὐχομαι νιν Ὀλυμπία τοῦτο δόμεν γέρας ἐπὶ Βάττου γένει. It is natural to assume that in deciding how forthrightly to articulate a victor's hopes for the future Pindar was guided by the wishes of his client (and, in the case of a boy-athlete, of his client's family), and that these in turn would have been determined at least in part by the degree of confidence that he (or they) felt in the possibility of success. When an Arkesilas or a Hieron had his heart set on an Olympian crown, there was presumably little need to mince words about it. When in *I.* 6.7ff. the laudator prays openly that Lampon's εὐάεθλος γενεά be permitted to move directly from Phylakidas' current success at the Isthmus to an Olympian victory, thus skipping an important rung in the agonistic ladder (see above, note 27), his boldness can be assumed to have reflected, and been authorized by, the sanguine expectations of an ardently encouraging father (cf. *I.* 6.66ff.) and an athletically distinguished clan.

³²The θυμὸς ἄτολμος in question in *N.* 11.30–32 is that of Aristagoras' parents, not (as τὸν . . . καταμεμθέντ' . . . ἰσχύν might at first glance seem to suggest) Aristagoras' own; see Verdenius (note 11 above) 108–9.

ΠΩΣ ΛΙΠΟΝΑΥΣ ΓΕΝΩΜΑΙ . . . ; (AESCHYLUS,
AGAMEMNON 212)

This question is of vital importance, for it indicates the thought that unbalances the poised alternatives of Agamemnon's dilemma.¹ A *hapax*, λιπόνανς suggests λιποτάξιον ("desertion of ranks"),² a term from classical Athenian jurisprudence denoting one of the offences for which any citizen could bring a charge under the law of δειλία before a court martial and which entailed ἀτιμία as the penalty.³ Not merely illegal in classical Athens, λιποτάξιον was also grounds for invective (cf. Pl., *Symp.* 179A, with Bury's note), as the case of Cleonymus makes especially clear (Ar., *Eq.* 1369–72; *Nub.* 353; *Vesp.* 15–27, 592, 823; *Pax* 444–46, 670–78, 1295–1304; *Av.* 290, 1480–81).⁴ Λιπόνανς is therefore, as often in Aeschylean diction and imagery, an anachronistic violation of the heroic world that Aeschylus is at pains to preserve at the level of plot, e.g., by presenting a princess at banquets (Ag. 243–47; cf. *Od.* 1.328–64; 4.120–301; 6.304–5; 7.140–343), a queen attending the king's bath (Ag. 1109, 1382; cf. *Od.* 3.464–69; 10.364–65, 449–51), and heroes sitting rather than reclining at table (Ag. 1595; cf. *Od.* 4.238; 7.203; 17.478; 20.136; 23.89).⁵ This anachronism forms part of the complex of fifth-century Athenian legal vocabulary recurrent throughout the trilogy, including words such as ἀρωγή (Ag. 47; *Cho.* 477), βοή (*Cho.* 885), ἐπήκοος (Ag. 1420; *Cho.* 980; *Eum.* 732), (κατ)αίσχυντήρ (Ag. 1363; *Cho.* 990), τίτας (*Cho.* 67) and, of course, compounds of δίκη. The anachronistic λιπόνανς lends a specious persuasiveness to Agamemnon's "rhetorical question" as Fraenkel (ad loc.), Denniston and Page⁶ and Hammond⁷ rightly call line 212. Led astray by Agamemnon's question, all of those who have taken up a position on the thorny issue of his

¹M. W. Edwards, "Agamemnon's Decision. Freedom and Folly in Aeschylus," *CSCA* 10 (1977) 17–38 at 25.

²E. Fraenkel, *Aeschylus: Agamemnon* (Oxford 1950) ad 212.

³D. M. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (London 1978) 160.

⁴I. C. Storey, *Rh. Mus.* 132 (1989) 247–61.

⁵See Fraenkel (note 2 above) ad loc. and P. E. Easterling, "Anachronism in Greek Tragedy," *JHS* 105 (1985) 1–10 at 2.

⁶J. D. Denniston and D. Page, *Aeschylus: Agamemnon* (Oxford 1957) ad 206ff.

⁷N. G. L. Hammond, "Personal Freedom and its Limitations in the *Oresteia*," *JHS* 85 (1965) 42–55 at 47.

guilt have failed to ask what sanctions heroic society placed upon one who refused military service or deserted an army once he had "en-listed."

In contrast to the situation in classical Athens, military service was not compulsory for the heroic chieftain, and not just for the fatuous reason that there was no law-code to compel it. The Homeric chieftain lived according to an aristocratic ethic, which held that πᾶν . . . ἀναγκάϊον χρῆμ' [or πρῶτον] ἀνιερὸν ἔφν (Theog. 475 = Euenus frag. 8 West). He acted as his θυμός bade him, while compulsion was the lot of slaves (*Cho.* 75–76) or even beasts, as the frequent collocation of ἀνάγκη with yoke-imagery reminds us.⁸ It does not matter what may be the source of the compulsion, and Dover⁹ gives an impressive list of possibilities: pain, shame, peril. For one to yield to this compulsion against the dictates of his own desire is itself shameful, and un-free. Heracles exemplifies the contrast between θυμός and ἀνάγκη in the form of Eurystheus' commands for his labours as opposed to the πράξεις performed voluntarily (Pind., *Ol.* 3.25–28; Paus. 3.17.3).¹⁰ The obligatory labours are κακά (Soph., *Trach.* 1046 = Cic., *Tusc.* 2.8; Eur., *Her.* 1411) and his servitude to Omphale is grounds for reproach (τοῦ-ναιδος Soph., *Trach.* 254, cf. 71). Consider another example. The first book of the *Iliad* presents a situation anticipating that in *Oresteia*, with Calchas responding to a divine intervention, in this case plague rather than the adverse winds of *Agamemnon* 147, 192 and 214, by calling upon Agamemnon to give up a young woman whom he dearly loves (*Il.* 1.113–15; cf. Aesch., *Ag.* 208). In that book, when Agamemnon is compelled to give up his *geras* against his will, he is moved to take immediate (and as it happens ill-advised) action to save face (cf. ὄφρα μὴ οἶος / Ἀργείων ἀγέραςτος ἔω, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἔοικε, *Il.* 1.118–19), seizing for himself the *geras* of Achilles. This ethic of independence applies to Agamemnon's dilemma in *Oresteia* as well. The chorus describes the madness that follows hard upon, or perhaps even constitutes, his choice as "shameful in its counsel" (αἰσχρόμητις *Ag.* 222): shameful, because

⁸H. Schneckenberg, *Ananke* (Munich 1964) 18, note 16. For examples of the shame of acts done under compulsion in an erotic context, see H. Parry, "The Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite. Erotic *Ananke*," *Phoenix* 40 (1986) 253–64 at 258.

⁹K. J. Dover, "Some Neglected Aspects of Agamemnon's Decision," *JHS* 93 (1973) 58–69 at 65–66 = *Greek and the Greeks* (Oxford 1987) 145–46.

¹⁰E. Robbins, "Heracles, the Hyperboreans, and the Hind: Pindar *Ol.* 3," *Phoenix* 36 (1982) 295–305 at 297.

Agamemnon is destroying his δόμων ἄγαλμα (208) and breaking one of the most sacred of ties.¹¹

In keeping with this aristocratic ethic, even though many of the Argive chiefs were bound by the oath of Tyndareus to aid Helen's husband (Hes. frag. 204.69–84 [40–46] Merkelbach–West; cf. *Il.* 9.337–39 τί δὲ δεῖ πολεμιζέμεναι Τρώεσσιν / Ἀργείους; . . . / . . . ἧ οὐχ' Ἑλένης ἔνεκ' ἠϋκόμοιο;),¹² they felt no apparent compulsion to engage in this effort. Those who sailed sailed willingly (Eur., *Hel.* 396); yet there are hints in the stories of Achilles,¹³ Neoptolemus¹⁴ and Agamemnon himself¹⁵ that others sought to avoid military service. Amid these hints there is one incontrovertible piece of evidence for a chieftain's freedom of choice in enlisting. At *Ag.* 841–42 Agamemnon says: μόνος δ' Ὀδυσσεύς, ὅσπερ οὐχ' ἐκὼν ἔπλει, / ζευχθεῖς ἐτοῖμος ἦν ἐμοὶ σειραφόρος. The allusion is to the story that Odysseus tried to avoid military service by feigning madness, ploughing a field with salt (*Cypria* apud Procl. *Chrest.* page 31 lines 40–43 Davies = page 40 lines 30–33 Bernabé; cf. Soph. *Odysseus Maenomenus* frag. 462–67 Radt¹⁶). He chose not to enlist and would never have gone to Troy had he not been outsmarted by Palamedes, who placed the infant Telemachus in the path of his father's plough. At first glance, reference to this incident is artistically otiose, for no-one has mentioned Odysseus and, after all, “[w]hat had Agamemnon to complain of in Nestor, Diomedes, and many others?” (Denniston and Page ad 841f.; cf. intro. page xxxiii). Yet these lines, part of

¹¹R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Studies in Aeschylus* (Cambridge 1983) 83.

¹²See O. Taplin, “Agamemnon's Role in the *Iliad*,” in C. Pelling ed., *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature* (Oxford 1990) 60–82 at 68–69.

¹³Achilles avoided military service disguised as a girl (Eur. *Scyrii* frag. 682–86 Nauck², Polygnotus apud Paus. 1.22.6; see *LIMC* 1.55–69), although we might explain this away as the work of Thetis (it also has initiatory overtones; see A. E. Crawley, “Achilles at Skyros,” *CR* 7 [1893] 243–45 and K. Dowden, *Death and the Maiden* [London 1989] 65). The *Iliad*, which does not know the story of transvestism, shows Achilles threatening to return home from Troy (*Il.* 9.357–61), albeit as a legitimate reaction to Agamemnon's theft of his *geras*.

¹⁴By portraying himself as a deserter, Neoptolemus wins the confidence of Philoctetes in Sophocles' play; despite his profound reservations about deception in general (Soph. *Phil.* 86–97), he feels no shame in his self-presentation as a deserter.

¹⁵Agamemnon proposes retreat three times in the *Iliad*, once as a test (*Il.* 2.139–41) and twice out of a sincere desire (*Il.* 9.17–28 and 14.80–81). His words on the last occasion are instructive: οὐ γάρ τις νέμεσις φυγέειν κακόν. His proposal is not strictly evidence of desertion because it involves communal retreat.

¹⁶W. B. Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme* (Oxford 1954) 82–83.

the complex of yoke-imagery in the trilogy (*Ag.* 44, 529, 953, 1071, [1226 del. Ludwig], 1618, 1640; *Cho.* 676, 795, 1044, [*Eum.* 405 del. Wilamowitz]), recall the earlier statement that in making his own decision Agamemnon ἀνάγκας ἔδω λῆπαδνον (*Ag.* 218) and so they draw a parallel between the decisions of the two chieftains. The *Odyssey*, which influenced all of *Oresteia*, apparently including its lost fourth play,¹⁷ repeatedly draws parallels between the two men (*Od.* 1.29–31, 298–300; 3.193–312; 4.514–37; 11.405–34; 13.383–85; 24.193–202).¹⁸ Agamemnon returned home quickly only to be slain by his adulterous wife, while Odysseus returned home slowly to a wife who had remained faithful despite pressure from her suitors. The parallel suggested in *Agamemnon* is equally pointed: Odysseus reversed his decision to stay at home and dropped the pretence of insanity in order to save the life of his child; Agamemnon could equally well have reversed his decision to enlist in order to save Iphigeneia.

There would, of course, have been a price to pay. If he had left the ships, he would have lost power, prestige¹⁹ and a chance for material gain (cf. φιλοκτεανώτατε, *Il.* 1.122). He would have failed to help the brother whom, in Homer at least (*Il.* 4.169–70),²⁰ he obviously loves. He would even have humiliated himself,²¹ though desertion may not

¹⁷On the *Odyssey*'s influence on *Proteus*, see D. F. Sutton, "The Date of the *Prometheus Bound*," *Philologus* 128 (1984) 127–30. In addition to the *Odyssey*, influence may have been exerted on *Oresteia* by *Nostoi* apud Procl. *Chrest.* page 67 lines 25–27 Davies = page 95 lines 17–19 Bernabé, Hes. frag. 23 (a) 7–30 and 23 (b) Merkelbach-West, Xanthus 700 *PMG*, Stesichorus 210–19 *PMG*, Simon. 549 *PMG*, Corinna 690 *PMG* and Pind. *Pyth.* 11.16–37. See M. I. Davies, "Thoughts on the *Oresteia* before Aeschylus," *BCH* 93 (1969) 214–60 and E. Robbins in M. J. Cropp et al., eds., *Greek Tragedy and its Legacy: Essays Presented to D. J. Conacher* (Calgary 1986) 1–11.

¹⁸See S. Bassett, "The Second Nekyia," *CJ* 13 (1918) 521–26; E. F. D'Arms and K. K. Hulley, "The *Oresteia*-Story in the *Odyssey*," *TAPA* 77 (1946) 207–13; H. Hommel, "Aigisthos und die Freier. Zum poetischen Plan und zum geschichtlichen Ort der *Odyssey*," *Studium Generale* 8 (1955) 237–45; U. Hölscher in *Festschrift für R. Alewyn* (Cologne and Granz 1967) 1–16; A. Lesky, "Der Schuld der Klytaimnestra," *WS* 80 (1967) 5–21.

¹⁹Hammond (note 7 above) 47.

²⁰Agamemnon's affection for Menelaus is perhaps preserved in Aeschylus' presentation of the two kings as a pair of eagles (*Ag.* 115). In Greek folklore, birds often occur in a brace, cf. Pind. *Ol.* 2.87–88 and G. M. Kirkwood, "Pindar's Ravens," *CQ* 31 (1981) 240–43.

²¹A. Lesky, "Decision and Responsibility in the Tragedy of Aeschylus," *JHS* 86 (1966) 78–85 at 81. Lesky 81–83 compares the Argive king in *Suppl.* who, confronted with alternatives similar to Agamemnon's, makes the opposite decision and saves the suppliants, possibly at the expense of his own life in the trilogy's lost second play.

have been more shameful than the course "shameful in its counsel" that he actually chose. Despite the cost of Agamemnon's decision, the example of Odysseus makes it perfectly clear that those who call desertion a "criminal act" as Fraenkel does (ad *Ag.* 212) or speak of its "impossibility" as Denniston and Page do (ad *Ag.* 206ff.) or claim as Lloyd-Jones does²² that "Agamemnon has no choice" are imposing fifth-century laws and values upon a character portrayed realistically (at the level of plot, at least) as living centuries before. These examples further illustrate the claim of Hammond, Lesky, Peradotto, Edwards and Conacher²³ that in not deserting Agamemnon makes a real choice and, most significantly, makes the wrong choice.

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²²H. Lloyd-Jones, "The Guilt of Agamemnon," *CQ* 12 (1962) 187-99 at 191.

²³Hammond (note 7 above) 47, Lesky (note 21 above) 82, J. J. Peradotto, "The Omen of the Eagles and the ΗΘΟΣ of Agamemnon," *Phoenix* 23 (1969) 237-63 at 255, Edwards (note 1 above) 31, and D. J. Conacher, *Aeschylus' Oresteia: A Literary Commentary* (Toronto 1987) 12-13. I am grateful to Professors Emmet Robbins, Christopher G. Brown and Gloria D'Ambrosio-Griffith and to the journal's anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier versions of this note.



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HOW DO THE PEOPLE DECIDE? THUCYDIDES ON PERICLEAN RHETORIC AND CIVIC INSTRUCTION

At the heart of the government of any political system lie the mechanisms of decision-making; at the heart of the classical Athenian democracy lay the peculiar mechanisms of decision-making that relied on speech-making before mass, voting audiences. The rules and procedures of the democratic institutions in which the Athenians made their communal decisions are by now fairly well understood.¹ Further work on the Athenian democracy, and especially on democratic decision-making, will entail discussion of the nature of the interaction between the two components of Athenian government, viz. public speakers (ῥήτορες), those who made proposals and publicly argued for or against political projects, and the demos, those who as a group decided on the proposals.² The inquiry into ancient democratic decision-making sends one back again to the speeches and comments on public deliberation in Thucydides. In spite of his evident limitations as a source for what actually transpired in the assemblies he reports, as a sophisticated political thinker Thucydides retains his importance as an observer and critic of the practices of the contemporary democracy. Merely by making the speeches so prominent, at considerable expense

¹ Problems remain of course. An adequate bibliography in this space is impossible. Two recent handbooks conveniently summarize the state of scholarship: R. K. Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation in Athens* (Cambridge 1988); J. Bleicken, *Die athenische Demokratie* (Paderborn 1985). The following works are especially important: M. H. Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford 1987); P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford 1981), *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford 1972). Because of the state of the evidence, we are naturally better informed about the fourth century than the fifth. The early decades of the democracy remain especially problematic; the evidence for this period is usefully discussed in the relevant sections of Rhodes, *Commentary*, and M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley 1986).

² O. Reverdin, "Remarques sur la vie politique d'Athènes au V^eme siècle," *MH* 2 (1945) 201–12, and M. I. Finley, "Athenian Demagogues," *Past and Present* 21 (1962) 3–24 remain fundamental. Recent important contributions to this topic have been made by M. Pope, "Thucydides and Democracy," *Historia* 37 (1988) 276–96, and J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton 1989).

to other aspects of political activity,³ Thucydides already isolated the public forum in which the speeches were delivered as the key factor in political decision-making.

In this paper I wish to examine how Thucydides portrays the relation between political rhetoric and democratic decision-making, and in particular to show that, as part of his well-known distinction between Pericles and other politicians, Thucydides specifies a peculiar use of rhetoric as a crucial factor in democratic decision-making. In the first section of this paper, I examine those passages in which Pericles is credited with an ability to instruct the demos in the course of persuading it. In the second section, I examine those passages in which the two democratic politicians identified as demagogues, Cleon and the Syracusan Athenagoras, lay claim to a form of political rhetoric that disparages instruction. The distinction between the two types of rhetoric is crucial for understanding Thucydides' accounts of democratic decision-making: by means of instructional rhetoric the demos is rendered capable of autonomous, conscientious decision-making; in the absence of instructional rhetoric, responsible democratic decision-making founders. Finally, in the third section of this paper, I discuss what constitutes Thucydides' notion of instruction in political rhetoric.

I. THE INSTRUCTIONAL RHETORIC OF PERICLES

In Thucydides' account, the Athenian system of government worked well under the leadership of Pericles and essentially failed under the leaders who followed him, but the difference is clearly not to be attributed to any changes in the institutional structure of government. Thucydides claims that the following statements held true for Pericles and the period of his leadership; by implication they were not true of his successors (2.65.8–9):

1. κατείχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως.
2. οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ [sc. τοῦ πλήθους] ἢ αὐτὸς ἤγε.
3. ἐγένετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή.

³For these other aspects of political activity, severely neglected by Thucydides, see P. J. Rhodes, "Political Activity in Classical Athens," *JHS* 106 (1986) 132–44.

1. He controlled the masses with a free hand.
2. He was not led by the masses, but rather he led them (cf. 1.127.3).
3. In theory it was a democracy, but in fact it was rule of the first man.

These are provocative statements, but they tell us little beyond ill-defined generalities. There were no formal constitutional changes marking the transition between Pericles and the successors. Hence the difference between the periods of good and bad government is to be accounted for by reference to the particular personalities and activities of those involved in government at any particular time. In no formal sense had the demos surrendered to Pericles their control over affairs.⁴ At no point does Thucydides say or imply that the system worked under Pericles because the people essentially, if informally, surrendered decision-making to him, the wise and responsible leader. To cite to the contrary any of the three statements quoted above, especially the notorious statement concerning the "rule of the first man," merely begs a question: what was it, in Thucydides' account, that made Pericles' leadership successful in contrast to the leadership of his successors?

In his final speech Pericles enumerates four qualities that belong to him to a greater extent than to any other politician and render him extraordinary as a leader in Athens (2.60.5):

οὐδενὸς ἥσσω οἶμαι εἶναι γνῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα, φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων.

I believe that I am second to none in (1) discerning what policies are expedient and (2) explaining these policies, and (3) in devotion to the polis and (4) incorruptibility.

All four traits are undoubtedly meant to be understood as contributing to Pericles' success. They are also all referred to in Thucydides' formal

⁴ At 2.65.4 Thucydides says that the Athenians πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν [to Pericles], but this must refer strictly to Pericles' resumption of ordinary duties as *strategos*, and refers in any case to a moment very late in his life. K. J. Dover, "ΔΕΚΑΤΟΣ ΑΥΤΟΣ," *JHS* 80 (1960) 61–77, at 75, interprets this phrase to mean that the Athenians regained confidence in Pericles' political advice. Thucydides was clearly sensitive to formal transfers of power: he records the creation of the board of πρόβουλοι in the aftermath of the Sicilian disaster, through which the demos surrendered much, but not all, of their control over day-to-day affairs (8.1.3–4), as well as the notorious assembly at Colonus in which the democracy was formally dissolved (8.67.2–3).

encomium of Pericles (2.65.5–13) and differentiate him from the politicians who followed. The latter two items, devotion to the polis and incorruptibility, are straightforward and need no clarification here.⁵ The first item, discerning expedient policy, has often been noted as a crucial factor in Pericles' success as portrayed by Thucydides.⁶ But it is the second item—explaining expedient policy (ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα [sc. τὰ δέοντα])—that is of interest in this context, for it is the only attribute that pertains directly to the interaction between leader and demos in the decision-making forum.⁷ This attribute is further specified in the very next sentence of his speech, when Pericles glosses his ability to “explain expedient policy” as “providing clear instruction” (σαφῶς διδάξας, 2.60.6).⁸ Does this practice in fact distinguish Pericles from his

⁵ It is implied in the encomium that Pericles was interested primarily in the public good, and this of course has been a major theme of the entire portrayal of Pericles; cf. e.g., 2.13.1, 43.1–2, 60.2–4. The point about incorruptibility is repeated at 2.65.8. The succeeding politicians are accused of acting on the basis of private ambition and private profit (τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη, 2.65.7) and striving for political supremacy (2.65.10) which led to stasis (2.65.11–12). With respect to devotion to the polis and incorruptibility Alcibiades provides the greatest contrast to Pericles (6.15.2, 92.4).

⁶ The encomium of 2.65 establishes a contrast between the war strategy of Pericles and that of the successors, but this is not consistently maintained throughout the history; on this problem, see M. H. Chambers, “Thucydides and Pericles,” *HSCP* 62 (1957) 79–92; A. W. Gomme, “Four Passages in Thucydides,” *JHS* 71 (1951) 70–80. The contrast between the γνώμη of Pericles and the ὁγῆ of the demos has been pointed out by J. S. Rusten, ed., *Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War Book II* (Cambridge 1989) 198–99, and J. de Romilly, ed., *Thucydide II* (Paris 1962: Budé) xviii–xxii. But one must be aware of the multiple senses that γνώμη can bear in Thucydides; cf. Rusten 148, de Romilly xx n. 1.

⁷ G. F. Bender, *Der Begriff des Staatsmannes bei Thukydides* (Würzburg 1938) studied the four qualities of 2.60.5, but this study is of little value and eerily betrays the atmosphere of the time and place in which it was written. In addition to much talk of Führertum, the following is offered (in part) as an explanation of ἐρμηνεύσαι, the Periclean attribute with which this paper is principally concerned (17): “Die Fähigkeit des ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα schließt gleichzeitig auch das große Gebiet der Massenführung und Massenbeeinflussung wie die Kunst der Diplomatie in sich ein. Hier wird die Politik zur angewandten Psychologie. Der Politiker muß in einem ständigen, freilich von ihm diktierten Einklang mit dem Volk stehen, kurz, er muß Fleisch von ihrem Fleisch und Geist von ihrem Geist sein, wenn er sie regieren will. Der Staatsmann muß aber auch genügend Einsicht in die Psyche der fremden, gegnerischen Völker haben. Und nicht zuletzt bilden den irrationalen Untergrund der Kunst des ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα jene ‘magnetischen Qualitäten’ des Führers, die ihm die Herzen der Menge und des Einzelnen allein durch den Zauber seiner Persönlichkeit erobern lassen.” I venture to think that Bender is off the mark.

⁸ In contrast to the perverse view of Bender cited in the preceding note, the follow-

successors in Thucydides' account? And how does Pericles' skill at explaining or instructing affect democratic deliberation?

It would be an error to understand Pericles' skill in public explanation or instruction as a mere euphemism for persuading the demos.⁹ Although in the fifth century Pericles had already become legendary as an orator of the utmost persuasive power, and the elaborate speeches put in Pericles' mouth by Thucydides may have contributed to the growth of this legend, in reading Thucydides we must guard against importing a notion that is not present.¹⁰ Thucydides once refers to Pericles as "most powerful in speech and action" (1.139.4),¹¹ and he certainly has something to say about the manner in which Pericles addressed the demos. But it is not as if the Athenians, enthralled under the spell of this wise and beneficent demagogue (as opposed, e.g., to Cleon, the corrupt demagogue), were effectively robbed of the ability to decide in any other way than this leader advised.¹² This does not mean that as portrayed by the historian Pericles does not avail himself of numerous rhetorical devices and does not aim to persuade the assembly: he manifestly does both. Rather, Pericles is not portrayed in Thucydides in the mold of what has become, due largely to Gorgias and

ing comment of Franklin Roosevelt is truly instructive (quoted by J. Tatum, *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction* [Princeton 1989] vii): "Government includes the art of formulating a policy [cf. γνῶναι τὰ δέοντα] and using the political technique to attain so much of that policy as will receive general support: persuading, leading, sacrificing [cf. χρημάτων κρείσσω], teaching always, because the greatest duty of a statesman is to educate."

⁹For instance, Rusten (note 6 above) 198 glosses the attribute under discussion here as "persuasiveness." Where Thucydides uses a form of διδάσκω, the word regularly means 'instruct', 'teach', or 'explain', and cannot be reduced to 'persuade': 1.68.2, 1.86.4, 1.90.4, 1.136.3; 4.17.2–3, 4.83.3, 4.118.9; 5.9.2, 5.27.3, 5.86; 6.9.3, 6.64.1, 6.93.1; 7.18.1; 8.54.1, 8.56.2, 8.75.1. Only 2.93.1 is ambiguous. There is an explicit distinction between διδάσκω and πείθω at 3.71.2; 4.46.5; 5.98; 6.38.4 (discussed below); 8.45.3, 8.72.1 (παράμυθεομαι instead of πείθω). For διδάσκαλος, cf. 3.42.2 (discussed below), 3.82.2; 8.45.2. In the section of his *Life of Pericles* that relies on Thucydides, Plutarch uses the two terms together with no apparent distinction (15.1): τὰ μὲν πολλὰ βουλόμενον ἤγε πείθων καὶ διδάσκων τὸν δῆμον. Cf. also Lys. 2.19.

¹⁰For evidence of the early stages of this reputation of persuasiveness, cf. Eupolis frag. 102 K.-A.; Com. Adesp. frag. 10 K.; Ar. *Ach.* 530–31; Pl. *Phdr.* 269E; Plu. *Demosth.* 6.5; for a discussion of later ancient sources, cf. W. R. Connor, "Vim Quendam Incredibilem: A tradition concerning the oratory of Pericles," *CIMed* 23 (1962) 23–33.

¹¹λέγειν τε καὶ πρᾶσσειν δυνατώτατος.

¹²So, e.g., V. Ehrenberg, *Sophocles and Pericles* (Oxford 1954) 90. An extreme version of this view is elaborated at length by L. Homo, *Périclès: une expérience de démocratie dirigée* (Paris 1954).

Plato, the classical stereotype of the orator: the skillful wielder of persuasion (πειθώ) who by virtue of this skill alone can rule supreme in a democratic polis.¹³ Cleon is portrayed to some extent in this mold: he is called "a demagogue . . . and most persuasive with the masses" (4.21.3); neither of the terms of this description is applied to Pericles by Thucydides.¹⁴ Therefore, as with the three other attributes enumerated in 2.60.5, so Pericles is distinguished also with regard to the attribute under discussion. Whereas some of the succeeding politicians obviously persuaded the demos sometimes, and Cleon in particular is credited with an extraordinary ability to persuade the demos, none is said to have the power of explaining policy or instructing the demos.

The virtue of the Periclean type of rhetoric is made clear by a passage from the funeral oration in which Pericles describes political deliberation in Athens. Among the idealized virtues of the Athenian character is cited a form of democratic deliberation in which the public insists on receiving instruction from the politicians. This is none other than the instructional rhetoric attributed elsewhere to Pericles, but seen from the perspective of the demos, the audience (2.40.2):

καὶ αὐτοὶ¹⁵ ἦτοι κρίνομεν γε ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μάλλον λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ᾧ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν.

We at least decide policy correctly even if we do not formulate it, in the belief that it is not public discussion that hinders action, but rather not to be instructed by debate before going forth to our tasks.

¹³Cf. Eupolis frag. 102.5–6 K.-A.: πειθῶ τις ἐπεκάθιζεν ἐπὶ τοῖς χεῖλεσιν, οὕτως ἐκῆλει.

¹⁴δημαγωγός . . . καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος. Cf. the other description of Cleon at 3.36.6, as well as the description of the Syracusan Athenagoras: δήμου τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς (6.35.2). The term δημαγωγός, like πιθανώτατος, was not generally pejorative; see W. R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton 1971) 109–10; R. Zoepffel, "Aristoteles und die Demagogen," *Chiron* 4 (1974) 69–90. In fourth-century accounts Pericles is sometimes referred to as δημαγωγός or something equivalent, in a manner that is not necessarily hostile but assimilates his political style to that of later politicians: e.g., Isoc. 8.126, 15.234; Arist. *Pol.* 1274A8–11; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 27.1, 27.3, 28.1.

¹⁵The reading αὐτοὶ is to be preferred to οἱ αὐτοί; cf. J. S. Rusten, "Two Lives or Three? Pericles on the Athenian Character (Thuc. 2.40.1–2)," *CQ* 35 (1985) 14–19, at 18 n. 27.

The conceit that emerges from these two passages (2.40.2, 2.60.5–6) assigns the crucial factors of Athenian decision-making to an exemplary interaction of leader and demos. It is admitted that the mass of citizens in the assembly do not as a rule formulate policy (ἐνθυμούμεθα);¹⁶ this indeed is part of the responsibility of politicians (i.e., γινώναι τὰ δέοντα) and in practice would entail writing up draft motions and making proposals to the council and assembly. But, firstly, as an indication of the demos' autonomous power of decision, the mass of citizens are the ones who as a group do the actual deciding (κρίνομεν), not the leading politician. Secondly, regarding the conscientiousness of the demos, in the funeral oration the claim that these decisions on public policy (τὰ πράγματα) are made correctly (ὀρθῶς) necessarily includes the notion of public-spiritedness and the avoidance of personal or factional interest. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the demos decides correctly not merely because it has been persuaded to do so, but after it has been "instructed" (προδιδασχθῆναι)—not, that is, instructed to do so, in our euphemism for command, but instructed about public policy. This mass instruction that precedes mass decision-making can refer only (as we know from 2.60.5–6) to speeches like those delivered by Pericles before the assembly in which he "explains" (ἐρμηνεύσαι) and "instructs" (διδάξας). It is significant that in the funeral oration the role of the responsible leader in this interaction is left implicit; the emphasis falls all the more on the power of decision exercised independently and responsibly by the demos.

The beneficial effects of this sort of rhetoric and deliberation extend further. In the next sentence of the funeral oration, Pericles claims that the type of public deliberation described just above gives the Athenians extraordinary strength to carry out their decisions (2.40.3):

διαφερόντως γὰρ δὴ καὶ τότε ἔχομεν ὥστε τολμᾶν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι.

¹⁶Rusten (note 6 above) 155 cites L. Edmunds, "Thuc. ii.40.2," *CR* 22 (1972) 171, n. 8: "γῆ stresses the likelier member of the disjunction"; so Kühner–Gerth 2.173, 298. It is worth noting that the word ἐνθυμέομαι is used here and in 2.60.6 in the relatively rare sense "to formulate policy" with the added notion of "generating a proposal," for in both cases the context is public, official deliberation. These are the only passages to my knowledge where the word bears this sense. At 1.120.5 and 8.68.1 the notion of official deliberation is absent.

We are indeed superior in that respect [i.e., the attitude to deliberation before action just mentioned], so that the same people are not only especially daring but also especially reflective about what we undertake.¹⁷

The Athenians execute what they decide because they themselves understand the reasons for their decision. We should recognize the strength of decision implied here as the sort of steady conviction which the individual citizen bears from his *own* thorough understanding of a matter, as opposed to a shallow and unreliable inclination based on unassimilated reasons presented from without, reasons that may have seemed persuasive at the moment of decision, but are readily replaced by a new set of impressions. Pericles then asserts that this extraordinary conviction based on independent understanding accounts for the Athenians' famed resolution in the face of dangers.¹⁸ The role of intelligence and reasoned communication in this complex presentation of Athenian deliberation, decision-making, conviction, action, and courage has not of course gone unnoticed.¹⁹ Yet if this idealized account is to be informative, one must recall the actual public situation that stands, however remotely, behind the glorified abstractions. When Thucydides asserts the value of προδιδαχθῆναι λόγῳ πρότερον, he has in mind the best rhetoric of the democracy's public forums.

II. THE NON-INSTRUCTIONAL RHETORIC OF CLEON AND ATHENAGORAS

The instructional role attributed to Pericles' rhetoric becomes clearer when he is contrasted with the two democratic politicians who are explicitly portrayed as demagogues, Cleon and the Syracusan Athe-

¹⁷ τὸδε refers to the preceding statement: Rusten (note 6 above) 156. In contrast to 2.40.2 (cf. note 15 above), here the article in οἱ αὐτοί is crucial: it is the same individuals who understand, decide, and do.

¹⁸ οἱ τὰ τε δεινὰ καὶ ἡδέα σαφέστατα γιγνώσκοντες καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μὴ ἀποτρεπόμενοι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων (2.40.3). The Corinthian speaker at the first congress in Sparta attested to the fame of this Athenian attribute, but claimed the Athenians were brave παρὰ γνώμην (1.70.3). In his final speech, when their resolution was in fact weakening as the war became difficult, Pericles reiterated the advantage in bold action (τόλμα) that the Athenians enjoy as a result of their superior understanding (ξύνεσις, 2.62.4-5).

¹⁹ Most thorough perhaps, and typical of the tendency to interpret abstractly, is J. Th. Kakridis, *Der Thukydideische Epitaphios*, Zetemata 26 (Munich 1961) 54-56. Cf. also J. de Romilly, *Histoire et raison chez Thucydide* (Paris 1956) 302-3.

nagoras.²⁰ These two are shown advocating the demos' role to decide public policy, but they do so in a manner that precludes the use of rhetoric to instruct and therefore the possibility of conscientious decision-making. In addition to the basic distinction between kinds of democratic leader, it seems that Thucydides is insisting on an analogous distinction between the Periclean version of a mature demos that decides best because, when properly instructed, it tends to act with intelligence and responsibility and, on the other hand, mere democratic (if not demagogic) sloganeering—"the demos is best at deciding policy."²¹

In his speech in the Mytilene debate Cleon claims to distinguish a section of the audience that is capable of rendering correct decisions on public policy (3.37.4): "Those who decide fairly rather than in a spirit of competition generally conduct affairs successfully."²² These people are presumably in his view the large majority, for he identifies those who manage *poleis* well as the common people (φασυλότεροι) (3.37.3). But in fact every aspect of Cleon's view of democratic decision-making runs contrary to the Periclean model. The common people are distinguished from the intelligent (ξυνετώτεροι), who, being self-satisfied and capacious, generally ruin *poleis* (3.37.4, 38.4–7). The common people are further specified as precisely those who do *not* use their own judgment and are *incapable* of taking a critical attitude towards the politician (3.37.4).²³ In short, this is the demagogue's mob, indisposed to instruction and incompetent to decide autonomously; thus this group is a far

²⁰Cf. note 14 above. The brief reference to Androcles as demagogue is inconsequential for the present purpose; he is mentioned only because of his opposition to Alcibiades (8.65.2). Though capable of demagoguery, Alcibiades is not portrayed by Thucydides as a demagogue: he was rather feared by the demos as a potential enemy and portrayed somewhat in the mold of an aristocrat of an earlier generation who might strive for tyranny; cf. 6.15.3–4, 6.28.2, 6.61.1–3. Furthermore, Alcibiades' depiction of democracy as "acknowledged folly" (6.89.6, proclaimed in Sparta) is the contradictory of the demagogue's pro-democratic slogan discussed below.

²¹The formulations of Cleon and Athenagoras are discussed below. Pope (note 2 above) 285–86 fails to distinguish between Pericles' formulation and those of Cleon and Athenagoras. There were other expressions of the view that the demos was the best judge of policy: Theseus in Eur. *Supp.* 438–41, responding especially to 417–18; [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.6–7; Pl. *Prt.* 322E–323A; Dem. 24.37, cf. 23.145–46; Arist. *Pol.* 1281A40–B15, and esp. 1286A24–35 with the crucial qualification that the majority be σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχὴν (1286A36–B3).

²²κρίται δὲ ὄντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου μάλλον ἢ ἀγωνισταὶ ὀρθοῦνται τὰ πλείω.

²³οἱ δ' ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ἐξ αὐτῶν ξυνέσει . . . ἀδυνατώτεροι δὲ τοῦ καλῶς εἰπόντος μέμψασθαι λόγον.

cry from the mature, Periclean demos idealized in Book II. Cleon further disparages the Periclean ideal by mocking the instructive role of the political leaders during public deliberation: it is the duty of such leaders to avoid engaging in what he terms "cleverness and a contest of intelligence" while advising the masses (3.37.5).²⁴ Thus, whereas Cleon formally acknowledges the propriety of the demos' power of decision, in his scheme instruction in debate is mocked as destructive display and the demos is precluded from deciding independently and intelligently.

The Syracusan demagogue Athenagoras repeats the democratic position on deliberation in a manner that looks suspiciously like a trite formula (6.39.1):

φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς πλουσίους, βουλευῆσαι δ' ἂν
βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνετούς, κρῖναι δ' ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλούς.

The wealthy are the best guardians of the treasury, the intelligent give the best counsel, and the many, after they have listened, are the best at deciding.

The context is a speech ostensibly devoted to the likelihood of an Athenian invasion of Sicily; Athenagoras' rude dismissal of the possibility of such an attack seems ridiculous after Thucydides has just described Athenian preparations.²⁵ Athenagoras is speaking in opposition to Hermocrates, one of Thucydides' favorites (cf. the explicit praise, 6.72.2). Furthermore, those who, like Hermocrates, are advocating defensive measures are accused by Athenagoras of conspiring to overthrow the democratic regime and rekindle the stasis that is said to plague Syracuse (6.38). Athenagoras is portrayed as a politician of the worst and most dangerous type: he divides the assembly into many and few, asks leave to act on behalf of the many against the few, and chastises the few in the name of the many.

The superficial resemblance between the democratic slogan proclaimed by Athenagoras (6.39.1) and Pericles' picture of conscientious democratic decision-making (in 2.40.2–3), buttressed by the repetition of the important verb "decide" (κρίνειν), is fraught with irony. First of

²⁴ δεινότητι καὶ ξυνέσεως ἁγῶνι. In the next section of his speech Cleon elaborates this mockery of deliberative debate as mere epideictic contest (3.38.2–7).

²⁵ K. J. Dover, *Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, IV (Oxford 1970) 301 neatly catches the tone: Athenagoras "tell[s] his audience what it wishes to hear (a combination of 'they won't attack' with 'if they do, you'll beat them')."

all, from the Periclean perspective Athenagoras' distinction between the intelligent (ξυνητοί) and the many (πολλοί) is false, as was Cleon's distinction between the intelligent (ξυνετώτεροι) and the common people (φαυλότεροι). Indeed, it is Pericles' conceit that the Athenians in general are capable of intelligence when properly instructed. Secondly, Athenagoras claims that the many decide best merely after they have *listened to* the debate—ἀκούσαντας; the Periclean formulation would have it that the demos (i.e., the assembly, not necessarily just the many) decide best after they have been *instructed*—e.g., διδαχθέντας.²⁶ In contrast to Pericles, Athenagoras claims that his task is to “persuade the many” (τοὺς πολλοὺς πείθων), but (in addition to reproving and watching) to “instruct the few” (τοὺς ὀλίγους . . . διδάσκων, 6.38.4).²⁷ His “instruction” for the would-be oligarchs is that their plots, which include the “false” reports of an Athenian invasion, risk destroying the city (6.39.2–40.1).

The case could not be more transparent. As if to leave no doubt about the irony of Athenagoras' fraudulent democratic rhetoric, Thu-

²⁶Cf. Pericles' προδιδαχθῆναι (2.40.2). An explicit distinction between “listening” (ἀκούειν) and “being instructed” (διδάσκεσθαι) at a crucial moment of public deliberation confirms the validity of this contrast. When Pisander first proposed to the assembly in 411 that the Athenians would have to modify their form of government in order to recall Alcibiades and win over the support of the Persian king (8.53.1–2), the idea naturally met with much resistance. But when Pisander explained (σαφῶς ἔλεγεν) that what was at stake was their very survival (8.53.3), the demos decided to move cautiously to implement this frightful, but apparently necessary policy. Thucydides describes the two stages of the demos' reaction thus: ὁ δὲ δῆμος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀκούων χαλεπῶς ἔφερε τὸ περὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας· σαφῶς δὲ διδασκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου μὴ εἶναι ἄλλην σωτηρίαν, δείσας καὶ ἅμα ἐπελπίζων ὥς καὶ μεταβαλεῖται, ἐνέδωκεν (8.54.1; cf. Pericles' σαφῶς διδάξας, 2.60.6). The fact that this example comes from the account of the events leading up to the regime of the Four Hundred does not detract from its value. The terrorism that overshadowed later assemblies (8.66) had not yet begun. In this assembly the demos voted only to explore the possibilities of recalling Alcibiades and decided nothing about a change in government (8.54.2). Pisander's advice to the assembly on this occasion implies nothing about an oligarchical plot; in fact the advice was well-considered and represented an important lesson for the demos in Athens far from the theater of war. In this assembly both Pisander and the demos acted responsibly. Pisander can certainly not be accused of telling the people what it wished to hear! It is worth recalling that up until 411 Pisander had been one of the leading democratic politicians; cf. Lys. 25.9; Andoc. 1.36 for his reputation as a δημαγωγός, and A. G. Woodhead, “Peisander,” *AJP* 75 (1954) 131–46 for other sources and a critical appraisal of his career. Demosthenes made a similar distinction between ἀκούειν and διδάσκεσθαι in democratic deliberation; cf. *Prooem.* 4.2, 25.3, 46.2, 48.1 Clavaud.

²⁷On the distinction between πείθω and διδάσκω, cf. note 9 above.

cydides reports that following the debate the Syracusan assembly was prevented from making any decision at all: one of the generals cut off debate entirely and assumed the power to decide and execute policy (6.41). The Syracusan general gave as his reason the excessive exchange of slanders that had overtaken the ostensible issue (6.41.2); as Thucydides portrayed the debate, all the slander stemmed from Athenagoras. Far from encouraging a conscientious response in the audience, the effect of Athenagoras' rhetoric was to produce civic irresponsibility, i.e., open faction. The anonymous general reasserted the need for responsible behavior on the part of the demos (6.41.2): "We ought to be looking how each individual among us and the entire polis together might best prepare to repel the invaders."²⁸ Their decision having been made for them, the Syracusans had nothing to do but disperse (6.41.4). Although the general's policy was in the event expedient, his intervention was a harsh lesson for the Syracusan demos.

III. WHAT CONSTITUTES INSTRUCTION IN POLITICAL RHETORIC?

We are on difficult ground in trying to ascertain just what Thucydides had in mind when speaking of a political rhetoric that instructs. On this question there is nothing more explicit to be found in his text than the various passages discussed above. He does not indicate how the two types of rhetoric differ in style or what superficial characteristics make a particular style of rhetoric instructional or demagogic. He is content to point out that the difference exists, and that the effect each produces on democratic decision-making is correspondingly different.²⁹ Yet it is still possible for us to make some headway towards understanding the admittedly elusive concept of instructional rhetoric. Several initial considerations should be borne in mind.

First of all, we are interested in determining not what particular advice any particular political situation demanded, but what general

²⁸ εἷς τε ἕκαστος καὶ ἡ ἑμπάσα πόλις καλῶς τοὺς ἐπιόντας παρασκευασόμεθα ἀμύνεσθαι.

²⁹ Distinctions of this sort have not passed unnoticed by modern political scientists who study mass decision-making; cf. F. G. Bailey, *Humbuggery and Manipulation: The Art of Leadership* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1988) esp. 11–35. K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* (Berkeley 1974) 23–25, 29–30 discusses the didactic role of public speakers in Greek tradition; Ober (note 2 above) 317–18 discusses the advisory role of Athenian politicians.

features of deliberative rhetoric Thucydides believed could improve democratic decision-making. Secondly, the question at issue does not entail an absolute distinction between instruction and persuasion; clearly both Pericles and the demagogue persuade the political audience, while only Pericles is said to instruct. So the features that make a particular form of rhetoric instructional do not necessarily hinder persuasion; on the contrary, in the proper circumstances they may constitute the means of persuasion. Thirdly, Thucydides presented instructional rhetoric in the context of the admirable form of democratic decision-making that is ascribed to the Athenians in the funeral oration and under Pericles' leadership generally. Thus, in a purely formal sense one could assert that what constitutes instruction must be whatever tends to make democratic deliberation mature, conscientious, intelligent, and responsible. There are numerous techniques one could imagine that might tend to promote that type of decision-making,³⁰ but an obvious and essential condition for mature democratic decision-making requires that the citizens have ample and accurate information concerning the issues to be decided. Aristotle stresses the need for the politician to supply the sort of detailed information about practical matters, e.g., finance, armaments, food supply, etc., that would surpass the resources of average citizens.³¹ In this respect, large sections of Pericles' first two deliberative speeches should be taken as an example of instructing the demos (1.141.2–143; 2.13.3–6, 8). In these passages Pericles is shown providing the demos with the practical information about current military and financial conditions that is vital for them to make an informed decision concerning his argument that Athens will prevail in the war (1.144.1, 2.13.9). If he were to advocate the same policy, yet withhold or distort the information necessary for an informed decision, he would be treating the demos as children and incapable of rendering mature, independent decisions.

In the remainder of this paper I shall point to two factors which distinguish the political rhetoric that in Thucydides' account instructs the decision-making audience: such rhetoric must be scrupulously honest in its presentation of the speaker's political advice and must depend on reasoned argument for its persuasive power. Both of these factors

³⁰Cf. Bailey (note 29 above). For an example, cf. Pericles' demand quoted in note 37 below.

³¹*Rhet.* 1359B19–60A37, 1396A4–12. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3.6; Pl. *Grg.* 455B–56A; *Prt.* 319B–D; *Alc.* 1.106C–7D.

are compatible with the considerations of the preceding paragraph and, in order to be rhetorically effective, clearly require just the sort of mature political audience idealized by Pericles in Book II. The non-instructional rhetoric associated with the demagogues in Thucydides' text is, by contrast, less than honest and dependent for its persuasive power on something other than reasoned argument.

First, honest political advice. In a well-known passage from the encomium of Pericles, Thucydides contrasted Pericles and his successors in the following terms: whereas Pericles "did not say anything to please [the demos] in an attempt to gain power by improper means," the politicians who followed "began to surrender even decisions on policy to the people's pleasure" (2.65.8, 10).³² The point is clear: pleasing the demos in an effort to maintain political authority could easily prevail over telling the demos the truth at any cost. (Aristophanes' *Knights* is the paradigmatic document.) Even a task apparently so straightforward as having messengers from abroad relay an accurate message to the demos could not in fact be taken for granted; the urge to lie to the people in order to please them was just too strong. Such, in fact, was one of Nicias' fears while under duress in Sicily (7.8.2).³³

As we see him in Thucydides, Pericles is unflinchingly honest when speaking to the demos. Readers of Thucydides are meant to assume that there is simply no duplicity in Pericles' political advice in his three deliberative speeches.³⁴ Cleon, on the other hand, is presented as treating the interests of the demos irresponsibly (4.28.4–5) and as an outright liar, ready to deceive the demos when his political supremacy is at stake (4.27.3–4). In one section of his speech on Mytilene it might seem at first that Cleon attempts to instruct the demos by providing necessary political intelligence about revolts among subject states (3.39). But the crucial assertion that would justify the harsh decree, that all Mytilenians participated in the revolt (3.39.6), is flatly rejected by

³²μη κτώμενος ἔξ οὐ προσηκόντων τὴν δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονὴν τι λέγειν . . . ἐτράποντο καθ' ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι.

³³φοβούμενος δὲ μὴ οἱ πεμπόμενοι . . . τῷ ὄχλῳ πρὸς χάριν τι λέγοντες οὐ τὰ ὄντα ἀπαγγέλλωσιν.

³⁴This honesty is an essential part of the presentation of Pericles' character (2.60.5–6 and note 5 above). But the reader's trust in Pericles' integrity is strengthened by the fact that Thucydides saw fit to present the three speeches (1.140–44, 2.13.2–9, 2.60–64) without opposition.

Diodotus (3.47.3) and belied by Thucydides' narrative (3.27.2–3, 36.4). Cleon's information is therefore suspect, if not actually false. Thucydides is inviting us to question the integrity of Cleon's political advice: as the author of the previous day's resolution that was being reconsidered (3.36.6), his political authority was under challenge and his response would naturally (in Thucydides' view) be self-serving.

The connection between honest political advice and rhetorical instruction is made explicit by Diodotus. Responding to Cleon, Diodotus inclines to the Periclean ideal of public instruction (3.42.2): "Whoever contends that public discussion is not the instructor of public policy is either stupid or privately interested."³⁵ This allusion notwithstanding, Diodotus does not simply attempt to instruct the demos in the Periclean manner. Because conditions of public debate are so degraded that politicians are automatically suspected of being either stupid or interested, there is virtually no possibility of instituting that model of frank public discourse (3.42.2–6). Even politicians who advise in the public interest and conceive good policy cannot speak openly, but must deceive the demos into adopting good policy (3.43.1–3).³⁶ Diodotus specifies lying and aiming to please (παρὰ γνώμην τι καὶ πρὸς χάριν λέγειν, 3.42.6) as typical of the debased, destructive habits of deliberation under which the Athenians labor. In contrast to the Periclean ideal, the Athenians have become, in Thucydides' account of the Mytilene debate, extremely immature in their decision-making: compare Diodotus' pathetic, if realistic, complaint about the unaccountability, short-sightedness, and irresponsibility of his audience (3.43.4–5) with Pericles' demand, when his policy was under challenge, that his audience acknowledge their share of the responsibility (2.64.1): "Do not be angry with me, for you too joined with me in deciding to go to war."³⁷ It is an egregious gap in Thucydides' account of Pericles' leadership that there is no discussion, or even hint, of how Pericles acquired and main-

³⁵ τοὺς τε λόγους ὅστις διαμάχεται μὴ διδασκάλους τῶν πραγμάτων γίνεσθαι, ἢ ἀξύνετός ἐστιν ἢ ἰδίᾳ τι αὐτῷ διαφέρει.

³⁶ E.g., in his first speech in Book VI Nicias attempted to instruct the Athenians why they ought not to attack Sicily; cf. διδάξω, 6.9.3. When this failed, he tried the tactic of deception in the second speech, but this too failed; cf. 6.19.2, 6.24.1–2. In Thucydides' account of the assembly's decision in favor of the expedition not a single citizen voted responsibly (6.24.3–4).

³⁷ μήτε ἐμὲ δι' ὀργῆς ἔχετε, ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ ξυνδιέγνωτε πολεμεῖν. Cf. also Th. 8.1.1.

tained the reputation for integrity that Thucydides claims for him, especially since his reputation must have been repeatedly impugned.³⁸

Second, reasoned argument. There are of course, as Aristotle and others have shown, innumerable ways to persuade an audience. The claim that instructional rhetoric depends on reasoned argument for its persuasive power does not mean that the speaker argues on the basis of some sort of dry and impeccable logic, that he has included no fallacy or distortion, or that he does not appeal to the emotions at all. Clearly such an extreme would hardly qualify as rhetoric and in any event would never work in a mass, political assembly. Rather, among all the means of persuasion adopted by the speaker the audience must ultimately be appealed to as rational agents, whose power of decision operates on the basis of rational considerations. To this extent, the role of reasoned argument is already implied by the funeral oration's account of rational political deliberation (2.40.2–3) discussed above. As a contrast to the assembly that decides rationally, Thucydides speaks simply of a mob, where there is no possibility of rational decision-making. Thucydides makes it abundantly clear that the assembly is refractory, all too apt to slip into a degree of brutishness that would render them a mob (ὄχλος), insusceptible to the instruction their best leaders might offer, and therefore incapable of making conscientious decisions.³⁹ In contrast to Pericles, Cleon is shown seeking to inflame passions and otherwise encouraging the assemblies he addresses to act like a mob.⁴⁰ In the case of Athenagoras we are shown a politician who virtually succeeds in turning a deliberating assembly into a mob. The Syracusan

³⁸Thus Thucydides does not specify the charge for which Pericles was fined in 430 (2.65.3). Plato mentions a charge of κλοπή for this occasion (*Grg.* 516A); Plutarch mentions the decree of Dracontides which touched on Pericles' handling of money, but the date of this episode is unknown (*Per.* 32.3–4).

³⁹The word ὄχλος is used in this sense at 4.28.3; 6.89.5; 7.8.2; 8.86.5 (with regard to the *ekklesia* [8.86.1] of the Athenians on Samos), and at 6.63.2 (with regard to the Syracusans). At 2.65.4 δῆμος seems to bear a similar sense, but it refers to an assembly sometime after the occasion of Pericles' last speech; because this fact is missed by V. Hunter, "Thucydides and the Sociology of the Crowd," *CJ* 84 (1988) 17–30, at 21–22, her analysis of the assembly in which Pericles delivered his last speech is faulty. The standard example for the decay of the assembly into a mob is the "trial" of the Arginusae generals; in his description of that occasion Xenophon normally uses the word δῆμος to refer to the assembly, but at its most tumultuous moment uses ὄχλος (*Hell.* 1.7.13).

⁴⁰3.38.1, 3.40.7; 4.22. Mobs, of course, can get out of hand, as Cleon is said to have discovered (4.28.3). Thucydides praises Alcibiades for controlling the assembly in Samos that had degenerated into a mob (8.86.5).

assembly was severely divided over the danger of an Athenian invasion; Hermocrates' warning won few adherents (6.35). In his speech against Hermocrates Athenagoras begins by presenting the case against the need for immediate defensive measures (6.36.3–37). In this section Athenagoras indeed presents a rational, if ill-informed, argument, and the audience is addressed as if they were capable of deciding the issue on its merits. But, as remarked above, in the considerable remainder of his speech Athenagoras abruptly dismisses the invasion issue and seeks to inflame passions by gratuitously raising the specter of an oligarchic revolution (6.38–40). That Athenagoras' rhetoric led directly to the threat of mob behavior should be inferred from Thucydides' account of the general's intervention (6.41). Thus in spite of a brief attempt to instruct his audience and the glimmer of a reasoned argument, Athenagoras ultimately refused to try to persuade his audience by means of reason, but tried instead to win the day by arousing the strong emotions of political conflict.

But even under the leadership of Pericles the mature form of democratic government is difficult to achieve and prone to fail under adverse circumstances. It is no small part of the responsible leader's job to maintain the demos in a sober and attentive state, for only thus can their constitutional power of decision be used conscientiously (i.e., *κρίνειν ὀρθῶς*). Therefore, one aspect of Pericles' virtue as orator lay in his ability to encourage, entice, excoriate, or abuse the Athenians into the conscientious mode that would render them susceptible to his instruction. This is the purport of the following claim: "When he saw that their boldness was outrageously excessive, his words would thrust them into apprehension, and when on the other hand their fears were unfounded, he would restore their confidence" (2.65.9).⁴¹ Indeed Pericles' last speech is just such an effort to dispel anxiety and restore a mood calm enough for deliberation.⁴² In the aftermath of this speech, although Pericles was dealt an angry, personal rebuke (2.65.3), the citizens nevertheless regained the mode of civic responsibility (2.65.2): they made their decision on the basis of a rational consideration of the public good (*δημοσίᾳ μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἀνεπείθοντο*), having largely overcome the

⁴¹ ὁπότε γοῦν αἰσθοῖτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ δεδιότας αὐτὸν ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν.

⁴² ἐβούλετο θαρσεῖν τε καὶ ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης πρὸς τὸ ἡπιώτερον καὶ ἀδεέστερον καταστήσαι (2.59.3); cf. 2.65.1. On γνώμη vs. ὀργή, cf. note 6 above.

emotional state that stemmed from personal suffering (ιδία δὲ τοῖς παθήμασιν ἔλυπούντο).⁴³ On an earlier occasion in the war Pericles was compelled to adopt a different course when the demos was in a similarly refractory state (2.22.1). Whereas he was confident that he had formulated, and the demos had adopted, the expedient policy regarding military strategy, he also realized that an assembly at that moment would be too emotional to decide rationally. Presumably emotions were running so high that even his rhetoric was not up to the task of tempering and instructing the demos. Hence he concluded that it was better to postpone deliberation altogether until circumstances made conscientious deliberation more attainable.⁴⁴ We should infer that Pericles found this course preferable to addressing the demos and either facing the mob's rejection or lying to placate the mob.

The two factors singled out here as critical for Thucydides' notion of an instructional political rhetoric did not pass unnoticed by other contemporaries of Athenian democracy who reflected on democratic decision-making. It will suffice in this space merely to mention certain respects in which Plato and Demosthenes developed the concerns raised by Thucydides.⁴⁵

⁴³We should understand Pericles' rhetoric to have had a similar effect when the time came to retreat from Attica into the city. The transition, undertaken to secure the public good, was difficult because it involved overcoming extraordinary emotional inclinations based on personal, familial, or local deme attachments (2.14.1, 16.1–2). As Thucydides portrays it, Pericles' speech represented in 2.13.2–9 was the proximate cause of the move.

⁴⁴πιστεύων δὲ ὁρθῶς γινώσκειν περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξίεναι [cf. γνῶναι τὰ δέοντα], ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα, μὴ ὀργῇ τι μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ ξυνελθόντας ἔξαμαρτεῖν (2.22.1). No one has definitively explained how Pericles, even as general, could have prevented not only an assembly (which is doubtful), but any public meeting (ξύλλογος) (which seems preposterous). Rusten (note 6 above) 129 shows that Thucydides' "meaning here must be that Pericles refused to debate περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξίεναι either in the assembly or elsewhere."

⁴⁵I omit Aristotle because, although he summarizes the formal topics and techniques of deliberative rhetoric (*Rhet.* 1.4–8; cf. the passages cited in notes 21 and 31 above), there is no passage to my knowledge where he specifically discusses the relation between deliberative rhetoric and democratic (especially Athenian) decision-making. He clearly did not trust the mass decision-making of democratic assemblies, because of the destructive activity of demagogues, and preferred that the competence and membership of such assemblies be limited and that they meet as seldom as possible: cf. *Pol.* 1292A4–37, 1292B25–93A10, 1298B11–26, 1304B20–5A7, 1318B6–19B1. On the other hand, since Aristotle saw the enthymemes as providing the rational or logical elements of rhetorical persuasion (*Rhet.* 1354A11–31, 1355A3–15, 1356A35–B20), insofar as enthymemes are

In *Gorgias* Plato argues that rhetoric (ῥητορική) and instruction (διδασκαλική) both produce persuasion (πειθῶ, πείθειν), but that they are absolutely distinct activities, since they produce two absolutely distinct types of persuasion, viz. belief (πίστις) and knowledge (μάθησις, ἐπιστήμη) (452E–55A). Plato's condemnation of all Athenian politicians, including of course Pericles, follows from his contention that none instructed the demos (502D–3D, 515C–19D). Whereas Plato follows Thucydides in seeking to distinguish the element of instruction in forms of public discourse, Plato differs from Thucydides in virtually ruling out a hybrid form of discourse that would combine instruction and rhetoric.⁴⁶ Furthermore, Plato's general distinction between arts and their imitations and his concern to establish philosophically definitive criteria of scientific knowledge have no relevance for Thucydides' mundane concerns. But Plato's general criticism of Athenian political rhetoric essentially coincides with Thucydides' account of the non-instructional rhetoric of the demagogues. First, since rhetoric aims only to please, political orators are duplicitous: they gratify the demos and seek their own interest at the expense of the common good (502E).⁴⁷ Secondly, the distinction between rhetoric and instruction involves not only the speaker or leading partner, but also the audience or receptive partner: rhetoric, the non-rational means of persuasion, is said to be effective only with the ignorant or an audience that constitutes a mob (ὄχλος) (459A–C; cf. 454B–55A, 456C). In a famous passage near the end of the dialogue both of these criticisms are entailed in a way that displays the immaturity of mass decision-making that omits instruction: Socrates describes the Athenian jurors he may someday have to face as no more receptive to his non-rhetorical defense than children would be to a doctor who is prosecuted by a cook for administering severe, but necessary treatment (521E–22C). In *Gorgias* then, the political leaders who employ rhetoric are incapable of instructing the citizens they address, and the mass of citizens who form the political audience are, like children or a mob, fundamentally indisposed to, if not utterly incapable of, receiving the instruction any potential political leader

utilized in democratic deliberative rhetoric, they would presumably contribute towards putting even mass decision-making on a rational basis.

⁴⁶ "Virtually," because even in *Gorgias* Plato hints at the possibility of a scientific rhetoric (503A, 504DE, 517A).

⁴⁷ Cf. J. de Romilly, "La condamnation du plaisir dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide," *WS* 79 (1966) 142–48, on the common ground between Thucydides and Plato on this point.

might try to administer. We would be wrong to fail to recognize an element of caricature involved in Plato's judgment, but the categories he employs are essentially the same as those used by Thucydides.⁴⁸

Demosthenes can be observed putting Thucydides' distinction between instructional and demagogic rhetoric to practical use. Much of the collection of deliberative prooemia exploits a contrast between good and bad types of symbouleutic rhetoric and the beneficial or corruptive effects of each type of rhetoric on deliberation and decision-making in the assembly.⁴⁹ The contrast is naturally self-serving and the elements of the contrast owe something to commonplaces of fourth-century oratory. Demosthenes speaks honestly; his rivals are duplicitous.⁵⁰ Demosthenes aims at the common good, regardless of the discomfort involved for himself or the demos; his rivals advance their private interests by pleasing the demos.⁵¹ Demosthenes demands an attentive audience that will follow his argument; his rivals encourage hasty decisions and curtail reflection.⁵² Demosthenes demands that the demos assume their share of the responsibility for the communal decision; his rivals encourage immaturity and irresponsibility.⁵³ Occasionally Demosthenes speaks of instruction in this context: he uses the verb διδάσχω to stand for the entire style of symbouleutic rhetoric that is being advocated.⁵⁴ The interesting point is not merely that Demosthenes describes his style of rhetoric in terms that recall for us Thucydides'

⁴⁸Plato eventually changed his tune. In *Laws* he attempted to combine rhetoric and instruction, though the context is no longer democratic deliberation, but legal preambles; cf. *Laws* 718B–23D, 857C–E, and H. Yunis, "Rhetoric as Instruction: A Response to Vickers on Rhetoric in the *Laws*," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 23 (1990) 125–35.

⁴⁹Blass (*Die Attische Beredsamkeit*², III.1.322–28) argued for the authenticity of the collection of prooemia. R. Clavaud, ed., *Démosthène: Prologues* (Paris 1974) 5–55 has put the case beyond doubt. (Clavaud's edition is used to cite the prooemia below.) In any event the documents in the collection could only come from fourth-century Athens.

⁵⁰*Prooem.* 4.1, 7.3 (= *Orat.* 16.3), 14.1, 31, 36.1, 52.

⁵¹*Prooem.* 1.3, 8, 27, 32; cf. *Orat.* 3.3, 9.63–64.

⁵²*Prooem.* 3, 4.2–3, 9, 12, 17, 18, 25, 33, 37, 43.2, 46, 55. It was a commonplace already by the fourth century for speakers to use the prooemium to render their auditors attentive (in addition to well-disposed and ready to understand); cf. O. Navarre, *Essai sur la rhétorique grecque avant Aristote* (Paris 1900) 213–39. But in the passages cited here Demosthenes explicitly connects the assembly's attentiveness to the expediency of their decision.

⁵³*Prooem.* 17, 22.2, 32.3, 34.3–4, 44, 49.

⁵⁴*Prooem.* 4.2, 6.2 (= *Orat.* 14.2), 25.2–3, 46.2, 48.1; cf. *Orat.* 8.72. In these passages the use of διδάσχω recalls the charged sense of the word in Thucydides. The word is frequently used elsewhere in Demosthenes to mean "explain" or "instruct" without apparently carrying any of the connotations discussed here.

presentation of the virtues of Pericles' deliberative rhetoric. Rather, in the prooemia Demosthenes seeks to enhance his authority among the demos by using the same argument that Thucydides used to account for the success of Pericles, viz. the democracy's interests are advanced when the assembly employs a conscientious mode of decision-making, and that difficult but necessary mode of decision-making is itself made possible only with the aid of an instructional political rhetoric. In Demosthenes' case, he is actually trying to shape the mature, responsible, attentive audience that is asked to respond favorably to his honest, demanding, reasoned argument.

The simplicity of Thucydides' dichotomy between instructional and demagogic rhetoric is historically as problematic as most other aspects of his biased portraits of Pericles and Cleon. (I say nothing of Athenagoras, of whom we hear nothing outside of Thucydides.) We ought to accept his unqualified ascription of a distinctive, instructional rhetoric to Pericles in the same vein as we do his presentation of Pericles' deliberative speeches without opposition. Since Thucydides himself approved of Pericles' war policy, and evidently believed it could have succeeded (2.65.12–13), he took pains to establish for the reader the correctness of that policy. It is precisely in Pericles' deliberative speeches that this policy is set out and justified for the benefit of the reader. Insofar as Thucydides instructs his readers about Athenian policy through Pericles' speeches, the impression is inevitably created that Pericles' audience, the Athenian demos, was instructed and that Thucydides' conception of instructional rhetoric is being exemplified. If we cannot accept these parts of the history at face value, neither can we thereby dismiss them as useless. At the very least Plato and Demosthenes attest to the usefulness of the rhetorical categories first elaborated by Thucydides. It is hard for us who have no experience of the sort of deliberation and decision-making that went on in Athens to appreciate both the pressures that affected such decision-making and the absolute necessity for widespread responsibility among the demos who for better or worse wielded the power of decision.⁵⁵ If during the debate that immediately preceded their decisions, the assembled citizens were en-

⁵⁵Cf. M. I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge 1983) 140–41 on civic responsibility in the Athenian democracy. M. Walzer, "Political Decision-Making and Political Education" in *Political Theory and Political Education*, ed. M. Richter (Princeton 1980) 159–76 discusses a theory of decision-making that applies to citizens of modern western democracies, and the sort of education that might improve such decision-making.

CONTINUOUS HISTORY AND XENOPHON,
HELLENICA 1-2.3.10

The question of the composition of Xenophon's *Hellenica* has dominated study of the author and the work for over a century. Our text of *Hellenica* picks up at roughly the point where Thucydides left his history of the Peloponnesian War unfinished and continues unbroken down to the battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C. Yet it has been argued on the basis of formal, stylistic and other differences between sections that there were breaks in the composition and that the work was composed at two or more different periods of Xenophon's life. A reference to contemporary events dates the writing of the sixth book firmly in the 350s B.C., but there has been a persistent belief that other sections were written earlier. There have been bipartite and tripartite theories of composition and though the more complex have been rejected, it has been largely accepted that there is a formal and stylistic break at the end of Xenophon's continuation of Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War which could only be evidence of a chronological break in composition. The main formal difference is the summary nature of the continuation, which has a smaller scope and scale and a more systematic chronological framework than the rest. The stylistic differences involve synonym choice, sentence structure and particles. Other evidence centers on comments in the early sections that seem unlikely to have been written in the light of later events. It would indeed have been quite natural for Xenophon to have conceived the first part of *Hellenica* as a continuation of the war complete in itself, to have written that down in a distinctive form, perhaps "published" it, and to have decided only subsequently to return to the rest of the course of Greek history. It is also possible that his style changed in the interim. Recent approaches to the composition problem have been more sceptical however, and there are now those who find no reason to believe that *Hellenica* was not all written at the same time as the sixth book. But the form of the work remains unexplained, and the sceptics have not fully supported their position, so that it is not yet clear how widely it is held.¹

¹W. P. Henry, *Greek Historical Writing* (Chicago 1967) is the most accessible account of past approaches to *Hellenica*. M. MacLaren, "On the composition of Xenophon's *Hellenica*," *AJP* 55 (1934) 121-39 has a useful summary of stylistic statistics on

There are other problems attached to the question of composition. The chronological framework of Xenophon's continuation of Thucydides, which appears to constitute part of its particular formal identity, was probably subject to interpolation, perhaps considerable. The connexions between the end of Thucydides and the beginning of Xenophon are loose and there is a suspicion of a lacuna in one or the other.²

I have elsewhere tried to undermine the composition question by presenting positive evidence for the unity of *Hellenica* in the form of narrative characteristics and patterns that occur throughout all sections of the work.³ This paper presents new evidence that the formal differences between the continuation of the Peloponnesian War and the rest of the work are quite consistent with the essential unity of *Hellenica* and certainly not proof of different periods of composition; it also seeks to explain the stylistic differences in terms of a variety of factors other than chronological development. The evidence suggests that in certain circumstances which fit *Hellenica*, it became regular practice to preface a work with a summary of events on a smaller scope and scale from the rest; it also illuminates some of the secondary problems outlined above.

Diodorus Siculus (15.94.4) supplies the evidence when he describes the history of Dion written by Athanas of Syracuse in terms that suggest a parallel to *Hellenica*:

different sections on 130. Not all his figures are accurate, but they are close enough. Henry does some sharp work with the statistics 107–33. A. W. Gomme, A. A. Andrewes, K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* Vol. 5 (Oxford 1980) 431–34 represent the sceptics, but their comments on Xenophon are brief since he is not their primary interest. There have always been proponents of the essential unity of *Hellenica*. E. Schwarz in *Rh. Mus.* 45 (1889) 161–93 was one of the earliest. Those who believe the work was written all at once must set it in the 350s B.C. because of the reference to this as the time of writing: *Hellenica* 6.4.37.

²On the chronological interpolations, G. E. Underhill, ed., Xenophon, *Hellenica* (Oxford 1906) xxxvi–xlii, esp. xxxix: "On the whole, therefore, the balance of probability appears to be in favour of regarding as spurious all these passages (references to Olympiads, years of war, archons and ephors, contemporary events in Persia and Sicily), which have evidently been inserted in imitation of Thucydides' custom. . .", and again on year and season notices, "Not all of these, however, are above suspicion." On the connexions, Underhill xv–xvii, Henry (note 1 above) 14–17, 20–21, 49. Underhill concludes that most of the looseness would be explicable if we assumed that Xenophon was dealing with a text of Thucydides whose last few paragraphs have now been lost. Henry concludes the connexions are so loose that Xenophon could not have been continuing Thucydides at all. M. MacLaren, "A Supposed Lacuna at the Beginning of Xenophon's *Hellenica*," *AJP* 100 (1979) 228–38 believes there are more connexions with Thucydides than meet the eye.

³V. J. Gray, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* (London 1989).

Τῶν δὲ συγγραφέων Ἀθήνας ὁ Συρακόσιος τῶν περὶ Δίωνα πράξεων ἐντεῦθεν ἀρξάμενος ἔγραψε μὲν βύβλους τρισκαίδεκα, προανέλαβε δὲ τὸν ἀγραφὸν χρόνον ἑτῶν ἑπτὰ ἀπὸ τῆς Φιλίστου συντάξεως ἐν μιᾷ βύβλῳ καὶ διελθὼν τὰς πράξεις ἐν κεφαλαίοις συνεχῇ τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐποίησεν.

Of the historians Athanas of Syracuse wrote thirteen books on the events surrounding the expedition of Dion, making this his starting point, but he attached as a preface to this in one book the unwritten period of seven years from where Philistus had ended, and by treating the events in summary fashion, he made the history a continuous narrative.

Athanas is part of a tradition of historical writing which seeks to create a continuous record of the past. Philistus had played a very important part in creating the tradition for Sicilian history. The evidence does not allow us to judge whether he achieved initial continuity by taking up where a previous historian had left off, but he certainly achieved subsequent continuity within his own works. Ancient critics say that he wrote on three separate themes: the history of Sicily to 406/5 B.C., the career of Dionysius the Elder to his death in 367/6 B.C., and the career of Dionysius the Younger, but they insist that in spite of their separateness these three themes formed a continuous narrative. Dionysius of Halicarnassus adds that the connexion between the work on Sicily and the work on Dionysius the Elder could be seen at the end of the work on Sicily. Athanas therefore imitated Philistus' own practice and developed the tradition of continuous history in connecting the beginning of his work on Dion with the end of Philistus' work on Dionysius the Younger. But he took one interesting step forward from Philistus. Dionysius of Halicarnassus says that Philistus left his work incomplete and Diodorus agrees that his history ended in 363/2 B.C., when Dionysius the Younger was still in power (15.89.3). Philistus probably died before he could complete his work. He was killed within a year or two of Dion's arrival in 357 B.C.⁴ Athanas therefore took up the theme of Dionysius the Younger in mid-stream, summarising the seven years before the expedition of Dion which he was to make his own subject.

⁴Jacoby *FGH* 556 and 562 for the life, works and meagre fragments of Philistus and Athanas. D.S. 13.103.3 for the continuity of Philistus' history, 15.89.3 for his end point, 16.16 for his death. D.H., *Letter to Gnaeus Pompey* 4-5, *On Imitation* 3.2 for how he joined the work on Sicily to the work on Dionysius, and for his failure to complete his work.

Diodorus' description of Athanas' work is one in keeping with the tradition of continuous history set by Philistus and acknowledged by the ancient critics, and it is for that reason likely to be accurate. But Diodorus does not explain why Athanas chose the summary form to achieve the continuity. His reason may have been a reluctance to deal fully with what he had himself not witnessed. Athanas was an eye-witness of the events he described in his fuller narrative, but perhaps not a witness at all of what he summarised. He served personally under Dion, who displaced Dionysius from power, and he witnessed the campaigns of Timoleon, who came to clear up Sicily after the anarchy that ensued on the death of Dion, but it is debatable whether he was in Syracuse when Dionysius the Younger was in power. Dion's followers included many who had gone into exile with him, and the period of their exile was also the period of Dionysius' rule (367–57 B.C.). The probability that Athanas was among them and therefore outside Syracuse during the period he treated in summary form is given support by his subsequent appointment to a shared command in Syracuse with Heraclides, one of the most prominent of all the exiles. Philistus also dealt with events contemporary with his own maturity in which he had played a prominent part. He had a long and chequered career serving under the Dionysii and died in the struggle of the Younger Dionysius to hold his tyranny against the return of Dion, the relative he had exiled.⁵ Athanas' fuller treatment of events in which he did participate could be seen as an affirmation of the value of contemporaneous autopsy in which the events of the writer's mature eye-witness are his main interest. This could be a feature of the tradition of contemporary Sicilian history and together with the desire for historical continuity, it could account for the summary form of Athanas' first book.

But Polybius suggests another explanation of the summary form. Polybius was committed to the tradition of continuous history. He signalled his intention to take up his main narrative where Aratus had left off at Olympiad 140 (1.3.2), and he prefaced his main account with an introduction which took up where Timaeus had left off at Olympiad 129 (1.5.1). This introduction began with the dawn of a new era, the first occasion on which the Romans crossed the sea from Italy, and it lasted the entire first two books (1.13–15; 2.71). A short prefatory summary of

⁵Jacoby 562 T. 1 speaks of Athanas' shared command with the exile Heraclides. See D.S. 16.6ff. and Plutarch, *Dion* on the career of Dion and Heraclides. Plato, *Ep.* 7.329C indicates 367 B.C. as the date of Dion's exile.

events starting with the Peace of Antalcidas in 387 B.C. (1.6-12) explained as background to this new era how and when the Romans established themselves in Italy and what prompted that first overseas venture.⁶ Polybius believed historians should begin their histories at the dawn of a new era that was generally recognised and self-contained, and he applied this to his own introduction. He added that a summary account of previous or intervening events might be required to make the new era more comprehensible to the reader. This explains his own summary and could serve as an explanation of others as well (1.5.4). His principle of beginning with the dawn of a new era could in fact be a better explanation of Athanas' use of the summary form than the argument from contemporary witness. The return of Dion to Syracuse was indeed the beginning of an era. The preface could indeed have been designed to explain his return against the background of the seven last years of the rule of Dionysius. It made no sense to start a full scale history in the middle of the career of Dionysius the Younger.

There was in fact a tension between the concept of continuous history and the desire for a sensible and significant starting point. This tension was particularly likely to reveal itself when a previous historian left his work incomplete. Athanas may have seen that he had to begin his full account at a sensible place, but he also had to complete the unfinished account of Philistus. The solution was the bridging summary.

But Athanas was not the first to face this problem or find this solution. Xenophon also used a bridging summary to link the beginning of his fuller narrative on to the end of his predecessor's incomplete account. The controversial first part of *Hellenica* (1-2.3.10) is the summary in question. It achieves continuity with the unfinished work of Thucydides just as Athanas' summary achieved continuity with that of Philistus. Xenophon was committed to continuous history. The abrupt beginning of *Hellenica* attests to it and his ending confirms it by expressing the hope that he will find his own continuator. His summary of the story of the Ten Thousand and their return to the coast (*Hell.* 3.1.1), which prefaces the account of subsequent expeditions in Asia, is further proof of his commitment.

Xenophon appears to have devised the bridging summary before Athanas. He was writing his sixth book in the 350s B.C. and should

⁶F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* Vol. 1 (Oxford 1957) for references to these passages.

logically have written his bridging summary before then. Athanas was still writing after 337/6 B.C.⁷

Xenophon and Athanas could both have devised the bridging summary independently but the formal similarities between their works are marked enough to suggest a relationship. Their summaries are also both on roughly the same scale. Athanas covered seven years in one ancient book, Xenophon treats six years in what we now possess as a book and a bit, but which was anciently recognised as two.⁸ The conclusion must be that Xenophon inspired Athanas. Both probably exhibited unevenness of treatment. Xenophon includes various more detailed incidents in the midst of his summary narrative and it is difficult to imagine that Athanas wrote a whole book on seven years without doing the same. Their decision to use the bridging summary created considerable formal differences of scale and scope within their works. There may have also been stylistic differences between Athanas' summary and main account like those observed in *Hellenica*, but too little survives to permit a judgement.

Their reasons for using the summary form also seem the same. Both chose the dawn of a new era as the starting point for their fuller accounts. The nature of the era could be formulated in various different ways, but there would have been general agreement about the cutting point. The expedition and return of Dion to Syracuse signalled to those hopeful of such an outcome the end of tyranny and dawn of freedom for Syracuse. The end of the Peloponnesian War signalled the end of Athenian power and the beginning of Spartan control of Greece. Xenophon's choice of the return of Lysander to Sparta after the siege of Athens and the elimination of opposition in the Aegean as the end of the summary part of his account probably indicate that he saw the new era as one of

⁷Jacoby 562 F.3 indicates Athanas was writing after 337/6 B.C. Xenophon's summary cannot be this late. L. Canfora, *Tucidide Continuato* (Padova 1970) 195 notes that Athanas continued Philistus and suggests he did this in imitation of Xenophon, but makes nothing more of the similarity.

⁸There is evidence in antiquity of different book divisions from those currently observed: Underhill (note 2 above) xiii: Harpocration seems to recognise 2.3.10 as the dividing point between Books 2 and 3 when he ascribes 2.3.2 to Book 2 and 2.3.36 to Books 3, so that "we need not confine ourselves to the prevailing division into seven books." L. Canfora, "Il Papiro Rainer e la Divisione in Libri delle Elleniche," *ZPE* 24 (1979) 47-51 gives evidence of the division between the end of Book 1 and the beginning of Book 2 at 1.5.7/8. I would conclude that someone in antiquity recognised a summary consisting of two books, on a par with the one book of Athanas.

Spartan control of Greece. Xenophon's more specific aims in writing his summary might be subject to debate, those of Athanas will perhaps never be recovered, but in formal terms their summaries brought them both to their starting points and in that way explained their main narratives.

The evidence points to the emergence in Greek historical writing of the concept of continuous history and of the bridging summary as a device to facilitate the continuation of themes left incomplete by earlier historians. Philistus heralds the concept of continuous history, consciously so, if the ancient critics read him right. Xenophon creates the concept of the bridging summary for mainland Greek history probably a few decades before Athanas follows suit for Sicilian history. Dionysius of Halicarnassus notes affinities between Philistus and Thucydides as historians, not least the fact that both left their histories incomplete. This linked their continuators. Many of the followers of Dion were philosophers, as was Xenophon. The connexions between Athanas and Xenophon may have been closer than we think.⁹

The evidence also throws new light on the old controversy about the first part of *Hellenica*. The recognition that it is deliberately designed as a summary begins to explain the formal features like the brevity and unevenness that differentiate it from the subsequent narrative. Summaries may have been like that.

Since Athanas was not the inspiration for Xenophon, but rather the other way around, it seems logical to try to find the inspiration for Xenophon's bridging summary in the author he continued, bearing in mind the traditional nature of most ancient literary developments. Thucydides' account of the Fifty Years (1.88-115) is indeed the earliest extant summary account of an earlier period that provides essential preliminary explanation of the main theme.¹⁰ It could also be seen as a

⁹On resemblances between Thucydides and Philistus, including their failure to complete their works, D.H., *Letter to Pompey* and *On Imitation* (note 4 above). On Xenophon as philosopher, Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* II.48ff. On Dion and his companions as philosophers, Plutarch, *Dion*. It is not impossible that Xenophon and Athanas were known to each other. Athanas was in exile with Dion, who spent time in the Peloponnese. We do not know what contacts Xenophon had outside Scillus in the 350s B.C., but his estate was on the road to Olympia and I imagine a wide network of visiting contacts including philosophers. He was certainly famous enough to be the focus of such visits, considering the number of encomia Diogenes says were written for his son Gryllus who died at Mantinea.

¹⁰A. W. Gomme, *An Historical Commentary on Thucydides* Vol. 1 (Oxford 1945)



contribution to continuous history. Thucydides continues the history of Herodotus, covering events in summary form from the point at which Herodotus broke off to the point where he embarks on the fuller account of his own theme, the Peloponnesian War. He begins with the completion of the siege of Sestos, summing up the final events in Herodotus thus:

When the Medes withdrew from Europe, defeated on land and sea by the Greeks, and those who had fled in the ships were vanquished at Mycale, Leotychidas, the Spartan King who led the Greeks at Mycale, went home with the Peloponnesian allies, while the Athenians with the allies from the Hellespont and Ionia, already in revolt from the King, remained behind and besieged Sestos which was held by the Medes. Passing the winter there, when the Persians abandoned the place, they took it, and after this they all sailed away from the Hellespont to their respective homes.

(1.89.2-3)

He then proceeds to the story of the rebuilding of Athens.

If there is a relationship between Xenophon's summary and Thucydides', it would be one of inspiration rather than imitation, since there are obvious formal differences between them. To begin with, Xenophon summarises his events in their natural chronological order before the events they precede, whereas Thucydides summarises his out of their natural order in the form of a digression during the events they naturally precede. Thucydides had a reputation in antiquity for unnatural organisation of events. Xenophon was a plainer man.¹¹ Moreover, though both are highly selective in their choice of material, Xenophon's summary is larger in scale relative to its scope. Thucydides writes up the rebuilding of the Athenian walls in some detail, but Xenophon highlights several episodes including the reaction of Hermocrates to his unjust sentence of exile, the return of Alcibiades from exile, the battle of Arginusae and the trial of the generals, the Athenian expectation of enslavement at the end of the war which highlights the generosity of

361-413 deals with the nature of the summary of the Fifty Years. Scholars often forget that Thucydides is as odd as Xenophon in his omissions and preferences. No one expected full coverage from a summary.

¹¹ See the comments made by Dionysius of Halicarnassus on the organisation of Thucydides' history (*de Thuc.* 9-11), particularly the implication that the summary of the Fifty Years is out of its natural order. Polybius emphasises the importance of the right order of events 1.13.8-9.

Sparta in refusing to enslave. Thucydides shows his commitment to the theme of Athenian power by dwelling on the walls, Xenophon shows his commitment to moral virtue.¹²

Yet both are undeniably continuations of earlier historians in summary form, and there are beyond that some other quite interesting resemblances. These are perhaps more generic than specific but even generic similarities are significant. Thus their avoidance of particles and their dry narrative style, further discussed below, could be features commonly exhibited by summaries. They are part of a stylistic distinction both writers make between summary and main account. There are further formal distinctions. Thucydides abandons the strict chronology of his main account in his summary and favours loose designations of time such as the vague *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα*, which occurs only thirteen times in Book 1, but nine times in the summary (1.98.4, 100.1, 108.4, 111.2, 112.5, 113.1, 114.1, 2, 118.1). There are other loose designations as well (1.100.2,3 *χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον* . . . *ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους*, 1.107.1 *κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τούτους*, 1.113.1 *χρόνου ἐγγενομένου*, etc.). There are no year end or beginning notices, only references to years passing (1.112.1), sometimes within events (1.101.3, 103.1, 110.1, 115.2). The nature of Xenophon's chronology is complicated by the general belief that the more elaborate apparatus is interpolated, but if all the suspected interpolations are removed from the summary, what remains is as loose as in Thucydides. Nothing should be made of their shared use of common phrases like *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα*, or the resemblance between *Hell.* 1.1.1 (*μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλαῖς ἡμέραις ὕστερον*) and similar phrases in Thucydides (*μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον* 1.114.1, *μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ . . . οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσι ὕστερον* 118.1), but the generic similarities are indicative of a shared view of the nature of the summary.

Their basic reasons for writing their summaries may also be similar. Both provide essential preliminary explanation of the starting point of the fuller narrative. Thucydides says he wrote on the Fifty Years because he wanted to improve the chronology of earlier historians but also to show how the Athenians rose to the power that was theirs at the beginning of the War (1.97.2). He used his summary in the same sort of way Polybius later used his, to explain the rise of Athens to greatness and the background to the outbreak of the war. He summarised the Fifty Years because he preferred to write on the Peloponnesian War,

¹²Gray (note 3 above) on the emphasis on moral virtue in highlights in Book 1-2.3.9.

which he considered the greatest event in Greek history (1.1). He had lived through it and was in a better position to make sense of it than earlier history (5.25ff.). The summaries of Xenophon and Athanas, as far as I understand them, affirmed the same basic principle. They completed the unfinished work of their predecessors or gave a better account of the completion than others, but they reserved their fuller accounts for history that marked a new era, which may also have been more properly contemporaneous with their maturity. Their summaries served to make their main themes comprehensible. Athanas explained the circumstances leading up to the return of Dion. Xenophon explained the way in which the Spartans became the leaders of Greece.

Thucydides' summary of the Fifty Years may have inspired Xenophon's own bridging summary, but Xenophon must be given final credit for pioneering a new form of continuous history. This is in keeping with his marked tendency toward literary experimentation in other genres as well.¹³ The conclusion from the evidence of Diodorus on Athanas and the discussion arising from it is that the formal differences between Xenophon's summary continuation of the Peloponnesian War and the rest of the *Hellenica* do not constitute a problem. They have been misunderstood because they were innovative in their time.

The recognition of the formal identity of the work illuminates other areas of the controversy like the loose connexion with Thucydides. We still do not know how continuators were expected to connect their work with that of their predecessors when those predecessors had left events in mid-stream, but we do now know that the principal difficulty was how to take up in summary form events that had been left incomplete in fuller form. Thucydides had an easy task continuing Herodotus, if that was part of his intention, because the break was so clean and tidy. Continuing the mess Thucydides and perhaps Philistus had left was more difficult. Xenophon's loose connexions have been fully documented. His difficulties have not. We should note that Xenophon sometimes makes loose connexions with his own previous narrative. Conon disappears after the battle of Aegospotami in 405 B.C. to surface fighting with the Persian Pharnabazus off Caunus in 394 B.C. (2.1.29; 4.3.11).

¹³ Xenophon's role in literary experimentation is well attested. He was a pioneer of biographical form (*Agésilas*, *Cyropaidia*) and of Socratic literature, especially in works like *Memorabilia*, for which see A. Momigliano, *The Development of Greek Biography* (Harvard 1971). I have argued that his *Cynegeticus* and his *Hiero* are also formal literary experiments, *Hermes* 113 (1985) 156–72 and *CQ* 36 (1986) 115–23.

Peisander is appointed to the sea command at the end of 395 B.C. and disappears until this same battle (3.4.29; 4.3.11). The exiles from Rhodes appeal to the Spartans out of a complete vacuum (4.8.20). Perhaps looseness was generally acceptable. Nevertheless, the idea of a lacuna at the beginning of Xenophon's text or the end of Thucydides' has its attractions, and the evidence concerning continuous history might support it. Philistus apparently announced the connexion between his history of Dionysius the Elder and his history of Sicily at the end of the first work, not the beginning of the second. Xenophon was not necessarily in control of Thucydides' text, but the parallel is suggestive. He certainly announces a hope of his own continuator, albeit from a cleaner end point, at the end of his own work. There are of course mysteries still to be solved, like the uncanny resemblances between events from the end of Thucydides and the beginning of Xenophon (Thuc. 8.71, 80 versus Xen. 1.1.33-36), but the evidence concerning continuous history makes it impossible for me to believe that Xenophon did not himself believe that he was continuing Thucydides.

There are no other arguments of substance to support the idea that Xenophon's completion of Thucydides was written as a separate work. In the tradition of continuous history, when a bridge was required to a previous historian, the summary was a standard preliminary to the fuller work. The stylistic differences now need to be addressed.

Stylistic variation has played an important part in supporting the theory against the essential unity of *Hellenica*. It has been argued that there are changes in style between the various sections which indicate that they were written at different times in Xenophon's life, and these changes have been used to support the idea that the sections were independently conceived. The formal identity of *Hellenica* could still accommodate the possibility that the summary and other sections were written at different times, and even perhaps as independent themes. Philistus might also have laid down his pen between the history of Sicily, the history of Dionysius the Elder and the history of Dionysius the Younger. Thucydides could have written his history of the Fifty Years earlier or later than the rest. Yet there seems to me no stylistic reason to believe that Xenophon's whole history was not written more or less sequentially in the 350s B.C.

Stylistic differences have been seen as evidence of chronological development, but they can be simply evidence of good writing, which adapts style to content. Xenophon was a master of style who followed the principle of rhetorical propriety and varied his language from genre

to genre and passage to passage to fit the required mood or tone. The formal encomium of the Spartan King, *Agésilauos*, is written in a more elaborate style than *Hellenica*. Its version of the campaigns of Agésilauos in Asia, though largely a word for word copy of the *Hellenica*, nevertheless recognises the difference between encomium and history by preferring more poetic vocabulary and showing more concern for euphony and balance. Scientific/anatomical descriptions in the technical *Peri Hippikes* reflect on the other hand the unadorned style appropriate for such descriptions. Dialogues such as *Hiero*, *Symposion* are generally written in the natural style of conversation, but those passages designed to be more persuasive are more rhetorical than the rest. The historical works differentiate speeches from narrative, preferring more elaborate styles for speeches, but individual speeches also vary to suit the character of the speaker and the circumstances of the delivery. Stylistic variation, between Xenophon's works and within them, acknowledges variations of content and tone.¹⁴ Presumably then, his *Hellenica* will have one style for summary narrative and another for fuller narrative, adapting to fit the content in both cases. This takes us some way in understanding obvious differences like the increase in narrative rhetoric from the summary to the fuller account. A rhetorical summary would be overdone.

Stylistic variation need not reflect even content, however, let alone lapse of time. It can be merely a positive feature of normal writing. The earlier and later parts of Tacitus' *Annals* also revealed differences from which theories of various periods of composition and distinct types of content were at first developed. They were later recognised as nothing more than evidence of a constantly changing style throughout the work, a Tacitus never content but always seeking variation for its own sake. Dover also concluded in his study of Greek word order that the desire

¹⁴I have made reference to the variety of Xenophon's styles in several other places, including "Xenophon's *Cynegeticus*," *Hermes* 113 (1985) 167-70 and *Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* (note 3 above). The introduction to *Agésilauos* (I) and the summary of virtues (II) are markedly rhetorical. A. Opitz, *Quaestiones Xenophontaeae: de Hellenicorum atque Agésilai necessitudine* (Breslau 1912) clearly proves that Xenophon made the style of Agésilauos' campaigns in *Agésilauos* more rhetorical. For the features of scientific description in *Peri Hippikes* see my comments in *Hermes* 167-70. For variation within dialogues, compare the quiet and conversational introduction to *Hiero* with the grand style of the more emotional part of the complaints of Hiero and the more inspiring parts of the advice of Simonides at *Hiero* 6 and 11. On the greater elaboration in speeches see below.

for variety was inclined to cancel out any tendency to logical uniformity. He hinted that this was a general rule of Greek prose style.¹⁵

Those stylistic differences between sections of *Hellenica* that are not explicable in terms of changing form or content as above prove on examination to be quite largely explicable in terms of Dover's normal rule of Greek prose style, that it consciously seeks variation within both small and large units of composition, and that it constantly varies the ways of achieving variety for its own sake. The examination also reveals that the summary is not an inept or lazy piece of writing, as some have alleged, but in its own right a work of art, as we would expect from Xenophon.

There are two main areas of stylistic evidence used to support the idea of chronological breaks in composition: use of synonyms and use of particles. One of the differences between that part of *Hellenica* dealing with the Peloponnesian War and the rest of the work that has appeared most convincing evidence for a chronological break is that the phrase *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα* and its variants predominate over *ἐκ δὲ τούτου* and its variants in the first part, whereas the preference is reversed in the second.¹⁶

The break is of course not straightforward. There are other synonyms designating time "after this" beside these two. *Ἐντεῦθεν* is one, occurring at 1.1.6, 8, 22; 1.2.13, 1.7.9, etc. To concentrate on the relationship between only two of a wider range of synonyms may mislead. Moreover, there is no simple change from the one form to the other. While *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα* predominates in the account of the Peloponnesian War (hereafter called Part I), in a ratio 5:1, with only four occurrences of *ἐκ δὲ τούτου*, *pace* MacLaren's five (1.3.8, 1.5.7, 14, 1.6.4 [a dubious case]), *ἐκ δὲ τούτου* predominates in the rest of *Hellenica* (hereafter called Part II), in a ratio approaching 1:5 in some sections, with only fourteen occurrences of *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα* (in Books 6-7 six times: 6.4.15, 6.5.10, 49; 7.1.22, 7.4.12, 26). The break seems established, however, because *ἐκ δὲ τούτου* takes over so dramatically after the end of the Peloponnesian War, with not a *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα* in sight through the whole

¹⁵Cf. R. Syme, *Tacitus* Vol. 1 (Oxford 1958) 340-63, Vol. 2, 711-45 with the later scepticism of J. N. Adams, "The language of the later books of Tacitus *Annals*," *CQ* n.s. 22 (1972) 350-73. K. J. Dover, *Greek Word Order* (Cambridge 1960), particularly his comments on 66-68.

¹⁶MacLaren gives the statistics *AJP* 55 (1934) 130. Andrewes/Dover produce the scepticism (note 1 above) 443f.

narrative of the Athenian Civil War that follows. There may be some difficulty explaining why μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα then returns and recurs throughout all subsequent books, but it has not seemed insuperable.

Yet the principle behind this argument, that a sharp change of preference means a chronological break, is quite untenable. The same sharp change of preference also occurs in another pair of synonyms ἀθροίζειν / συλλέγειν over Books 5–6, where ἀθροίζειν dominates in Book 5 (5.1.7, 2.16, 23, 24, 25, 38, 4.44) with infrequent occurrence of συλλέγειν (5.4.60), but the reverse operates in Book 6, where συλλέγειν dominates (6.2.5, 4, 21, 5.4, 11, 15, 18) and ἀθροίζειν is infrequent (6.5.8, 22). Yet a chronological break between the end of Book 5 and the beginning of Book 6 makes no sense at all, since those books both deal with the thematically unified narrative of the Boeotian War. The principle that synonym change = chronological break is untenable, however abrupt the change.

If the change from ἀθροίζειν to συλλέγειν is not linked to a change of content, nor to a chronological break, the change to ἐκ δὲ τούτου need not be either. It has been argued that the preference for μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα is part of Xenophon's attempt to imitate Thucydides' style while continuing his subject, but this must be a very peculiar imitation, when Thucydides' more characteristic and more imitable features are completely lacking, and when the use of μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα is widespread elsewhere through a whole range of Greek writers. It is more likely that in the course of writing a long work preference changes almost unconsciously. It is equally possible that there is a deliberate desire for variety. The change might represent quite normal and deliberate variation.

Xenophon indeed shows signs of adopting variation as a literary principle. His deliberate variation of synonyms is attested in several forms. First, there is the apparent desire to avoid using the same synonym twice in the same passage. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα is not infrequently found alternating with ἐκ δὲ τούτου in very close proximity, often in succeeding sentences, as if Xenophon is deliberately seeking variation. This desire for variety explains two of the uses of ἐκ τούτου in Part I:

1.5.6 has two succeeding sentences with the varying beginnings: μετὰ δὲ τὸ δειπνον . . . ἐκ δὲ τούτου τέτταρες. . . .

1.5.13–15 has three beginning μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα . . . ἐκ τούτου δέ . . . μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα. . . .

4.4.1 has two beginning μετὰ τοῦτό γε μὴν . . . ἐκ δὲ τούτου. . . .

6.5.49 has two sentences one sentence apart beginning μετὰ ταῦτα . . . ἐκ δὲ τούτου. . . .

7.1.22 has two beginning μετὰ ταῦτα . . . ἐκ δὲ τούτου. . . .

A second type of variation occurs within the phrasing of the one synonym: ἐκ δὲ τούτου . . . ἐκ τούτου δέ at 4.5.18-19. This explains the triplet in 1.7.3-5: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα . . . μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα . . . μετὰ ταῦτα δέ. There is also variation with other variants (4.7.7).

Xenophon also has a tendency throughout *Hellenica* to vary the use of the synonyms over an extended sequence of several pages, so that while ἐκ δὲ τούτου generally prevails in Part II (3.3.4, 11; 3.4.11, 14, 16(2); 4.4.9, 14, 4.5.6, 18, 19), the opening words of the distinct and separate episodes beginning 3.3 and 3.4 are μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο / ταῦτα, the episode beginning 4.4 opens with both variants in close proximity, the episode 4.5 with ἐκ δὲ τούτου, 4.6 with μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, 4.7.2 with ἐκ δὲ τούτου, etc.

Variation can also produce clusters over smaller sequences. In 7.4 there is a clustering of μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον . . . μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πολλὸ ὕστερον (13, 16), then of ἐκ τούτου δὴ (18, 20). Of the four uses of ἐκ τούτου in Part I two are close together, at 1.5.7, 14, which may reveal a clustering tendency behind the desire for variety noted above.

The tendency to vary indications of time "after this" is pronounced in *Anabasis*, which uses both synonyms throughout, often side by side for deliberate variation (e.g., 6.6.19; 7.5.10), often in clusters alongside other variants. The following cluster sequences begin the separate and distinct paragraph sections in the OCT:

6.5.22, 6.6.1 ἐντεῦθεν

6.6.17 μετὰ ταῦτα

6.6.29, 35, 37; 7.1.2 and 7, 7.2.8 ἐκ τούτου

7.2.12 μετά

7.2.31, 3.1 ἀκούσας/ἀκούσαντες ταῦτα

7.3.7, 13, 15 μετὰ ταῦτα/τοῦτο

7.3.21, 26 ἐπει(δὴ) δέ

7.3.40, 44 ἦνικα δέ

7.4.12, 20 ἐκ

7.5.6 ἐντεῦθεν

7.6.42, 7.7.4, 11 ἀκούσας ταῦτα / ταῦτ' ἀκούσας / ἐπεὶ ταῦτ' ἤκουσεν

7.7.1, 20, 7.8.1, 7 ἐντεῦθεν

7.8.8, 16 ἐνταῦθα δὴ.

This almost rhythmical preference for first one then another variant must be deliberate variation for its own sake rather than evidence of different periods of composition or differences of mood or tone. If μετά and ἐκ were here considered on their own, as they have been in *Hellenica*, without regard for the other variants, the statistics would show that ἐκ prevails over ten OCT pages (6.6.29–7.2.12), μετά over thirteen OCT pages (7.2.12–7.4.12), and ἐκ from there. This would produce the impression of a break similar to that in *Hellenica*. There is therefore no reason to think that the change from μετά δὲ ταῦτα to ἐκ δὲ τούτου at the end of the Peloponnesian War is at all unlike the changes that occur constantly throughout *Anabasis*, which are certainly not evidence of a chronological break. The recognition of variation as a principle of Xenophon's writing suggests that there is nothing unusual in such change.

It is useful to look at the behaviour of another pair of synonyms: ἔπεσθαι / ἀκολουθεῖν. Part I has ἔπεσθαι exclusively (2.1.27, 2.2.29), and it continues dominant after the end of the Peloponnesian War (2.4.18, 30, 32). The deliberate desire for variety dictates the first use of ἀκολουθεῖν (2.4.32), in close proximity to its variant. The first use of ἀκολουθεῖν in isolation does not come until 3.1.27, and it then co-exists with ἔπεσθαι for Books 3–5 (e.g., ἔπεσθαι 3.4.23; 4.6.2, ἀκολουθεῖν 3.1.27; 4.2.18). The desire for variety continues in several passages where both synonyms are used close together (3.1.22, 3.4.7–8; 5.1.8), but ἀκολουθεῖν gradually begins to dominate, and by Book 7 it is in total control (7.1.24, 33, 40, 46, 7.2.4, 11, 20, 22, etc.). In this case there is no abrupt change at the end of the Peloponnesian War or the Athenian Civil War. Variety dictates the first sign of the change to ἀκολουθεῖν at 2.4.32, not chronological development.

The statistics are further complicated by Xenophon's desire for euphony, a principle of his writing recognised in the more elaborate *Agésilas* but not in *Hellenica*. The pair ἔπεσθαι / ἀκολουθεῖν provide an example of euphonious treatment:

- 2.1.27 ('p' alliteration 'oi' assonance) εἶπε τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐπομένοις
- 2.2.20 ('hep', 'hop', 'heg' assonance, parison 'hepesthai/hegontai') ἔπεσθαι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ὅποι ἂν ἡγῶνται
- 2.4.18 (rough breathings, 'n' 'm' alliteration 'oi' assonance) νίκη δ' ὑμῖν ἔσται ἐπομένοις, ἔμοι μέντοι θάνατος
- 2.4.30 ('p' alliteration, 'syn/symm, pont/pant' assonance) συνείποντο δὲ καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι πάντες πλὴν

- 2.4.32 (rough breathings versus 'l' alliteration) τοὺς μὲν ἱππέας ἔλ'αν εἰς αὐτοὺς ἐνέντας καὶ τὰ δέκα ἀφ' ἥβης συνένεσθαι, σὺν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπηκολούθει
- 3.1.22 (paranomasia 'parepomenos/paradounai', 'p' alliteration) παρεπόμενος αὐτῷ ἡξίου τὴν Γεργιθίων πόλιν παραδοῦναι αὐτῷ
- 3.1.27 ('k' alliteration) ἡκολούθει κάκεινος
- 3.4.7 ('k/ch' and 'th' alliteration versus rough breathing) παμπλήθης ὄχλος θεραπεύων αὐτὸν ἡκολούθει . . . οὔτε ἔπεσθαι ἑαυτὸν ἔτι εἶα
- 3.4.23 ('p' 'n' 'm' alliteration, 'ou' assonance) πάντος τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐπομένου, but euphony vies with variety to produce in the next few lines the uneuphonic οἱ δ' Ἕλληνες ἐπηκολουθοῦντες αἵρουσι
- 4.2.18 ('k' alliteration) ἐπηκολούθουν καίπερ γινώσκοντες ὅτι κίνδυνος εἴη κυκλωθῆναι
- 4.6.2 ('hep', 'hop', 'heg', etc. rough breathings) ἐπόμεθα ὅποι ἂν ἡγήσθε
- 5.1.8 (rough breathings 'p' alliteration, 'p' 'l' alliteration) ὅπως μὴ πλανῶνται αἱ ἐπόμεναι . . . ἐπηκολούθει κατὰ τὸν λαμπτήρα ὑπολείπόμενος

While some of these might be contested, the general principle is clear, that Xenophon has a regard for euphony in his use of synonyms, and also for some figures of speech, though these are rarer. The patterns of euphony could suggest that Xenophon's synonym preference is often actually determined by considerations of euphony, and that given a choice, he prefers the one that fits the pattern of sounds that he has already formed in his mind, or that given a preference for one synonym or the other, he chooses a pattern of sound in surrounding words to suit. The use of ἀκολουθεῖν without euphonic effect in 5.3.26 and 6.3.7 to replace the euphonic ἔπεσθαι in the formula at 2.2.20 and 4.6.2 suggests that changing preference is at least sometimes more important than euphony, but euphony is certainly a deliberate feature of the style where it occurs, raising the possibility at least that variations of synonyms also involve deliberate stylistic choices. If the choice is fully deliberate, it becomes harder to accept that his preference simply developed in time without his controlling it.

To return to the original pair of synonyms, there is evidence of a certain desire for euphony in their use as well. Consider the variants:

- 4.4.1 ('ou' assonance in the latter, 'e' assonance in the former?) μετὰ τοῦτο γε μὴν . . . ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐπολέμουν
- 7.1.22 ('m' alliteration versus 'ou' assonance) μετὰ ταῦτα μέντοι οἱ Θηβαῖοι μείναντες . . . ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐμβάλλουσι

The conclusion must be that synonym variation is a matter of stylistic choice, too complex to accept as evidence for a chronological break. The pattern of synonym development is moreover uneven. Μετά δὲ ταῦτα and ἔπεσθαι dominate in Part I but the latter dominates more exclusively. Then the first is absent from the Athenian Civil War but the latter continues, meanwhile allowing the variant ἀκολουθεῖν to appear. Then both synonyms exist side by side in each case, but μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα / ἐκ δὲ τούτου both persist while ἀκολουθεῖν comes to dominate ἔπεσθαι completely. So that while ἐκ δὲ τούτου is present throughout, gains ground over μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα from the end of the Peloponnesian War but never completely eclipses it, ἀκολουθεῖν arrives late, co-exists for some time, then makes a complete takeover. When the patterns are different in detail, and when euphony then emerges as a complicating factor, it is dangerous to argue that stylistic variation is evidence of anything as clear cut as a chronological break in composition.

Anabasis has a similar variation of synonyms and these certainly cannot be evidence of a chronological break. Ἔπεσθαι is the regular preference in Book 1 and ἀκολουθεῖν puts in an appearance only in Book 2 (ἔπεσθαι 1.3.17, 18, 19, 21, 4.11, 14, 15, 8.19 versus ἀκολουθεῖν 2.5.30, 3.1.4, etc.). Euphony is operating again:

1.3.17 (rough breathing alliteration) τῷ ἡγεμόνι ὃν δοίη ἔπεσθαι

1.3.18 (") ἔπεσθαι καὶ ἡμᾶς

1.3.19 (") οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἐπόμενοι

1.3.21 (") ὁμῶς δὲ ἐδόκει ἔπεσθαι

1.4.11 ('p' 'th' alliteration) καὶ ἀναπείθειν ἔπεσθαι

1.4.14 (rough breathings) ἔπεσθαι τοὺς Ἑλλήνας

1.4.15 ('p' alliteration) ψηφίσωνται ἔπεσθαι

It may be argued here that euphony is a secondary consideration, and the factor determining the choice of synonym is personal preference for the form, but this is less plausibly argued for another pair of synonyms, περί / ἀμφί, where there is no marked preference for one or the other, but euphony seems to determine the choice throughout, περί occurring at 1.2.8, 7.1.2, 8.27, 9.30, 2.1.7, ἀμφί at 1.2.3, 10, 8.1, 27, 10.3:

1.2.3 ('m' alliteration) τῶν ἀμφὶ Μίλητον στρατευομένων

1.2.8 ('er' assonance) ἐρίζοντά οἱ περί σοφίας

1.7.1 ('pe' assonance) ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ περί μέσας νύκτας

1.7.2 (hiatus avoided) Κυρῶ περί

1.8.1 ('a' assonance) ἦν ἀμφὶ ἀγορὰν πλήθουσιν

1.9.30 ('p' alliteration) πάντες δὲ οἱ περὶ αὐτόν

2.1.7 ('p' alliteration) ἦν περὶ πλήθουσιν ἀγορὰν

The euphonic variation in the formulaic expression of time 1.8.1 / 2.1.7 surely proves the case. 'A' assonance determines the choice and order of the first, 'p' alliteration the choice and order of the second. Deliberate euphonic considerations are paramount over other aspects of preference.

The pair ἀμφί / περὶ establishes the principle of euphonic choice in *Hellenica*, where the sounds of names, which are invariable and not a matter of choice, dictate the use of now one now the other synonym. Both are used at 5.3.13 with a suggestion of euphony: οἱ περὶ Ποδάνημον . . . οἱ ἀμφὶ Προκλέα (variety to avoid the cacophonous repetition of peri po . . . peri pro . . .). Other instances are also chosen with an ear to euphony: ('m' alliteration, avoidance of hiatus) 2.3.46: ἀμφὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Μελάνθιον, ('m' alliteration) 3.2.4: ἐσώθησαν μέντοι αὐτῶν ἀμφί, ('m' alliteration) 5.4.7: ἀμφὶ Μέλωνα, ('m' alliteration); also 5.4.29: ἀμφὶ Σφοδρίαν ('ph' alliteration). If the choice of these synonyms is dictated by the concern for euphony, then so might others be.

The pair μετὰ / σύν confirms the principle. Both are used throughout *Hellenica*, often side by side for variation, and euphony determines the choice in many cases:

1.1.10–11 two sentences describing Alcibiades: ('m' alliteration, variation) μετὰ Μαντιθέου . . . σύν πέντε τριήρεσι

1.1.18, 1.3.6, 1.4.2 ('t') μετ' αὐτοῦ (ὄντες)

1.1.28 ('t') μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀήττητοι

1.2.15, 17 ('t') τοῖς μετὰ Θρασύλλου

1.3.13 (variation) σύν δὲ τούτοις . . . μετὰ δὲ τούτων

1.3.15 ('s') ἀρμοστής καὶ σύν αὐτῷ

1.3.21 ('t') μετὰ πάντων

1.4.8–10 (variation) Ἀλκιβιάδης μετὰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν . . . Θρασύβουλος σύν τριάκοντα ναυσὶν . . . Θράσυλλος σύν τῇ ἄλλῃ στρατιᾷ

1.4.19 ('t') μετὰ τῶν παρεσκευασμένων εἴ τις ἄπτοιο μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν

1.4.21 ('t') μετ' αὐτῶν Ἀριστοκράτης

2.3.36 ('t') ἐν Θεταλίᾳ μετὰ Προμηθέως

2.3.48 (variation) σύν . . . μετὰ

2.4.2 three times (clustering?) σύν

2.4.10 twice (clustering?) σύν

2.5.12 ('th') μεθ' αὐτοῦ θέσθαι

The variants ἀθροΐζειν / συλλέγειν also show euphonic consideration. They are spread through *Hellenica* 1 in a certain rhythmical distribution but with a slight preference for the former: ἀθροΐζειν (1.1.15), συλλέγειν (1.2.6, 3.17, 4.8, 9), ἀθροΐζειν (1.4.3, 13, 1.6.3, 7, 14, 25, 2.1.31, 2.2.8/9). The principle of euphony seems to determine choice:

- 1.2.6 ('l' alliteration) στρατίαν τε συνέλεγεν πολλήν
- 1.3.17 ('l' alliteration) ναῦς συλλέξων αἱ ἦσαν ἐν τῷ Ἑλλησπόντῳ ἄλλαι καταλελειμμένοι
- 1.4.3 (rhythm? 't' and 'n' alliteration 'a' assonance) καταπέμψω Κύρον κάρανον τῶν εἰς Καστωλὸν ἀθροΐζομένων
- 1.4.8/9 ('k' and 'l' alliteration) ἐκείθεν δὲ συλλέξας ἑκατὸν τάλαντα ἤκεν
- 1.4.13 ('st' alliteration) ὁ ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως ὄχλος ἠθροΐσθη
- 2.2.8 (rough breathings) ἅπαντες ἠθροΐσθησαν
- 2.2.9 (rough breathings) ὅσους ἐδύνατο πλείστους αὐτῶν ἀθροΐσας, ὥς δέ. . . .

Both variants continue in Part II, sometimes side by side for deliberate variety (4.2.16–17). Euphony continues to be observed:

- 5.4.60 ('l' 'g' 'n' alliteration) συλλεγέντων τῶν συμμάχων εἰς Λακεδαίμονα λόγοι ἐγίνοντο
- 7.4.28 (rough breathings) αἱ τε ἡμέραι ἐν αἷς ἡ πανήγυρις ἀθροΐζεται

In the abrupt change from ἀθροΐζειν to συλλέγειν over Books 5–6 noted above moreover, euphony accompanies the statistical aberrations of minority usage as if it determines the choice:

- 5.4.60 as above
- 6.5.8 (rough breathings) ἡσυχίαν εἶχον ἠθροισμένοι
- 6.5.22 ('oi' assonance) αὐτοὶ δὲ ἠθροισμένοι

This sets up an entirely different way of looking at synonym preference. The collection of statistics proves nothing. Each use must be seen in context. The idea of stylistic variation = chronological development of style must be matched against = deliberate stylistic choice.

Of the other synonyms adduced as evidence of a chronological break, τροπαῖον ἰστάναι / ἰστασθαι (MacLaren's unchecked statistics 5:0 in Part I, 4:17 in Part II) are both used at 5.4.66 in a clear bid for variety. Moreover, MacLaren's grouping of the statistics blurs an important development and his analysis that the later statistics show a grow-

ing reaction against the non-Attic middle form is misleading.¹⁷ The pattern is that the active dominates in Book 1, the middle in Books 2-5, the active and middle both occur in Books 5-6, but the middle voice takes over completely in Book 7, showing a development from one form to another as marked as that of ἔπεσθαι / ἀκολουθεῖν. Though the Attic form does return at 5.4.66, 6.2.24, 7.1.19, the non-Attic makes a dominant finish 7.1.32, 2.15, 4.25, 5.13, 26. This makes Book 1 Attic, Books 2-5 and 7 non-Attic, the others mixed. It bears no compositional explanation.

The pair ἔλαττοῦν / μείουν also occurs in close proximity for variety and is determined/marked by euphony: 1.5.4 μείω χρήματα ἀναλώσει ('m' alliteration 'ei' assonance), 3.4.8-9 συμπράττοντά τι ἡττωμένοις versus Ἀγησίλαε, μειοῦν μὲν ἄρα ('t' alliteration versus 'm' alliteration and avoidance of hiatus).

The complexity of the pattern of choice is clear. It is unwise to postulate a chronological break whenever there is a change of stylistic preference. The evidence seems rather to suggest a varying evolution of preference for some synonyms over others, but often no strong preference at all, and on top of this a very strong desire for variety and a considerable regard for euphony. The "preferences" seem to occur on the larger and the smaller scale. We might prefer to call the changes of "preferences" natural short-term evolution.

Anabasis provides a further rather striking example of synonym variation in the formulaic march description where stylistic variation was bound to be noticed. There are two main phases of the march: the journey inland (Book 1), and the journey home (Books 2-7). The Greek army marches under the command of Cyrus in Book 1 on the journey inland and then under their own command from Book 2 on the journey back. When Cyrus "moves forward" according to this formula in Book I, he regularly ἐξελαύνει (e.g., 1.2.5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 19, 20) and only on occasions does he πορεύεται (1.2.1, 4, 1.5.4, 7.20, 8.18). This ratio of ἐξελαύνει to πορεύεται is roughly that of μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα to ἐκ δὲ τούτου in *Hellenica* 1. But from Book 2, after the death of Cyrus at the battle of Cunaxa, when the Greeks are on their own, in the identical formulaic passages of march description, ἐξελαύνειν gives way completely and suddenly to πορεύεσθαι. The first occurrence is at 2.2.13, 3.10, the formula recommences 2.4.25, 27, 28, and persists into the later books,

¹⁷MacLaren (note 16 above) 131, n. 39. Ἀκολουθεῖν is a standard Attic form, whereas ἔπεσθαι is allegedly more poetic.

e.g., 4.4.1–7 and 4.7. This is an even more abrupt and striking change than μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα το ἐκ δὲ τούτου, precisely because of the formulaic expression.

The break is so striking that it is tempting to think that the words are not true synonyms. Xenophon regularly uses compounds of ἐλαύνειν to describe the charge of cavalry, a matter of faster and more driving movement than mere marching (e.g., *Hellenica* 7.2.22, where the infantry is said to πορεύεσθαι and the cavalry to ἐλαύνειν). He also uses ἐξελαύνειν of the “progress” of Cyrus the Great from his palace out among the people he ruled in *Cyropaidia* (8.3.1ff.), so that it seems to have royal overtones. He could have deliberately chosen ἐξελαύνειν to indicate the impressive speed and drive of Cyrus, whom he greatly admired, and πορεύεσθαι for the lesser speed and drive of the Greeks. He does say explicitly that Cyrus was moving quickly in order to take his brother by surprise (1.5.9). He could equally have chosen ἐξελαύνειν to indicate the majesty of Cyrus and πορεύεσθαι the ordinariness of the Greeks. But there are objections. Cyrus covers no more distance on his average march than do the Greeks on theirs (it ranges from 10 to 30 parasangs) so that it seems wrong to suppose that he did move more rapidly. Moreover, Xenophon also uses the alternative πορεύεσθαι of the royal “progress” (8.3.19, 8.5.17, 21, etc.). Herodotus similarly, though he does use ἐξελαύνειν of royal progress (4.80) and of the rapid movement of Croesus (1.78–79), in the account of Xerxes’ march against Greece, which is surely the equivalent of Cyrus’ march against his brother, regularly uses πορεύεσθαι (7.26, 30–33, 43, 58, 108–133, etc.), with an only occasional use of ἐξελαύνειν (7.8, 10.33.41, 8.115). He uses both as if they were synonyms at 1.188. There seems to be no difference in meaning.

Xenophon’s change of preference is surely not due to a chronological break, and the cause could be sheer desire for variety. Thucydides varies his formulaic end of year statements for what appears to be no particular reason other than variety for its own sake.¹⁸

¹⁸ Andrewes/Dover (note 1 above) 390–91. One could argue that Xenophon deliberately changed his preference from ἐξελαύνειν to πορεύεσθαι in *Anabasis* in order to mark the end of the significant and separate phase of action that culminated in the battle of Cunaxa. By this argument, the change of preference from μετὰ ταῦτα το ἐκ δὲ τούτου in *Hellenica* might mark the Peloponnesian War as a significant and separate phase of action and the end of an era. This would still not be evidence of a chronological break but it would give meaning to the variation. The objection remains that the changing preference

The principle of variation permeates Xenophon's writing at the most basic level: the order of subject and predicate in main clauses. The "normal" order is SP, but this is regularly broken by PS. I do not count those instances where no S is designated. These are some of the statistics for usage:

1.1.1–26: SP 22 PS 9

3.1.1–26: SP 20 PS 8

5.1.1–26: SP 28 PS 9

Several features are of interest. The first is that variety of word order takes the same forms as synonym variety (side by side variation, clusters of first one then the other). The second is that word order variety can be dictated by content or pursued for its own sake. PS order frequently marks passages of significant content like speech or dramatic action. There is chiasmus of PS SP PS SP in the Spartan letter (1.1.23). The conversations between Dercylidas and Meidias (3.1.22–28) produce SP 2 PS 8, a reversal of a normal ratio. PS clusters occur in the dramatic military engagement of 5.1.10–13, SP 5 PS 7, and the description of the crucial battle of Arginusae (1.6.24–35, SP 11 PS 7). The battle of Cunaxa in *Anabasis* has three PS in the early dramatic sighting of the enemy and five in the critical action from 1.8.17ff. Elsewhere however the variation is not related to content. *Hellenica* 1.1.1–26 opens with three occurrences of PS, then lapses into the more normal SP with only occasional PS, sometimes significantly in speech (14, 23), sometimes singly for sheer variety (12), sometimes clustering (1, 18). There seems to be a mixture of deliberate choice of PS for significance and deliberate use also for sheer variety. This is a rough parallel to the results of the examination of synonyms, that variety for its own sake as a principle of good writing accounts for some, and other kinds of preference account for the rest.

To return to the evidence of μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα / ἐκ δὲ τούτου and conclude this part of the discussion, it is sensible to say that the change in this pair of synonyms over Parts I–II is no more or less significant than the change from ἀθροίζειν to συλλέγειν over Books 5–6 and that even the very notion of development of preferences over time is hope-

for the various designations of time over the shorter sequences of parts of *Anabasis* and *Hellenica* (above) does not mark significantly disparate phases of action or indeed any significant change of content.

lessly complicated by the principles of variation and of euphony, if not of rhythm as well, which are ever present in Xenophon's writing.

There is another main category of stylistic variation in the *Hellenica*. This is the increasing use of a diversity of particles. The synonym evidence does not bear out the general impression from the particles of increasing variety, for while μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα / ἐκ δὲ τούτου are both used in II, ἀκολουθεῖν gradually eclipses ἔπειθαι, decreasing variety, and ἀθροίζειν / συλλέγειν dominate alternatively from book to book. The particles have to be tackled on their own, divorced from supporting evidence.

Particles are indeed used far less frequently in I than in II but some preliminary caution needs to be employed in the interpretation of statistics.¹⁹ Those particles that enliven speech (this includes a big majority) almost always occur more frequently in speech than in narrative, and in speech particle range and frequency reflects the content of the speech and the mood of the speaker. Particle variation between speech and narrative is found in almost all authors and proves nothing more than the rule of good writing, which adapts style to content. The abrupt change in particle frequency between the end of the Peloponnesian War and the beginning of the Athenian Civil War is entirely due to the exchange of speeches between Critias and Theramenes at the beginning of II. What may appear to be explicable only in terms of a chronological break is in fact only a symptom of changed form and content. The use of γέ right through up to the end of the Athenian Civil War for example is almost entirely associated with speech (1.6.7, 14, 1.7.6 [twice], 19, 21, 29, 2.3.27, 33, 36, 37, 38, 42 [twice], 46).

It is therefore not the statistics but the higher frequency of speeches in Part II that needs explanation, and the simple explanation is that they reflect the change of form from the summary to the fuller form of narrative. Yet there are also later sections that resemble Part I in their lack of speeches. There is one short and one very long set speech in I and several passages of informal speech. In the section 4.2–7, which is of equal length, there is one short set speech and a few passages of informal speech. The changing frequency from Part I to II could be classified as “normal” even without the change of form.²⁰

There are nevertheless few particles even in the long speech of Euryptolemus in I: 1.7.6 (γέ twice), 19, 21, 29 (γέ), 33 (τοίνυν). The

¹⁹ MacLaren (note 16 above) particularly employs no caution in regard to the distribution of particles, treating them simply as a table of statistics.

²⁰ Andrewes/Dover on speech distribution in Thucydides (note 1 above) 392–93.

speeches of Critias and Theramenes that herald the beginning of II have a far higher frequency and greater range: 2.3.13, 15, 18 (δή), 28 (γε), 29 (καίτοι), 31, 32, 34 (δήπου), 33 (γε μήν), 35, 45 (δήπου), 36 (οὐ μέντοι γε), 37 (γε μέντοι), 37, 48 (μέντοι), 38, 46 (δέ γε), 40 (ἀλλὰ μήν), 42 (γε μήν γε). Polydamas' report of Jason's spirited attempt to win his willing support later in the work (6.1) is another example of a highly particled speech. But there are speeches later in the work that are even more devoid of particles than those in Part I. Cleocritus' solemn appeal for Athenian unity has only one γε μέντοι (2.4.22), Timolaus' careful analysis of Spartan strength has none (4.2.11), nor are there any in the dignified complaint of injury from Pharnabazus (4.1.32-33); whereas the rather desperate Agesilaus answers him with γε μέντοι . . . καίτοι . . . μέντοι (34-36), and Pharnabazus then replies in kind with τοίνυν . . . μέντοι (37). Xenophon clearly uses particles in the speeches he writes in order to convey the mood of the speaker. A high frequency of strong particles conveys excitement and engagement, a low frequency conveys dignity, restraint and calm. This explains the variation. Eurypolemus was trying to calm the excitement of the Athenian mob, already sufficiently aroused by the Arginusae affair. He needed no inflammatory particles. But Critias and Theramenes in Part II were fighting it out for their political survival, and their frequent use of strong particles conveys moods more appropriate to those circumstances. This is what creates the abrupt change in the statistics over Parts I and II.

The narrative merits more attention. Ἐνταῦθα δή occurs in I at 2.15, 5, 8, 2.1.20, 21, 31, τότε δή at 5.13. This represents a limited use of the particle δή with temporal adverbs. From II over an equivalent section of narrative there is no astounding increase of usage, but a clear diversification to include a wider range of phrases: 2.4.1 (μὲν δή), 23 (πάνυ δή), 37 (ἐπεὶ μέντοι . . . ἐπεμπον δή), 40 (ἐνθα δή), 3.1.9 (διὰ ταῦτα δή), 2.5 (ὁμοῦ δή), 2.16 (ὅσους γε δή), 2.17 (ὅσον μὲν δή).

The Xenophonic favourite γε μήν has an interesting evolution as well. It occurs first in speeches at 2.3.33, 42, but first in narrative only at 3.1.7. It continues to occur in speech (three times in 3.5.12-13), occasionally in narrative (3.5.7), frequently in lists and catalogues (e.g., 4.2.17, 4.3.15). Yet its absence from Part I and presence in Part II is paralleled in its absence from *Anabasis* 2, 3, 4 and 6 and presence in 1, 5, 7. The varying frequency must again be classified as more or less "normal."²¹

²¹ Andrewes/Dover (note 1 above) 444.

Μὲν δὴ which frequently acts as a “framing” device to lead the reader from one section into the next also occurs first in II, summing up and marking the end of the story of the death of Theramenes before leading into the story of the eventual downfall of the Thirty (2.4.1). There are many subsequent occurrences of the device (e.g., 5.2.7, 3.9, 18, 5.4.21, 33, 5.4.45).

Μέντοι is another example of increasing usage of particles in Part II. It occurs once in I (2.1.7). It clusters in the Civil War, in narrative and speech (2.4.12 [twice], 18 [twice]). It remains a favourite in Part II, used five times in the description of Agesilaus’ Theban campaign (5.4.51–53).

There is clearly a phenomenon that needs explanation. The heart of the matter is what particles represent. While stylistic habit may lead Greek writers to vary synonyms over smaller or larger sections of the narrative or adopt favourite particles and use them to exhaustion for shorter or longer stretches, it cannot really explain an almost wholly non-particled style such as that found in the summary narrative. Such consistency is more likely to be a result of deliberate choice reflecting the nature of the subject matter. Xenophon’s use of a greater number and variety of particles in his more excited speeches indicates this sort of deliberate choice. His *Anabasis* proves that in narrative too the varying frequency of particles reflects varying content. There are few particles in the quiet description of the march of the army of Cyrus in Book I, yet the emotional encomium of Cyrus after his death at Cunaxa positively bristles with the most forceful particles in the Greek repertory (1.9): μέντοι 6, 29, καὶ γάρ (οὖν) 8, 10, 11, 17 (twice), 21, τοιγαροῦν 9, 15, 18, μὲν δὴ 13, γε μέντοι 14, γε μήν 16, 20, ἀλλὰ μήν 18, γε 22, 24, 28, δὴ 22, 25, 28, 29. The battle of Cunaxa sees an increase in the use of particles, but even this climactic event is not as coloured as his first-person praise of Cyrus. Particles also reflect engagement in the writing of Thucydides. Though he does not generally favour a densely particled style, the dramatised disaster at 3.113 has a relatively high frequency.²²

Xenophon also uses particles deliberately in the narrative of *Hellenica*. The emotional significance of the Tearless Battle is surely the reason for the use of the highly committed τοιγαροῦν (7.1.31). He uses the particles normally restricted to lively speech (καίτοι, τοιγαροῦν, τοίνυν) in his first-person comments, e.g., 6.5.51–52 on Iphicrates.

The particle evidence suggests that Xenophon thought a more

²²J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*² (Oxford 1954) comments on the general usage of particles in his introduction. Of particular value are lxi, lxiv, lxxiiff., lxxviiiiff.

dramatic colour or more committed and personal tone generally less appropriate for his summary narrative. This makes good sense. The formal prefatory summary did not merit a high level of commitment. Thucydides' summary of the Fifty Years is a precedent. It is almost entirely lacking in particles. They occur in the summary only in the highlight account of the rebuilding of the walls (1.90-93) and just once elsewhere (1.111.3). His fuller narrative employs more. I would guess the same applied to the summary Athanas wrote.

Thucydides' diction is in other respects of course completely different from Xenophon's. There is no comparison with the Thucydidean preference for ξύμμαχοι over σύμμαχοι and ἐλασσοῦσθαι over ἐλαττοῦσθαι, or his love of abstracts, e.g., 1.92 κολύμη . . . παραινέσει, 109 "all shapes of death," etc. Xenophon has produced no stylistic imitation, but they are both writing in a style suited to a summary.

The diction of the summary may now be summarily described. Though it can accommodate the distinguishing features of the writer, like Thucydides' abstractions and Xenophon's simplicity, it also has its own unvarying features. It is low in particles because it is low in excitement. It avoids obvious rhetorical emphasis in its narrative as inappropriate. It is on the other hand not devoid of basic features of good writing like stylistic variety or euphony. Thucydides uses formulaic expression (1.108.4, 117.3: the peace formula), but he finds three different ways of expressing the act of fighting a naval battle in as many sentences (1.105.1). Xenophon's varied word order and his regard for variety and euphony in his use of synonyms are a sign of the care he took over his own summary. The more elaborate style of his speeches shows that his narrative plainness is deliberate. The Spartan letter has triple chiasmus (1.1.23). Hermocrates uses longer heavier sequences of sound and carefully balanced phrases (1.1.28). There is artistry in the sound of Callicratidas' opening sequence (1.6.5) and the full-blown glory of the peroration of Euryptolemus (1.7.33). Where the style is plain, it is deliberately and artfully plain, not primitive, not the style of an inexperienced or lazy writer. The summary is not unfinished.

My main conclusions are as follows: Xenophon wrote in a tradition of continuous history, adopting the beginning of a new era as the starting point for his fuller narrative, and attaching this onto the work of Thucydides by means of a bridging summary which served as preface to his main account. He intended the whole work as a unity. The unity of the summary with the rest of the work is seen in its philosophic character and the use of narrative patterns characteristic of the work as

a whole.²³ The Sicilian pattern of continuous history in Philistus and Athanas confirms this unity. There is no reason to believe that the summary and the main account were not written at roughly the same time. Diodorus says that Xenophon wrote the whole *Hellenica* in extreme old age, at Scillus (15.89.3). This supports the dating in the 350s B.C. indicated in Book 6.

Xenophon must have felt there was no adequate completion of Thucydides already in existence, or he would have taken up where that left off instead. There were various other historians who seem to have continued Thucydides, including Cratippus, Theopompus and the author of *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*.²⁴ It may be hard to believe that, writing so long after the events, he was the first to complete the story of the Peloponnesian War, even though there is no evidence to the contrary. Yet he need not have been the first. He might have written to demonstrate his own themes or because previous accounts seemed to him inadequate. Thucydides was not the first to write up the events of the Fifty Years either. Xenophon may have found previous accounts not sufficiently philosophical. He may also have been simply vying with them for recognition.²⁵

Xenophon probably thought Thucydides had continued Herodotus and saw himself as continuing the tradition. He may have been directly inspired by Thucydides' summary of the Fifty Years. His own summary shares at least a certain generic identity with Thucydides' account of the Fifty Years.

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²³Gray (note 3 above).

²⁴L. Canfora has some controversial views on these continuators (note 7 above) 62, 64–65, 81, 195–96, 203–17. Theopompus appears to have written later than Xenophon, but *non liquet* on Cratippus and *Hell. Oxy.* certainly seems not to have adopted a summary form, but *non liquet* on Cratippus and Theopompus.

²⁵Polybius also used his introductory first two books to correct previous versions (1.14–15).

CICERO AND THE RHETORIC OF ART

Cicero's remarks to Atticus and Fabius Gallus about the art collection he was putting together for his favorite villa at Tusculum have not received much attention from commentators.¹ However, the decorative scheme or program of the Tusculan villa complex, of which the art collection was an integral part, in fact projects a carefully orchestrated image of the owner which reflects both his political status and his social aspirations.

The term "decorative program" as it has been used by such archaeologists as Lafon, Coarelli, Sauron, and others refers to the conscious integration of art and architecture in the Roman villa of the late Republic and early Empire to achieve a public statement about the social and political status of the villa's owner.² The concept looks to all the ways of giving an architectural unit as small as Lucullus' Apollo room (Plut., *Luc.* 41.4–7) or as large as Hadrian's Villa at Tivoli a precise intellectual significance. The Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum owned by the Epicurean L. Calpurnius Piso, for example, creates through its libraries, gardens, and statues of divinities and philosophers an atmosphere of otherworldliness, forming a suitable *sedes beata* for a

¹The research for this paper was begun in 1986 during the NEH Summer Seminar, "Roman Art in a Social Context," at the American Academy in Rome under the direction of Professor Eleanor Winsor Leach. Versions of the paper were presented at meetings of the Southern Section of the Classical Association of the Middle West and South in October, 1986 in Greenville, SC and the American Philological Association in January, 1989 in Baltimore, MD. I would like to thank Professors Leach, George Kennedy, and Frank McHugh for their helpful criticisms of this paper.

²The most useful work for the Ciceronian era is X. Lafon, "A propos des 'villae' républicaines: quelques notes sur les programmes décoratifs et les commanditaires," in X. Lafon, ed., *L'art décoratif à Rome à la fin de la République et au début du Principat* (Rome 1981) 151–72. Lafon 158 suggests that Second Style wall paintings in the reception rooms of some villas show the intellectual preoccupations which inspired the decor of these rooms. For examples of recent work on public and private decorative programs, see, respectively, F. Coarelli, "Il Complesso Pompeiano Del Campo Marzio," *Rendiconti Della Pont. Accad. Rom. Di Arch.* 44 (1972) 99–122 and G. Sauron, "Temple Serena: A propos de la 'villa des Papyri' d'Herculaneum: Contribution à l'étude des comportements aristocratiques romains à la fin de la République," *Mélanges de l'Ecole Française de Rome* 92.1 (1980) 277–301.

man who has retired from an active political career.³ The property which might have been given this type of program was public or private; the private property so extensively treated generally refers to the country villa rather than the town house, or *domus*, since the *domus* was both smaller and more public and offered less scope for creative personal expression.⁴ A program at a country villa would encompass topography, landscaping, architecture, furnishings, and works of art of every kind.⁵ The conscious suggestion of a decorative program is implied in the art collections displayed in planned architectural settings in some Republican era villas, which were conceived as private museums. Although conceding that the evidence is insufficient for reconstructing the themes of these programs, Lafon cites as instances of intentional decorative programs the villas of Lucullus, in particular his villa at Tusculum (Plin., *N.H.* 34.36; Plut., *Luc.* 39.2; Varro, *R.R.* 1.2.10), friends of Verres (and Verres himself, *Verr.* 4 *passim*), Hortensius (Plin., *N.H.* 35.130), and even the villa Cicero's brother Quintus wanted to own (*Q.fr.* 3.1.5).⁶ All of these would have constituted readily available models for Cicero. In the case of Cicero's villa at Tusculum it does appear

³For a complete discussion of the decorative program of this villa, see Sauron (note 2 above).

⁴Lafon (note 2 above) 153–56 does, however, note that some town houses, for instance those of Lucullus and Augustus, clearly did have decorative schemes so we cannot push this too far. Furthermore, this is not, of course, to say that the *domus*, with its atrium full of *imagines*, did not play a role in projecting status, merely that it did so in a necessarily different way from that of the villa, which was built on a grander scale and where the owner could display his social clout by limiting his hospitality to only the most important people, as he could not do in the city. On the social status of the Roman house, see R. Saller, "*Familia, Domus*, and the Roman Conception of the Family," *Phoenix* 38 (1984) 349–55; T. P. Wiseman, "*Conspicui postes tectaque digna deo*: The Public Image of Aristocratic and Imperial Houses in the Late Republic and Early Empire," in *L'Urbs. Espace urbain et histoire*, Collection de l'Ecole Française de Rome 98 (1987) 393–413; and A. Wallace-Hadrill, "The Social Structure of the Roman House," *Papers of the British School at Rome* 56 (1988) 43–97.

⁵Lafon (note 2 above) 151–52.

⁶Lafon (note 2 above) 168; on the subject of famous Republican era art collections, see also A. Desmouliéz, *Cicéron et son gout*, *Latomus* (1976) 61. C. C. Vermeule, *Greek Sculpture and Roman Taste* (Ann Arbor 1977) gives an extremely useful survey of sculpture collections in a programmatic context during the Empire, and A. Stewart, "To Entertain an Emperor: Sperlonga, Laokoon and Tiberius at the Dinner-Table," *JRS* 67 (1977) 76–90 lays out the evidence for a programmatic sculptural display at the villa of an Emperor.

that he had a decorative program and that it did project a self-image based on the values of *decorum* and, to a lesser extent, *utilitas*.

A preliminary problem facing this inquiry is the difficulty of gauging Cicero's knowledge of art. In Roman politics and society it was considered inappropriate to display too much interest in art. Architecture was one thing—it was serious and functional—but art was merely craft and its admirers, at least in public, mere dilettantes, which tended to discourage public speakers from appearing too much interested in the subject.⁷ But even given this restriction the evidence from Cicero is wildly inconsistent since Cicero's public persona or, more properly speaking, his rhetorical persona, varies considerably according to the needs of the moment. The most famous example is *Verrines*, where Cicero pretends to know virtually nothing about art, and is often taken at his word by modern readers.⁸ In this trial it was crucial for Cicero to mark a stark contrast between Verres, the rapacious art thief, and himself, the simple man innocent of any knowledge of Greek painting and sculpture. At times, however, Cicero was forced to speak with some expertise about the objects Verres had stolen in order to show the magnitude of Verres's crime and so he implies to his audience that what he does know about art, for instance the name of Praxiteles, he managed to learn in the course of preparing his brief (*Verr.* 2.4.2). In a quandary when faced with two bronze statues he cannot avoid mentioning he seems to have a moment of doubt, "sed earum artificem—quem? quemnam? recte admones. Polyclitum esse decebant" (*Verr.* 2.4.3). And there is plenty more in the same vein. But the reader inquisitive enough to enumerate the objects mentioned in so seemingly tentative a fashion in the course of these speeches quickly compiles an impressive catalogue which belies the ignorance Cicero rhetorically professes and instead corresponds well to his written assessments in *Brutus*, *De Oratore*, and

⁷E. Rawson, *Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic* (London 1985) 193. Cicero's technical knowledge of architecture is obvious from *Q. fr.* 3.1. G. Becatti, *The Art of Ancient Greece and Rome* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1968) 30 argues that the Romans preferred architecture "because they saw it as the realization and blending of *utilitas* and *decor*."

⁸G. Showerman, "Cicero's Appreciation of Greek Art," *AJP* (1904) 306–14 leans heavily on passages like *Verr.* 4.43.94 ("tametsi non tam multum in istis rebus intellego quam multa vidi") to argue that Cicero's knowledge of art was slight. For the opposite view, see A. Desmouliéz, "Sur l'interprétation du 'De Signis'," *Rev. Univ.* 58 (1949) 155–66 and A. Michel, *Rhétorique et philosophie chez Cicéron* (Paris 1960) 298–327.

other philosophical works where he seemingly speaks quite knowledgeably about painting and sculpture.⁹ Fresh from *Verrines*, for instance, we are surprised to read at *Brutus* 70 that Cicero considers Polyclitus the perfect sculptor whose statues derive their perfection from their *veritas* (although in the intervening quarter century Cicero had improved his knowledge of Greek sculpture through travel to Greece, trading in the art market, and further study).

Indeed Cicero's other public statements do not show him to be untutored in art. At the other extreme from *Verrines* stands his defense of the Greek poet Archias in 62 B.C., in which he is quick to establish the primary political value of the artist as one who shapes the public image not only in his own time but, more importantly for a nation with such a keen sense of history and the *mos maiorum* as the Romans, for generations and civilizations to come:

An statuas et imagines, non animorum simulacra sed
corporum, studiose multi summi homines reliquerunt;
consiliorum relinquere ac virtutum nostrarum effigiem nonne
multo malle debemus summis ingeniis expressam et politam?
(*Arch.* 12.30)

The sculptor and painter might protest, but the defendant in question is a poet, and the other two artists would notice that his finished product is described in sculptural terms, *effigiem . . . expressam et politam*. There is an interest and sympathy with the artist: Cicero's ready use of the artistic vocabulary suggests fundamental connections between the expressive power of the graphic arts and the rhetorical force of the spoken (or written) word to create not just an image but a reality.¹⁰ Sensitive to appearances and trained as an orator to calibrate the effect of his words on an audience and to control its response to his version of truth, Cicero was fully aware that realities can be manufactured. In this respect forensic rhetoric and artistic rhetoric—here the rhetoric of private decoration—share common aims.

Cicero's education and career, like his writings, offer conflicting evidence of his knowledge of art. We know that he traveled abroad in

⁹Michel (note 8 above) 298–327 finds enough in Cicero's philosophical works to piece together his personal philosophy of art.

¹⁰Orators were trained in the description of works of art and "the visual arts were often used as analogies in literary criticism." Rawson (note 7 above) 193.

the course of his rhetorical studies, where he would have seen enough art in both public and private collections in Sicily, Greece, and Asia to encourage his appreciation. It is probable, too, that Cicero's knowledge of art developed in the course of this study of rhetoric and that he was drawn to certain features of art as a result. Illustrative comparisons between oratory and art, for instance *De orat.* 3.26, are most commonly found when Cicero is dealing with points of rhetorical criticism.¹¹ At the same time nothing suggests that Cicero had a particularly profound knowledge of art or a great love for it. What he says in *Brutus* and elsewhere smacks of the manual; little of it betrays an original mind or especially sensitive insights.¹² And the Grand Tour may add polish but is no guarantee of depth. The external evidence for Cicero's interest in art is therefore contradictory; with the direct evidence, what he wrote specifically about his collection, we are on firmer ground.

Cicero discusses his collection in ten letters to Atticus (*Att.* 1.1, 3–11) written between 68 and 65 B.C. while he was in the process of refurbishing his newly acquired property at Tusculum.¹³ In addition there is one letter to Fabius Gallus (*Fam.* 7.23), which Shackleton Bailey dates to the regime of Caesar.¹⁴ The letters to Atticus are not concerned exclusively with art and even those paragraphs (sometimes sentences) devoted to the subject are cursory and lacking in details, but to ascribe this solely to Cicero's ignorance of art seems unjustified. Cicero is writing to a trusted friend at the source in Greece who is thoroughly familiar with his needs and tastes. Since we later hear that Atticus had undertaken to arrange Pompey's art collection in 55 B.C. (*Att.* 4.9.1), we may assume he was well versed in the procedure and needed little instruction. The objects he purchased for Cicero are as follows:

¹¹ Desmouliez (note 6 above) 56, 62; J. E. Sandys, ed., *M. Tulli Ciceronis Ad M. Brutum Orator* (Cambridge 1885) lxxi–lxxiv.

¹² See Rawson (note 7 above) 197.

¹³ D. R. Shackleton Bailey, ed., *Cicero's Letters to Atticus* (Cambridge 1977) 280.

¹⁴ Shackleton Bailey, ed., *Cicero's Letters to his Friends* (Cambridge 1977) 370 argues that Cicero would not have used the phrase *pacis auctor* of himself prior to the Civil War. The letter has been dated as early as 62/61, which would certainly fit better with the letters to Atticus concerning the art collection, but a date of almost twenty years later does not weaken its value as evidence for a decorative program at Tusculum. Quite the contrary: a clearly defined program realized some years earlier is at least suggested if not confirmed by Cicero's firm ideas in *Fam.* 7.23 of what is, and what is not, appropriate for his home.

1. Statues made of Megaric marble, subject unidentified, for which Cicero paid 20,400 sesterces (1.8.2; 1.9.2).
2. Herms made of Pentelic marble with bronze heads (1.8.2; 1.9.2) of Heracles (1.10.3) and Athena (1.4.3; 1.1.5).
3. Bas-reliefs, iconography and material unspecified, for insertion into the stucco walls of the *atriolum*, or secondary entrance hall (1.10.3).¹⁵
4. Two well-covers in carved relief (*putealia sigillata duo*, 1.10.3).

On behalf of Cicero, Fabius Gallus, an esteemed friend, purchased some figures of Bacchantes and a statue of Mars, material unspecified (*Fam.* 7.23.2), none of which pleased his client.¹⁶ Gallus also had bought for himself an ornamental table-support, or *trapezophorum*, most likely of the type made from marble or ivory and carved into fantastic shapes of griffins and dolphins mentioned in Juvenal 3.205, which Cicero had an option to acquire. Cicero mentions to Gallus that he is decorating some *exhedria* . . . in *porticula Tusculani* with paintings, but of what he does not say.¹⁷

Eleven letters, therefore, constitute our knowledge of the art objects Cicero purchased. It is clear from these letters (*Att.* 1.4.3; 1.8.2) that Atticus made other purchases, but these are never specifically mentioned and we can only speculate on what they might have been. Cicero may possibly have bought some art on his own, but the letters give no indication of this and on balance it seems unlikely. It is safe to conclude from remarks made to Gallus in *Fam.* 7.23.2 that in the case of at least some statues Cicero knew what was on the market ("novi optime et saepe vidi") and may have specified some choices by name ("nominatim tibi signa mihi nota mandassem, si probassem"), although clearly he had not been so forthcoming to Gallus in his initial commission, so unsatisfactory were the results. For the most part, however, Cicero seems to have been content to rely on middlemen of taste and discretion, who were also, like Atticus, good businessmen; good-

¹⁵Bailey (note 13 above) 285.

¹⁶Bailey (note 14 above) 371 believes the actual vendor was likely the sculptor C. Avianius Evander.

¹⁷Pliny, *N.H.* 22.6.12 comments that when it was owned by Sulla, the walls of the Tusculan villa were painted with frescoes depicting his victories in war, but we cannot assume from this that they were still there when Cicero purchased the property, two owners later.

naturedly, perhaps ironically, he claims only enthusiasm for himself, leaving the expertise to others (*Att.* 1.8.2).

The paucity of details about the collection does not prevent us from making some general observations about the statuary. Costly materials are emphasized and popular types of statuary are preferred, but the iconographic content as well as the material of several items remains unspecified. None of these items appears to have been ordered on the basis of its beauty, workmanship, originality or monetary value, of which Cicero seems benignly oblivious. In fact the reader is left with the impression that purchasing art was a business transaction much like any other. But the mere fact that Cicero does not mention the aesthetic value of his purchases means little, and while therefore nothing should be read into such silence, it would be well to bear in mind that in his personal letters generally Cicero does not often dwell long on any one subject and he usually assumes in his correspondent great if not complete familiarity with whatever is being discussed. These letters are no exception. For instance, in some of the same letters (*Att.* 1.10.3; 1.4.3), Cicero expresses his interest in purchasing Atticus's library for the Tusculan villa in equally brisk and perfunctory terms, and yet no one would deduce from this that he knew nothing about books. But what the letters do tell us—and this has been overlooked for too long—is that Cicero did have a very clear idea of what he wanted to buy, a conception that is reflected in the consistency and precision of his language when he writes about his collection. There he constantly stresses two decorative prerequisites, suitability and utility, the classic *decorum* and *utilitas* of Roman philosophy and aesthetics. In order of importance, *decorum* clearly comes first.

In discussing his acquisitions Cicero is commonly accused of being too vague. Vermeule remarks that Cicero seems "to plead for almost any sculpture to adorn the exercise area of his villa at Tusculum."¹⁸ Lafon, who does advance an hypothesis for an "open" decorative program at the Tusculanum, nonetheless finds in the letters a remarkable lack of precision in Cicero's vocabulary, arguing that he seems more interested in accumulating objects without many connections between them, and leaving the final selections up to Atticus.¹⁹ But

¹⁸ Vermeule (note 6 above) 6.

¹⁹ Lafon (note 2 above) 163–64.

the letters do not support these readings. In formulating his requests and reactions Cicero constantly uses a very precise vocabulary of appropriateness.²⁰

- 1.5.7 Cicero first mentions the statues cryptically but not vaguely: "quae tibi mandavi et quae tu intelleges convenire nostro Tusculano velim, ut scribis, cures. . . ."
- 1.6.2 Atticus is gently reminded of his commission: "tu velim, si qua ornamenta γυμνασιώδῃ reperire poteris quae loci sint eius quem tu non ignoras, ne praetermittas."
- 1.8.2 Cicero thanks Atticus for the herms and adds, "qua re velim et eos et signa et cetera quae tibi eius loci et nostri studi et tuae elegantiae esse videbuntur quam plurima quam primumque mittas, et maxime quae tibi gymnasi xystique videbuntur esse."
- 1.9.2 Cicero presses Atticus for the marble statues and herms as well as "quicquid eiusdem generis habebis dignum Academia tibi quod videbitur, ne dubitaris mittere et arcae nostrae confidito. genus hoc est voluptatis meae. quae γυμνασιώδῃ maxime sunt, ea quaero."
- 1.10.3 When the herms have still not arrived, Cicero orders them shipped, plus "si quid aliud οἰκείον eius loci quem non ignoras reperies, et maxime quae tibi palaestrae gymnasiaque videbuntur esse."
- 1.4.3 Cicero praises the Hermathena as *mihi gratum* and *ornamentum Academiae proprium meae*.

Finally, in a passage not without textual difficulties, he has this to say about the Hermathena,

- 1.1.5 "Hermathena tua valde me delectat et posita ita belle est, ut totum gymnasium eius ἀνάθημα videatur."

The adjectives *dignum*, *gratum*, *proprium*, γυμνασιώδῃ twice, and οἰκείον, a term employed by both rhetoricians and literary critics as a synonym for πρότερον,²¹ plus the verbs *convenire* and the formula *esse videtur*, stress that the common characteristic and chief value of these works of art is not that they are by the same artist or school or represent the same or complementary subjects or copy works of known artistic

²⁰All quotations from Cicero have been taken from Shackleton Bailey's Cambridge texts (notes 13 and 14 above). The letters are quoted according to Bailey's chronology.

²¹For example Aristotle, *Poet.* 3.7.4 and Demetrius, *Eloc.* 114.

skill and beauty, but that they are appropriate. Now, it must be acknowledged that appropriateness is not the most stimulating criterion to modern readers, if what we are looking for is an intellectual concept that gives shape and coherence to a program but, *pace* Cicero's critics, propriety was nonetheless to the ancients a precise concept with a long philosophical heritage, as well as a wide appeal to conservative Romans and those who, upwardly mobile, could afford to make no mistakes. Literary and rhetorical parallels abound: the principle of *decorum* and its influence on Cicero's life and thought cannot be exaggerated.²² (Indeed the idea seems never to leave Cicero's head as he writes about his collection, so unvarying is his vocabulary.) The *locus classicus* is *Orator* 21.70 which reads, "ut enim in vita sic in oratione nihil est difficilius quam quid decet videre. Ποῦρον appellant hoc Graeci, nos dicamus sane decorum," and Cicero goes on to discuss this in speaking, writing, and other aspects of life.

Decorum has many aspects but chief among these in considering a decorative program is its social orientation: it is a concept realized in the reaction of others, which in Cicero's case is the favorable reception of his projected self-image. He is clearly purchasing works of art with this value in mind, with the express purpose that people will see these statues and form a favorable impression not only of his taste and discrimination, but of his political influence and social standing as well. The program of the house defines the man. More exactly, the house was inseparable from the man, as Cicero says in *De Officiis* 1.138–39, where he writes that the prime object of a house

est usus, ad quem accommodanda est aedificandi descriptio, et tamen adhibenda commoditatis dignitatisque diligentia . . . Ornanda enim est dignitas domo, non ex domo tota quaerenda, nec domo dominus, sed domino domus honestanda est.

Clearly the house cannot supply what is not already there, but there is the suggestion that this has been tried and an awareness that its appearance is important to the image of the owner. Vitruvius agrees when he states that houses and villas should be appropriate to the social

²²*Decorum* is properly an ethical term; *decor* is the aesthetic equivalent and *aptum* the rhetorical term. J. J. Pollitt, *The Ancient View of Greek Art: Criticism, History, and Terminology* (New Haven 1974) 343.

status of their occupants (6.5.1–3).²³ This was exactly the point of a decorative program: as Wiseman has observed of Cicero's house on the Palatine, which he triumphantly rebuilt upon his return from exile, the villa at Tusculum and all its decorative trappings represented his public status, his *existimatio*, and he exercised great care to project this status properly.²⁴ Rather than risking the censure of those who would condemn him, as he did others, for *luxuria* if he built on too grand a scale, and at any rate lacking the cash to do so, Cicero opted for a less showy standard, which was nonetheless calculated. Moderation in building, he goes on to say in *De Officiis* 1.140, is a virtue, a virtue symbolized by all that *decorum* implies. The definition of *decorum* given in *De Officiis* 1.96 accords perfectly with his own much advertised view of himself as architect of the *concordia ordinum*, "id decorum velint esse, quod ita naturae consentaneum sit, ut in eo moderatio et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali."

In a long book about Cicero's taste, Desmouliéz argues that Cicero's artistic taste, like his taste in general, is grounded in a philosophical aesthetic which is in turn dictated by two ethical necessities, one of which is *decorum* (and the other *utilitas*).²⁵ Desmouliéz does not concern himself otherwise with Cicero's interest in the plastic arts beyond the argument for taste, but he makes a valid point when he observes, "Certes, il est bien vrai que le principe qui inspire les choix de Cicéron est tout à la fois, dans sa nécessité même, fondamental et élémentaire . . . Et d'autre part, il apparaît nettement que Cicéron cherche dans la convenance un accord intellectuel autant, sinon plus, qu'une harmonie artistique."²⁶

That this intellectual accord should be mirrored in a correct public posture is made clear in the letter to Fabius Gallus, where the veiled horror (whether mock or real) with which Cicero reacts to Gallus's acquisitions of "four or five" statues of Bacchantes and a statue of Mars shows a clear sense of self-image. Cicero is careful not to criticize Gallus's own taste (he is *in omni iudicio elegantissimus* and somewhat

²³ *Decor* and *utilitas* are also standard terms of Roman architectural criticism. Vitruvius 1.2.5–7 states that *decor* is the essential architectural principle by which one judges whether the form of a building is appropriate to its function and location, and whether the details of the building are appropriate to its completed form. Pollitt (note 22 above) 67.

²⁴ Wiseman (note 4 above) 393.

²⁵ Desmouliéz (note 6 above) 266–316.

²⁶ Desmouliéz (note 6 above) 306.

exonerated later in the letter) but underneath the tone of polite protest lie unmistakable grounds for his dissatisfaction. The ostensible complaint is that Gallus has spent too much money, but Atticus was given a free hand (*Att.* 1.9.2) and Atticus had good taste. The real problem is that Gallus has violated the doctrine of propriety, having acted in ignorance of Cicero's usual practice which, as we read a few lines later, is to buy "ea . . . signa . . . quae ad similitudinem gymnasiorum exornent mihi in palaestra locum," which statues of Maenads most assuredly would not do. Metellus' Muses, to which Gallus had evidently compared the Maenads, would have been worth the money and would have been infinitely more appropriate ("aptum bybliothecae studiisque nostris congruens"). The problem of image centers squarely on the statue of Mars, not the thing, Cicero complains, to grace the home of the self-styled *pacis auctor*. Cicero rejoices that Gallus at least has not bought a statue of Saturn, god of bad fortune. Better than this would have been Mercury, he jokes, but even that favorable divinity seems not to fit into Cicero's program, at least not the one suggested by the earlier letters, where the positive values of wisdom and restraint in the Athenian manner were much in evidence. For Cicero, as in a decorative program generally, works of art must be appropriate to the public reputation of the man who owns them. Underlying considerations of *decorum* is the value of *utilitas*: utility inheres in the fact that these statues were more than mere ornaments for Cicero's home. They served a purpose, and this purpose was to enhance Cicero's image.

Works of art must also be appropriate to the spaces they are meant to adorn, the second prerequisite of Cicero's collection. He is plainly delighted with the Hermathena Atticus has acquired for the Academy, "quod et Hermes commune est omnium et Minerva singulare est insigne eius gymnasi" (*Att.* 1.4.3). One expects to find such a statue in a gymnasium; like the other objects it has a functional value as a meaningful element in the overall decorative program. On the other hand, there is no spot suitable for the Bacchae ("Bacchis vero ubi est apud me locus?" *Fam.* 7.23.2).

All the objects Cicero mentions are destined for specific, pre-selected spots at the Tusculan villa which were being redecorated or refurbished to the taste of the new owner.²⁷ The neighborhood in Tusculum afforded two excellent examples for him to emulate, Lucullus's

²⁷Lafon (note 2 above) 163.

lavish villa and Crassus's park "à la grecque," which sported a gymnasium, *ambulationes*, and open seating areas for conversation on the model, in turn, of the philosophical gardens of ancient Greece.²⁸ Cicero specifically cites his gymnasium and palaestra, sometimes designated as the Academy (he is criticized for loose vocabulary here),²⁹ a *xystos* or colonnade, the library, *exhedria*, and an *atriolum* as ultimate destinations for his new statuary. These were not conceived as separate spaces but as parts of an architectural ensemble including a garden.³⁰ With regard to the gymnasium/palaestra/Academy Cicero is not really being imprecise: the term "gymnasium" was used interchangeably with "palaestra" to indicate the same area and Roman private gardens were commonly so designated in imitation of Greek public models.³¹ As for the "Academy," Cicero was in the process of constructing two gymnasia at Tusculum, not for physical exercise as the name would imply and as the Greek antecedents were used, but for leisurely reflection, discussion, and even debate. The Tusculan villa, after all, was the setting for *Tusculanae Disputationes* as well as *De Divinatione* and *De Oratore*; Lucullus's library nearby provided the backdrop for *De Finibus*. Cicero's pair of gymnasia were situated on two different terraces, one above the other, the higher one called the Lyceum and the lower one the Academy (*Div.* 1.8; *Tusc.* 2.9), both named after the places in Athens where Aristotle and Plato had taught.³² Like their Athenian precursors each consisted of a garden surrounded by a *xystos* and annexed buildings—a library in the Lyceum and other (unidentified) buildings near the Academy; everywhere there were seats where one could converse and even write comfortably, and here and there herms of philosophers and divinities.³³ Greek gymnasia were commonly decorated with statues of Hermes and Heracles,³⁴ and so were their Roman counterparts. Statues of these divinities, along with a Hermathena, have been found

²⁸P. Grimal, *Jardins Romains* (Paris 1969) 103.

²⁹Lafon (note 2 above), but Lafon attributes this to Cicero's as yet incomplete conception of the program. Cicero can be quite careless in his technical terminology (see G. M. A. Grube, *The Greek and Roman Critics* [Toronto 1965] 177), which makes the precision in his vocabulary of *decorum* in the letters all the more striking.

³⁰Bailey (note 13 above) 282 and 283.

³¹Grimal (note 28 above) 246–47. Bailey (note 13 above) 285 observes that "every gymnasium included a palaestra, but a palaestra might stand on its own."

³²Grimal (note 28 above) 249; Bailey (note 13 above) 282.

³³Grimal (note 28 above) 249.

³⁴Bailey (note 13 above) 285.

at the Villa of the Papyri; a Hermes (and other statues) stood in the Horti Lamiani.³⁵

Cicero appears to be using a fairly traditional formula not only in his choice of art, but also in his architectural plans. Since he speaks of certain spaces as a whole, he does seem to be thinking in terms of a decorative program which would reflect his rising social, economic, and political status as well as his philosophical interests. The spaces he is concerned with, where the private world of the owner would open up to admit guests and where the individual stamp of the owner upon his surroundings would be most obvious, are also the very spaces where decorative programs have been located in other private homes, namely, "lieux de promenade (portiques-jardins) [et] lieux de travail intellectuel au sens large comme les *musaeum* connus chez Varron et Cicéron, bibliothèques et éventuellement salles d'exposition de collections, comme les pinacothèques dont l'usage était devenu canonique des Auguste."³⁶ I would only modify this to say that not just the indoor but also the outdoor spaces Lafon mentions were used for intellectual activities, since colonnaded walkways were there for those who chose to walk as they talked, in the fresh air but out of the heat of the sun, in the manner of the Athenian philosophers and their pupils and doubtless what Cicero himself had done when he studied abroad.

Very often the library served as the focal point of a program and fittingly so if the basis for these programs was intellectual. Parallels are to be found in the public sphere, such as the public library built by Asinius Pollio in the late first century B.C., whose grounds very likely were embellished with his famous sculpture collection,³⁷ and in a private context, the library of Piso at the Villa of the Papyri, which, filled as it was with the works of the Epicurean Philodemus, inspired a decor reflecting Epicurean *ataraxia* and philosophical detachment.³⁸

Gardens also figured prominently in the program and they loom

³⁵Sauron (note 2 above) 289; Vermeule (note 6 above) 48.

³⁶Lafon (note 2 above) 157–58. Not every room in the house would participate in the program, at least not on the same level as the more public areas. For the public nature of *pinacothecae*, see Wallace-Hadrill (note 4 above) 73.

³⁷First public library: Plin., *N.H.* 7.30.115; 35.2.10; Isid., *Etym.* 6.5.1; Ovid, *Trist.* 3.1.71–72. Sculpture collection: Plin., *N.H.* 36.4.23–26, 33–34. For arguments in favor of a sculpture garden outside the library, see G. Becatti, "Letture Pliniane: Le opere d'arte nei Monumento Asini Pollionis," *Studi in onore di A. Calderini e R. Paribeni III* (Milan 1956) 199–210 and F. Coarelli, *Roma Sepolta* (Rome 1984) 136.

³⁸See Sauron (note 2 above) 277–301.

large in Cicero's private world, both figuratively and physically. Grimal has shown that Cicero planned his gardens on the Greek model to exploit its intellectual associations. The garden, where he wrote many of his theoretical works and set many of his dialogues, appeared to Cicero, Grimal says, as the place where he could commune with all Hellenic culture, "le lieu nécessaire de son *otium*—non plus la détente physique et morale après les fatigues de la politique et du barreau, mais le moment où la pensée est enfin libre en face d'elle-même."³⁹ True enough for the gardens, but the evidence clearly shows that Cicero made the same use of his interior space: in *Att.* 1.10.3 he appears thoroughly aware of the intellectual function of the palaestra and gymnasium he wished to decorate, for he says that he is sitting there as he writes, so his thoughts run naturally on it. In 1.5.7 he reminds his friend of the importance of sending the new acquisitions to Tusculum since that is the only place where he finds rest "ex omnibus molestiis et laboribus," and in 1.11.3 the mere thought of the place is enough to cheer him up. The function of space, therefore, seems to be a critical factor in the selection of decoration, but the overriding consideration that governs a program is the extent to which it creates and enhances the image of the patron, and Cicero is no exception: the Hermathena may have been a priceless work of artistic genius, but for Cicero its chief value lies in its correct intellectual and political connotations. As Grimal puts it, "la divinité qui règne sur son gymnase à lui, c'est Athéna, la déesse philosophe par excellence,"⁴⁰ and the man occupying this room reflects the philosopher par excellence, the spiritual descendant, in avocation if not pure doctrine, of Plato and Aristotle.

When the Roman orator and statesman retired to his villa, then, was he escaping from the realities of daily life into a purely Greek world of reflection and meditation? The atmosphere is surely Greek. Cicero consistently describes Greek art in Greek terms, chosen on the basis of a fundamentally Greek aesthetic, destined for rooms which bear Greek names closely associated with famous Greek philosophers and designed to stimulate discussions about Greek literature and philosophy. For all intents and purposes, the real world is left behind. And some-

³⁹Grimal (note 28 above) 361. And at his villa in Astura Cicero mourned his daughter Tullia (*Att.* 12.10; 12.20).

⁴⁰Grimal (note 28 above) 362, n. 2; Sauron (note 2 above) 295 concurs; see also Bailey (note 13 above) 288. Plut., *Cic.* 31 tells us that Cicero kept a statue of Minerva in his townhouse, which he later removed and dedicated at the capitol before he went into exile.

times it was, as, for instance, when Caesar visited an anxious Cicero at his villa in Puteoli in 45 B.C. and, to Cicero's great relief, discussed literature instead of politics (*Att.* 13.52). Politics was, of course, on everyone's mind then and would undoubtedly have been discussed everywhere, but the anecdote is nonetheless illuminating for what it suggests about the kinds of topics discussed in the country, and the dialogues substantiate the impression that, appearances notwithstanding, the real world is actually never forgotten. The men who meet in the garden of Scipio in *De Re Publica*—Scipio, Laelius, and others—are members of a closed circle of influential politicians in control of Rome who, in the act of discussing political theory, are making public policy.⁴¹ If this is a fictional setting, real-life analogies are not hard to find: Tusculum was close to Rome and here we often find Cicero hosting the important people of the day—Hortensius, Crassus, Pompey, and others.

These are not men idling away their recreational hours in diverting surroundings. Neither the activities in which they are engaged nor the setting in which they find themselves exists at a complete remove from the public arena. In fact, to speak of a clear distinction between public and private is impossible. The physical plan of the Roman house militated against such a division, as Stambaugh points out,

The street—door—fauces—atrium—tablinum—garden sequence is normal in . . . Republican houses, and marks a progression from public to private space. Yet the formal axial arrangement, and the tendency to keep the door open, gave a certain public access deep into the house.⁴²

Thus, to an extent not paralleled in the modern home, public meets private in the Roman house, and not just the town house. The country villa provided the backdrop for the world of *otium*, that highly structured and very formal counterpart to public *negotium*. The spaces in the villa where visitors gathered—the gymnasium, the palaestra, the *xystos*, and the gardens—were borrowed from the sphere of public Greek architecture and have not in translation been so privatised that all public associations have been lost. As Wallace-Hadrill points out in his recent study of the social structure of the Roman house, "It is by

⁴¹ Grimal (note 28 above) 360.

⁴² J. E. Stambaugh, *The Ancient Roman City* (Baltimore 1988) 164. Ancient sources: Livy 6.25.9; Suet., *Aug.* 45.4; Martial 1.70.13–14 (Stambaugh 360, n. 15).

borrowing the language of actual public spaces in the domestic context that architect and decorator can evoke in the visitor the 'feel' of something more than a private house."⁴³ The particular "feel" that Cicero aspired to was the atmosphere that pervaded the homes of the rich and powerful. Consider the libraries he built. In the city libraries had assumed an important social function as a meeting place for everyone with an interest in literature and philosophy (Cic., *De Fin.* 3.7; Plut., *Luc.* 42.1.2) but they were not common in villas. Cicero took care to include such spaces in his program by adding on a library every time he bought a villa that did not have one.⁴⁴ It would appear from this that he was more interested in imitating, on a necessarily reduced scale, the extravagant domains of Lucullus and Caesar, men of power who could open up their libraries to friends and clients, than in modeling himself after the more bookish, or at least less political, Atticus and Varro (he copies only their Amaltheum and Musaeum, respectively)⁴⁵ and this is certainly a significant index of his social and political aspirations.

None of this is meant to deny Cicero's genuine intellectual interests, but simply to bring the more public activities of the villa into sharper focus and to recognize their political significance. Cicero may have claimed to his friends, as Plutarch, *Cic.* 32 reports, that he was a philosopher by trade and not an orator, but the reality was just the opposite. Like all Roman politicians he always had one foot in the forum. Therefore, in the search for the private world in antiquity, here as elsewhere one is led ineluctably to conclude that while the country villa may have been a refuge for the weary orator and politician, it was not meant to provide a purely private existence. The man who chose a career in public life in ancient Rome more or less forfeited his right to privacy or, to put it more accurately, may never have felt he had a claim to any.

Private homes were designed with the public in mind. A decorative program served a public purpose, and if, as the evidence presented here strongly suggests, Cicero did have a decorative program in mind for the Tusculan villa, this would go a long way towards explaining his apparent lack of interest in the aesthetic merits of his collection. In semiotic terms he was less interested in the signifier—the arrangement and decoration of his house and gardens—than in the signified—the

⁴³ Wallace-Hadrill (note 4 above) 59.

⁴⁴ Lafon (note 2 above) 158. Cf. Desmouliez (note 6 above) 98.

⁴⁵ Grimal (note 28 above) 358.

philosophical and political connotations of his property,⁴⁶ thus displaying a response to art, one which values subtle nuances as well as overall effects, which is not frequently credited to the Romans.⁴⁷

Contrary to earlier opinion, therefore, the literary evidence clearly shows that Cicero had a good understanding of the kind of art that ought to adorn his home, an understanding grounded in the philosophical principle of *decorum*. He purchased statuary on the basis of this firmly held, if evolving and fairly conservative, philosophical aesthetic. His works of art served *utilitas* in being more than decorative objects: rather than merely representing the material artifacts of a lost world, they overtly referred to the philosophical and intellectual values of that world. Furthermore, the collection and the spaces Cicero wished to decorate fit into a well-documented type of decorative scheme designed to enhance social status and political prestige. Tusculum was a refuge but not an island of isolation, and Cicero, even in private, was ever the public man. Finally, although the ambience of the private world was distinctly Greek, its purpose was not to resurrect lost Athenian abstractions but to foster thoroughly Roman realities.

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⁴⁶C. Watzinger, "Vitruvstudien," *RhM* 64 (1909) 202–3 says that *decor* should be considered a *telos*, or an effect produced by the successful completion of a task (here, the effect of the program), rather than an *ergon*, the task itself.

⁴⁷Desmouliez (note 6 above) 45 argues the reverse.

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CATULLUS 44: THE VULNERABILITY OF WANTING TO BE INCLUDED

Catullus' poem on the frigidity of Sestius' style and the cold which the poet caught from it has attracted considerable scholarly attention.¹ His commentators have divided their time between setting a poetic context for Cat. 44 and sorting out the types of parody to be found in it. Catullus' parody of religious language within the frame of an apotropaic prayer, his use of legal language, as well as his parody of Sestius' style have all elicited comment.² With regard to the poem's dramatic background, critics have envisioned four basic poetic contexts:³ 1) Catullus read Sestius' speech in the hope of getting invited to dinner (Benoist,

¹The text I shall follow unless otherwise stated is D. Thomson, *Catullus a Critical Edition* (Chapel Hill 1978). I shall cite the following by name only: A. Baehrens, *Catulli Veronensis Liber* (Leipzig 1893) 2 vol.; B. Benoist, *Poésies de Catulle* (Paris 1890); E. DeAngeli, "A Literary Chill: Catullus 44," *CW* 62 (1969) 354–56; R. Ellis, *A Commentary on Catullus* (Oxford 1889); C. Fordyce, *Catullus: A Commentary* (Oxford 1961); P. Forsyth, *The Poems—A Teaching Text* (Univ. Press of America 1986); G. Friedrich, *Catulli Veronensis Liber* (Leipzig and Berlin 1908); G. Goold, *Catullus* (London 1983); T. Haerhoff, "On Catullus XLIV.21," *CP* 29 (1934) 255–56; H. Karsten, "De Catulli Carmine XLIII," *Mnemosyne* 19 (1891) 222–28; W. Kroll, *C. Valerius Catullus* (Stuttgart 1968); G. Lafaye, *Catulle—Poésies* (Paris 1966); M. Lenczantin de Gubernatis, *Il Libro di Catullo Veronese* (Torino 1928); E. Merrill, *Catullus* (Cambridge, MA 1893); C. Murley, "Was Catullus present at Sestius' Dinner," *CP* 33 (1938) 206–8; R. Mynors, *C. Valerii Catulli Carmina* (Oxford 1958; corrected 1960; 1967); E. Paratore, "Una Nuova Edizione di Catullo" *Rivista di Cultura Classica* 5 (1963) 394–455; G. Pighi, *Catullo Veronese* (Verona 1961) 3 vol.; K. Quinn, *Catullus: The Poems* (London 1970); M. Schuster, "Catullus Gedicht an sein Landgut (c. 44) in Χαρίσματα. Festgabe zur 25 jährigen Stiftungsfeier des Vereines Klassischen Philologen in Wien (Wien 1924) 42–48; L. Schwabe, *Quaestiones Catullianae* (Giessen 1862); L. Schwabe, review of Ellis' commentary in A. Fleckeisen, ed., *Jahrbücher für Classische Philologie* 117 (1878) 257–68; S. Small, *Catullus: A Reader's Guide To The Poems* (London 1983); G. Williams, *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (Oxford 1968) 139–40.

²For parody of prayer form, see: J. Granarolo, *L'oeuvre de Catulle* (Paris 1967) 64; C. Jones, "Parody in Catullus 44," *Hermes* 96 (1968) 379–83; D. Ross, Jr., *Style and Tradition in Catullus* (Harvard 1969) 66–67. For the parody of Sestius' style, see: V. Buchheit, "Catullus Dichterkritik in c. 36," *Hermes* 87 (1959) 309–27; DeAngeli as does A. Ronconi, *Studi catulliani* (Brescia 1971) 173–92, esp. 183–84 = "Atteggiamenti e forme della parodia catulliana," *Atene e Roma* 18 (1940) 141–58, esp. 151–52, argue that the first lines are a parody of the language of the courts.

³Karsten (note 1 above) neatly summarizes all of the positions and possible permutations of poetic contexts to his day.

Paratore, Schwabe 1878, Williams). 2) Sestius invites Catullus to dinner—either a) with a copy of the speech (Baehrens, Ellis, Goold, Karsten, Kroll, Lenchantin, Merrill, Quinn, Small), or b) thus the poet feels obliged to read one of Sestius' speeches (DeAngeli, Fordyce, Murley, Schwabe 1862). 3) At dinner a) Sestius reads Antius' speech, Catullus Sestius' response (Pighi),⁴ or b) Catullus reads only Sestius' speech (Haarhoff). And finally 4) the poet made the whole thing up: a) Sestius had told Catullus that he would only invite him to dinner if the poet would read his speech, so Catullus gets mad—he is no parasite (Friedrich), or b) Catullus makes fun of Sestius as an *exemplum* of those who only invite people who will praise their work (Schuster).

In all discussions, however, scholars have given too little import to lines 2–4, which question whether or not the *Fundus noster* is Sabine or Tiburtine, for shaping the poetic context. All comment on the lines—some to adduce evidence for where the poet's farm really was, some to provide parallel references for the relative worth of the bits of real estate, and a few to note that the poet might be poking fun at himself for claiming to live in a higher rent district than he really does.⁵ They then set the lines aside to get on to the pun and proceed to explicate the poem as if it had begun with line 5. Lines 1–4 are thus a parenthetical false start—little more than a humorous attempt to get the “god's” name right.⁶ But the lines do more; they are an organic part of the poem.

⁴Thus he reads *legit* in 21 and takes the *malus liber* to refer to Antius' speech, not Sestius'. Pighi seems to be the only one who would defend the *legit* reading of V (ORG) in 21 against Lachmann's emendation *legi*. Friedrich's explanation of how *legei* became *legit* is persuasive. Baehrens' emendation of *legit* to *fecit* (not even cited by Thomson) is required only if one accepts his poetic context (followed by Benoist, Goold, and Karsten) that Sestius was simply following the fashion of the day by sending around a copy of his speech to the famous literati. All ignore Cornelissen's “Satura,” *Mnemosyne* 6 (1978) 306 needless (though clever) emendation of *otioque* to *alioque* in line 15.

⁵Schuster holds that these verses are a “Pendantmotiv” and aim at saying nothing more than that whether his lands are rich or poor the poet is thankful to them. Friedrich thinks that the poet intends for the lines to prove that he is rich. The terms of Sestius' invitation are good for *einen armen Schlucker aber nicht für einen Mann* like Catullus who owns land. DeAngeli noting that 2–5 sounds like “a lawyer's quibble” argues that the lines are in Sestius' style. Quinn notes correctly on 2–3 that “there'd be no point in denying C. a fashionable address if he were not anxious to possess one.”

⁶Cf. e.g., *inter alios* Fordyce's comments on the *sed* in 5, “resumptive after parenthesis” or Kroll's “1–9 eine durch die Parenthese V.2–4 schleppende Periode, die den ersten, zeitlich späteren Teil der *narratio* enthält.” Indeed most editors set parentheses around 2–4. Quinn modifies Mynors' parentheses to dashes. But the *nam* both here and at

Indeed, they establish the tone in which the poem is to be interpreted—one of self-bemusement for the vulnerability caused by the poet's desire to belong to the fashionable set.⁷

As he opens his poem, Catullus uses lines 2–4 to reveal three things about his poetic persona: One, there were those who did not wish to hurt his feelings (*quibus non est / cordi Catullum laedere*, 2–3) and those who did (*at quibus cordi est*, 3). Two, Catullus distinguished these people by whether or not they would accept his claim that his land was up-scale Tiburtine rather than mid-scale Sabine. And three, it mattered to Catullus (*autumant*, 2; *quovis . . . pignore, contendunt*, 4; and the petulant *verius*⁸ of 5). Thus as the reader moves from these introductory lines into the rest of the poem, he must take with him a Catullus who is eager to be perceived as well-to-do, yet one who is vulnerable to being checked by those who would deflate his self-portrait.

This then supplies the context needed to understand the much disputed phrases *dum sumptuosas appeto . . . cenas* (9) and *nam, Sestianus dum volo esse conviva* (10). Catullus (ever eager to get a free meal, be accepted, and be viewed as well off)⁹ was trying to secure a dinner invitation from Sestius. *Appeto* and *volo* show clearly that it was he who was seeking the invitation. It is true that he wants the meal because it will be a good one (*sumptuosas*, 9). But he gives equal weight to his desire to be counted in the company of Sestius (*Sestianus conviva*, 10). With the Tibur / Sabine worries of 1–5, the reader should see in this a desire to be a member of the fashionable (for whatever reason) circle of Sestius.¹⁰

To secure this invitation, Catullus sets out to read Sestius' speech in *Antium petitorem*.¹¹ This allows the poet play for his famous pun on

1.10 must be taken as explanatory, not just a postponing parenthesis. Cf. Jones, Williams, for comments on getting the address to the "gcd" right.

⁷See Small, Friedrich for a discussion of the social anxiety to be found in this poem.

⁸Cf. Benoist's comment on *verius*, "Le poète cherche plaisamment ici à faire prévaloir l'opinion qui flatte sa vanité."

⁹Cf. Cat. 10 and 13.

¹⁰On the success of the *gens Sestia* in general see J. D'Arms, *Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome* (Harvard 1981) 55–62.

¹¹For the arguments in favor of Catullus' Sestius being Cicero's P. Sestius and the poem's Antius being C. Antius C. f. Restio who authored a sumptuary law see *inter alios*: F. Della Corte, *Personaggi Catulliani* (Florence 1976) 230–32; C. Neudling, *A Prosopography to Catullus* (Iowa Studies in Classical Philology 12 1955) 5–6, 160–62. All of the

the cold he caught from Sestius' style. It is important to note however that the pun does not end the poem, nor does the twist of the curse toward Sestius, but rather, the reason why Sestius deserves to get sick: *qui tunc vocat me, cum malum librum legi* (21).¹² Catullus is angry because Sestius would not invite him on his own account—simply because he was a nice guy. He would only invite him because the poet would read and presumably flatter Sestius' work. But more importantly when one reflects on the first five lines, the point is that the poet was willing to suffer this indignity. He, as he says, deserved to get sick (*non inmerenti quam mihi meus venter; . . . dedit*, 7–8). Catullus was willing to do whatever it took to be considered Tiburtine rather than Sabine. In doing so he made himself vulnerable to those who would exclude him. He is hurt by those who would reject his real estate claims; he is made sick by his attempts to be invited to dinner. Thus he is as much the butt of his joke as Sestius. The rich well-connected aristocratic orator showed his bad taste in his style, Catullus in his desperate desire to be included in Sestius' company.

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commentators attend to the sense of *petitor*. Earlier commentators (e.g., Ellis and Fordyce) while holding *petitor* probably meant "a candidate for office" were troubled by no attestation of the use in Cicero. But G. Fletcher, "Catulliana," *Latomus* 26 (1967) 104–6 provides parallels. The word can mean either "a candidate for office" (Merrill, La Faye, Paratore, Goold, Quinn, Lenchantin, Kroll) or "a plaintiff in a private law suit" (Baehrens—more or less, Benoist, Pighi). Voss' suggestion (1684) that the Antius who passed the sumptuary law was "a plaintiff" against Sestius for breaking that law is indeed tempting given the context of the poem. But perhaps C. Sisson, *The Poetry of Catullus* (New York 1967) is right to avoid having to choose by not translating the word.

¹²S. Eitrem, "Varia," *SO* 5 (1927) 85–87 argues that the *malum librum* is an allusion to the *mali libri* (which cause sickness through enchantment) of the *XII Tablets*. This last line has been translated in accord with the various poetic contexts in a number of ways (from a number of texts) *inter alios*: "who invites me only when I have read his nasty speech: (Fordyce); "who only invites me when he has produced a nasty book" (Goold); "who invited me on the occasion when I read his pestilential book" (Haarhoff); "qui m'invite quand j'ai lu un mauvais livre" (La Faye); "der mich nur einlädt, nachdem ich eine schlechte Rede von ihm gelesen habe" (Kroll); "che m'invita solo quando mi son sobbarcato a leggere uno dei suoi pestiferi scritti" (Paratore); "che solo allora mi invita, quando ha letto (brutta cosa) una citazione" (Pighi); "der lädt einen ja nur, wenn man seine Schriften gelesen hat" (Schuster); "who only asks me when I have read one of his stupid books" (Sisson).

PROPERTIUS 3.3.45–46: DON'T GO NEAR THE WATER

Sextus Propertius, towards the end of his dream of Ennian song (3.3.57ff.), has just encountered Calliope in the grotto of the Muses. He is a poet in search of inspiration no less than of themes, a poet, seemingly, without an authentic voice. The goddess obliges him with a crash course in elegiac subject-matter: what to avoid at all costs and what to pursue.¹ The forbidden topics are entirely martial in character and include heraldic trumpetings (41), sylvan blood-letting (42), Marian skirmishes (43), Roman depredations in Germany (44), and pollution of the Rhine with blood and bodies (45–46). In this generic and perfunctory catalogue only the last image arrests:

barbarus aut Suevo perfusus sanguine Rhenus
saucia maerenti corpora vectet aqua.

It is not the general idea that strikes one (such pollution, after all, had been part of the conventional scenery of heroic warfare since the time of Homer²) so much as it is an aural pattern: almost like a snatch of song recollected by accident. For Propertius' audience, however, if not for his modern critics, Calliope's words must have had an immediate ironic effect since they are hers (and Propertius') only in the most superficial sense. The cadence, the syntax, and the crucial figure of speech belong to Vergil. In the Roman tradition at least, the image of a great river mourning for its conquered people is, preeminently, Vergil's image.³

¹ Cf. Apollo's earlier recommendations in a similar vein, 15–24.

² The standard *locus* is Achilles' *aristeia* on the banks of the Scamander (*Iliad* 21.200–232) and his subsequent battle with the river itself (233–382). Among many later imitations, Statius, *Thebaid* 1.38–40 may be cited as representative:

caerulea cum rubuit Lernaean sanguine Dirce
et Thetis arentes adsuetum stringere ripas
horruit ingenti venientem Ismenon acervo.

³ See *Aeneid* 8.711–13 and below. There is some evidence that Propertius and Vergil enjoyed the sort of relationship which would have resulted in mutual, and intimate, acquaintance with one another's work. Cf. Propertius' direct references at 2.34.61–78, and

The poem concludes with Calliope's short list of recommended topics (47–48, garlanded lovers and their inebriate, nocturnal revelry) and with a bracing splash of Philetan water that brings the poet to his senses just in time (52). When he awakes, his artistic "identity crisis" will have been resolved.

Propertius has indeed made progress. We recall that he had come originally, not to the grotto with its doves and still water, but to the gushing spring of Hippocrene nearby (2). He had imagined that after a draught from the source he too might nerve himself to compose historical epic as Ennius had done (4–6). But Apollo himself interdicted the spring and, after a few professional and stylistic observations of his own, set Propertius on his way to the cave (13–26).

Above all, the poet will have gained from his dream visit a sure sense of his place in the brilliant, and intimidating, Augustan literary scene whose salons were, in the late 20's, all abuzz with a great name and a great work in progress: Vergil and his *Aeneid*.⁴ Emulation of, and competition with, the "Father of Latin Poetry" are not the issue of 3.3.⁵ Nor should the elegist seek his place in the sphere of a contemporary author who had already made his reputation in pastoral and didactic

the less explicit testimony of Suetonius 33: "recitavit et pluribus, sed neque frequenter et ea fere de quibus ambigebat."

That Propertius is echoing Vergil in 3.3.45–46, rather than the converse, seems likely for two reasons. First, the image of the Rhine occurs in a context (criticism of epic) appropriate to parody of actual epic description. Secondly, it can be demonstrated that 3.3.45–46 is one of a number of echoes of the *Aeneid*. See A. La Penna, "Properzio e i poeti latini dell' eta aurea," *Maia* 3 (1950) 212–13 who, although he does not cite the description of the Rhine, makes a good case for Propertius' use of the *Aeneid* and cites several instances of it.

⁴The crux of the issue is the extent to which the *Aeneid* in progress was known and, therefore, likely to have influenced Propertius at this stage of his career. It is clear from 2.34.65–66 ("cedite Romani scriptores, cedite Grai / nescioquid maius nascitur Illiade") that Vergil's work in epic had already won for him considerable notoriety. L. Richardson, *Propertius Elegies I–IV* (Norman 1977) 315, nn. 61–62 states that Propertius' references to Vergil's account of Actium allude, not to the shield description of *Aen.* 8, but "to a separate poem Vergil is to write . . . though P. may have had some knowledge of Vergil's design for the *Aeneid*." But the position that Propertius knew only a little of the *Aeneid* fails to convince, given the numerous echoes of the epic in the elegies.

⁵For Propertius' connection to other Augustan poets and, especially, the Horatian focus of Book 3, cf. J. P. Sullivan, *Propertius: A Critical Introduction* (Cambridge 1976) 12, and W. Nethercut, "The Ironic Priest Propertius' 'Roman Elegies' III 1–5 Imitations of Horace and Vergil," *AJP* 91 (1970) *passim*.

verse and was now well on his way to becoming the new Ennius.⁶ Propertius, rather, will stake the issue of his eventual fame precisely upon the anti-Vergilian tenor of his voice;⁷ and that is the significance of Calliope's evocation of the river image from *Aeneid* 8. Not even in his wildest dreams will our poet go near that sort of water again.

In my view, the description of the Rhine deserves far more attention than it has received.⁸ I shall argue, in fact, that it is cardinal, not simply in the context of 3.3, but in the overall development of Propertius' sense of himself as an artist. Upon what evidence may such claims rest?

The first point to be emphasized is one that numerous scholars have made: the first five elegies of Propertius' third book were composed together and were intended to be considered together as a kind of program, a poetic discourse on art and life.⁹ They are unified insofar as they define, collectively, the poet's attitude toward his craft, his audience, and his world. Moreover, symmetrical pairing and chiasmic arrangement of 3.1, 2, 4, and 5 around the centerpiece 3.3 reinforce this thematic unity on the structural level.¹⁰

Even more significant for my thesis is the exceptional coherence exhibited by the group as a whole. Propertius sets up his primary opposition in such a way that large parallel motifs (elegy and peace; epic and war) function antithetically within their respective areas of art and life.¹¹ In 3.1 and 3.3, for example, where art is the focus, the elegy-epic antithesis dominates; whereas in 3.4 and 3.5 larger concerns are ad-

⁶See, again, for Propertius' essentially positive evaluations of Vergil's achievements in epic, pastoral, and didactic verse, 2.34.61-78.

⁷Sullivan (note 5 above) 147-58 has made particularly important contributions to this aspect of Propertian scholarship. For a general assessment of the uneasy relationship between the elegists and the Augustan political and literary establishment, cf. M. Hubbard, *Propertius* (New York 1975) 93-115 and, more specifically, H. Stahl, *Propertius: "Love" And "War" Individual and State under Augustus* (Berkeley 1985) 181-84.

⁸None of the critical works and commentaries that I have consulted mentions Vergil's shield description of the Rhine in connection with this passage.

⁹So, Hubbard (note 7 above) 71, Sullivan (note 5 above) 14, and Stahl (note 7 above) 190.

¹⁰This, essentially, is the view of Nethercut (note 5 above) 406, of Hubbard (note 7 above) 81, and of H. Juhnke, "Zum Aufbau des zweiten Buches des Properz," *Hermes* 99 (1971) 113.

¹¹Hubbard (note 7 above) 71 provides a succinct description of the thematic antitheses: "The first five poems form a group which examines the claims of epic and elegy and their relation to war and peace."

dressed, and the antithesis broadens appropriately to comprise the contrasting themes of peace and war.¹² Within this framework, the poet builds a system of correlatives and equivalencies through the use of repeating, subsidiary motifs.¹³ These confirm the themes upon which he is basing his program (elegy versus epic; peace versus war) and create, between the artistic and moral spheres, connections (elegy:peace :: epic:war) that will enable him to function simultaneously, and with equal authority, as a critic of literary art and contemporary values.¹⁴

Of the recurring themes of 3.1–5, that of water and of the military triumph are especially important and have, accordingly, received substantial critical notice. William Nethercut, for example, has persuasively demonstrated that the major themes of peace and war are reflected, in the programmatic elegies, by the images of water at rest and water in motion.¹⁵ Furthermore, these motifs recur with enough frequency to build resonance from one poem to the other and to create large associative patterns within their respective thematic fields.¹⁶

Nethercut has also observed that Propertius readily ties one type of image (water in motion) to a different type (military triumph).¹⁷ Thus in elegy 3.4 the poet's exhortation to the fleet bound for Parthia (7, "ite, agite, expertae bello date lintea prorae") is followed by the injunction to bring back triumphal spoils (8, "et solitum armigeri ducite munus

¹²For the enlargement of theme that concludes the program, see Juhnke (note 10 above) 113: "Zwar lässt sich am Buchbeginn mit Sicherheit eine aus drei und zwei Elegien zusammengefügte Fünfergruppe (3,1–5) ansetzen, die im Traum der Dichterweihe (3,3) gipfelt—ihr gehen zwei Zeugnisse dichterischen Selbstbewusstseins voraus (3,1 und 2), und zwei Begründungen der dichterischen Grundentscheidung entwickeln den Gedanken des 'elegischen' Lebensbereich (3,4 und 5)."

¹³The military triumph, for example, recurs throughout 3.1–5 as the reward for the acquisitive approach to life that Propertius, as an elegiac poet eschews, e.g., 3.3.45–46: the effigy of the conquered Rhine in a triumphal procession; 3.4.11–22: the triumph that is to follow the successful conclusion of Rome's *bellum abolendae infamiae* against Parthia; 3.5.15–16: the futile triumph of Marius over Jugurtha in the underworld.

¹⁴The theme of military conquest figures equally importantly in Propertius' depictions of epic subject matter (both Homeric and Roman historical) and of actual warfare. Propertius, however, adopts the persona of the man of peace, and this moral position informs his choice of literary subjects (3.5.1, "Pacis amor deus, pacem veneramur amantes").

¹⁵Nethercut, "Ille parum cauti pectoris egit opus," *TAPhA* 92 (1961) 392, 397, 401.

¹⁶Nethercut (note 15 above) *passim* demonstrates Propertius' technique in this area by citing the major recurrences of the water motif in 3.1–5 and by commenting on their cumulative effect.

¹⁷Nethercut (note 15 above) 394.

equi"). This connection between water and triumphal imagery has particular bearing upon my study of 3.3.45–46. In that light, then, let us consider Propertius' description of the Rhine.

The allusion to the Rhine, "stained with Suebian blood," is enigmatic in the sense that Propertius has not specified any particular action along the German border. He may, according to one commentator, be referring to "Julius Caesar's campaign against Ariovistus in 58 B.C."¹⁸ Butler and Barber, however, suggest that the poet is probably hinting at the aftermath of Gaius Carrinas' punitive expedition against the Suebi in 29 B.C.,¹⁹ and Rothstein, while allowing for other possibilities ("Mann kann an die Kämpfe Cäsars oder Agrippas denken"), finally concurs in the latter view.²⁰

According to Dio (52.21.5ff.), Octavian's triumph on the 14th, 15th, and 16th of August 29 B.C. was staged in the following fashion: celebration of victories over the Pannonians, Dalmatians, Iapydes, Morini and Suebi, and Gauls (day 1); commemoration of Actium (day 2), and celebration of the conquest of Egypt (day 3). If Rothstein is correct, Propertius' description of the blood-stained Rhine refers, not so much to Carrinas' *actual* victory, as to the stylized representation of it in the triumphal procession of August 14th—an inference validated by two other similar depictions of the Rhine. Thus, Ovid, *trist.* 2.41–42, where the triumphal image of the Rhine is portrayed ("cornibus hic fractis viridi male tectus ab ulva / decolor ipse suo sanguine Rhenus erat") and *Pont.* 3.4.107–8 ("Squalidus inmissos fracta sub harundine crines / Rhenus et infectas sanguine ploret aquas").²¹

The Rhine, of course, was not the only river to grace Octavian's

¹⁸Richardson (note 4 above) 329, nn. 45–46.

¹⁹H. E. Butler and E. A. Barber, *The Elegies of Sextus Propertius* (Oxford 1933) 269, n. 45. So also W. A. Camps, *Propertius Elegies Book III* (Cambridge 1966) 68, n. 45.

²⁰M. Rothstein, *Die Elegien Des Sextus Propertius*, Vol. II (Berlin 1924) 28, n. 45: "näher aber liegt, was von Erfolgen berichtet wird, die offiziell dem jetzigen Herrscher zugeschrieben wurden. . . ."

²¹See below and, once again, Rothstein (note 20 above) who, in the context of his remarks on Propertius' Rhine, makes a brilliant connection with the elegist's earlier depiction of the triumphal effigy of the Nile (2.1.32, "Der Fluss trauert über die Niederlage seiner Landsleute wie II 1, 32 der Nil den Sieg der Römer empfindet") and then relates, not simply the Propertian, but also Ovidian images of the Rhine to the same triumph: "Es ist wohl kein Zufall, sondern wird auf die bildliche Darstellung bei dem grossen Triumph des Jahres 29 zurückgehen, dass gerade der Rhein auch von Ovid zweimal in der Schilderung eines Triumphes blutbefleckt vorgestellt wird. . . ."

C. J. Fordyce, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos VII–VIII* (Oxford 1977) 287, n. 726 also cites the Ovidian *loci*.

triumph in effigy. We learn from Propertius 2.1.32–33 that the Nile was compelled to undergo similar humiliation:

Aut canerem Aegyptum et Nilum, cum attractus in urbem
septem captivis debilis ibat aquis.

Rothstein correctly associates Propertius' description of the blood-stained Rhine with Octavian's triumph. I shall demonstrate, however, that the image has as its ultimate reference and more important target Vergil's mourning Nile (*Aeneid* 8.711–13) in a nearly identical triumphal setting.

The most impressive of the tableaux which Vulcan had fashioned upon Aeneas' shield was the naval disaster off Actium, inflicted on the forces of the East by Octavian, Agrippa, and their supernatural allies (*Aeneid* 8.677ff.). Vergil concludes this part of the ecphrasis with the rout of Cleopatra herself (707–10) and with the opposed image of the Nile, sorrowfully beckoning its conquered people into protective waters (711–13). There follows immediately the tableau of the final panel, in the near foreground, as it were: Octavian's three-day triumph (714–28). Here we find scenes of revelry (717), sacrifice (719), and a procession of vanquished nations (722–23), brought up by effigies of the rivers Euphrates (726), Rhine (727), and Araxes (728).

Where, then, is the Nile? Vergil has omitted any reference to it here, and deliberately so. Both Cleopatra and her river have already been described (707–13) in terms which suggest both the pathos of defeat and the stylized images of a triumphal procession. Vergil, in other words, has made his Nile serve a two-fold poetic purpose. The mourning river of 711–13—an intricate and affecting personification—pre-empt the simpler and more brutal image which we might expect in the ceremonial context, i.e., that of a bound, blood-stained, or crippled river hauled in effigy through the city. Although it would make sense for someone viewing the shield to *see* the Nile in the panel devoted to the procession, Vergil, in his literary recreation of the scene, relies upon the likelihood that his audience will remember the earlier image of the mourning Nile, and thus avoids an anticlimactic redundancy.

The Rhine and the Nile, then. What has the Roman Callimachus borrowed from the Roman Homer, what has he altered, and why?

barbarus aut Suevo perfusus sanguine Rhenus
saucia maerenti corpora vectet aqua.

(Prop. 3.3.45–46)

contra autem magno maerentem corpore Nilum
 pandentemque sinus et tota veste vocantem
 caeruleum in gremium latebrosaque flumina victos.

(Verg., *Aen.* 8.711-13)

It will be apparent, first, that the elegiac image shares with the epic one a bold central metaphor: that of a mourning river. Vergil's image, however, is comparatively richer in descriptive detail—a complex blend of the naturalistic (*Nilum*, *sinus*, *caeruleum*, *latebrosa flumina*) and the metaphorical.²² The figurative portrayal of the Nile, spreading out its currents to welcome and enfold, emphasizes consolation for the vanquished rather than the glorious military achievement of the victor. In contrast, the personification of the Rhine is limited by sparing use of figurative language. But for the phrase *maerenti*. . . *aqua*, it would not even transcend the ordinary, much less create an indelible impression. Blood-stained rivers were, as we have seen, an almost generic feature of epic description, and the fact that this one is to be associated with Octavian's victory float does not enhance it. Propertius, however, has revitalized the image by integrating with it a striking metaphor (the mourning water). And not only that. He has deliberately appropriated the phrasing from the greatest poet of his generation.

Striking parallels at other levels indicate that Propertius has borrowed just enough from the image of the Nile to bring its author into focus here in the dream of Ennian song. Both poets, for example, end lines with the names of the rivers; and while this fact may not be significant in itself, or even worthy of notice, other points of correspondence can hardly be coincidental. Syntactically, the image of the Rhine mirrors that of the Nile:

Suevo	perfusus	sanguine	Rhenus
abl.	participle	abl.	proper name
magno	maerentem	corpore	Nilum
abl.	participle	abl.	proper name

Further, the cadence and rhythm of the lines are nearly identical, with spondaic substitution in the second, third, and fourth metra of each

²² For comparably artful blends of metaphorical and naturalistic elements in Vergilian imagery, cf. the description of Atlas, *Aen.* 4.246-51, and the epiphany of Tiberinus, *Aen.* 8.31-35.

verse reproducing the slow, almost turgid movement typical of such rivers. This effect is heightened by the near—*homoioteleutaion* of participle and proper name in each instance (*perfusus* . . . *Rhenus*: *maerentem* . . . *Nilum*). I contend that, in the hexameter, Propertius has made his elegiac Rhine sound, look, and even feel like Vergil's epic Nile, not so much in terms of meaning as in a syntactically and rhythmically associative way.

The passages share, as I have indicated above, a crucial metaphor which their specific differences in tone and meaning only serve to dramatize:

saucia maerenti corpora vectet aqua.

contra autem magno maerentem corpore Nilum,

It is especially noteworthy that Propertius and Vergil should both have employed the present participial form of the same verb in identical senses.²³ Is this a casual or coincidental doublet? I think not. In each verse, the participle has been juxtaposed with a form of the noun *corpus*. The recurrence of such an unusual collocation—an even stronger point of correspondence than those previously cited—throws the metaphor itself into high relief and creates an unmistakable aural, visual, and connotative resonance from passage to passage.

²³In the first place, *maerere* is a relatively unusual verb in Augustan verse. H. H. Warwick, for example, *A Vergil Concordance* (Minnesota 1975) lists only ten citations for the infinitive and all of its inflected forms together. L. Cooper, *A Concordance of the Works of Horace* (New York 1971) adduces only seven for Horace. Interestingly, H. Tränkle, *DIE SPRACHKUNST DES PROPERZ UND DIE TRADITION DER LATEINISCHEN DICHTERSPRACHE HERMES EINZELSCHRIFTEN Heft 15* (1960) 84 attributes to Propertius the first metaphorical use of *maerere* in reference to non-human entities and cites 3.3.46 in support: "*maerere* wird von Personen oder Kollektivbezeichnungen gesagt, die Personen einschliessen (Cis. *Pis* 17 *res publica*; *Sest.* 131 *domus*). Eine personifizierende Übertragung auf dinge finden wir bei Properz zuerst, nachgeahmt von Stat., *Theb.* 4, 107. Dann wagen spätere Dichter vereinzelt ähnliches."

Whatever he may think about the connection, or lack thereof, between Propertius and Vergil, it is difficult for me to see how Tränkle gets from the Augustan to the Silver Age use of the metaphor without taking Vergil's Nile, *magno maerentem corpore*, into account. If Propertius is really the first to use *maerere* in this sense, then Vergil will have had to follow him. Yet Tränkle makes no mention whatever of Vergil in this regard, and the perfect parallelism of the epic and elegiac images underscores the seriousness of his omission. It is much more likely, as I have argued in this study, that Vergil was the original source of the figure and that Propertius echoed him for poetic reasons of his own.

Barring the possibility of a common source, Ennian or otherwise, the conclusion is clear: Propertius' Rhine has more than a trace in it of Vergil's Nile, and the contamination doubles the image's power and effect. Most obviously, the blood-stained, mourning Rhine functions as part of the matrix of motifs which give the program elegies of Book 3 their coherence as a group:

water in motion/warfare and death—military triumph.

epic inspiration/heroic subjects—literary fame.

In another equally important sense, by bringing the *Aeneid* and its author into the frame of thematic reference, the image helps to resolve Propertius' professional dilemma. "Don't go near the water!" Calliope warns. She means, of course, "Don't even *think* about Vergil. Be proud to be just the sort of poet that you are."²⁴

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INTERPRETATIONS

FUROR AND FURIAE IN VIRGIL

F. Cairns has recently attempted to justify Aeneas' rage at the end of the *Aeneid* (12.946–47: *furiis accensus et ira / terribilis*) by distinguishing “between *furor* and *furibundus* on the one hand, which are always condemnatory, and *furiae* and *furo* / *fuens* on the other. These latter terms may be condemnatory but need not be” (*Virgil's Augustan Epic* [Cambridge 1989] 82–84). The evidence for the rehabilitation of *furiae* over *furor* comes chiefly from *Aen.* 8.494, where in response to the atrocities and tortures of Mezentius Etruria rises up *furiis . . . iustis*. But that merely suggests that the whole range of such words is generally condemnatory, and that here when justifiable *furiae* is provoked, in order to be acceptable, it must be modified by *iustus*. In response to Cairns' argument, D. P. Fowler has noted: “If you want to distinguish justified anger from irrational rage, you do it more clearly than by using words from the same root” (*G&R* 37 [1990] 108). I should think this is so, but it is worth noting that the ancients also attempted to make the distinction, though not in a way that will assuage uneasiness about Aeneas' final act: *quidam “furorem” pro bono et innocenti motu accipiunt, “urias” semper pro malo* (DServ. ad *Aen.* 4.474). The observation *per se* is philologically and critically worthless (as *Aen.* 8.494 proves); DServ. or his source just needed at this moment to formulate a “scientific” rule so as to blame Dido, as some at *Aen.* 12.946–47 seem to need to do in order to praise Aeneas.

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IN DEFENSE OF PETRONIUS 119, VERSES 30–32

Ecce Afris eruta terris
citrea mensa greges servorum ostrumque renidens
ponitur ac maculis imitatur vilius aurum,
quae sensum trahat. Hoc sterile ac male nobile lignum
turba sepulta mero circumvenit, omniaque orbis
praemia correptis miles vagus esurit armis.
Ingeniosa gula est. (Sat. 119.27–33)

Lines 30–32 “seem extraneous” to Shackleton Bailey, “the product of some twaddler” (*AJP* 108 [1987] 463). For *sensum* perhaps read *censum* (P): such a table is so costly as to “dissipate a fortune,” though I can find no parallel. *OLD* (s.v. *traho* 5) cites Sallust’s *pecuniam trahunt*; cf. also Seneca (*Ben.* 7.9.2): *video istic mensas et aestimatum lignum senatorio censu*. To Heinsius’ objection that the *citrus* is indeed fruit-bearing, note that to the ancients *citrus* signified both thyine-wood (used particularly for making tables) and a fruit-bearing tree, the citron (cf. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* 13.103). Surely any tree which has been uprooted and stained to resemble gold may sensibly, and appropriately in this vituperative context, be termed *sterile ac male nobile*.

My main concern, however, is with *omniaque . . . armis* which Shackleton Bailey calls “an interruption.” There is a play here on *orbis*. If we understand that the word in this context also means ‘table,’ then clearly there is no intrusion: even the wandering soldier hungers after the rewards of the table. *Circumvenit* presages *orbis*, and *esurit* (‘figurative’ according to *OLD*) harks back. For *orbis* meaning ‘table’ see *OLD* s.v. 2; that the examples there have *orbis* plural is an indication of the small size of these “occasional tables.” The single Petronian table is obviously a much larger version, a size not uncommon according to Pliny, who says that after the color of the wood, size is the chief consideration: *post haec amplitudo est; iam toti caudices iuvant, pluresque in una* (*Nat. Hist.* 13.97).

Pliny discusses the tree and these tables at great length (*Nat. Hist.* 13.91–103). One comment in particular is of interest. He says that they were made to serve as wine tables, *nec vinis laeduntur ut iis genitae* (13.99), which adds point to *turba sepulta mero*, the phrase termed possibly “a calque from 89 v. 56” by Shackleton Bailey.

ALLAN KERSHAW

BRIEF MENTION

THE STUDY OF WOMEN IN ANTIQUITY: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

PRESENT

The publication of *Arethusa* 6 in 1973 inaugurated the serious study of women in antiquity in our time. Classics was one of many disciplines to begin developing a subfield of women's studies in the early 1970s. Since then, has the study of women in antiquity become part of the "mainstream"? In order to answer this question I decided to examine articles and reviews published in current periodicals. I spent one day (October 1, 1990) skimming through the journals on display racks at the Ashmolean and Bodleian Libraries, assuming that they constituted a random sample. I looked at all the journals in Classics, Archaeology, and Ancient History that could conceivably have some material on women in antiquity. I checked only the titles listed in the main index of each journal; book reviews that were not listed in such an index were not noted. My criterion for including an article or review was that it could be of special value to someone teaching a specialised course or doing research on women in antiquity as well as to readers with a more casual interest in the subject. I do not claim any statistical significance for this survey. Nor is it intended to alert readers to a dearth of articles and reviews on ancient women in particular journals; for example, *Arethusa* frequently publishes work in this field, but I happened to examine a special issue on pastoral. I looked at forty-five journals. Of these, twenty-two did not have an article or review relevant to the study of ancient women.¹ Twenty-three journals contained at least one title and of these *Helios* had devoted an entire issue to Roman women.²

¹*AAntHung* 31, 1–2 (1985–88); *ACD* 32 (1989); *AJA* 94, 3 (1990); *Antichthon* 22 (1988); *Apeiron* 23, 2 (1990); *Arethusa* 23, 1 (1990); *BStudLat* 20, 1 (1990); *CP* 85, 1 (1990); *Eirene* 26 (1989); *Epigraphica* 50 (1988); *GIF* 41, 2 (1989); *Glotta* 68, 3–4 (1990); *Gnomon* 62, 4 (1990); *GRBS* 30, 2 (1989); *LEC* 88, 2 (1990); *MH* 47, 2 (1990); *Phronesis* 35, 1 (1990); *Prudentia* 21, 2 (1989); *QUCC* 33, 3 (1989); *RhM* 133, 2 (1990); *RPh* 62, 2 (1988); *SIFC* ser. 3, 8, 1 (1990).

²*AJP* 111, 2 (1990): Dolores O'Higgins, "Sappho's Splintered Tongue," and a review of Jane M. Snyder, *The Woman and the Lyre*; *AA* heft 1 (1990): Michaela Fuchs,

Feminist scholars, including those who are not specialists in classical antiquity, would probably be particularly interested in some of the articles in *Helios* and in Larissa Bonfante's study of nudity. The vast majority of the publications are traditional historical or literary studies. But I doubt that they would have been so numerous without the inspiration of feminism, however remote from the mind of some of the authors. This little survey confirmed my sense that the study of women has, indeed, become part, albeit a very small part, of the mainstream of Classical Studies.

PAST

Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood recently remarked to me, "I don't like to fill in the blank spaces in our knowledge of the ancient world with suppositions, I try to keep the blank spaces blank; for otherwise there is the danger that the hypothetical status of such suppositions may be eventually eroded, unconsciously—at least in part."

Frauen um Caligula und Claudius"; *AW* 21, 2 (1990): Robert R. Stieglitz, "Die Göttin Tanit im Orient"; *Archaeology* 43, 5 (1990): Larissa Bonfante, "The Naked Greek"; *A&R* 35, 1 (1990): M. Salanitro, "La moglie di Trimalchione e un amico di Marziale"; *CB* 66, 1–2 (1990): Antoinette Brazouski, "Lovers in Elysium"; *CJ* 85, 3 (1990): review of Suzanne Dixon, *The Roman Mother*; *CW* 83, 6 (1990): J. D. Noonan, "Livy 1.9.6: The Rape at the Consualia"; *Eos* 76 (1988): André Hurst, "Les dames du temps jadis: un argument"; *Gymnasium* 97, 3 (1990): Henriette Harich, "Catonis Marcia"; *Helios* 16, 1 (1989): special issue *Studies on Roman Women* containing Marilyn B. Skinner, "Ut Decuit Cinaediorum," Maria Wyke, "Mistress and Metaphor in Augustan Elegy," Ronnie Ancona, "The Subterfuge of Reason," Judith P. Hallett, "Women as *Same* and *Other* in Classical Roman Elite," Thomas A. J. McGinn, "The Taxation of Roman Prostitutes," and introduction by the editor Adele Scafuro; *Hermes* 118, 2 (1990): R. Ferwerda, "Plotinus and the Muses"; *Hesperia* 59, 2 (1990): Erkki Sironen, "An Honorary Epigram for Empress Eudocia in the Athenian Agora"; *Historia* 39, 1 (1990): Linda-Marie Günther, "Cornelia und Ptolemaios VIII"; *Latomus* 48, 4 (1989): C. Segal, "Otium and Eros"; *Mnemosyne* ser. 4, 43, 1–2 (1990): S. Wiersma, "The Ancient Greek Novel and its Heroines: a Female Paradox"; *RF* 117, 4 (1989): review of P. Mattei, *Tertullien, Le mariage unique*; *PP* 249 (1989): Giovanni Pugliese Carratelli, "Artemis Hyakinthotrophos a Taranto?"; *Phoenix* 43, 4 (1989): Christopher G. Brown, "Ares, Aphrodite, and the Laughter of the Gods"; *Ramus* 17, 2 (1988): S. E. Lawrence, "Iphigenia at Aulis: Characterization and Psychology in Euripides"; *RIDA* sér. 3, 36 (1989): Gilbert Hanard, "Manus et mariage à l'époque archaïque"; *RSA* 17–18 (1987–88): reviews of A. M. G. Capomacchia, *Semiramis*, G. Pettinato, *Semiramide*, and H. G. Beck, *Kaiserin Theodora und Prokop*; *ZPE* 83 (1990): D. G. Martinez, "T. Köln inv. 2.25 and Erotic damazein," Jane Bellemore and Beryl M. Rawson, "Alumni: The Italian Evidence."

Having worked for some twenty years on the history of Greek and Roman women, I've now been invited to designate the blank spaces in the field, and, what is even more difficult, to point to areas that were filled in, and are still being filled in, without adequate justification in the ancient sources. Some of the generalizations about "women" that were blithely voiced need to be erased, even if it means that we must face gaps in our knowledge. In my view, there have been two principal, but interconnected, reasons for defects in our map of knowledge of women in antiquity. One reason is the wholesale application of theories of literary criticism by scholars who did not distinguish the study of men's ideas and images of women from the study of historical women. I am not alone in wondering why some books purporting to be about the history of ancient women written in French have recently been translated into English. For example, Giulia Sissa, *Greek Virginity* (translated from *Le corps virginal*³) states that her subject is: "Did the hymen exist according to the Greek perception of anatomy (among laymen as well as physicians)?" (p. 1). Her sources are all male-authored and she presents them from the male viewpoint. The "physicians" and the "laymen" are all men. Sissa does not discuss how their views might have influenced the lives of actual women. She ignores sources such as Sappho (LP 105a, 105c, 107, 114) and Archilochus (*P. Colon.* 7511), who do provide perspectives on how the loss of virginity affected women. For what audience is the translation of Sissa's book intended? Scholars interested in this erudite subject can surely read the French version. One suspects that the translation is an opportunistic attempt to attract the much larger group of readers who are interested in learning how women in the past actually lived their lives, but who cannot read French. Certainly the quality of Sissa's work does not justify the translation. Indeed, the book would have been much improved if she herself had read more secondary literature that was not in French. In her notes to Chapter 1, she gives twelve citations to secondary literature in French and only one to a book published in English, and is evidently unaware that she is repeating ideas that were published years ago by other scholars (e.g., in Chapter 6 "The Tortoise and the Courtesan").

A second problem inhibiting the development of this field is that some would-be historians of women who do distinguish the study of women's lives from the study of men's ideas about women were trained

³[1987] trans. by Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, Ma., and London 1990).

in literary rather than in historical methodology. They call themselves "social historians," supposing social history to be less rigorous than political or economic history. But, in fact, social history is often the most difficult of all ancient histories, because the sources are mute, sparse, or anecdotal, and the subfields more recently established. A properly trained historian would pay attention not only to gender, but to other distinctions including those of class, age, ethnicity, regional specificity, historical period, and change over time.⁴ A discussion of alleged conflicts between appearance and reality concerning the seclusion of women in Classical Athens is once again in progress. But, as Aristotle (*Politics* 6.5.13 1322b–1323a) stated, poor men are obliged to use their wives and children as slaves. Seclusion of free women was a luxury and an indicator of social and economic status. Thus attention to social and economic class and to the principles concerning conflicts between ideals and reality established by Ernestine Friedl in 1967⁵ would show that the subject of seclusion is a red-herring.

FUTURE

For this section of my essay I consulted several other scholars who shared my interest in women in antiquity.⁶ Highest on the list of desiderata was more work on the realia of women's lives. Specialists in women in antiquity believe that archaeologists, and to a lesser extent, art historians will be able to make a substantial contribution to the field. Archaeologists in the past looked into the question of the location of the *gynaikonitis* and reported finds of loom weights. But historians of women would like to know more about women's health and use of domestic and public space and about women of various ethnicities in the Hellenistic Kingdoms and Roman provinces. They would also like more guidance on the interpretation of portrayals of women in sculpture

⁴For a model, see Bellemore and Rawson (note 2 above).

⁵The Position of Women: Appearance and Reality," *Anthropological Quarterly* 40, pp. 97–108. Friedl is cited by Roger Just (see note 9 below), but not by David Cohen, "Seclusion, Separation, and the Status of Women in Classical Athens," *G & R* 36 (1989) 3–15.


⁶I wish to express my gratitude to Suzanne Dixon, Gillian W. Clarke, David Harvey, Natalie B. Kampen, and Barbara Levick for their contributions to this discussion.

and vase painting. A need for more work on women in late antiquity was voiced, especially on law.⁷

One colleague suggested that editorial boards add to their guidelines for publication an evaluation of whether an article or book on any subject where it might be relevant had included a consideration of women and urged that referees should encourage authors to take notice of this factor. Another aspect of affirmative action would be a recommendation to consider whether the work of women scholars had been cited where it was appropriate: we must take care lest they become a "muted group." After "anonymous refereeing" of articles for journals and of papers for conferences was instituted some fifteen years ago, the number of contributions by female classicists that were accepted increased. I wonder whether the name of a woman author or speaker still makes any difference to audiences. Women scholars have certainly made a substantial contribution to the study of the legal status of Greek women; but Raphael Sealey, *Women and Law in Classical Greece*⁸ does not refer to the articles of Susan Guettel Cole, or of Claude Mossé, or of Cynthia Patterson, or to articles published in Helene P. Foley, *Reflections of Women in Antiquity* (London 1981). The title of Sealey's book is misleading, and as in the case of Sissa's book, one suspects an opportunistic attempt to attract the large group of readers interested in women's history. Less than half of his book is devoted to the Classical period. His chapters, presented in the following order, are: "Women in Greek Thought"; "Women in Athenian Law"; "Women in the Laws of Gortyn"; "Women in Sparta and in Hellenistic Cities"; "Women in the Roman Republic"; "The Women of Homer"; and "Women and the Unity of Greek Law." There are two appendices, one tangential to the subject of the book, the other in dubious taste. Sealey's book will disappoint readers interested primarily in women's legal status. The only laws on rape that he discusses are those at Gortyn and he ignores the wealth of evidence from Ptolemaic Egypt. Sealey's proper subject is the unity of Greek law; but presumably scholars interested in this debatable topic would not need to be told in the first sentence that Xerxes was a "Great King," and would not need a glossary of "Athenian Legal

⁷Jane Gardner, *Women in Roman Law and Society* (London 1986) covers Roman Law through the second century A.D.

⁸(Chapel Hill and London 1990).



Terms.” In contrast to Sealey, Roger Just, *Women in Athenian Law and Life*,⁹ is even-handed in his use of secondary sources. His discussions of law are presented *sine ire et studio*. Just’s book can be recommended to undergraduates, but scholars will not find much that is new in it.¹⁰ Because Just was trained as an anthropologist, it was hoped that he would be able to construct a new theory or explanation concerning the relationship of images of women in tragedy to historical women, but he did not succeed in doing this. This subject is one of many that remain on our agenda.

Among works in progress, I am particularly looking forward to Holt N. Parker’s study of Metrodora’s medical text. Parker is convinced that the author is a woman. The more we can confirm that authors of various works in antiquity attributed to women actually were women, the less likely it will be that scholars can credibly assert that Erinna, Sulpicia, Philaenis, and Theano, Perictione and other writers of Neo-Pythagorean treatises were men who adopted female pseudonyms. Such arguments impose silence on an already “muted group.”

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⁹(London and New York 1989).

¹⁰A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens. I, The Family and Property* (Oxford 1968) is still preferable for advanced students who can be relied upon to examine the primary sources cited.

BOOK REVIEWS

DAVID A. CAMPBELL, tr. Greek Lyric, with an English Translation. In Four Volumes, Vol. II: Anacreon, Anacreontea, Choral Lyric from Olympus to Alcman. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press and London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1988. Pp. viii + 547. Cloth, \$14.50. (Loeb Classical Library)

This, the second of four projected volumes replacing Edmonds' *Lyra Graeca*, has the same virtues as its 1982 predecessor: Campbell's texts have been composed independently from the latest editions and supplied with a minimal apparatus. The selection of material has been generous, even optimistic: nine fragments seem more than we shall ever read of Terpander, but there are also 170 pages on Alcman (about doubling the length of Edmonds), including scraps from scholia and ancient commentaries that Page had relegated to the testimonia. There are also extensive and well-organized *testimonia vitae atque artis* and finally accurate and unpretentious translations accompanied by expert and concise notes. All this in a convenient (following the enumeration of Preisdanz for the Anacreontea and Page for the rest), well-produced (I have noticed Greek mis-typed only in Test. 16 on p. 36 and 350 on p. 50) and remarkably economical book.

Though Edmonds provided unparalleled service to English readers for more than half a century, his extravagances in Greek as well as English have become so notorious that his successor was bound to give us saner texts and drier translations. But another central feature of the new Loeb is that Campbell has added a series of discreet glosses, cross-references, and occasional references to secondary literature which constitute in effect a commentary on the poetry. Though he evidently would like to follow Edmonds and let the texts speak for themselves (long swaths of the Anacreontea pass by with little more commentary than the identification of Dionysiac epithets), Campbell has taken it upon himself in presenting the archaic fragments to indicate where possible the context and occasion of the original performance. In fact, the new Loeb may be seen as less a translation of Greek Lyric Poetry than as a presentation of what we know of Greek lyric poetry, and often how we know it. For example, in rendering Alcman 60 (Campbell/Page = 16 Edmonds: καὶ τὴν εὐχομαι φέροισα / τόνδ' ἐλιγρῦσω πυλεῶνα / κῆρατ' ὠκυπαίρω) Campbell's "And to you I pray, bringing this garland of goldflower and lovely galingale" is not simply a less florid version than Edmonds' "To thee also I pray with this garland of cassidony and lovely bedstraw for an offering." Campbell also manages to suggest how such lines might have been uttered during a rite for Hera: he chooses the flat-footed "bringing" for φέροισα instead of Edmonds' idiomatic "with" because

the word may apply literally to a cult procession (as at Frag. 1.61); a note on the word adds: "Fem. sing. participle: a girl or girls' choir is singing" and another note refers us to Frag. 3 where *πυλεών* is again used in a maidens' hymn. There Pamphilus is cited from Athenaeus to the effect that the term denoted a garland for Hera among the Spartans. In Edmonds all we have is an unexplained title, "To Hera," and a reference (under the Greek) to Athenaeus. Page had eschewed exegetical notes altogether in *PMG*, "futile ratus brevia praecipere in rebus quae explanatione plenissima indigent" (ix), but Campbell provides a great deal of information, saying the minimum that need be said or may be said with certainty.

This scrupulous, unpatronizing, almost scientific presentation will make this Loeb of interest to all classicists, including specialists in archaic poetry who will value Campbell's opinions on a wide range of difficult and sometimes neglected Greek verse. At the same time, it is, oddly, a Loeb that only the most sophisticated Greekless reader will enjoy. The translations are deliberately plain and unimpassioned; they are designed primarily to convey information. At times the notes inevitably overwhelm the fragment and cannot avoid textual and papyrological matters: not every reader will appreciate the significance in a fact like "The form has the epic case-suffix $-\phi\iota(v)$." Thus the price of presenting such refractory material stripped of rash supplements and false lyricism has been that the sound of poetry is muffled in these pages, and there remains a real need for a "literary" translation of Greek lyric, especially one that would offer a more substantial sample than does Lattimore. Those who read or teach Greek poetry in translation must wait for such a book. In the meantime, Campbell offers to scholars and to ideally patient general readers a convenient and extraordinarily rich *vade mecum* of the lyric poets.

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MARY WHITLOCK BLUNDELL. *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics*. Cambridge University Press, 1989. Pp. xii + 298.

Mary Whitlock Blundell sets out to examine in five plays of Sophocles the traditional moral values of helping friends and harming enemies ("HelpFriends/HarmEnemies," as the author refers to the concept throughout) and the concurrent principle of justice as retaliation (*talio*). Her work has neither the lyrical intensity nor the occasional startling intimacy of Nussbaum's consideration of ethics in tragedy in *The Fragility of Goodness*; it is, however, always clear, direct, and persuasively argued. She begins with a discussion of the validity of using drama to examine ethics and with a concise description of the principles themselves; this should prove useful for all those who must explain either the ethical

systems of the ancient world or the relationship of tragedy and moral philosophy. Assuming that *dianoia* expresses *ethos*, Blundell identifies the "coherent moral character" of the dramatic figures and then uses, as she says, the apparent inconsistencies in their ethical views as "data to be explained in terms of a unitary moral personality" (p. 23). Even though no major reinterpretations of the plays emerge, her approach provides many perceptive and thoughtful observations as well as some unique and convincing responses to several of the more vexing—and most rehashed—critical dilemmas, e.g., the inconsistencies of Ajax's "deception speech," of Antigone's speech of self-justification, and of Philoctetes' acquiescence to Herakles' demands at the end of *Philoctetes*.

Blundell's arguments in her chapter on *Ajax* set the tone and pattern for her analyses elsewhere of the four other plays (she excludes *Oedipus Tyrannos* and *Trachiniae*), each of which can be read as a separate essay. Ajax's sense of justice, which demands direct and personal retaliation against an enemy and all those who are *philo*i of the enemy, is revealed as faulty. Because of his disregard for the reciprocal bonds of *philia* with both his divine supporters and his human dependents, he does not assume responsibility for the welfare of his wife, child, and followers. Blundell initiates here her discussion of the relationship of passion to HelpFriends/HarmEnemies with a consideration of the self-indulgence of Ajax's desire for suicide, an emotional motivation that denies those ethical claims that conflict with personal desire. She finds that frequently passion energizes the ethical conflicts that are the stuff of the dramatic plot. The "deception speech," which has been frequently indicted as "out of character" for the brutally honest Ajax, Blundell reads as a critique of the flaws in the HelpFriends/HarmEnemies system Ajax espouses. Speaking to Tecmessa and the chorus, the hero reveals how fully he disregards HelpFriends; honesty should prevail between friends. Odysseus' *philia* makes explicit this failing, for it is defined by qualities of honesty, flexibility, and a willingness to accommodate friends. Finally, considering the relationship of the speech and Ajax's character, Blundell points out that, although it appears to have eluded most commentators, the deception or *dolos* practiced when Ajax undertakes the night attack upon the Greek chiefs indicates early on that he is capable of *dolos* when it is necessary to HarmEnemies.

Although Blundell finds the expected contrasts between the *philia* of Antigone and that of Creon in *Antigone* and the expected contradictions that arise from the application of HelpFriends/HarmEnemies within a family, again she manages to tease out several intriguing points. One is the dependency of Antigone's arguments for the priority of kin ties on a particular view of the underworld as a place where blood ties override earthly enmities. In death, Eteocles and Polyneices forgive each other and Antigone can forgive the latter for his attack upon the former (thus treating a *philos* as an enemy). This, however, undermines both Antigone's insistence that she must please the dead immediately, for they will in time forgive her for the sake of kinship regardless of her actions, and her persistent rejection of her sister, to whom she will be reconciled

in death. Another interesting point Blundell explores is Creon's inconsistency in violating the *nomos* of obligations to kin and the gods as protectors of families and, at the same time, accepting the power of an inherited throne. In both Creon and Antigone as in Ajax, it is "passion which sets the goals that reason defends" (p. 141), and it is the anger of Creon that makes him unable to profit from the advice of his *philoî*.

HelpFriends/HarmEnemies and *talio* are, Blundell argues, the motivating force in *Electra* as well, yet it is here that their problematic nature is most apparent. These principles work only when all agree on who is friend or enemy and who is at fault. The distortion in the relationship of kin ties and *philia* caused by the murders of Iphigeneia and Agamemnon, and the subsequent confusion of social and familial roles (the mother as non-mother, the *paedagogus* as father, the heirs as the disinherited) set the scene to reveal the negative effects of a system in which the judgment of friend and enemy is relative to the individual perspective. Retributive justice becomes an unending cycle of revenge; *talio* becomes an objective cover for the passions that generate deeds of irrational brutality. Here Blundell is at her best in elucidating both the problem and the causes.

Blundell credits *Philoctetes* with being the "most ethically complex of all of Sophocles' plays" (p. 184), and as she unrelentingly traces the convolutions of shifting loyalties and shifting moral terminology, she demonstrates her point. Moral choice is a dynamic element of the plot, as both Odysseus and Philoctetes try to win over the young Neoptolemus. Again it is the particular points rather than the overall discussion that seem most interesting, especially her argument that because the plot develops from a prior violation in the HelpFriends/HarmEnemies code (the Atreidae and Odysseus' treatment of Philoctetes), its resolution would seem to lie in the reaffirmation of this code and *talio*. Yet Philoctetes' insistence upon harming his enemies creates a moral stalemate. Herakles, returning a favor to a friend, can resolve the issue, but in fact the incoherence of HelpFriends/HarmEnemies is not remedied; by going to Troy, Philoctetes necessarily helps his enemies. Neoptolemus demonstrates a second flaw in HelpFriends/HarmEnemies when he realizes that it provides no criteria for deciding among conflicting loyalties. The unsatisfactory resolution arises from a choice based on personal sympathy, passion not principle.

Oedipus at Colonus redeems not only Oedipus but also, according to Blundell, the ethic of HelpFriends/HarmEnemies. This is possible because the conflicting claims of family, city, and *philia* are carefully redefined and then even more carefully balanced. First, action rather than relationship (citizenship or kinship) defines "friend"; second, Oedipus is willing to subordinate his own desires to those who have demonstrated that they are friends; and third, he does not focus on HarmEnemies to the exclusion of HelpFriends. Thus Oedipus, persuaded by Antigone and Theseus, respects the suppliant Polynices and repays the favors of Theseus. Oedipus himself, the subject of Apollo's prophecy one more time, literally embodies the code HelpFriends/HarmEnemies, and in

this embodiment becomes the object of a hero cult, for it is the power of the hero after death to enhance HelpFriends/HarmEnemies that generates worship. The elevation of the earthly representative of this human moral code to cult figure does not mean, Blundell insists (although not entirely convincingly), that *Oedipus at Colonus* is an unqualified vindication of the ethic, because the doomed Polyneices and his sister's moving plea, among other things, maintain our awareness of the possible conflicts.

In her conclusions Blundell reiterates the problematic nature of HelpFriends/HarmEnemies and *talio*. The moral system provides no way to reconcile the conflicting claims of different *philoï*; in no instance is there, for example, an argument for disregarding an obligation to a specific friend for the good of a larger group of friends. The relativity of the code, which arises from evaluating others by their relationship to oneself rather than by any external assessment of their action or character, leads to endless problems, especially because this code encourages judgments based on perceptions or beliefs that are often based in emotion or passion. The personal impulses of love and hate are in themselves sufficient to generate conflict; when they underlie an allegedly neutral value system, such conflicts become even less amenable to solution. Blundell concludes that the need for external criteria to govern relationships between people is clear; the world will always need a Theseus. But more importantly, perhaps, as she herself notes, it is in the inability of such principles as *talio* and HelpFriends/HarmEnemies to serve as practical moral guides that their tragic potential—the stuff of these tragedies—is located. *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies* should be read not only by those interested in Sophocles or in literature and philosophy but also by those interested in fifth-century Athens. It will provide them with much food for thought.

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MARTHA MAAS AND JANE M. SNYDER. *Stringed Instruments of Ancient Greece*. Yale University Press, 1989. Pp. xx + 261. 163 ills. Cloth, no price stated.

The authors of this valuable book have set out to provide a comprehensive survey of the stringed instruments (lyres, harps, and lutes) from their earliest attestation in Greek lands to the Hellenistic age, making the fullest use of both archaeological and literary evidence. They divide the whole time—span into four convenient periods, which are treated successively. The first runs from the beginnings to about 700 B.C. ("Homer and before"); the second is the Archaic age, taken to end *ca.* 525 with the rise of red-figure vase painting; the third is classical Athens to *ca.* 400; the fourth is "late classical and early Hellenistic." The first, second, and fourth of these periods receive a chapter each, but classi-

cal Athens, because of the abundance of evidence, receives four, dealing with different instruments. In each case the archaeological and literary evidence is reviewed in parallel, and every effort made to establish as much as may be about the instruments' shapes and sizes, construction, ornamentation, accoutrements, tuning and playing techniques, and social role. Each chapter is followed by about ten pages of half-tone illustrations. Besides the customary list of these at the beginning of the book, there is a full list of all the objects referred to in the text, and a bibliography.

The Greek stringed instruments all have their origins in the old high civilizations of western Asia and the Nile valley. The authors make sufficient acknowledgement of the fact, and refer to oriental monuments occasionally when they are especially pertinent, but in general confine themselves to Greece. They point out that Minoan and Mycenaean lyres already show certain features—round base and symmetrical frame—that distinguish them from most Mesopotamian and Egyptian ones and link them with those of archaic Greece. Without mentioning the recent discovery of drilled tortoise shell fragments at the late Bronze Age sanctuary at Phylakopi (Melos), which may take the *chelys* back centuries earlier than it was attested in Greece, they plead for a greater measure of continuity from the Mycenaean age than is sometimes admitted, arguing that the regular limitation to 3–5 strings in Geometric representations reflects only the limitations of the artistic medium, not the temporary absence of the seven-stringed lyre. This is possible, but the number of representations is considerable, and this material evidence is in striking accord with ancient belief in a pre-Terpadrian four-stringed lyre. If Homeric bards sang on seven notes, what was the special contribution of the citharodes who, according to Heraclides Ponticus (frag. 157), clothed epic verse in melody of their own?

Certainly we cannot draw any neat distinction between the terms φόρμιγγς and κίθαρις. Maas and Snyder pay careful attention to nomenclature, and point out that Homer and other poets apply both names to the same instrument. The by-form κίθαρα (produced, I suppose, by the analogy of λύρα) is not attested till the early fifth century (Theognidea 778, Epicharmus 79 and 109). λύρα was apparently a generic term covering all types of lyre, but perhaps especially the tortoise-shell lyre. In and after the fourth century it can be distinguished from κίθαρα, as in Pl., *Rep.* 399d; Aristox. frag. 102; Anaxilas frag. 15 Kock; Aristid. Quint. pp. 85.14, 91.1ff., 92.11 W.–I. βάρβιτος is identified on good grounds with the long-armed bowl lyre often seen on vases in sympotic and Bacchic contexts. The interesting suggestion is made (40, 118f., 127) that it was brought to Athens by Anacreon. When Maas and Snyder say that the name barbitos "occurs only once in the extant poetry of the Archaic age, in a fragment of Alcaeus (D 12.4 L.–P.), in which it appears in a form peculiar to the dialect of Lesbos, *barmos*," they overlook Sappho 176 and Anacreon 472. As regards Athens, they do not note that the early comic poet Magnes wrote a play entitled *Barbitistai*. Aristophanes may allude to it with ψάλλον at *Equ.* 522, as the scholiast be-

lieves; if so, the reference is of interest in relation to what is said of the playing technique of the barbitos on p. 122.

The arrangements for tuning lyres seem to have been somewhat more various than the authors allow it to appear. They should have cited the important study by E. Pöhlmann with E. Tichy in *Serta Indogermanica* (Festschrift G. Neumann, Innsbruck 1982) 287–311. And it is surprising to find the construction of the kithara discussed with no mention of the widely-held and altogether plausible view that the complex attachments generally seen on the inner side of the arms were not merely ornamental curlicues but levers for releasing the tension of the crossbar: see C. Sachs, *The History of Musical Instruments* (New York 1940) 130; A. J. Neubecker, *Altgriechische Musik* (Darmstadt 1977) 73; B. Lawergren, *Imago Musicae* 1 (1984) 150; D. Paquette, *L'Instrument de musique dans la céramique de la Grèce antique* (Paris 1984) 95f., 241–43.

On the question of increases in the number of strings in the latter part of the fifth century, Maas and Snyder are sceptical, suggesting that Ion of Chios' poem ἐνδεκάχορδε λύρα was actually about a harp (154), and that Timotheus in *Persae* 229–31 is referring to novel rhythmic patterns and not to a polychord kithara (62). But Pherecrates speaks of Timotheus raping Musica with his twelve strings (frag. 155.25 K.–A.), and Aristophanes too (frag. 467 K.–A.) implies a new music that rejoices in having gone beyond the heptachordic. From the later Hellenistic period we have the Delphic Paeans which were sung to the kithara, as the inscriptions prove, and use fourteen to fifteen notes. Probably only a few virtuosi used such polychord kitharas, but we can hardly deny their existence.

Fifth-century authors associate the harp especially with Lydia, and the fact that it is first mentioned by Alcman (?) and Sappho is in keeping with this provenance. One source attributes its invention to the Lydian Tyrrhenos, though others derived it from Thrace (Phot. α 2956–7 = Bekker *Anecd.* 452.3; Cantharus frag. 12 K.–A.; Duris *FGrH* 76 F 28; none of these cited by Maas and Snyder). At Athens it was almost entirely a woman's instrument (148ff.), though it might be noted that Euripides is said to have had one, bought after his death by Dionysius I (Hermippus ap. *Vit. Eur.* p. 5.14 Schwartz). The vases are said not to show anyone singing to it (154), yet it is clear from literary evidence that at least some types of harp could accompany song (Sappho 21, 22?; Eupolis frag. 148 K.–A.; Plato com. frag. 71.14 K.–A.). Does the harpist on New York 07.286.35 (M. Wegner, *Musikgeschichte in Bildern* II. 4: *Griechenland* [Leipzig² 1970] 103; Paquette, op. cit. 195) not have her mouth open?

One such harp was the σαμβύκη, which appears to have been a smallish instrument; Euphorion said that it had only four strings. Maas and Snyder (184) hesitate as to whether it was a harp or a lute, but Curt Sachs argued convincingly that it was a horizontal angular harp with a boat-shaped body. The instrument depicted on a white-ground lekythos, Brussels A 1020, which Maas and Snyder oddly interpret as a lyre seen from the side, is probably a unique Greek

representation of the *sambyke*, though the painter has erroneously equipped it with a bridge as if it were a lyre. There is a Roman representation in a painting from Stabiae in the Naples Museum.

The lute was a late arrival in Greece. On the question where it came from (185), it might have been worth mentioning Pollux's opinion (4.60) that it was of Assyrian origin and Varro's (? Mart. Cap. 9.924) that it was Egyptian. Pollux also confirms the supposition (186) that the *τρίχορδος* was a lute, by identifying it with the *πανδοῦρα*.

As the above paragraphs indicate, the authors, in spite of diligent efforts to collect all relevant literary evidence, have missed a number of useful particles of information lurking in corners. The *φοῖνιξ* or *φοινίκιον*, for which they cite only Hdt. 4.192.1 and ps.-Arist., *Probl.* 19.14, is actually attested as early as Alcaeus (p. 507 Voigt, frag. 424A Campbell); cf. also Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.20 (?); Aristox. frag. 97; and authors cited by Athenaeus 637b. Various stringed instruments whose names are recorded do not achieve a mention in the book at all: *βύρτη*, *ἐπιγόνειον*, *κλειψιάμβος* and *παρίαμβος*, *λυροφοῖνιξ* and *λυροφοινίκιον*, *νάβλα(ς)*, *πεντάχορδον*, *πήληξ*, *σιμικόν*, *σπάδιξ*, *τρίπους*, *ψάλτιγξ*. To be sure, some of them may not have existed before the late Hellenistic period, and about some our ignorance is total.

It is a pity that the notes could not be printed below the text: it is burdensome to have to keep heaving a pound or so of long-life paper this way and that, particularly as one has to keep an eye on the illustrations too. As for the illustrations, many of them are flanked by great expanses of emptiness, and might with advantage have been reproduced larger. Bigger or sharper reproductions can sometimes be found in Paquette or elsewhere. It would also have been helpful if each caption had been furnished with a dating; and if cross-references in the text and notes had been by page and not merely by chapter.

I could multiply my quibbles. I could unroll a list of minor bloomers. But the last word must be of gratitude for a deeply researched, thoughtful, careful, well-written and highly instructive book. For anyone concerned with Greek music it will be indispensable.

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TIMOTHY J. MOORE. *Artistry and Ideology: Livy's Vocabulary of Virtue*. Frankfurt am Main, Athenäum, 1989. Pp. xii + 233. Cloth, DM 68. (Athenäum Monografien: Altertumswissenschaft, Bd. 192)

In his Preface (9) Livy asks the reader to pay special attention to the virtues that enabled Rome to grow to greatness in her early days and to the vices that had crippled her in recent times. Of the 142 books, roughly the first third described the halcyon period of early Rome, the remaining two-thirds the grim

decline. The large majority of books, therefore, were more concerned with *dissidentes mores* than with *illa aetate qua nulla virtutum feracior fuit* (9.16.19). Nevertheless, Livy was generally viewed in ancient times as a man of cheerful disposition, a depicter of the gentler emotions, and the generous appraiser of great men (Quint., *Inst.* 10.1.101; Sen., *Suas.* 6.22). Perhaps the great length of the completed history deterred many from reading beyond the early books. Even the epitomators flagged as they neared the end: only a few lines for the last books, with no Periochae surviving for Books 136–37. Moore's monograph on the vocabulary Livy used to describe moral virtue, therefore, is appropriate, concerned as it is with this optimistic aspect of Livy's reputation. The author selects for study fifty words, divided among six chapters entitled "Bravery and Industry," "Justice and Loyalty," "Forbearance and Self-control," "Humanity and Kindness," "Wisdom and Knowledge," "Innocence and Seriousness." An important Conclusion follows, together with six detailed appendices. Moore restricts himself to virtues that are abiding and inherent in human beings; words denoting temporary states (e.g., *pudor*, *verecundia*), or how others view us (e.g., *auctoritas*, *gloria*) are excluded.

The exposition, which is crisp and clear, follows a regular pattern: first, the meaning of the word; second, other words with which it is commonly associated ("formulas"); third, frequency and distribution; fourth, those to whom the virtue is usually attributed (e.g., Romans, non-Romans; plebeians, patricians); finally, the *in-privativum* as it bears on our understanding of its positive opposite.

Overall, Moore has done a sensible job of determining the meanings of the fifty words (he sometimes corrects or amplifies J. Hellegouarc'h's views in *Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la République*). Some words are unambiguously positive (e.g., *virtus*, *perseverantia*), some often self-serving or deceptive (e.g., *benignus*, *clementia*), others change their meaning by context (e.g., *audacia* and *pertinacia* are usually favorable in the military sphere, negative elsewhere), while still others are even more variable (e.g., *fides*, *consilium*, *lenitas*). However, it is not always clear why Moore regards some virtues as usually abiding traits of character (e.g., *audacia*), whereas others are temporary (e.g., *ferocitas*). It is legitimate to interpret some virtues that strictly apply to things as applying to people: e.g., at 1.28.11 *mitiores* modifies *poenas*, but clearly the Romans are the real subject of discussion, or at 33.21.3 *cuius magnitudini* strictly refers to *regium nomen* rather than to Attalus I himself. On the other hand, at 39.1.6 *parsimonia* is scarcely an abiding trait of Roman soldiers, but a "virtue" imposed on them by an impoverished Liguria: *inops regio, quae parsimonia astringeret milites*.

Moore is thorough in his comparison of passages in Livy with their Polybian originals, as well as of the famous passage on Torquatus and the Gaul (7.10) with his source, Claudius Quadrigarius (*HRR* frag. 10b = Aull. Gell. 9.13). From these he establishes that Livy's vocabulary and moral ideas derive not from his sources, but are his own invention. He also demonstrates Livy's conservatism.

Three examples: (1) *virtus* seldom refers to a particular virtue or general moral excellence ("courage" and "endurance" are its most common meanings); (2) Livy tends to avoid usages with philosophical overtones popular in the late Republic, such as *iustitia* (in preference to *fides*) and *humanitas*; (3) Livy does not betray the progression toward the terminology of imperial propaganda in words like *providentia*, *clementia*, and *indulgentia*.

Most patterns of distribution are unsurprising, since most, Moore sensibly argues, depend on subject matter. One might have expected to see personal taste and preference changing over time, as we find in Tacitus; but the only marked shift of this type that Moore notes is that of *consilium* giving way to *prudentia* in the third, fourth, and fifth decades (could this also be the explanation for other oddities, such as the disappearance after the first decade of *promptus* to describe human beings, or the liking for *patientia* up to Book 30 but for *patiens* after 33?). Moore's fifty words are therefore evidence for constancy rather than change in the extant books. Livy's fondness for certain repeated phrases ("formulas") emerges in a quite pronounced way in Moore's study (e.g., *fortis ac strenuus*, *fides virtusque*: Moore usually selects words of the same part of speech to illustrate formulas). Some virtues are shared by quite diverse peoples in Livy's history (e.g., *modestia*, *patientia*), but others, Moore shows, are largely reserved for Romans (e.g., *moderatio*, *perseverantia*, *constantia*). The intellectual virtues receive little emphasis, with *sapientia* actually being set in opposition to Roman values (one wonders what Livy's lost "philosophical dialogues" were like: Sen., *Ep.* 100.9). Moreover, the rarity or absence of certain words describing civilized living comes as a surprise in a writer famed for depicting the *affectus dulciores* (Quint., *Inst.* 10.1.101): e.g., the complete absence of *abstinentia* (used twice in the *Periochae*, however) and of *mansuetudo* (*mansuetus* refers once to a person); *liberalitas* appears but once, *humanitas* three times, while *probitas* and *probus* describing people appear three times, and only in Books 39 and 40.

Moore realizes that the infrequency of a word "does not necessarily imply a lack of concern for the ideal" (p. 84, n. 4); yet elsewhere he uses word counts as a barometer of Livy's beliefs, which is not always satisfying. I do not believe, for example, that Moore on the basis of word count has undermined Ogilvie's thesis that in Book 3 Livy emphasized *moderatio*, in 4 *modestia*. On six occasions he finds that "people in the *Periochae* are credited with virtues which Livy did not attribute to them" (p. 129). But the absence of a particular word does not mean that the ideal itself is absent. This reviewer, at any rate, is willing to credit Coriolanus (*Per.* 3), Valerius Corvus (*Per.* 7), and L. Marcus (*Per.* 25) with possessing *virtus* (p. 129, n. 4). One of Moore's most striking discoveries is the increasing rarity in the later books of many words denoting soldierly excellence, such as *virtus*, *fortis*, *strenuus*, *audacia*, and *acer* (only *impiger* continues in frequency). Moore accounts for this phenomenon by saying that in the later books, when Rome no longer has to fight for survival, military virtues became less vital than they were before. There is truth in this,

but the explanation seems incomplete. Moore acutely notes that at the same time these soldierly traits are less emphasized, words like *clementia*, *benignitas*, *lenitas*, *prudentia*, and *iustitia* are on the increase. These words, of course, do not so much characterize the soldiers as their commanders. I would attribute these shifts in frequency less to the goals of the fighting than to Livy's increasing concentration on the complex relationships between soldier and commander, and between commander and the conquered.

Altogether, this is a useful and commendable monograph.

T. J. LUCE

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FATHERS AND SONS: A NOTE ON PINDARIC AMBIGUITY

A number of recent essays have suggested that deliberate ambiguity is a device frequently deployed by Pindar and Bacchylides in the service of their epinician program. George Devereux and Robert Renehan, for example, have pointed to the exploitation of ambiguity in individual words—for the purpose of narrating a more positive version of a myth, or of imbuing other contexts with celebratory elements.¹ Thomas Cole has demonstrated Pindar's penchant for ambiguity in the enumeration of victories. In the passages Cole discusses, the poet's language allows for an interpretation which credits the victor and his family with more victories than they have actually won.² Finally, Thomas Hubbard has observed many cases of ambiguous reference, where a statement starts out as "objective" and ends up "subjective" (or vice versa). That is, a statement applies to the victor and the poet simultaneously, as a way of identifying the interests of *laudator* and *laudandus*.³ In such cases, it is very clear how the ambiguity enhances the poet's glorification of the victor and his house.

In this essay, I would like to make a contribution to the typology of Pindaric ambiguity. There are a few passages in the epinicia whose

¹ See G. Devereux, "The Exploitation of Ambiguity in Pindaros O. 3, 27," *RhM* 109 (1966) 289–98, and R. Renehan, "Conscious Ambiguities in Pindar and Bacchylides," *GRBS* 10 (1969) 217–28. On the topic of ambiguity in general, see W. Empson, *Seven Types of Ambiguity* (New York 1947) and W. B. Stanford, *Ambiguity in Greek Literature* (Oxford 1939).

² T. Cole, "1 + 1 = 3: Studies in Pindar's Arithmetic," *AJP* 108 (1987) 553–68. Cf. the remarks of R. Hamilton, *Epinikion: General Form in the Odes of Pindar* (The Hague, Paris 1974) 106: "It is my impression that Pindar is deliberately confusing the account to make it seem as if there were more victories than there actually are [in I. 5 and I. 6]."

³ T. Hubbard, *The Pindaric Mind: A Study of Logical Structure in Early Greek Poetry*, Mnemosyne Supplement 85 (Leiden 1985) 133–62.

referent could be either a father or his son.⁴ Thus, scholars have noted that the extended gnomic passage in the third triad of *Isthmian* 1 applies equally well to the victor Herodotus and his father Asopodorus.⁵ Similarly, the generalizing reflections of *Isthmian* 6.10–13 accommodate the situations both of the victor Phylakides and his father Lampon:

εἰ γάρ τις ἀνθρώπων δαπάνη τε χαρεῖς
καὶ πόνῳ πράσσει θεοδμάτων ἀρετάς
σύν τέ οἱ δαίμων φυτεύει δόξαν ἐπήρατον, ἐ-
σχατιαῖς ἤδη πρὸς ὄλβου
βάλλετ' ἄγκυραν θεότιμος ἐών.

Coming right after the mention of the Isthmian victory of Phylakides in line 8 (Φυλακίδα νικῶντος) and the prayer for an Olympic victory, the generalizing *ei* clause of lines 10–13 certainly applies to the victor himself. But its main reference is to the victor's father Lampon, mentioned at the opening of the elaborate proem (κίρναμεν Λάμπωνος εὐαέθλου γενεᾶς ὕπερ, 3) and again after the generalizing *ei* clause (ὁ Κλεονίκου παῖς, 16). Thus the double reference of lines 10–13 makes possible a transition from son to father as the focus of the poet's attention.

I would like to consider in detail three passages where Pindar's syntax seems deliberately to blur father and son, or grandfather and grandson. But if we are to take these ambiguities of referent as deliberate, we must be able to explain how the blurring of relatives serves the poet's encomiastic program. I should like to suggest an explanation which grounds the poet's use of this type of ambiguity in his social context. Much recent historical work has emphasized the centrality of the family in archaic and classical Greece.⁶ This historical reorientation

⁴I do not consider in this category *Pythian* 1.85–100. Although many scholars have disagreed about the addressee of these lines (Hieron or his son Deinomenes), I consider compelling the arguments of A. Köhnken, "Hieron und Deinomenes in Pindars erstem pythischen Gedicht," *Hermes* 98 (1970) 1–13.

⁵See L. Woodbury, "The Victor's Virtues: Pindar, *Isth.* 1.32ff.," *TAPA* 111 (1981) 242–44 and G. W. Most, *The Measures of Praise: Structure and Function in Pindar's Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean Odes* (Göttingen 1985) 54–55.

⁶See, for examples, W. K. Lacey, *The Family in Classical Greece* (Ithaca 1968), W. R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton 1971) 9–15 and "The Razing of the House in Greek Society," *TAPA* 115 (1985) 79–102, S. C. Humphreys, *Anthropology and the Greeks* (London 1978) 193–204, 212–16 and *The Family, Women and Death* (London 1983). See also two classic works on the centrality of the family which have recently been reprinted or retranslated: N. D. Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité antique*

has had an impact on the reading of tragedy, where we have learned to view Antigone as a representative of the rights of the household, rather than as a rugged individualist.⁷ But rarely have these findings been applied to Pindar, where *laudator* and *laudandus* still confront each other in splendid isolation. Yet Pindar's victors, like the characters in tragedy, are completely enmeshed in a social system which defines them first as members of a household and a family, and then (often) as members of a *polis*. Within such a system, the identification of father and son in the song of praise glorifies the entire family rather than just the individual victor. Or perhaps we should say that the notion of selfhood reflected in Pindar's poems is different from ours; that Pindar's victors base their self-definition on identification with the family and particularly with the patriline.

Do we have any independent evidence that such identification within the patriline occurred in archaic and classical Greece? Svenbro has recently revived the observation of Sulzberger, that in myth and epic a child is often named after a salient characteristic of one of his parents or grandparents. Thus Telemachus' father "fought afar," Neoptolemus' father "went to war young," and Astyanax' father was "lord of the city." Indeed, the names of sons can be their fathers' epithets, as in the late tradition that Odysseus had a son Ptoliporthes (Apollodorus *Bibl.* 7.35) and Orestes a son Tisamenos.⁸ This usage finds its counterpart in the common historical practice of naming a grandson after his grandfather. As Svenbro notes, the two naming systems coexist. Thus, one of Themistocles' children is named Neokles after his paternal grandfather, while the others bear names which commemorate Themistocles' achievements: Archeptolis, Mnesiptolema, Nicomache, and

(Paris 1864), translated as *The Ancient City: A Study on the Religion, Laws, and Institutions of Greece and Rome* (Baltimore and London 1980), and G. Glotz, *La Solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce* (Paris 1904, repr. New York 1973).

⁷For an extremely eloquent treatment of the centrality of the house rather than the individual in Greek tragedy, see J. Jones, *On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy* (Oxford 1962) 41–43, 82–137, and on the problem of the self in *Antigone*, 193–200. See also S. Goldhill, *Reading Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge 1986) 69–78, 88–106, J. P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet, *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece* (New York 1988) 19, 335–36.

⁸Sophocles *Hermione* (acc. to Eustathius, *Ody.* 1479.10); see S. Radt, ed., *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* Vol. 4 (Göttingen 1977) 192, Pausanias 2.18.6. For many more examples of this naming practice in myth and epic, see M. Sulzberger, "Ὄνομα ἐπώνυμον. Les noms propres chez Homère et dans la mythologie grecque," *REG* 39 (1926) 381–447, Stanford (note 1 above) 99, J. Svenbro, *Phrasikleia: anthropologie de la lecture en Grèce ancienne* (Paris 1988) 79–86.

Asia (see Plutarch *Vit. Them.* 1.1, 32.1).⁹ Such naming practices have a double purpose, according to Proclus in his commentary on Plato's *Cratylus*: οἱ μὲν γὰρ πατέρες πρὸς μνήμην ἢ ἐλπίδα ἢ τι τοιοῦτο βλέποντες ὀνόματα τίθενται τοῖς παισίν (Proclus, *In Platonis Cratylum Comment.* 47, LXXXVIII Pasquali).¹⁰ On the one hand, the son's name is intended to commemorate his ancestors' achievements (μνήμην);¹¹ on the other, the name expresses a hope that the son will be like his father (ἐλπίδα).¹² Thus these naming practices locate the son's identity at the intersection of his obligations to the past and to the future. Both these obligations constitute individual identity as an aspect of family continuity.

As a commentary on these ancient practices, consider the observations of Michael Herzfeld on such identification in a modern Cretan mountain village:

In 1866 . . . seventeen Glendiots perished in the burning of the Arkadi Monastery at the end of a fierce but unsuccessful revolt against Turkish rule. . . . Their involvement cost the Glendiots dearly: the Turks, in retaliation, burned the village to the ground. The visceral meaning of this event was demonstrated to me over a century later by an octogenarian Glendiot, self-consciously dressed for the occasion in the white boots and formal waistcoat of the older local costume, who declaimed his own verses about the heroism and tragedy of his ancestors' role in the defense of Arkadi. His usually robust voice cracked and faltered, and tears

⁹Sulzberger (note 8 above) 399, Svenbro (note 8 above) 86–89.

¹⁰Cited by Sulzberger (note 8 above) 429, Svenbro (note 8 above) 28. Cf. Plato *Cratylus* 397b2–6.

¹¹Svenbro (note 8 above) 89–92.

¹²The fathers' hope here should be compared with the *locus classicus* for the notion of likeness within the patriline—Hesiod *Op.* 235: in the just city, τίκτουςιν δὲ γυναῖκες ἐοικότα τέκνα γονεῦσιν (see West's note *ad loc.* and compare Plato *Cratylus* 394a1–4). Or else the hope may be that the son will surpass the father, as Hector wishes for Astyanax (*Iliad* 6.476–480):

Zeῦ ἄλλοι τε θεοί, δότε δὴ καὶ τόνδε γενέσθαι
παῖδ' ἐμόν, ὥς καὶ ἐγὼ περ, ἀριπρεπέα Τρῳέσσιν,
ᾧδε βίην τ' ἀγαθόν, καὶ Ἰλίου ἴφι ἀνάσσειν·
καὶ ποτέ τις εἴποι 'πατρός γ' ᾧδε πολλὸν ἀμείνων
ἐκ πολέμου ἀνιόντα.'

Notice that even here, Hector wants Astyanax to be like in kind (ὥς καὶ ἐγὼ περ), but better than he himself.

streamed down his cheeks, as he reached the point where his own relationship to the main protagonist—his grandfather—became explicit. This was not a response that could be explained away by reference to the intrusion of nationalistic rhetoric in village life; indeed, such an explanation could only succeed in sounding hollow and cheap.

Instead, what we see here is a complete *identification*. The narrator, imbued with a notion of selfhood that defines identity in terms of continuity in the male line, lamented an encapsulating death—one in which he, his father, his grandfather (the actual protagonist), and indeed all possible ancestors in the same line, are fused into a single identity. He never knew his grandfather, who was slain almost two decades before his own birth, just as another Glendiot who took the life of his brother's killer had never known his brother. In the case of vengeance killing, one might argue that social pressure would make such direct contact with the deceased irrelevant: the shame of failing to "take the blood back" would be sufficient incentive to do so. But this misses the point of a patrilineal ideology in which the inheritance of selfhood in the male line means that the deaths of one's agnates are wounds of the self. The old man who so profusely lamented his grandfather's heroic demise had also inherited his grandfather's baptismal name, and the fact that the grandfather had died fighting for an independence that was at once Glendiot, Cretan, and Greek gave special poignancy to the identification.¹³

To return to Pindar, we have pointed to the blurring of reference in *Isthmian* 1.40–51 and *Isthmian* 6.10–13 as a manifestation of the same cultural system which governed Greek naming practices. But both these passages are deliberately couched in generic terms which facilitate the free play of reference between father and son.¹⁴ Can we find passages in which the subjects are specified, but such ambiguity still occurs? Consider, for example, *Nemean* 11, where Pindar says,

ἄνδρα δ' ἐγὼ μακαρίζω μὲν πατέρ' Ἀρκεσίλαν
καὶ τὸ θαῖτὸν δέμας ἀτρεμίαν τε σύγγονον. (Nem. 11.11–12)

These lines have generally elicited little comment, though scholars have noted the uncommon use of *makarizō* with two accusatives. There is no certain parallel for this use; the normal construction is acc. pers. gen.

¹³ M. Herzfeld, *The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain Village* (Princeton 1985) 9–10.

¹⁴ On the generic quality of such passages (especially *ei* clauses) in Pindar, see E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1986) 54–56.

rei.¹⁵ In this context, Pindar could easily have avoided all ambiguity by putting the father in the genitive (as in Herodotus 1.31; Aristophanes *Vesp.* 429; Lysias 2.81), or in the dative as the object of *epi* (as in Philodemus *Peri Theōn* 1.15), or simply by supplying the definite article with *andra*. Scholars have attempted to normalize Pindar's usage by comparing passages where verbs from the same semantic sphere—τιμωρόμαι, αἰτιάομαι, ἐπαινέω, μέμφομαι—take two accusatives.¹⁶ But in every parallel cited, one of the accusatives is adverbial, or at least inanimate.¹⁷ Thus εἰ μή σ' ἐταίρων φόνον ἐτιμωρησάμην (Euripides *Cyc.* 695) hardly seems a good parallel for *makarizō* with two personal accusatives.

That we can find no exact parallels suggests that the use of *makarizō* with two personal accusatives was felt to be ambiguous, and therefore was generally avoided. That Pindar chooses to use the construction though there are completely unambiguous alternatives suggests further that the ambiguity is deliberate. Indeed, there are at least three possible interpretations of line 11: (1) "I congratulate this man, the father Arcesilas,"¹⁸ (2) "I congratulate the father on his son,"¹⁹ (3) "I congratulate the man on his father."²⁰ The first two interpretations are ruled out

¹⁵ See LSJ s.v. μακαρίζω. There is a possible parallel in Aristophanes, *Vesp.* 588, where Reiske emended τοῦτ' ἐγὼ τοὶ σεμνόν· τούτων ὧν εἰρηκας μακαρίζω τοῦτ' ἐγὼ τοὶ σε μόνον . . . μακαρίζω. D. M. MacDowell, ed., *Aristophanes "Wasps"* (Oxford 1971), however, prefers to keep *semnon* with a colon after it. See his comments *ad loc.*

¹⁶ MacDowell (note 15 above) *ad loc.*, M. R. Lefkowitz, "Pindar's *Nemean xi*," *JHS* 99 (1979) 51–52, n. 19; W. J. Verdenius, "Pindar's Eleventh *Nemean Ode*: A Commentary," *ICS* 7 (1982) 22. Passages cited as parallels are Aeschylus *PV* 340; Euripides *Cyc.* 695; *Alc.* 733; Aristophanes *Ach.* 514; Pindar *Nem.* 11.30–31.

¹⁷ See Verdenius (note 16 above) 22 for criticisms of Lefkowitz' parallels.

¹⁸ Thus the scholia take the line (A. B. Drachmann, ed., *Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina* vol. 3 [Leipzig 1927] 187).

¹⁹ As a parallel for this sentiment, cf. the fourth-century Delphic inscription SEG XVIII 222b, 11.1–3 (= J. Ebert, *Griechische Epigramme auf Sieger an gymnischen und hippischen Agonen* [Berlin 1972] no. 46):

ὦ μάκαρ εὐκλείας Ἀρχων στέ[φανον δις ἐδέξω]
Ἰσθμια νικήσας Πυθιά τε ἱππ[οσύναι].
ζηλοῦται δὲ πατὴρ Κλείνος κ[λυτοῦ εἵνεκα παιδός]

(In line 3, I accept the supplement of Peek apud J. Bousquet, "Inscriptions de Delphes," *BCH* 83 [1959] 159.)

²⁰ L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar*, vol. 2 (London 1932) 326–27 notes all three possible interpretations. The first he rejects on the grounds of generic propriety. As for

by the addition of line 12, but in the process of performance the audience might well experience real doubt about the meaning of the phrase. At least for a moment, it appears that the poet congratulates father and son reciprocally for each other, or even identifies them by the doubling of accusatives around the verb *makarizō*.²¹

In *Olympian* 8, it is said of the victor Alcimedon, a wrestler, that he "inspired in his father's father the strength to wrestle with old age":

πατρὶ δὲ πατρὸς ἐνέπνευσεν μένος
γῆραος ἀντίπαλον·
Ἄϊδα τοι λάθεται
ἄρμενα πράξαις ἀνῆρ.

(*Ol.* 8.70–73)

Scholars have noted the aptness of the wrestling image in *antipalon*, but have not generally noticed that the metaphor, like the *menos*, has been transferred from grandson to grandfather.²² These lines describe a process which inverts the usual model of Pindaric heredity, *to sungenes* or *phua*.²³ Usually the victor's inherited quality and the model of his ancestors' triumphs instill in him the force needed to win. Here, the victor's own triumph infuses his grandfather with renewed strength. On reflection, the gnomic observation which closes this section seems surprisingly slippery, for the victor must be the *anēr* who has accomplished

interpretations (2) and (3), ambiguity seems to engender ambiguity: it is impossible to tell from Farnell's discussion whether he favors one or both translations.

²¹ Even when the construction is made clear by the addition of line 12, Pindar's syntax has intriguing implications. For, as Verdenius (note 16 above) 22 notes, what we have here is a σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος (cf. Kühner–Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache* vol. 2.1 [Hannover 1898] 289–90). This means that *patera*, like *demas* and *atremian*, is *meros*: as Wilamowitz observes, "der Vatersname ist kurz für die Abstammung gesetzt, die sozusagen ein Teil des Mannes ist" (U. von Wilamowitz–Moellendorf, *Pindaros* [Berlin 1922] 431, n. 1). Wilamowitz' words suggest that the father is doubly *meros*: he is a part for the whole line of descent, as well as an integral part of the victor's own identity.

²² B. L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (New York 1890) 199, Renehan (note 1 above) 218–19. C. Carey, "Prosopographica Pindarica," *CQ* 39 (1989) 4 suggests on the basis of lines 74–75 that Alcimedon's paternal grandfather was also a victorious wrestler.

²³ For the theory of *phua*, see P. W. Rose, "The Myth of Pindar's First Nemean: Sportsmen, Poetry, and Paideia," *HSCP* 78 (1974) 151–54, 175; for the practice, see E. Thummer, *Pindar Die Isthmischen Gedichte* vol. 1 (Heidelberg 1968) 49–54.

fitting things,²⁴ but his grandfather is the one who “forgets Hades” once he has been given “the strength to wrestle with old age.” The blurred reference of the sentence replicates the exchange of *menos*, superimposing grandfather and grandson. The generic *anēr*, the subject of the sentence, is a composite of the two men.²⁵

In this context, it is worth noting Carey’s observation that it is rare for relatives of the victor to be mentioned in epinician only by relationship and not by name: “For immortality the naming is essential. To be preserved in song as an anonymous father, uncle or grandfather is not to be preserved at all” (p. 3). As a solution for this anomaly at *Olympian* 8.70–71, Carey suggests that Alcimedon’s grandfather is the Timosthenes mentioned along with Alcimedon in the Naming Complex of lines 15–18.²⁶ Carey’s point is well taken, but in fact there is a simpler solution: it may be that the victor’s grandfather was Alcimedon and that the victor was named after him—a common Greek practice, as we have observed.²⁷ The name Alcimedon occurs at line 65 and the mention of

²⁴We should not simply efface the ambiguity, as the scholiast and LSJ attempt to do, by glossing *armena praxais* as *eu praxas* (see Drachmann [note 18 above] vol. 1.260–61 and LSJ, ἀραρίσκω B. V. 4.). There are no parallels for this meaning in Greek (notice that LSJ lists *Ol.* 8.73 alone), while *Nem.* 3.58 suggests that we should give *armenos* due weight in Pindar.

²⁵It is true that the victor Alcimedon is a *pais* (*Ol.* 8.68), but already the language describing his victory over four other boys promotes him in a sense to the status of *anēr*:

ὅς τυχᾶ μὲν δαίμονος, ἀνορέας δ’ οὐκ ἀμπλακών
ἐν τέτρασιν παίδων ἀπεθήκατο γυίοις
νόστον ἐχθιστον καὶ ἀτιμότεραν γλῶσ-
σαν καὶ ἐπίκρυφον οἶμον,

Here Pindar crafts a kind of athletic oxymoron: by defeating four *boys*, Alcimedon lays hold of *manly* achievements. By this linguistic sleight of hand, the poet prepares the way for the ambiguous use of the generic *anēr*. *anēr* itself seems dramatically postponed to round out both the gnome and the entire section which describes the effect of the victory on the grandfather.

²⁶Carey (note 22 above) 3–4.

²⁷There are positive arguments against Carey’s identification of Timosthenes as Alcimedon’s grandfather:

1) The fact that both Timosthenes and Alcimedon figure in the naming complex (15–18) suggests that this poem belongs to the category of multiple victory odes discussed by Hamilton (note 2 above) 104–6. If so, this would make it less likely that the family would commission one poem to celebrate two victories won two generations apart, but

his father's father at line 70, close enough for an audience which knew the family to make the connection. If grandfather and grandson shared the same name, this would enhance the effect of the composite *anēr*, which stands in the place of the name Alcimedon.²⁸

then not include the family's other four victories.

2) Related to argument (1), Carey claims that the family only had two major victories because of the "absence of detail" about the rest of the family's six victories mentioned in line 76 (p. 1). Yet Pindar specifically says in line 76 that this is the family's sixth crown *φυλλοφόρων ἀπ' ἀγώνων*. *φυλλοφόρων* looks like a poetic periphrasis for *ἀγώνες στεφανηφόροι* or *στεφανίται* (the technical terms for the highest rank games which only awarded crowns—cf. Herodotus 5.102.3; Xenophon *Mem.* 3.7.1; Isocrates 15.301; L. Robert, "Sur des inscriptions d'Éphèse," *Rev. Phil.* 3rd series, 41 [1967] 16). Thus Pindar's adjective suggests that he is referring in line 76 only to the family's major Panhellenic victories. Carey's assumption that there were only two such Panhellenic victories (of grandfather and grandson) makes more plausible the mention of the grandfather's victory in a prominent position at the beginning of the ode. But if in fact there were six major victories, there is no reason that that of the grandfather should be singled out for mention in the Naming Complex.

There are also positive reasons (independent of the scholia) for the traditional view that Timosthenes was Alcimedon's brother. In the praise of the trainer Melesias (*Ol.* 8.53–66) it is possible that lines 56–59 refer to the victories of Timosthenes at Nemea:

εἰ δ' ἐγὼ Μελησίᾳ ἐξ ἀγενείων
 κῦδος ἀνέδραμον ὕμῳ,
 μὴ βολέτω με λίθῳ τραχεῖ φθόνος·
 καὶ Νεμέᾳ γὰρ ὁμῶς
 ἐρέω ταῦταν χάριν,
 τὰν δ' ἔπειτ' ἀνδρῶν μάχας
 ἐκ παγκρατίου.

(*Ol.* 8.54–59)

There are two ways of interpreting line 54: it refers either to Melesias' own victories as a boy (thus Gildersleeve, "Brief Mention," *AJP* 40 [1919] 105, Farnell [note 20 above] 65), or to the *kûdos* he earned from coaching boys (thus T. Fritzsche, "Zu Pindaros Epinikion," *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie* 125/126 [1882] 153–55, C. E. Whitmore, "Pindar, *O.*, VIII, 53ff.," *Studies in Philology* 15 [1918] 345–47). On the basis of the interpretation of line 54, lines 56–57 are then also taken to refer either to Melesias' own victory at Nemea or to the victory of a pupil. I am inclined to accept the latter interpretation (of line 54 as well as 56–57), because otherwise I see no way of accounting for *kai* and *homōs* in line 56. For if Melesias is himself the victor, the mention of his Nemean victory is not an addition, but a specification of the general category of line 54. Pindar does use *kai gar* to mark the specific instance after a general category (cf. *Pyth.* 9.42, on which see J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*² [Oxford 1954] 108–11 and L. Woodbury, "Apollo's First Love: Pindar, *Pyth.* 9.26ff.," *TAPA* 103 [1972] 570, no. 39), but this still leaves no explanation for *homōs*.

Furthermore, the sharing of the name between grandfather and grandson would make Carey's observations about the myth even more pertinent. Carey suggests that the collaboration of Aeacus in the building of the Trojan walls is Pindar's innovation, motivated by his desire to parallel more closely the victor's family history:

But if the myth is read in the context of the ode we can see that Pindar's purpose in altering the myth was not to offer an implicit criticism of the epic tradition but to create a parallel for the victor and his family. As well as picking up . . . the theme of divine favour stressed in the praise of both

The poet has no reason to say "likewise" if there is no change of topic between line 54 and line 56. As I understand these lines, Pindar starts out saying, "I will praise Melesias as a trainer of boys" [i.e., of Alcimedon], then adds, "for also at Nemea likewise I will tell this grace" [i.e., the victory of Timosthenes as a boy], then goes on to a second victory of Timosthenes as a man (58–59). Thus *καί* marks the shift from Alcimedon to Timosthenes, while *homōs* indicates that Pindar is still speaking of a boy's victory (in contrast to the men's victory he goes on to mention). Such a reading reveals the elaborate ring composition of lines 54–66:

- 54—Melesias as coach of Alcimedon as a boy
- 56—Melesias as coach of Timosthenes as a boy
- 58–59—Melesias as coach of Timosthenes as a man
- 63–64—Melesias skilled in coaching men (note *ἀνδρα*)
- 65–66—Return to the victory of Alcimedon as a boy.

If these victories *are* Timosthenes' (with Melesias as trainer), then obviously Timosthenes must be an older contemporary of Alcimedon. C. Carey, "Two Transitions in Pindar," *CQ* 39 [1989] 288–90 acknowledges that *kai homōs* is problematic for the traditional accounts of these lines. His interpretation differs from mine, but depends on the (to my mind) partially faulty arguments of Carey (note 22 above).

²⁸We find precisely the same exploitation of papponymy in an agonistic context in an Athenian inscription from the first half of the fourth century B.C. (IG II² 3125, = J. Ebert [note 19 above] no. 40):

Ἐμπεδίωνος παῖδες Ἀθηναῖοι ἐνίκων
Διοφάνης ἀγένειος ἐ[ν] Ἴσθμῶνι πανκρατ[ί]οιο
κα[ὶ] πρόγονος στεφ[άνου]· ῥώμην δὲ χερσὶν ἐπ[έ]δε[ι]ξε[ν].

As Ebert notes, πρόγονος in line 3 must refer to Diophanes' grandfather, in which case the only explanation for his not being named is that he was *also* Diophanes son of Empe-
dion (Ebert [note 19 above] 133–34 and "Zu vier agonistischen Epigrammen," *Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete* 19 [1969] 142–43).

the victor . . . and his city . . . , the myth also reflects two specific features of the victor's situation. One of these is the element of prophecy. . . . The second parallel concerns [Alkimedon's grandfather] as well as Alkimedon. In the victor's family Pindar sees a fateful connection (πότμος 15) with Zeus. The connection is begun by the grandfather's victory at Nemea, but it is only completed . . . when his grandson wins at Olympia. Thus we have a destiny which takes generations to come to fulfillment. The myth too tells of a fated sequence of events (πεπρωμένον 33). The destiny of Troy is begun by Aiakos, but for its completion it must wait for Aiakos' descendant Neoptolemos, who will take the city. The parallel is, we may reasonably suppose, Pindar's real reason for introducing Aiakos into the tale of the building of the Trojan walls. In the victor's family he sees the slow and obscure workings of an unswerving destiny, and he seeks to reflect this in the myth.²⁹

Mutatis mutandis, we can accept most of Carey's premises. Thus, it is a reasonable assumption that Alcimedon's grandfather was himself a wrestler (or a pancratist) and that he won one of the Blepsiadæ's six Panhellenic crowns. We need only add that he saw two grandsons (not one) win victories at major contests of Zeus (notice that in his prophecy Apollo speaks of the "children" of Aeacus—οὐκ ἄτερ παίδων σέθεν, 45). Then the two parallels Carey highlights—of prophecy and family destiny—would converge in the naming of Alcimedon after his grandfather. For as we have seen, names were repeated in a family in the hope that the descendant would reenact the achievements of the ancestor for whom he was named (recall ἐλπίδα in Proclus' commentary). The repetition of a name was an attempt at prophecy within the family.³⁰ So here,

²⁹Carey (note 22 above) 5–6.

³⁰Indeed, in such cases prophecy verges into an attempt to create the future by a kind of naming magic. We might say about Greek naming practices the very things Cole (note 2 above) 567 suggests for the ambiguous rhetoric of epinician:

. . . one must consider the degree to which the Pindaric ode is not simply a memorialization of events but an effort to determine them. That a victory should serve as a portent for more of the same in the future is natural enough: one of the functions of the epinician is to fasten upon and stress those aspects of a situation which can serve as favorable omens. And insofar as omens consist of words rather than objects or events, they can be created as well as pointed out and emphasized. . . .

In terms of the argument presented here, it is clear that the "determinative" function of epinician participates in a whole cultural system which colludes to create a glorious future for those of noble ancestry.

the grandson called Alcimedon after the victorious wrestler has fulfilled the prophecy of his grandfather's name.

Finally, consider the last lines of *Olympian* 14, which elaborate the victory announcement of lines 17–20:³¹

μελαντειχέα νῦν δόμον
 Φερσεφόνας ἔλθ', Ἄ-
 χοῖ, πατρὶ κλυτὰν φέροισ' ἀγγελίαν,
 Κλεόδαμον ὄφρ' ἰδοῖς, υἱὸν εἵπης ὅτι οἱ νέαν
 κόλποις παρ' εὐδόξοις Πίσας
 ἔστεφάνωσε κυδῖμων ἀέθλων πτεροῖσι χαίταν. (Ol. 14.20–24)

The construction from *patri* to *eipēs* is somewhat odd. There is the change in case from *patri* to *Kleodamon*, the fronting of *Kleodamon* out of its phrase (ὄφρ' ἰδοῖς), and the prolepsis of *huion*, fronted out of the *hoti* clause and even before the verb *eipēs* on which that clause depends. Any one of these phenomena alone is easily paralleled,³² but the combined effect is quite striking. For the listener, it creates a string of accusatives—indeed, these are the only endings the listener hears, for all the other endings between *klutan* and *huion* are elided. Thus we get the sequence *klutan . . . angelian, Kleodamon . . . huion*.

At this point we should notice who Pindar's messenger is: Echo. Her presence in this poem as messenger to the underworld has never been adequately explained. Fennel and Gildersleeve maintained that her association with Narcissus, son of Cephisus, drew her into the sphere of Orchomenos, but Verdenius has recently pointed out that there is no good evidence for the association of Echo and Narcissus before Ovid.³³ I suggest that the explanation for Echo's presence is to

³¹ M. Dönt, "Zur 14. olympischen Ode Pindars," *RhM* n.f. 126 (1983) 130, 134 treats the poem's last lines as the victory announcement. More accurately, Hamilton (note 2 above) 39 regards *Ol.* 14.17–20 as the Naming Complex and *Ol.* 14.21–24 as Victor Praise.

³² On the last, see Kühner–Gerth (note 21 above) Vol. 2.2.577–82.

³³ C. A. M. Fennell, *Pindarus. The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (Cambridge 1893) 141, Gildersleeve (note 22 above) 239, so also F. J. Nisetich, *Pindar's Victory Songs* (Baltimore and London 1980) 148–49. For criticism of this position, see W. J. Verdenius, *Commentaries on Pindar, Volume I*, *Mnemosyne Supplement* 97 (Leiden 1987) 123–24 (citing H. J. Rose, *Handbook of Greek Mythology* [London 1953] 178, n. 14) and compare H. Fränkel, *Ovid: A Poet between Two Worlds* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1945) 84 and 214, n. 38.

be found in the poem itself, in the echoing accusatives of lines 21–22. For, as we would expect of such a messenger, the substance of Echo's "glorious message" is the father's name, which seems to stand in apposition to *klutan . . . angelian*. And the meaning of the father's name, "glory of the people" (or, as a bahuvrihi, "he who has the glory of the people") perfectly designates the son's achievement, while the accusation *huion* after *Kleodamon* suggests that the son is himself the echo of his father.³⁴

By this interpretation, what resounds against the "blackwalled house of Persephone" is the victory announcement of the games: "Asopichos son of Cleodamos of Orchomenos has won the stadion race."³⁵ What the father hears in Hades is the echo of his own name, itself the perfect gloss on his son's victory. But Pindar's syntax implies also that the son himself is the echo of his father, accomplishing what his father's name portends. We could describe Pindar's syntactic conflation of father and son as an "echo effect": the two accusatives *Kleodamon* and *huion* are identified between the framing datives *patri* and *hoi*.³⁶ The same echo effect is produced in *Nemean* 11 by the two accusatives for father and son framing the central *makarizō*. In *Olympian* 8, the echo collapses into the single word *anēr* which designates grandfather and grandson simultaneously.

Discussing Greek naming practices, Svenbro notes that a son who is named for his father is expected to be like him and thereby to fulfill his name. In this context, Svenbro aptly designates the Greeks "une culture de mimésis."³⁷ What we have called the echo effect is the instantiation of the culture of mimesis in choral performance. At the moment

³⁴J. H. Barkhuizen, "Etymologising by Pindaros," (Diss. Pretoria 1975) 53 (quoted by Verdenius [note 33 above] 124) suggests that the assonance of *klutan . . . Kleodamon* is deliberate, while Verdenius himself notes that "the success of the son reflects the meaning of the father's name, viz. 'glory to the city.'" Verdenius does not connect these sound effects with Echo. For a similar analysis of the parodos of Sophocles' *Philoctetes* (where Echo appears in a song filled with repeated "o" sounds), see A. Carson, "'Echo with No Door on Her Mouth': A Notional Refraction through Sophokles, Plato, and Defoe," *Stanford Literary Review* 3 (1986) 247–48.

³⁵See Dönt (note 31 above) 134. On the form of the victory announcement, see F. J. Nisetich, "*Olympian* 1.8–11: An Epinician Metaphor," *HSCP* 79 (1975) 59.

³⁶See Fennell (note 33 above) 141 and Dönt (note 31 above) 128–29, who notes that *hoi* in the final *hoti* clause refers to the father Cleodamos.

³⁷Svenbro (note 8 above) 28–29, 79.

of announcing the victory (*Ol.* 14), congratulating or praising the victor (*Nem.* 11; *Ol.* 8), the poet suggests by his syntax that the athlete has lived up to the expectations of his father and bestows on him the highest praise—complete identification with the patriline.³⁸

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³⁸This is not to claim that these passages must be read this way, merely that they can be—that is what makes them ambiguous. For discussion and comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I would like to thank Thomas Cole, Carol Dougherty, Richard Hamilton, David Konstan, Ian Rutherford, and Seth Schwartz.

ANOTHER PATH OF SONG: PINDAR, NEMEAN 7.51

Since scholars have made over 7,000 conjectures on the 3,500 lines of Pindar, most of them wrong, one is loth to add another to the heap. But I find it odd that the following emendation was not advanced long ago.¹ Pindar is praising the deeds of the Aeginetans:

θρασύ μοι τόδ' εἰπεῖν
φαεναῖς ἀρεταῖς ὁδὸν κυρίαν λόγων
οἴκοθεν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀνάπαισις ἐν παντὶ
γλυκεῖα ἔργῳ· κόρον δ' ἔχει
καὶ μέλι καὶ τὰ τέρπν' ἄνθε' Ἀφροδίσεια.

(N. 7.50–53)

50f. is usually rendered “I make bold to say that a sovereign road of praise for good deeds starts from your house” or the like.² Wilamowitz read ὁδὸς κυρία, with a stop after εἰπεῖν.³ Whether or not this is right (I think it unnecessary), the κυρία ὁδός is still obscure. Now the path of song is a familiar epinician metaphor,⁴ subtly varied by the poets and especially common as an abbreviated opening priamel or formula of transition, where the poet says that he could follow one of *many* paths of song to praise the *laudandus*. Such is the context of the current phrase, where a priamel follows.

Hence I propose that κυρίαν is corrupt for μυρία, i.e., “I make bold to say that many a road of praise for good deeds starts from your house.” κ and μ are easily confused in minuscule. In the following parallels note that μυρία is the standard adjective; that the usual κέλευθος is once replaced by πρόσοδοι; and that the image may be of roads going in all directions, or converging toward the *laudandus* (as at

¹ It is not in D. E. Gerber, *Emendations in Pindar* 1513–1972 (Amsterdam 1976), nor in his supplement in *Pindare*, Entretiens Hardt 31 (Vandœuvres–Genève 1985) 22–25.

² E.g., T. K. Hubbard takes κυρίαν as a “high and mighty” road (*QUCC* 51 [1986] 66); G. W. Most takes it as “legally valid” and thinks it continues the legal terminology of the preceding lines (*The Measures of Praise* [Göttingen 1985] 179, following A. Köhnken, *Die Funktion des Mythos bei Pindar* [Berlin and New York 1971] 74).

³ Cf. H. Lloyd–Jones, *JHS* 93 (1973) 134.

⁴ O. Becker, *Das Bild des Weges*, *Hermes Einzelschrift* 4 (Berlin 1937) 68–85; D. Steiner, *The Crown of Song: Metaphor in Pindar* (London 1986) 76–86; H. Mähler, *Die Lieder des Bakchylides I: die Siegeslieder* (Leiden 1982) ii 96f.; G. A. Privitera, *Pindaro, Le Istmiche* (Rome 1982) 172.

N. 6.45ff.), or radiating out from him, as here. Cf. *I.* 4.1ff., ἔστι μοι θεῶν ἑκατι **μυρία παντᾶ κέλευθος** | . . . | ὑμετέρας ἀρετὰς ὕμνω διώκειν; *I.* 6.22, **μυρία** δ' ἔργων καλῶν τέτμανθ' ἑκατόμπεδοι ἐν σχερῶ **κέλευθαι**; *N.* 6.45ff., **πλατεῖαι** | **παντόθεν** λογίοισιν ἐντὶ **πρόσοδοι** | νᾶσον εὐκλέα τάνδε κοσμεῖν; Bacchyl. 19.1f., πάρεστι **μυρία κέλευθος** | ἀμβροσίων ἐπέων; Bacchyl. 9.31ff., τὼς νῦν καὶ (ἐ)μοὶ **μυρία παντᾶ κέλευθος** | ὑμετέραν ἀρετάν | ὕμνεῖν; Bacchyl. 9.47ff.: στείχει δι' **εὐρείας κελε[ύ]θου** | **μυρία παντᾶ φάτις** | σᾶς γενεᾶς λιπαροζώνων θυγατρῶν.⁵

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THRASYBULUS AND HIS TRIERARCHIES

Thrasybulus, son of Lycus of the deme Steiria, was a trierarch of note. In 411 he took part in a revolution at Samos and then played a principal role in establishing the Athenian democracy in exile there after the Four Hundred had come to power in Athens. In 406 he fought at Arginusae, and after the battle was put in charge (together with Theramenes) of rescuing the dead and shipwrecked.¹ But apart from mentioning Thrasybulus' name in connection with these events, the extant sources make little effort to elaborate on the nature of his involvement, nor do they reveal other activities that related to his two trierarchies.² As a result, we are left to muse over several unanswered questions. For example, did Thrasybulus, like other Athenian trierarchs at Samos, collaborate in the plot to overthrow the democracy in Athens? Why did the Samian democrats turn to a relatively inexperienced Thrasybulus for help in 411 when their democracy was being threatened by an internal *coup*? How did the Athenians in the fleet come to follow Thrasybulus' lead in declaring their political independence from the Four Hundred in Athens and then elect him one of their generals before he had served a full year as trierarch? And why, during his second trierarchy, was a now more distinguished and normally outspoken Thrasybulus so quiet at the trial of the Arginusae generals, when, in effect, his own life was at stake? It is the purpose of this paper to investigate each of these questions.

Thrasybulus is serving as a trierarch in the fleet when he makes his debut in Thucydides' *History*. In 8.47.3 we learn that he was at Samos in the spring of 411, and that he was one of several Athenians

¹He seems to have held the office of trierarch only twice. Since there is no evidence to the contrary, I will assume that he was appointed to a regular one-year term on each occasion, and that these appointments coincided with the official Attic years 412/11 and 406/5; see B. Jordan, *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period* (Berkeley 1975) 61–70.

²In general, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Diodorus do not tell us much about Athenian trierarchs, and together they identify only three of them by name: Thrasybulus (Thuc. 8.73.4 and Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.35, 7.5 and 7.31 [all Xenophon references are to *Hellenica*]); Theramenes (in the last three passages just noted) and Ameinias, the brother of Aeschylus who was awarded the individual prize for valor at the battle of Salamis (Diod. 11.27.2). Thucydides and Diodorus also use the label "trierarch" in reference to two non-Athenians: Brasidas (Thuc. 4.11.4 and Diod. 12.52.2) and Hannibal (Diod. 24.1.6).

who were instrumental in helping the Samian democrats defend their government. Otherwise we are left in the dark about who he was³ and what he was doing during the earlier months of his first trierarchy. This would be less disappointing had Thrasybulus turned out to be an obscure figure in Athenian history, but, given his rise to unequalled prominence as a champion of the democracy, what were the beginnings of his career?

Most scholars bypass this matter altogether and ignore Thrasybulus until his name actually appears in historical context, but by doing so they overlook Thucydides' comment in 8.47.2 that the trierarchs as well as the "most influential" among the Athenian forces at Samos had begun to plot against the Athenian democracy the previous winter,⁴ perhaps as early as November 412.⁵ Who these men were we are not told, but the very fact that trierarchs were involved raises the question of Thrasybulus' participation,⁶ even though we cannot actually confirm his presence on the island until several months later. If Thrasybulus was not one of the conspirators, where was he and what was he doing as trierarch during the winter of 412/11? Yet if he was, how might we explain such "anti-democratic" tendencies in a man who is otherwise portrayed as a model democrat in every respect?⁷

Donald Kagan's⁸ solution is to argue convincingly that Thrasybulus consorted with the conspirators from the beginning and was even

³In 8.75.2, Thucydides refers to Thrasybulus as the son of Lycus (who is otherwise unknown); Xenophon (4.8.25), or perhaps Lysias (16.15) is the first to note that he belonged to the deme Steiria. Nepos (*Thrasybulus*) has nothing further to add about his family or early career.

⁴τὸ δὲ πλεόν καὶ ἀπὸ σφῶν ἀντῶν οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τριήραρχοί τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ δυνατώτατοι ὥρμητο ἐξ τὸ καταλύσαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν. M. Ostwald (*From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* [Berkeley 1986] 346, n. 36) is careful to point out the use of the pluperfect ὥρμητο. Thucydides first takes notice of the coming of winter at 8.29.1; he alludes to winter again at 30.1, 35.1, and 39.1.

⁵For the date, see G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*² vol. III, pt. 2 (Gotha 1904) 1467.

⁶On the basis of Thuc. 8.30, we can estimate that up to seventy-four trierarchs belonged to the conspiracy at the beginning.

⁷Lysias (28.4–8) implies that had it not been for his untimely and inglorious death at Aspendus, the Athenians would have convicted Thrasybulus of embezzlement and perhaps other improprieties in connection with his campaigns in 390/89. Whether or not this is true, they accorded him a hero's burial and interred him next to Pericles outside the Dipylon (see Paus. 1.29.3).

⁸*The Fall of the Athenian Empire* (Ithaca 1987) 113–17.

the leader of a faction of trierarchs and *dunatoi*, who decided among themselves to recall Alcibiades and change the government in Athens to an oligarchy in return for Persian support in the war against Sparta. Later, Kagan suggests, when negotiations with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades broke down, Thrasybulus disengaged himself from the intrigue and resumed his democratic ways as an outspoken opponent of the conspirators.⁹ This line of argument, however, rests on the assumptions that Thrasybulus was present at Samos at the time the conspiracy was formed and that he was already recognized by some Athenians as a leader of standing. The argument also forces Kagan to take issue with Thucydides and to contend that at least one trierarch, namely Thrasybulus, rejected the idea of oligarchy. He then must resort to special pleading in order to extricate Thrasybulus at the opportune moment from the ranks of the conspirators so that his reputation as a democratic loyalist would not be tarnished.

While few would doubt that Thucydides has been less than candid in reporting what the Athenian conspirators discussed in private, there is no compelling reason to believe that he has misled us in the case of Thrasybulus. On the contrary, his narrative leaves open the possibility that Thrasybulus, like other trierarchs, was serving with one of the generals who was not at Samos in November 412, nor was he necessarily there during the mid to late winter months when the conspirators were in the final stages of their plans. If this is correct, then there is no need to emend Thucydides' statement at 8.47.2 to allow for politicking by Thrasybulus, or to insist that he had a major leadership role at Samos prior to the spring of 411. As for where he may have been and with whom, we are free to speculate.

One approach is to look carefully at Thucydides' remarks about the comings and goings of Athenian generals to and from Samos during the first year of the Ionian War. Can we determine whether any of the generals who had been away from the island for most if not all of the winter of 412/11 were present there in the spring when the Samian oligarchs tried to overthrow the local democracy? Although such scrutiny is hardly foolproof,¹⁰ it still serves to identify two individuals, namely

⁹Kagan (note 8 above) 138–39.

¹⁰It would be reckless to presume, for example, that Thucydides has provided an accurate accounting of the various missions of each general who held a command in this year of the war or taken note of every instance when Athenian triremes were disabled or captured; in fact, there are many indications in Book 8 that he has overlooked such items.

Diomedon and Leon, whose movements fit this pattern.¹¹ These men are almost always found in tandem, and between them they commanded twenty-six triremes (and thus trierarchs) when they first entered the war in the summer of 412. In addition, Thucydides notes that they were the only generals who supported the cause of the Samian democrats before and during the revolution and mentions them by name in the same sentence in which he introduces Thrasybulus (8.73.4). This could be a telling reference. It is very possible, therefore, that Thrasybulus sailed from Athens with one or the other of them and subsequently served with both on campaign. In what follows I will make bold to argue that Thrasybulus was among the original trierarchs assigned to

In addition, we are not well enough informed about the process of allocating trierarchs to generals, especially whether these appointments, once made, were in any way binding. Jordan (note 1 above) says that in the second half of the fifth century "trierarchs served by appointment, which took place annually" (61), that "the appointments of trierarchs took place regularly at the beginning of the [Attic] year" (65), that "the appointment of trierarchs came under the purview of the board of generals" (61), and that "the generals determined which trierarch should command what vessel" (68), but he does not address the issue in question. It seems only practical that a general would maintain command of the same triremes with which he left Athens, particularly in the case of small squadrons, for as long as he remained in active service. I will assume, therefore, that there was some consistency in the assignment of naval personnel and that a retinue of the same trierarchs accompanied each general on campaign at all times unless the sources state otherwise.

¹¹In my opinion, Diomedon and Leon were regular members of the *strategia* of 412/11; cf. Jordan (note 1 above) 126–27 who suggests that they had initially served as *archontes* until the winter months when they "were elevated to the *strategia* by popular mandate." Regarding the other generals for 412/11, Phrynichus and Scironides arrived at Samos at the end of summer (8.25.1), only to be deposed during the winter (8.54.3); whereas Phrynichus returned to Athens, Scironides is not heard of again. Charminus arrived in the winter (8.30.1) and remained on the island into the spring during which time he conspired with the Samian oligarchs to subvert the democracy (8.73.3); he may have been the only Athenian general stationed at Samos from the moment when Phrynichus and Scironides were recalled until Diomedon and Leon arrived from Chalce at winter's end. Strombichides reappeared during the winter in the company of Charminus and Euctemon (8.30.1) and together with Euctemon and Onomacles (who had originally put into port with Phrynichus and Scironides) went immediately to Chios where he stayed until the spring. From here he sailed to the Hellespont in pursuit of the Spartan Derkyllidas (8.63.1) and finally returned to Samos in the summer of 411 (8.79.3–5). Onomacles eventually sailed back to Athens and became a member of the Four Hundred (see *Vit. X orat.* 833E–F); we do not know what happened to Euctemon. The whereabouts of Thrasycles also remains a mystery. He was the second general sent out from Athens to arrest the rebellion of Chios (8.15.2), but there is no further mention of him after 8.19. Thucydides never refers to Eucrates son of Niceratus; perhaps he had some assignment in Thrace (see *Arist. Lys.* 103 and schol.).

Diomedon, an idea that becomes more appealing as we seek to explain why the Samian democrats also turned to him for support in the spring of 411, and why the sources have so little to say about him during the trial of the Arginusae generals in 406.

Diomedon is a prominent figure in the pages of Thucydides. He left Athens in the summer of 412 with sixteen ships, ostensibly to proceed against the Chians and perhaps to join forces with Strombichides and Thrasycles, who were already campaigning in the area.¹² After a minor encounter with a squadron of ten Chian ships (he managed to capture four of them without their crews), Diomedon went on to Samos. From here he ventured to Teos with ten ships (to make an agreement with the Teans to receive Athenian ships in port) and then, following an unsuccessful assault on Haerae, sailed away to some unknown destination.¹³ At this time, says Thucydides (8.21), a revolution was taking place at Samos, where Samian democrats with the assistance of some Athenians—who happened to be present aboard three ships—killed 200 of the local oligarchs and condemned another 400 to exile. After this incident, we are told, the Athenians (in Athens) voted to make the Samians autonomous since they now regarded them as valuable allies; and so for the immediate future the democrats prevailed.¹⁴ The victorious Samians must have been pleased with what had transpired, and perhaps they even granted special honors to those Athenians who had come to their aid.¹⁵ Admittedly Thucydides does not provide these details, but the course of his narrative leaves little doubt that the three Athenian ships belonged to the original squadron of Diomedon. It is little wonder that the Samians were so eager to obtain Diomedon's help when their government was threatened by a *coup* the following spring.

Thucydides resumes the story of Diomedon at 8.23.1 and recounts how he and his fellow general Leon (Leon had recently arrived from

¹²Thuc. 8.19.2. On the activities of this pair, see Thuc. 8.15.2–17.3.

¹³Thuc. 8.19.3–4.

¹⁴For useful discussions of the nature of the Samian revolution of 412, in particular whether the government overthrown was oligarchic or democratic, see A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. V (Oxford 1981) 44–47; T. J. Quinn, *Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios: 478–404 B.C.* (Manchester 1981) 10–23; and more recently, G. Shipley, *A History of Samos* (Oxford 1987) 120–28. Whatever the answer, Andrewes (p. 45) is correct to point out that the Athenians “used Samos as their base from the start of the campaign.”

¹⁵See n. 16.

Athens with another ten ships and was to become Diomedon's co-partner on several campaigns) sailed to Lesbos with a fleet of twenty-five ships.¹⁶ Here they took possession of Mytilene and for the most part restored the island to the Athenians.¹⁷ Afterward they captured Polichne and Clazomenae and then made war against the Chians, whom they defeated in three separate battles and, then, despoiled the island at will.¹⁸ It is impossible to determine how long Diomedon and Leon remained on Chios, but the next time Thucydides¹⁹ mentions them by name, the Athenians (in Athens) have voted to send them *out from Athens* to replace Phrynichus and Scironides as generals of the Athenian fleet.

Diomedon and Leon must have returned to Athens sometime after their Chian campaign, perhaps coincidentally with the arrival at Samos of the large armada of forty-eight ships (including transports) under the command of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides.²⁰ Given their success against the Chians, it is reasonable to suppose that they wanted to provide the Assembly with a firsthand report of what had been accomplished there. After all, it was the secession of Chios (which Thucydides²¹ refers to as the greatest state of the Athenian alliance) that had caused the crisis in the eastern Aegean earlier in the summer. This secession had so alarmed the Athenians that they voted to utilize the "emergency reserve" fund to man a number of ships and send two small squadrons against the island without delay.²² The Chians, so it hap-

¹⁶Thucydides does not make it clear when Leon arrived at Samos (8.23.1: Λέων γὰρ ὕστερον δέκα ναυοὶ προσεβόηθησαν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν), but it was probably near the time of the Samian revolution. I have suggested elsewhere ("The Identity of Leon," *AJP* 96 (1975)) especially 197–99 that Leon also assisted the Samian democrats at this time and that for their services both he and Diomedon came to be held in great esteem (see Thuc. 8.73.4, where the words ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου can only refer to the Samian *demos*).

¹⁷Thuc. 8.23.2–3 and 6.

¹⁸Thuc. 8.24.2–3.

¹⁹8.54.3. He also fails to note that Strombichides, son of Diotimus, the first general sent by the Athenians to the eastern Aegean in the summer of 412, also shuttled back and forth between Athens and Samos at this time (see Thuc. 8.15.2–17.3). Strombichides must have returned to Athens from the Athenian watch station at Lade during the late summer of 412 (see Thuc. 8.17.3 and 24), for at 8.30 we read that he was reassigned to Samos and sailed *out from Athens* in company with Charminus and Euctemon sometime in the early winter.

²⁰Thuc. 8.25.1. These reinforcements arrived at the end of summer (τοῦ αὐτοῦ θερόντος τελευτῶντος).

²¹8.15.1.

²²Thuc. 8.15. He concludes this passage as follows: καὶ πολλὰ ἦν ἡ προθυμία καὶ

pened, offered stiff resistance and thwarted the initial efforts of the Athenians; at the same time, they supplied crews to the Peloponnesian navy and encouraged other cities to join in their revolt.²³ In fact, these activities went unchecked until Diomedon and Leon intervened and took control of the island. Only the Chian *polis* continued to hold out. It was for such reasons that Diomedon and Leon returned to Athens.²⁴

It is unlikely, however, that they were accompanied by their entire joint complement of twenty-six ships, for a withdrawal of this size would have drastically depleted the manpower of the fleet. Yet they would not have been so foolhardy as to risk crossing the Aegean without some form of escort, especially in light of the unpredictable naval presence of the Spartans and their allies. Let us suppose, therefore, that Diomedon and Leon sailed to Athens with a select squadron of their best triremes (and trierarchs) and remained there, together with officers and crews, until mid winter, when they were ordered to return to the fleet.²⁵ They doubtless made a brief stopover at Samos before setting sail for Rhodes, where they discovered the Peloponnesian fleet hauled ashore. Here they landed and defeated a contingent of Rhodians, who tried to defend these ships (we are never told of the Peloponnesians' actions or exact location at this time). After the defeat, however, the two fellow generals retired to the nearby island of Chalce in order to observe the enemy fleet.²⁶ When the Peloponnesians set out for Miletus at the end of winter, Diomedon and Leon sailed back to Samos.²⁷

Diomedon makes his final appearance in Thucydides' *History* in connection with the Samian revolution in the spring of 411. In 8.73

ὀλίγον ἐπράσσετο οὐδὲν ἐς τὴν βοήθειαν τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Χίον. On the Chian revolution in general, see Quinn (note 14 above) 43–49 and notes.

²³Thuc. 8.16–24.

²⁴They had also learned that certain Chians had attempted to betray their city to the Athenians (Thuc. 8.24.6: . . . ἐνεχείρησάν τινες πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἀγαγεῖν τὴν πόλιν, perhaps a reference to Tydeus, son of Ion, and his adherents who were soon put to death on a charge of Atticism, 8.38.3). This, too, was important news, which no doubt prompted the Athenians to send thirty-five more ships to Samos during the early winter (Thuc. 8.30.1). Athenian ships continued to guard Chios even after Diomedon and Leon departed for Athens, and once the above-mentioned reinforcements arrived, thirty ships plus transports and hoplites were soon assigned to campaign there in earnest.

²⁵Andrewes (note 14 above) 186 believes that they left Athens again in early January.

²⁶Thuc. 8.55.1.

²⁷Thuc. 8.60.3. Andrewes (note 14 above) 147–49 suggests that they may have arrived back on Samos "as late as the end of the first week of April."

Thucydides claims that Diomedon and other Athenians (including his fellow general Leon, the trierarch Thrasybulus, and the hoplite Thrasylus) were taken into confidence by the Samian democrats, who informed them of an impending oligarchic plot to overthrow the local government. How soon after his return from Chalce this occurred we are not told, but in all likelihood it preceded the actual *coup* attempt by a few weeks or more. At least one could posit a sufficient lapse of time for Diomedon and his colleagues to try to persuade the Athenian soldiers, one by one, to help defend the Samian democracy, for Diomedon and Leon to sail elsewhere (on such occasions they always left ships behind as a guard), and still to be present at Samos to lend a hand when the oligarchs eventually attacked.²⁸ Yet despite his unwavering support for the cause of Samian democracy, to say nothing of a distinguished record of command beginning in the summer of 412, Diomedon, together with Leon and other members of the existing *strategia*, was soon deposed by the newly created Athenian democracy at Samos.²⁹ It is not

²⁸Thuc. 8.73.5–6.

²⁹Thuc. 8.76.2: ἐποίησαν δὲ καὶ ἐκκλησίαν εὐθὺς οἱ στρατιῶται, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς μὲν προτέρους στρατηγοὺς . . . ἐπαυσαν, ἄλλους δὲ ἀνθείλοντο . . . στρατηγοὺς. . . . Scholars are quick to point out that three of the generals, namely, Diomedon, Leon and Strombichides, did not deserve their fate; see, for example, Andrewes (note 14 above) 268; Ostwald (note 4 above) 346–47; and Kagan (note 8 above) 169. Indeed there is no evidence whatsoever to implicate them in conspiratorial activities of any kind. Diomedon and Leon were merely “transient residents” on Samos until the early spring of 411, and, to judge from Thucydides’ narrative, Strombichides was hardly ever there. Certainly this would not have been lost on the Athenian soldiers and sailors. And if these generals had already been deposed by the Four Hundred in Athens (see Ostwald [note 4 above] 381), a second ouster would have been adding insult to injury.

It is possible, of course, that all three men were reelected to the new *strategia* at Samos. Strombichides, for example, seems to have retained a command in the Hellespont (see Thuc. 8.62.2–3) after the election, for he remained at Sestus until a messenger summoned him back to Samos (Thuc. 8.79.3: προυπέπεμπετο γὰρ αὐτῷ ἄγγελος), where the Athenians awaited the addition of his squadron of ships to their fleet so that they could more confidently and realistically challenge Astyochus and the Peloponnesian navy stationed at Miletus (Thuc. 8.79.5–6). The possibility of their reelection becomes all the more intriguing because we can arguably identify only seven out of what was surely a normal *strategia* of ten men: Thrasybulus and Thrasylus (Thuc. 8.76.2); Alcibiades (Thuc. 8.82.1); C. W. Fornara, *The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404* (Wiesbaden 1971) 67 believes that Alcibiades was added as an eleventh *strategos*); Chaereas (Diod. 13.49.6); and perhaps Eumachus (Xen. 1.1.22), Diodorus, and Mantitheus (Diod. 13.68.2), for which see Andrewes (note 14 above) 268. If Diomedon, Leon and Strombichides stayed on with the fleet in any capacity, there is no further mention of their names in connection

known where Diomedon went, but, given the alternatives, he probably remained with the fleet.

If, as we proposed above, Thrasybulus was one of the sixteen trierarchs attached to Diomedon's original squadron, we are given some leeway to conjecture about his activities prior to the spring of 411. For one thing, it is conceivable that Thrasybulus participated in two Samian revolutions. We recall that after Diomedon had his first skirmish with the Chian navy in the summer of 412, he took only ten ships with him against Teos and Haerae. Thucydides does not disclose the whereabouts of the other six ships from Diomedon's squadron, but two or probably three of them must be identified as the "three Athenian ships" which were in port when the revolution took place. Even though Thucydides (8.21) suggests that the presence of these vessels was merely fortuitous (ἐτυχον), he does not deny that the Samian democrats may have informed the Athenians of their plans to revolt. Nor does he deny that Diomedon, who apparently was the only Athenian general in the vicinity of Samos at the time, took it upon himself to maintain at least a precautionary force of Athenians on or near the island. If Thrasybulus was the trierarch of one of these ships, then it follows that he contributed in some way to the victory of the Samian democrats. This would explain why these very Samians solicited his services several months later (in the spring of 411) when they feared for the safety of their government.

Secondly, it is also possible that Thrasybulus campaigned with Diomedon and Leon on Chios and then accompanied them back to Athens in the late summer or early winter of 412. If so, he would have had little opportunity to become actively involved with the trierarchs and *dunatôtatoi* at Samos who were conspiring among themselves and with Alcibiades to overthrow the Athenian government. Moreover, Thrasybulus may not have heard any talk about an alliance with Persia until Pisander arrived in Athens and addressed the assembly on this matter in late December (412) or early January (411).³⁰ Thucydides leaves little doubt that Pisander played the consummate actor when he

with campaigns in the eastern Aegean and the Hellespont area. Diomedon and Leon maintain their anonymity until 406, when they were reelected to the *strategia* (Xen. 1.5.16), and Strombichides is not heard of again until 404/3 when he was executed by the Thirty (Lys. 13.13 and 30.14).

³⁰Thuc. 8.53–54. Busolt (note 5 above) 1470 and Kagan (note 8 above) 131 suggest late December as the date for this assembly; Andrewes (note 14 above) 186, early January.

persuaded his audience that they would have to recall Alcibiades (ὅς μόνος τῶν νῦν οἷός τε τοῦτο κατεργάσασθαι) and make temporary changes in the constitution if they wanted to strike a financial treaty with the Great King. Cleverly concealing the true revolutionary intentions of his fellow conspirators, he spoke in terms of "changing the democracy" (καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δημοκρατουμένοις) instead of establishing an oligarchy and even suggested that the Athenians could revert back to the existing constitution if the changes were unsatisfactory (ὑστερον γὰρ ἐξεσται ἡμῖν καὶ μεταθέσθαι, ἢν μὴ τι ἀρέσκη).³¹ If Thrasybulus was present on this occasion, he must have supported Pisander's proposal, which, after all, represented a small price to pay for the chance of improving the odds of winning the war against Sparta. In fact, Thrasybulus became so convinced that Alcibiades was the key to an Athenian victory that he worked single-handedly to bring about the latter's recall several months later at Samos.³² For the moment, however, we need not suppose that Thrasybulus was privy to Pisander's private conversations with the various clubs in the city, which he exhorted to join together and overthrow the democracy.³³ Like most Athenians, Thrasybulus would have to await the outcome of formal negotiations with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades at Magnesia, a task that was entrusted to Pisander and ten others.

Finally, if Thrasybulus continued to follow along in the footsteps of Diomedon (and Leon) he would have spent the remaining months of the winter at Rhodes and Chalce before returning to Samos to rejoin the main fleet. By this time Pisander and the other envoys to Magnesia had come and gone en route to Athens,³⁴ so that the Athenian conspirators

³¹Those who attended this assembly, says Thucydides (8.54.1), were hopeful that any changes in the constitution would be temporary: 'Ο δὲ δῆμος . . . δείσας καὶ ἅμα ἐπελπίζων ὥς καὶ μεταβαλεῖται, ἐνέδωκεν. On Pisander's mission to Athens, see W. J. McCoy, "The Non-Speeches of Pisander in Thucydides, Book Eight," in *The Speeches in Thucydides*, ed. P. A. Stadter (Chapel Hill 1973) 78–89.

³²Thuc. 8.81.1.

³³Thuc. 8.54.4. There is no evidence that Thrasybulus ever belonged to a political club.

³⁴Thuc. 8.63.3 and 64.1. Busolt (note 5 above) 1472 says that the embassy arrived at Samos near the end of February; I agree with Andrewes (note 14 above) 154 and Kagan (note 8 above) 138, who suggest a date in late March. The conspirators did not tell the Athenian soldiers and sailors what had transpired at Magnesia. Thucydides merely says that Pisander and the other envoys took still firmer control over the affairs of the army itself (τά τε ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ στρατεύματι ἐτι βεβαιώτερον κατέλαβον) without explaining the

who were left on the island had already consolidated their ranks and, in concert with three hundred Samian *dunatoi*, were plotting the overthrow of the Samian government.³⁵ Perhaps they had already assassinated Hyperbolus and cooperated in those deeds (καὶ ἄλλα μετ' αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα ξυνέπραξαν) that were designed to intimidate the local population.³⁶ It is not clear at what point in this sequence of events Diomedon and Leon returned from Chalce, except that they arrived in time to rally behind the Samian democrats and help them defend their government. If Thrasybulus was with them, it makes the text of Thuc. 8.73 all the more intelligible.

Yet let us set conjecture aside. It is doubtful that we will ever know a single detail about the trierarchy of Thrasybulus before the events of Thuc. 8.73, but there is no indication in this passage or elsewhere that he was ever associated with the Athenian conspirators on Samos, or that he had any foreknowledge of their intrigue with the Samian *dunatoi*, or that he had been apprised of the details of Alcibiades' chicanery at Magnesia.³⁷ On the contrary, Thucydides gives the impression that Thrasybulus as well as the other Athenians whom the Samian democrats asked for help in the spring of 411 were totally removed from the Athenian *ξυνωμοσία*.³⁸ If some of these men had endeared themselves to the Samians during their uprising of the preceding summer, it is logical that they would be sought out again in the throes of this new emergency.³⁹ The others were most likely perceived as democratic loy-

details. Pisander, of course, could maintain in public that he was obliged to report first to the assembly in Athens, but this did not deter him from discussing these "diplomatic matters" privately with his partners in crime.

³⁵Thuc. 8.63.3-4 and 73.2.

³⁶Thuc. 8.73.3.

³⁷It is difficult to believe that Thrasybulus would have continued to put such blind trust in Alcibiades had he listened to Pisander report on the meetings at Magnesia. Thucydides does not suggest that Thrasybulus was the least bit wary or incredulous of Alcibiades' ability to bring about an alliance with Tissaphernes and the Great King when later he persuaded the majority of Athenian soldiers at Samos to vote for his recall (8.81.1). Nor does Thucydides suggest that Thrasybulus was in any way suspicious when Alcibiades boasted of this claim in person (8.81.2) and made promises that he could never hope to fulfill (8.81.2-3).

³⁸8.73.4: οἱ ἐδόκουν αἰεὶ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦσθαι τοῖς ξυνεσιῶσιν.

³⁹This would certainly apply to Diomedon and probably to Leon and perhaps to Thrasybulus and the hoplite Thrasyllus, who are the only other Athenians identified by name in Thuc. 8.73.4. It seems strange that Thucydides would suddenly mention an otherwise nondescript trierarch and a common hoplite as key figures in the Samian revo-

alists who possessed some leverage with the soldiers of the fleet.⁴⁰ We are not told to what degree each of these Athenians was successful in man-to-man recruiting, only that collectively they assembled enough support to help defeat the Samian *dunatoi*.

If Thrasybulus' reputation among the Athenians in the fleet was enhanced by his involvement in the Samian affair, he did not emerge as one of their new leaders until after they had learned of the Four Hundred's ascension to power in Athens. For some time, the Athenians at Samos had been divided into two factions, each of which was so suspicious of the other that earlier that spring they refused to cooperate in a challenge of the Peloponnesian fleet that had sailed from Miletus to Samos.⁴¹ This situation could not have improved in the wake of the Samian revolution, but even then there was no serious rupture, in part, I think, because the conspirators carefully avoided a direct confrontation with the soldiers and sailors and exercised some discretion in their dealings with the Samian *dunatoi*.⁴² Nevertheless, most assuredly, the

lution of 411 without some qualifying statement, either in this passage or elsewhere in Book 8. Something appears to be missing. Why, for example, did the Samian democrats approach two men of such low military rank in the first place unless they were confident of obtaining their support? Despite the silence of Thucydides, Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus could have been making a name for themselves in Athenian circles amid the factional turmoil at Samos (see 8.63.2 and 76.1). Or it may be that they had established rapport with the Samian democrats earlier on, possibly as participants in the revolution of 412. I suggested this connection above in reference to Thrasybulus, especially if he was one of Diomedon's trierarchs. A similar case can be made for Thrasyllus. At 8.23.1 Thucydides says that Diomedon and Leon waged war against the Chians with twenty-five Athenian ships (8.23.1) and a contingent of hoplites from the military list who were pressed into service as *epibatai* (8.24.2: εἶχον δ' ἐπιβάτας τῶν ὀπλιτῶν ἐκ καταλόγου ἀγαγαστούς). Even though he does not tell us how or when these hoplites arrived on the scene, it is conceivable that Thrasyllus was among them and that he had left Athens aboard a trireme in Diomedon's squadron, perhaps one of the three that happened to be in port at the time the Samian democrats staged their first rebellion.

⁴⁰This group may have included all the trierarchs who spent the winter months with Diomedon and Leon.

⁴¹Thuc. 8.63.1-2. This atmosphere of suspicion seems to mirror the conditions in Athens where it was not easy to identify those who were actively involved in or even passively sympathetic to the wave of terror that gripped the city in the weeks (or even months) prior to the establishment of the Four Hundred; see Thuc. 8.66.

⁴²Thucydides (8.73.3) says that the general Charminus and "a group of Athenians at Samos" (καὶ τινῶν τῶν παρὰ σφίσιν Ἀθηναίων) colluded with the Samian *dunatoi* in the assassination of Hyperbolus and other heinous deeds (τοιαῦτα) but implies that the Samians were the actual perpetrators. The Athenian conspirators were also careful not to

situation of the Athenians at Samos was highly volatile and liable to disintegrate at any time. The conspirators, of course, had the most to lose, and so they continued to play a waiting game in hopes that their colleagues in Athens, once in control of the government there, would be able to justify the new regime to the personnel of the fleet. And perhaps it would have turned out this way had it not been for the *Paralus* incident, which precipitated an entirely different outcome.

After they had quelled the rebellion of the *dunatoi*, says Thucydides (8.74), the Samian democrats and the Athenian soldiers, unaware at the time that the Four Hundred were now in control, dispatched the state trireme *Paralus* to Athens to report on what had transpired. As it happened, the Four Hundred seized the vessel after it arrived in port, arrested two or three of its crew, and transferred the others to a troop ship. A certain Chaereas, son of Archestratus, however, escaped detention and returned to Samos with a collection of tales of what was going on in Athens. He told of scourgings and similar atrocities and convinced his comrades that the Four Hundred intended to incarcerate and even execute the relatives of any Athenian at Samos who did not share their political views. Suddenly the Athenian soldiers turned into a hostile mob that had to be restrained from stoning the ringleaders of the conspiracy and their accomplices.⁴³ But although tensions were high, in the end the Athenians were willing to listen to those among them with more level heads (ὑπὸ τῶν διὰ μέσου⁴⁴), a group that must have included the trierarch Thrasybulus and the hoplite Thrasyllus.⁴⁵ Later, as Thucydides describes it (8.75.2–3), these two men bound all the sol-

join arms with their Samian accomplices when they attacked the commons (8.73.6: ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς ἐπετίθεντο οἱ τριακόσιοι). Nonetheless the Athenians seemed to know who they were (see 8.75.1).

⁴³Thuc. 8.75.1.

⁴⁴It is difficult to read political innuendos into this phrase; see Andrewes (note 14 above) 267.

⁴⁵At 8.75.2, Thucydides refers to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus as οὗτοι γὰρ μάιστα προειστήκεσαν τῆς μεταβολῆς, a phrase that Warner (Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. R. Warner [Harmondsworth 1954]) correctly translates "who had been the two most active people in bringing about the change of opinion." Other translators seem baffled by the meaning of τῆς μεταβολῆς; e.g., R. Crawley ("the chief leaders of the revolution"), B. Jowett ("who were the chief leaders of the reaction"), C. F. Smith ("who had been the chief leaders in the revolution"), and J. de Romilly ("qui avaient pris la première place dans le mouvement"). Later in his career Thrasybulus displays the same knack for calming an emotional crowd in a potentially critical situation; see e.g., Xen. 2.4.39–42 and *Hell. Oxy.* VI (I). 2–3 Bartoletti.

diers, especially the promoters of an oligarchy, by the most solemn oaths to maintain the "new" Athenian democracy at Samos, to live in harmony with one another, to prosecute the war against the Peloponnesians, and to be ever hostile toward the Four Hundred. The soldiers then held an assembly in which they deposed their former generals and any of the trierarchs who were under suspicion. They replaced them with new officers.⁴⁶

One result of this extraordinary assembly was that Thrasybulus the trierarch became Thrasybulus the general. However young and inexperienced he may have been at the start of his first trierarchy,⁴⁷ Thucydides confirms that he became very popular both with the Samian democrats and the Athenian soldiers. Not only did he prove his steadfast loyalty to the cause of democracy, but he showed that he was a man who could control himself in moments of crisis and persuade others to do the same. He also espoused bold and creative changes that were designed to reinvigorate the low morale of his comrades and encourage in them a renewed desire for carrying on the war against Sparta. The Athenians were in desperate need of this kind of positive and level-headed leadership, and so, after they had voted to establish themselves as an independent state, they entrusted Thrasybulus and others like him to lead them in the future.

As I argued above, it is rash to assume that Thrasybulus was among the trierarchs who initiated the Athenian conspiracy at Samos (8.47.2) merely because Thucydides identifies him as a trierarch in 8.73.4. In the same vein, there is no reason to suppose that Thrasybulus was in the forefront of Athenian politics, or that he was an influential spokesman with a following in the fleet prior to the events at Samos in the spring of 411. His role in the Samian revolution was enough of an announcement of his talents and of his ability to lead. The ongoing political friction among the Athenians gave him ample opportunity out-

⁴⁶Thuc. 8.76.2. If Thucydides is correct in 8.47.2 that all the trierarchs present at Samos were members of the conspiracy, then the trierarchs who remained in office after the purge were probably away from the island at least during the early winter of 412/11 (as I believe was the case with Thrasybulus). Perhaps these were the very officers who had served with Diomedon and Leon.

⁴⁷J. K. Davis (*Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C.* [Oxford 1971] 240) comments, "Thrasyboulos' generalship of 411 and the fact that he had a marriageable daughter just before 390 are consistent in implying that he was born by the late 440s at latest, but it would be rash to take his birthday back beyond 450."

wardly to maintain his position. So great was his influence that Thucydides⁴⁸ speaks of him as if he were the leading figure of the "new" democracy.

My reconstruction of Thrasybulus' first trierarchy, albeit speculative in part, is nonetheless consistent with the content of Thucydides' narrative. Moreover, if there is any merit in the notion that Thrasybulus served with Diomedon during this time, then perhaps we have come a step closer to unraveling one of the many conundrums connected with the trial of the Arginusae generals, an event that occurred five years later when Thrasybulus was a trierarch for a second time. Thrasybulus had enjoyed a conspicuous career in the interim between 411 and 406, particularly in the Hellespont and the northern Aegean, where he often fought side by side with Alcibiades.⁴⁹ He also very probably retained his rank as *strategos* by will of the fleet until 407,⁵⁰ when both he and Alcibiades were elected *in absentia* to the "official" *strategia* in Athens.⁵¹ But the rapprochement with the Athenians was short-lived, and when Alcibiades fell from grace after the naval debacle at Notium,⁵² so too did Thrasybulus.⁵³ By July 406, however, he had been appointed trierarch and fought in this capacity at Arginusae.⁵⁴ On the other hand, we are told nothing of the whereabouts of Diomedon during these years. After the Athenian soldiers on Samos removed him from office, he disappears from the extant record until 406, when he was elected general for a second time.⁵⁵ Subsequently he was one of the eight com-

⁴⁸ 8.81.1: μετέστησε τὰ πράγματα. Thrasybulus was also the person most responsible for the recall of Alcibiades. How ironic that Thucydides has so little to say about Thrasybulus (see 8.100.4, 104.3, and 105.2–3) once Alcibiades has taken over the helm of command.

⁴⁹ See A. Andrewes, "The Generals in the Hellespont," *JHS* 73 (1953) 2–9.

⁵⁰ See Andrewes (note 49 above) 4; Fornara (note 29 above) 68–69; and Ostwald (note 4 above) 427.

⁵¹ Xen. 1.4.10.

⁵² The battle of Notium occurred sometime between late December 407 and April 406; Kagan (note 8 above) 312, n. 82 argues for an early date.

⁵³ If Alcibiades was visiting Thrasybulus at Phocaea at the time of the battle (Xen. 1.5.11), this undoubtedly worked to the latter's disadvantage in the eyes of the Athenians. Whatever the reason, he was not reelected to the *strategia* for 406/5.

⁵⁴ Xen. 1.6.35. Diodorus (13.101.2) confirms Thrasybulus' presence at the battle, but he does not refer to him as a trierarch. For the date of the battle, see Busolt (note 5 above) 1591–92.

⁵⁵ Xen. 1.5.16; Diod. 13.74.1.

manders who defeated the Peloponnesian navy at Arginusae.⁵⁶ And thus it came about that Diomedon and Thrasybulus again found themselves on a campaign as general and trierarch respectively. Little did they know at that time that they were about to become an integral part of one of the most bizarre trials in Athenian history. It is my final objective in this paper to examine the Arginusae episode from the perspectives of these two men, and to suggest why Thrasybulus evidently kept such a low profile at the trial.

Details of the naval battle near Arginusae are very sketchy, so much so that it is impossible to ascertain what Diomedon and Thrasybulus were doing during the course of the fighting.⁵⁷ Nor does our vantage point improve when we try to trace their activities immediately after the battle, mainly because Xenophon and Diodorus provide us with two different reports of what took place. Xenophon⁵⁸ says that following the retreat of the Peloponnesian navy, the Athenians returned to the Arginusae islands where the generals decided to put the trierarchs Theramenes and Thrasybulus as well as some taxiarchs in charge of rescuing the shipwrecked, while they themselves sailed to relieve the blockade of Conon at Mytilene. But a sudden wind and great storm forced them to abort these plans and remain where they were. When the wind subsided, the entire fleet sailed to Lesbos to link itself with the squadron of Conon who by now was free to maneuver. Together they put in at Mytilene, made an unsuccessful assault on Chios, and subsequently returned to their permanent base on Samos. Diodorus,⁵⁹ on the other hand, notes that the Athenians pursued the retreating Peloponnesians for some distance and caused a major carnage and wreckage of those ships before the generals, so we surmise, held a conference at sea. Whereas some thought it politic to pick up the Athenian dead,⁶⁰ others opted to effect the rescue of Conon. While they debated the matter, a violent storm arose and forced them to seek refuge at the Arginusae. Later they sailed to Mytilene to collect Conon and from

⁵⁶ Xen. 1.6.29. Sometime before the battle, says Xenophon (1.6.22–23), Diomedon had sailed to assist Conon at Mytilene where he was attacked by Callicratidas and lost ten of his twelve ships.

⁵⁷ Xenophon (1.6.29) says that Diomedon, with fifteen ships, was posted just to the right of Aristocrates (who commanded the left wing) before the fighting began.

⁵⁸ Xen. 1.6.33–35, 38.

⁵⁹ Diod. 13.100.1–6.

⁶⁰ As many scholars have noted. Diodorus focuses on the recovery of the Athenian dead, in contrast to Xenophon who underscores the rescue of the shipwrecked.

there proceeded toward Samos. Diodorus makes no mention of a special task-force assigned to recover the dead, even though he is quite explicit about the corpses of Athenian sailors strewn along the coasts of Cyeme and Phocaea. In fact, neither he nor Xenophon gives any indication that the Athenians ever initiated a search for these bodies with a view toward providing them a proper burial. Consequently the eight generals who commanded the fleet at Arginusae were ordered to appear in Athens before the Council and Assembly. Diomedon was one of six who obeyed.

Would that we were better informed about the recall of Diomedon and his fellow generals. Xenophon (1.7) would have us believe that the Athenians deposed (ἐπαύσαν) them before the trial, perhaps while they were still in and around Samos,⁶¹ but he does not tell us why.⁶² According to his account, the generals, before the Council, made a full statement about the battle and the magnitude of the storm.⁶³ They also might well have been more resolute in this position before the Assembly, had not Theramenes and the others who spoke out against them challenged them to account for their actions. It was then, and only then, that they changed their testimony and declared that they had assigned the rescue operations to the appointed trierarchs, including Theramenes and Thrasybulus. Xenophon makes it very clear, however, that this tack was spontaneous and that the generals were merely reacting to the accusations of their accusers. Yet what prompted Theramenes' vocal opposition? He leaves us without a clue.

Diodorus,⁶⁴ by contrast, insinuates that the generals themselves were directly responsible for their recall. He notes that even though the Athenians applauded their victory at sea, they were incensed at the

⁶¹ This reflects the sequence of events in Xen. 1.6.38ff. If the Athenians did depose the generals before they conducted a formal investigation and trial, it suggests that the fate of the latter had in some ways been prejudged.

⁶² Xenophon (1.7.2) notes that the popular leader Archdemus charged Erasinides, one of the generals, with embezzling public money from the Hellespont and misconduct (κατηγόρει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς στρατηγίας), but he does not associate the second charge specifically with the aftermath of the Arginusae battle (unless it had something to do with Erasinides' proposing to the other generals (1.7.29) that *all* the Athenians should sail out immediately against the Peloponnesians at Mytilene, as if the dead were of no concern). Nor does Xenophon suggest that Archdemus' prosecution was part of a political plot against the generals as a group.

⁶³ Apparently this was consistent with the content of their official report (1.7.3).

⁶⁴ 13.101.1–5.

generals for allowing the dead to go unburied. The generals in turn assumed that they had been betrayed by Theramenes and Thrasybulus (who had arrived in Athens ahead of the others). Accordingly they wrote open letters to the people stating that they had charged these two to recover the bodies. The Athenians then became angry with Theramenes and his associates, but, once the latter defended themselves,⁶⁵ they once again directed their wrath at the generals. These they ordered to turn over their command (τὰς δυνάμεις παραδίδοσθαι) to Canon and report home post haste. For some reason Diodorus omits the name of Diomedon from the list of the generals who actually returned to Athens to stand trial.⁶⁶

In recounting the proceedings of the final day of this infamous trial, Xenophon discloses in the speech of Euryptolemus some of the particulars of what was said, and by whom, when the generals met in private following the Arginusae battle. We learn that it was Diomedon who had urged his colleagues to gather up the shipwrecked before they did anything else,⁶⁷ and that he, together with Pericles, had endeavored to dissuade them from sending to the Council and Assembly an official reprimand charging Theramenes and Thrasybulus with insubordination.⁶⁸ Diomedon was painfully aware of the ways of decency and propriety and hence unprepared to bear false witness to save himself. Such a stand impressed Diodorus and/or his source, who praised Diomedon as an effective soldier, one who excelled in justice and other virtues.⁶⁹ Even after he had been condemned to death, Diodorus continues, Diomedon maintained his equanimity. He appealed to the Athenians to fulfill the vows that the generals had promised to Zeus Soter, Apollo and

⁶⁵Diodorus does not reveal what Theramenes and his associates said in their defense, nor does he identify "the associates of Theramenes" by name, except to say that they were witnesses to the events at Arginusae (συμπαράγεγονότας τοῖς εἰς τὴν ναυμαχίαν πράγμασιν) and that all of them were able orators and had many friends (ἀνδρας καὶ λόγῳ δυνατοὺς καὶ φίλους πολλοὺς).

⁶⁶13.101.5. This omission is all the more careless in light of 13.102, where Diodorus praises Diomedon for the way he conducted himself during the trial.

⁶⁷1.7.29; cf. Diod. 13.100.1: τῶν στρατηγῶν οἱ μὲν ᾤοντο δεῖν τοὺς τετελευτηκότας ἀναρεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ χαλεπῶς διατίθεσθαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτάφους περιορῶσι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας.

⁶⁸1.7.17. If Diomedon took this stand, it is difficult to image (following Diod. 13.101.2) that he then proposed to write letters to Athens censuring these trierarchs for something that was not their fault.

⁶⁹13.102.1.

the Erinyes. Indeed the "better citizens" (τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν) were so moved by his deep concern for the welfare of the state, even at the expense of his own life, that they reckoned him a god-fearing and magnanimous man undeserving of the calumny of his projected fate. If Diomedon had been more of a controversial figure in the politics of his day, we might suspect Diodorus of calculated flattery, but given Diomedon's apolitical stance, the eulogy is probably well-deserved. The surprising element in this section of Diodorus's history is that he dismisses the other generals without comment.

Thrasybulus' silence is striking throughout these legal proceedings. The evidence, moreover, is slight that he ever became personally involved in the prosecution of the generals, even after they contended that he was partially to blame for the unfortunate outcome of Arginusae. Xenophon hints in 1.7.18 that he may have been a party to some sort of intrigue,⁷⁰ but nowhere does he implicate him by name. Diodorus also refers to the "anti-generals" group as if Thrasybulus were of little or no account. He only states that the generals assumed (ὑπολαμβάνοντες) that he was one of their accusers.⁷¹ If Thrasybulus ever made a public statement, it was to defend himself against the generals' claims in their letters from Samos;⁷² otherwise there is no indication that he was an active participant in the events that followed. Instead the center of the stage is reserved for Theramenes,⁷³ whose role was that of provocateur. It was Theramenes who demanded that the generals give a public accounting of their conduct;⁷⁴ it was he, in order to prove Thrasybulus' and his innocence, who introduced at the trial a letter which the generals had sent to the Council and the Assembly.⁷⁵ It was also he who purportedly manipulated the occasion of the Apaturia festival that was to lead to Callixeinus' infamous indictment against the generals.⁷⁶ In

⁷⁰Near the beginning of his speech Euryptolemus says, εἴτα νῦν τὴν αἰτίαν κοινὴν ἔχουσιν [i.e., Diomedon and Pericles, and perhaps by extension the other generals] ἐκείνων [referring back to 1.7.17: τῷ Θηραμένει καὶ Θρασυβούλῳ] ἰδίᾳ ἁμαρτόντων, καὶ ἀντὶ τῆς τότε φιλανθρωπίας νῦν ὑπ' ἐκείνων [again referring to Theramenes and Thrasybulus] τε καὶ τινων ἄλλων ἐπιβουλευόμενοι κινδυνεύουσιν ἀπολέσθαι;

⁷¹13.101.2.

⁷²13.102.4.

⁷³Xen. 1.7.8: οἱ οὖν περὶ τὸν Θηραμένην; Diod. 13.101.3: τοὺς περὶ Θηραμένην; 101.4: τοῖς περὶ Θηραμένην; and 101.7: οἱ τοῖς περὶ Θηραμένην συωγωνιζόμενοι.

⁷⁴Xen. 1.7.4 and 31.

⁷⁵Xen. 1.7.4.

⁷⁶Xen. 1.7.8; Diod. 13.101.6-7.

essence, or at least in Xenophon's and Diodorus' words, the entire movement against the generals turned around Theramenes.

Theramenes, to be sure, was the more experienced politician and, given his quick wits and rhetorical expertise, the logical choice to develop the defense of the trierarchs.⁷⁷ Still it is puzzling why Thrasybulus, who was seldom reticent, was not more visible and outspoken before and during the trial.⁷⁸ As a former general who had been removed from office earlier in the year by an angry electorate,⁷⁹ perhaps he thought it untimely or inappropriate to criticize openly other generals who suddenly found themselves similarly accused. Or perhaps his actions were dictated by a sense of loyalty to two of the defendants, namely Diomedon and Thrasyllus, who had shared the important moments of his first trierarchy and in this way had helped to launch his public career. Or perhaps, like Euryptolemus and others,⁸⁰ he took it for granted that anyone indicted by the Council would be tried separately and thus be judged on the basis of personal accountability, an assumption that might have worked to the advantage of those generals who had refused to succumb to opportunism when they advised their colleagues to adopt a particular course of action. This was surely true of Diomedon, and Thrasybulus could have been aware of this even before the trial, including the fact that this man had from the first opposed censuring Theramenes and himself.⁸¹

Although no one can claim with certainty why Thrasybulus recedes into the background throughout the Arginusae affair, is it possible to suggest that his behavior might be explained by more than one reason? Certainly there arose the specter of a public trial and the fear that the Athenians, in their "collective wisdom," might hold him equally accountable for the tragic loss of life and bodies. However, Thrasybulus was a man who might well have had to face his own mixed motives. On

⁷⁷ We should keep in mind Thucydides' assessment of Theramenes at 8.68.4 (ἀνὴρ οὐτε εἰπεῖν οὐτε γινῶναι ἀδύνατος) as well as the latter's role in bringing about the collapse of the Four Hundred.

⁷⁸ It certainly was not for lack of voice, for Plutarch (*Alc.* 26.6) says of Thrasybulus that: ἦν γὰρ ὡς λέγεται μεγαλοφώνωτατος Ἀθηναίων.

⁷⁹ See Xen. 1.5.16.

⁸⁰ See Xen 1.7.12.

⁸¹ We also recall that immediately after the battle Diomedon had urged his colleagues to take personal charge of the recovery operations, whereas Thrasyllus had proposed the special rescue force to which Thrasybulus and Theramenes were assigned (see Xen. 1.7.29–30).

the one hand, he had been recently demoted from general to trierarch and during the Arginusae campaign was forced to obey rather than command. On the other, this was a principled man of upstanding character who was doubtlessly distressed in a personal sense by the unconstitutional nature of the Assembly's proceedings and possibly by the realization that he might have found himself, if the circumstances were different, in the same position as Diomedon and others who were being unjustly victimized by mob jury.⁸² Indeed, if he had served his military apprenticeship with Diomedon in 412/11, he would have been especially sensitive to the latter's plight.


Both public and personal reasons could have dictated Thrasybulus' behavior at the Arginusae trial. The spirit of the crowd on the Pnyx was so volatile that anyone who dared to challenge the will of the people ran the risk of immediate public condemnation. Yet, could not the relationship between military colleagues and men of ethical stature have also spoken in the silence of Thrasybulus?⁸³

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⁸²We get the impression that Diomedon and Thrasybulus were much alike in many ways. Compare, for example, Diodorus' remarks about Diomedon (13.102.1-3) with those of Xenophon (4.8.31), Nepos (*Thrasybulus* 1), and Pausanias (1.29.3) about Thrasybulus.

⁸³I am grateful to friends and colleagues R. A. Prier, Jr., R. J. A. Talbert, and W. W. West, III, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.



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WHEN DID THE ATHENIAN ASSEMBLY MEET? SOME NEW EVIDENCE

For †Isabelle and Toni Raubitschek

For ancient historians prospecting for facts about their period, the scholia found in the medieval manuscripts of Classical authors furnish much ore of varying quality. As those who have explored these regions can attest, the scholia contain many auriferous seams, and, for the unwary, much fool's gold. Some entries in the scholia bear the imprint of an ancient authority and clearly consist of precious material. Yet others, which seem initially to flash with the gleam of authenticity, are, when more closely examined, found to have little value, often composed of one part reasonable inference, the rest irresponsible guesswork. The process of extraction can be difficult, and one must be careful not to mistake the spurious for the genuine. But we should also not be too quick to discard information contained in a scholium simply because its author neglected to stamp it with the citation of an ancient source. Such haste impoverishes the study of ancient history.

The purpose of this article is to rescue from the rubbish heap a nugget of information about the Athenian Assembly found in a scholium to Dem. 24.20. The first part of this scholium informs us that the Athenians used to hold three meetings of the Assembly each month, but if some military emergency suddenly arose, an extra meeting might be summoned. The second part tells us at what times of the month meetings of the Assembly were normally held.

κατὰ μῆνα τρεῖς ἐκκλησίας ἐποιοῦντο, βουλευόμενοι περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πραγμάτων, πλὴν εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τις κατέλαβε πολέμου, ὥστε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνου ἄλλην ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι πλεον τῶν ὠρισμένων. καὶ ἐγένετο ἡ πρώτη ἐνδεκάτῃ τοῦ μηνός, ἡ δὲ δευτέρα περὶ τὴν εἰκάδα, ἡ δὲ τρίτη περὶ τὴν τριακοστήν.¹

¹Cf. schol. Aeschin. 1.60; Harp. s.v. κυρία ἐκκλησία; *Suda* K 2670; Photius s.v. κυρία ἐκκλησία; schol. Ar. Ach. 19 (to be associated with *Suda* E 470). All my citations of the Demosthenic scholia are from the superb new edition of M. R. Dilts, *Scholia Demosthenica* vol. I–II (Leipzig 1983–86).

The information found in the first part of this scholium is similar to that found in a scholium on Dem. 19.123 and in an entry in the lexicon of Harpocration (s.v. σύγκλητος ἐκκλησία), both of which add that an extra meeting called during an emergency was called an ἐκκλησία σύγκλητος.² Up until recently, scholars accepted this information without question and concluded that the Assembly met a fixed number of times each prytany, four times a prytany during the period of the ten tribes (*Ath. Pol.* 43.4), probably three times a prytany during the period of the twelve tribes, but that extra meetings called ἐκκλησίαι σύγκλητοι could be summoned if the need arose.³ In recent years, however, the information found in these passages has become the subject of a scholarly dispute.⁴ I do not wish here to continue that dispute; in the pursuit of truth, some polemic is inevitable, but when protracted, it becomes tiresome and fruitless. Rather, I will examine the evidence about the information contained in the second half of the scholium on Dem. 24.20 about the dates of Assembly meetings.

Usually when we come upon an interesting piece of information in the scholia that is not vouched for by the citation of an ancient source, we have no means of checking its veracity. In this case, however, we have a large amount of evidence that confirms its reliability. The evidence comes from the prescripts of Attic inscriptions which preserve

²The first part of the scholium to Dem. 19.123 is found in Codex A, the second in F² and Y. Similar information to that contained in Harpocration s.v. σύγκλητος ἐκκλησία is found in *Suda* Σ 1292; *Erym. Magn.* 733.15; Pollux 8.116. The scholium for Dem. 18.73 quoted by Hansen, "Ἐκκλησία Σύγκλητος in Hellenistic Athens," *GRBS* 20 (1979) 149 and cited by Hansen, "How Often did the Athenian Ekklesia Meet? A Reply," *GRBS* 28 (1987) 38, is not ancient evidence but probably derives from schol. Dem. 19.123 (see M. R. Dilts, "Palaeologian Scholia on the Orations of Demosthenes," *CIMed* 36 [1985] 257–59).

³E.g., G. Busolt and H. Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde* I–II (Munich 1920–26) 987–88; G. Glotz, *La cité grecque* (Paris 1928) 182–83; A. H. M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy* (Oxford 1960) 108–9; V. Ehrenberg, *Der Staat der Griechen* (Stuttgart 1965) 67; E. S. Staveley, *Greek and Roman Voting and Elections* (London 1972) 79.

⁴Hansen first challenged the reliability of the evidence found in the scholia and lexica in his *Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People's Court in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians* (Odense 1975) 51–57. He restated his position with new arguments in "How Often did the Ekklesia Meet?" *GRBS* 18 (1977) 43–70, and presented further arguments in "Ἐκκλησία Σύγκλητος," (note 2 above). Both of these articles were reprinted with addenda in *The Athenian Ecclesia: A Collection of Articles*, *Opuscula Graecolatina* 26 (Copenhagen 1983). I defended the evidence of the scholia and lexica in "How Often did the Athenian Assembly Meet?" *CQ* 36 (1986) 363–77. Hansen defended his position in "How Often did the Athenian Ekklesia Meet? A Reply," (note 2 above). Hansen's defense of his position has convinced neither me nor P. J. Rhodes, review of *The Athenian Assembly*, *CR* 38 (1988) 310–11.

decrees enacted by the Assembly.⁵ These prescripts often record the dates on which decrees were passed and thus indicate on what days of the month the Assembly met. The evidence provided by the inscriptions, along with some information in the literary sources, is substantial enough to enable us to draw some conclusions about the normal schedule of meetings of the Assembly and thereby to test the reliability of the information contained in the second part of the scholium on Dem. 24.20.⁶

Since the scholium appears to describe procedure during the period of the twelve tribes when a prytany was generally a month long, we will consider first the evidence for that period.⁷ The following list gives

⁵Since the inscriptions recording decrees of the Assembly dating before 341/40 do not indicate the day of the month in their prescripts, there is no epigraphical evidence for the date of meetings before that year. See A. Henry, "The Prescripts of Athenian Decree," *Mnemosyne* Suppl. 44 (1977) 37. For the one exception see note 47. All the rest of the evidence comes from the speeches of Apollodorus, Aeschines, and Demosthenes. J. Mikalson, *The Sacred and Civil Calendar of the Athenian Year* (Princeton 1975) 129 observes that the terms of the truce of 423 (Thuc. 4.118.11–13) were to go into effect on Elaphebolion 14 and concludes that this "in all probability indicates that a meeting of the Ekklesia occurred on this day." The inference is improbable. The terms of a treaty between two Greek communities went into effect not after it was ratified by their respective Assemblies (or other authoritative bodies), but when those designated by each community swore the oaths to the treaty. See P. Kussmaul, "Synthekai: Beiträge zur Geschichte des attischen Obligationenrechtes," (Diss. Basel 1969) 18–19. The stipulation that the truce of 423 was to go into effect on Elaphebolion 14 indicates only that the oaths were to be sworn on that day. The decree instructing the Athenian representatives to swear the oaths was in all likelihood passed several days before Elaphebolion 14.

⁶The task of assembling the evidence for the dates of meetings has been greatly facilitated by Mikalson's excellent work on the sacred and civil calendar. Like Mikalson (note 5 above) 10, I have adopted a conservative approach, accepting as evidence "only those restorations which are demonstrably correct." Since Mikalson was primarily interested in finding out whether the Assembly met on festival days, he did not include decrees passed by the Assembly for which the day of month, but not the name of the month, is known. My list includes such decrees as well as all those published after Mikalson completed the work for his study.

⁷Harris (note 4 above) 365. Cf. Pollux VIII, 115:

πρυτανεία δέ ἐστι ὁ χρόνος ὃν ἐκάστη φυλὴ πρυτανεύει. καὶ ὅτε μὲν δέκα ἦσαν πλείους ἐκάστη φυλὴ αἱ ἡμέραι, ἐπεὶ δὲ δώδεκα ἐγένοντο, ἐκάστη φυλὴ μηνὸς πρυτανείαν ἔχει.

The statement is roughly correct, but does not represent a strict rule consistently followed in every year. See B. D. Meritt, *The Athenian Year* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1961) 135–36. A. E. Raubitschek, *CIMed* 19 (1958) 84–86, has suggested that Pollux drew on Philochorus' *Atthis* and Theophrastus' *Nomoi*.

the day of the month and the meetings known to have taken place on that day. For the sake of completeness, I have included the few known decrees from the period of the thirteen tribes, but have marked them with an asterisk.

Evidence for the Dates of Meetings of the Assembly
in the Period of the Twelve Tribes

- 1st: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 2nd: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 3rd: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 4th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 5th: Mikalson believes that there are two meetings of the Assembly attested for this day,⁸ but his interpretations of the decrees he cites as evidence for these meetings are unlikely. One of the inscriptions records a meeting on Posideon 5, 220/19 (*Hesperia* 38 [1969] 425–31, no. 2 [Traill] lines 1–4). The prescript describes the decrees as βουλῆς ψηφίσματα, but Mikalson prefers to follow Traill, the editor of the inscription, who drew attention to line 13 which indicates the measure was a decree of the Assembly and argues that the phrase βουλῆς ψηφίσματα in line 4 is an error. Habicht *per litteras* suggests a more plausible explanation: “the date refers, in fact, to the meeting of the Council, when the probouleuma was drafted.” Mikalson believes that *IG* II² 656 records a decree of the Assembly passed on Elaphebolion 5, 284/83, but the inscription seems rather to reproduce a decree passed by a tribe.⁹
- 6th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 7th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 8th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 9th: Metageitnion 9, 271/70 (*Hesperia* 23 [1954] 287–96 [Dinsmoor] lines 2–6).
Metageitnion 9, 268/67 (*IG* II² 687, lines 2–5).¹⁰
Boedromion 9, 119/18 (*Hesperia* 47 [1978] 286, no. 15 [Traill] lines 1–4).

⁸Mikalson (note 5 above) 88, 122.

⁹See A. Wilhelm, *Ath. Mitt.* 39 (1914) 179; *IG* II² 656 *addenda*; A. Henry (note 5 above) 74.

¹⁰For the archon-year, see H. Heinen, *Untersuchungen zur hellenistischen Geschichte des 3. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Weisbaden 1972) 115–17; C. Habicht, *Untersuchungen zur politischen Geschichte Athens*, *Vestigia* 30 (Munich 1979) 116, n. 11.

- Boedromion 9, 101/0 (*IG* II² 1028, lines 1–3).¹¹
 Pyanopsion 9, 178/77 (*Hesperia* 51 [1982] 60–62, no. 3 [Tracy] lines 1–3).
 Posideon 9, 116/15 (*IG* II² 1009, lines 28–30).
 Gamelion 9, 282/81 (*Hesperia* 7 [1938] 100–9, no. 18 [Meritt] lines 2–6).
 Elaphebolion 9, 295/94 (*IG* II² 647, lines 1–7).
 Elaphebolion 9, 241/40 or 240/39 (*Hesperia* 17 [1948] 3–4, no. 3 [Meritt] lines 2–5).¹²
 Elaphebolion 9, 171/70 (*Hesperia* 3 [1934] 14–18, no. 17 [Meritt] lines 43–46; see also *Hesperia* 15 [1946] 198–201).
 Elaphebolion 9, 118/17 (*IG* II² 1008, lines 49–50).
 Skirophorion 9, before 240/39, possibly 254/53 (*IG* II² 784, lines 1–4).¹³
 (Month not preserved) 9, late 2nd century B.C. (*IG* II² 1019, lines 1–2).
 10th: Boedromion 10, 118/17 (*IG* II² 1008, lines 1–3).
 *Thargelion 218/17 (?) (*IG* II² 843, lines 2–6).
 11th: Hekatombaion 11, 286/85 (*IG* II² 650, lines 1–5).
 Hekatombaion 11, soon after 261, possibly 255/54 (*Hesperia* 38 [1969] 418–25, no. 1 [Traill] lines 1–4).¹⁴
 Metageitnion 11, 247/46 or 246/45 (*Hesperia* 52 [1983] 52 [Dontas] lines 1–5).
 *Metageitnion 11, 204/3 (*IG* II² 973, lines 2–6).
 Pyanopsion 11, 122/21 (*IG* II² 1006, lines 50–51).
 Posideon 11, 282/81 (*IG* II² 666, lines 1–4).
 Posideon 11, 104/3 (*IG* II² 989 as re-edited with new fragments by M. L. Lethen, *Hesperia* 26 [1957] 25–28, no. 1. lines 1–4 and 40–42).
 Gamelion 11, 107/6 (*IG* II² 1011, lines 63–65).
 Gamelion 11, 103/2 (*IG* II² 1034, lines 1–3).¹⁵

¹¹ Lines 66–68 of this inscription mistakenly give the day as ἔκπη.

¹² For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 10 above) 133–41 (241/40); M. J. Osborne, "The Chronology of Athens in the Mid-Third Century B.C.," *ZPE* 18 (1989) 209–42 at 225 (240/39).

¹³ For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 10 above) 137–41 (before 240/39 in a year of the Greater Panathenaia); Osborne (note 12 above) 237 (254/53).

¹⁴ For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 10 above) 126–28 (soon after 261); Osborne (note 12 above) 237 (255/54).

¹⁵ For the archon-year, see B. D. Meritt, "Athenian Archons 347/46–48/7 B.C.," *Historia* 26 (1977) 161–91.

- Mounichion 11, 187/86 (W. K. Pritchett and B. D. Meritt, *The Chronology of Hellenistic Athens* [Cambridge, MA 1940] 117–18, lines 2–5).
- Mounichion 11, 185/84 (*IG II²* 897, lines 1–6).¹⁶
- Mounichion 11, mid 2nd century B.C. (*IG II²* 996, lines 1–3).
- Mounichion 11, 106/5 (Josephus *AJ* 14.8.5).
- Thargelion 11, 262/61 or 251/50 (*IG II²* 770, lines 1–4).¹⁷
- Thargelion 11, early 2nd century B.C. (*Hesperia* 33 [1964] 183–84, no. 34 [Meritt] lines 1–4).
- Skirophorion 11, 272/71 (*Hesperia* 26 [1957] 54–55, no. 11 [Meritt] lines 2–7).
- 12th: Metageitnion 12, 247/46 (*IG II²* 778, lines 1–5).¹⁸
- Mounichion 12, 190/89 (*IG II²* 947, lines 9–12).¹⁹
- 13th: Elaphebolion 13, 184/83 (*Hesperia* 5 [1936] 419–28, no. 15 [Meritt] lines 1–4).²⁰
- 14th: Boedromion 14, 106/5 (*IG II²* 1011, lines 2–3).
- Thargelion 14, 235/34 (*IG II²* 790, lines 2–5).
- 15th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 16th: Pyanopsion 16, 242/41 or 241/40 (*IG II²* 795, lines 1–4; cf. *Hesperia* 4 [1935] 551).²¹
- Pyanopsion 16, 106/5 (*IG II²* 1011, lines 31–32).
- Mounichion 16, 296/95 (*IG II²* 644, lines 1–6).
- Thargelion 16, 107/6 (*IG II²* 1011, lines 73–74).
- Skirophorion 16, 188/87 (*IG II²* 893, lines 2–6; see also *AJP* 78 [1957] 375–81).

¹⁶Hansen, *The Athenian Ecclesia* (note 4 above) 152–53 classified this meeting as an *ekklesia synkletos*, but I questioned his position in “How Often did the Athenian Assembly Meet?” (note 4 above) 375. Hansen, “Reply,” (note 4 above) 47 quotes most of my argument, but strangely enough, leaves out the last sentence which contains what I think is the strongest objection to Hansen’s view. However, Hansen (p. 48) rightly notes “We must bear in mind, however, that the reconstructions advanced by Harris and by myself only apply if the rules affecting sessions of the *boule* and *ekklesia* were basically the same as in the fourth century, and this is certainly a far-reaching assumption.” With that statement, I am in full agreement.

¹⁷For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 10 above) 126 (262/61); Osborne (note 12 above) 237 (253/52 or 251/50, more likely the latter).

¹⁸For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 10 above) 133–41.

¹⁹For the archon-year, see S. V. Tracy, “The Date of the Athenian Archon Achaiois,” *AJAH* 9 (1984) 43–47.

²⁰For the archon-year, see D. M. Lewis, “The Archon Charikles,” *Horos* 6 (1988) 19–20.

²¹For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 10 above) 133, 143 (242/41); Osborne (note 12 above) 225 (241/40).

- Skirophorion 16, 165/64 (*IG* II² 949, lines 1–4).
- 17th: (Month not preserved) 17, 303/2 (*IG* II² 734, lines 3–7).²²
- 18th: Boedromion 18, 283/82 (*IG* II² 657, lines 1–5).
- Boedromion 18, 268/67 (*Hesperia* 5 [1936] 418–19, no. 14 [Meritt] lines 2–5; cf. *Hesperia* 38 [1969] 110–12).²³
- Boedromion 18, 247/46 or 246/45 (*Hesperia* 7 [1938] 121–23, no. 24 [Meritt] lines 2–4).²⁴
- Boedromion 18, 236/35 (*IG* II² 787, lines 1–4).
- Pyanopsion 18, 304/3 (*IG* II² 481, lines 1–5).
- Pyanopsion 18, 116/15 (*Hesperia* 16 [1947] 170–72, no. 67 [Meritt] lines 2–4).
- Posideon 18, 270/69 (*Hesperia* Suppl. 17 [1978] 2–4, lines 5–8; cf. *SEG* 28 [1978] no. 60).
- Anthesterion 18, 235/34 (*IG* II² 788, lines 1–5).
- Anthesterion 18, 163/62 (*Hesperia* 3 [1934] 27–31, no. 20 [Meritt] lines 2–5; cf. *Hesperia* 13 [1944] 266).
- Thargelion 18, 302/1 (*IG* II² 503, lines 1–5).
- Skirophorion 18, 181/80 (*Hesperia* 53 [1984] 370–74, no. 3 [Tracy] lines 1–4).
- (Month not preserved) 18, 194/93 (*IG* II² 888, lines 1–3).²⁵
- 19th: Posideon 19, 146/45 (P. Roussel and M. Launey, *Inscriptions de Délos* [Paris 1937] no. 1504, lines 50–51).
- Anthesterion 19, 286/85 (*IG* II² 651, lines 3–8).
- Anthesterion 19, 189/88 (*IG* II² 978 as restored by Meritt, *Hesperia* 26 [1957] 65, lines 2–7).
- Elaphebolion 19, 164/63 (*Hesperia* 26 [1957] 72–77, no. 22 [Meritt] lines 1–4).
- Mounichion 19, 279/78 (*IG* II² 672, lines 1–3).
- Mounichion 19, before 247/46 or 243/42 (*IG* II² 775, lines 28–31; see also *Hesperia* 7 [1938] 145 and *Hesperia* 28 [1959] 174–78).²⁶
- 20th: (Month not preserved) 20, before 224/23 (*IG* II² 857, lines 1–3).
- 21st: Metageitnion 21, 305/4 (*IG* II² 796, lines 1–4; see also *Hesperia* 5 [1936] 203).
- Metageitnion 21, 299/98 (*IG* II² 641, lines 1–7).

²²For the archon-year, see Chr. Karapa, *Arch. Delt.* 29 (1974) 159–63.

²³For the archon-year, see note 10.

²⁴For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 10 above) 133–41.

²⁵For the archon-year, see Habicht, *Studien zur Geschichte Athens in hellenistischer Zeit*, *Hypomnemata* 73 (Göttingen 1982) 165.

²⁶For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 10 above) 133–41 (before 247/46); Osborne (note 12 above) 224 (243/42).

- Maimakterion 21, 289/88 (*IG* II² 669, lines 1–5).
 Maimakterion 21, 262/61 or 261/60 (Diogenes Laertius 7.10).²⁷
 Anthesterion 21, 20/19 (*SEG* 30 [1980] no. 93, lines 1–5).
 Elaphebolion 21, 249/48 or 248/47 (*IG* II² 780, lines 2–4).²⁸
 Elaphebolion 21, 247/46 (*IG* II² 781, lines 2–5).²⁹
 Elaphebolion 21, 186/85 (*IG* II² 896, lines 2–5).
 Elaphebolion 21, 128/27 (*Hesperia* 4 [1935] 71–81, no. 37 [Dow] as re-edited with new fragments by Meritt, *Hesperia* 15 [1946] 201–13, no. 41, lines 101–4).
 Mounichion 21, 273/72 (*Hesperia* 51 [1982] 53–54, no. 10 [Walbank] lines 2–5).
 Skirophorion 21, 303/2 (*IG* II² 493, lines 2–8, and 494, lines 2–8).
 Skirophorion 21, 302/1 (*IG* II² 505, lines 1–4).
 Skirophorion 21, 273/72 (*IG* II² 676, lines 2–6).
 (Month not preserved) 21, soon after 261 or 255/54 (*IG* II² 697, lines 1–5 as restored by Dow, *Hesperia* 32 [1963] 352–56. See also Meritt, *Hesperia* 38 [1969] 433–34).³⁰
 (Month not preserved) 21, 195/94 (*IG* II² 702, lines 2–5).³¹
 22nd: Pyanopsion 22, 178/77 (Dow, *Hesperia* Suppl. 1 [1937] 120–24, no. 64, lines 1–3).
 Elaphebolion 22, 247/46 or 246/45 (*IG* II² 680, lines 1–4).³²
 Elaphebolion 22, 145/44 (?) (*IG* II² 967, lines 1–5).³³
 Mounichion 22, 109/8 (*BCH* 59 [1935] 64–70 [Béquignon] lines 1–7).
 (Month not preserved) 22, 299/98 (*IG* II² 642, lines 2–9).
 23rd: Metageitnion 23, 301/0 (*IG* II² 640, lines 2–7; see also *Hesperia* 4 [1935] 547).
 Elaphebolion 23, 190/88 (Pritchett and Meritt, *Chronology* 121–23, lines 1–4).³⁴
 Thargelion 23, 184/83 (*Hesperia* 10 [1941] 275–77, no. 73 [Pritchett] lines 1–4).³⁵

²⁷For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 10 above) 114.

²⁸For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 10 above) 139–41, 143–45 (249/48); Osborne (note 12 above) 237, 241 (249/48 or 248/47).

²⁹For the archon-year, see note 13.

³⁰For the archon-year, see note 14.

³¹For the archon-year, see S. V. Tracy, "Five Letter-Cutters of Hellenistic Athens," *Hesperia* 47 (1978) 257–58.

³²For the archon-year, see note 24.

³³For the archon-year, see C. Habicht, "The Eponymous Archons of Athens from 159/58 to 141/40," *Hesperia* 57 (1988) 242–46.

³⁴For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 25 above) 170, 177.

³⁵For the archon-year, see note 20.

- Skirophorion 23, after 262 or 260/59–256/55 (*IG* II² 772, lines 1–5).³⁶
- Skirophorion 23, 181/80 (*IG* II² 889, lines 1–4; see also B. Meritt, *The Athenian Year* [Berkeley and Los Angeles 1961] 197).
- Skirophorion 23, 140/39 (*IG* II² 971, lines 9–10).
- 24th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 25th: Boedromion 25, 266/65 (*IG* II² 665, lines 1–4).
- Boedromion 25, 227/26 (*IG* II² 837, lines 2–6).
- Pyanopsion 25, 302/1 (*Hesperia* 9 [1940] 104–11, no. 20 [Pritchett] lines 2–7).
- Pyanopsion 25, 252/51 or 251/50 (*IG* II² 769, lines 1–6).³⁷
- Posideon 25, 188/87 (*IG* II² 890, lines 1–4).
- Gamelion 25, 169/68 (*IG* II² 910 as re-edited by Dow, *Hesperia* Suppl. 1 [1937] no. 71, lines 1–4).
- Skirophorion 25, 285/84 (*IG* II² 654, lines 1–7).
- 26th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 27th: Boedromion 27, 127/26 (*Hesperia* 4 [1935] 71–81, no. 37 [Dow] as re-edited by Meritt, *Hesperia* 15 [1946] 201–13, no. 41, lines 76–78).
- *Gamelion 27, 208/7 (*IG* II² 849, lines 1–4).³⁸
- 28th: Anthesterion 28, 302/1 (*IG* II² 500, lines 2–6).
- (Month not preserved) 28, 137/36 (*IG* II² 974, lines 1–4).
- 29th: Metageitnion 29, 302/1 (*Hesperia* 1 [1932] 45–46 [Broneer] lines 1–5).
- Metageitnion 29, 281/80 (*Hesperia* 4 [1935] 562–65, no. 40 [Meritt] lines 1–5).
- Metageitnion 29, 226/25 (*Hesperia* 4 [1935] 525–30, no. 39 [Meritt] lines 2–7).
- Pyanopsion 29, 273/72 (*IG* II² 674, lines 1–2).
- Posideon 29, 302/1 (*Hesperia* 3 [1934] 6–7, no. 7 [Meritt] as re-edited with new fragments by Meritt, *Hesperia* 5 [1936] 414–16, no. 12, lines 2–7).
- Posideon 29, 160/59 (*IG* II² 953, lines 1–4).
- Gamelion 29, 304/3 (*IG* II² 483, lines 1–8).
- Gamelion 29, 135/34 (Dow, *Hesperia* Suppl. 1 [1937] no. 56 as re-edited with new fragments by Pritchett, *Hesperia* 9 [1940] 126–33, no. 26, lines 1–4).

³⁶For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 10 above) 116 (after 262); Osborne (note 12 above) 241 (260/59–256/55).

³⁷For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 10 above) 128 (251/50); Osborne (note 12 above) 237, 241 (252/51 or 251/50, more likely the former).

³⁸For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 25 above) 169.

- Elaphebolion 29, 194/93 (*IG* II² 850, lines 1–3).³⁹
 Mounichion 29, 188/87 (*IG* II² 892, lines 1–5).
 Thargelion 29, 300/299 (*IG* II² 585 as restored by Meritt, *Hesperia* 32 [1963] 4–5, lines 1–7).
 Thargelion 29, 147/46 (*Inscriptions de Délos* no. 1505, lines 41–43).⁴⁰
 (Month not preserved) 29, before 159 (*IG* II² 954, lines 1–4).
 (Month not preserved) 29, circa 50 (*IG* II² 1040, lines 20–22).
 30th: Boedromion 30, soon after 261 or 260/59–256/55 (*IG* II² 700, lines 1–4; cf. *Hesperia* 7 [1938] 110–14, no. 20).⁴¹
 *Boedromion 30, 214/13 (*Hesperia* 48 [1979] 174–78, no. 1 [Tracy] lines 1–4).
 Gamelion 30, 285/84 (*IG* II² 653, lines 1–5).
 Anthesterion 30, 267/66 (*IG* II² 661, lines 1–4).
 Anthesterion 30, 229/28 (*IG* II² 832, lines 1–5).
 Elaphebolion 30, 286/85 (*IG* II² 662 as re-edited with a new fragment by Lethen, *Hesperia* 26 [1957] 29–30, no. 2, lines 1–3).
 Mounichion 30, 293/92 (*IG* II² 649 as re-edited with a new fragment by W. B. Dinsmoor, *The Archons of Athens in the Hellenistic Age* [Cambridge, MA 1931] 3–15, lines 1–4).
 Skirophorion 30, 304/3 (*IG* II² 486, lines 3–8; *Hesperia* 7 [1938] 297, no. 22 [Schweigert] lines 3–8).
 Skirophorion 30, 303/2 (*IG* II² 495, lines 1–6; 496, lines 1–7; 497, lines 1–7).
 Skirophorion 30, 283/82 (*IG* II² 659, lines 2–7).
 Skirophorion 30, 276/75 (*IG* II² 685, lines 1–6).
 Skirophorion 30, 275/74 (*Hesperia* 2 [1933] 156–58, no. 5 [Meritt] lines 1–4).
 Skirophorion 30, 271/70 (Meritt, *Year* 192–94, lines 1–5).
 Skirophorion 30, 192/91 (*IG* II² 916, lines 8–11; see also Pritchett and Meritt, *Chronology* 115–16).
 Skirophorion 30, 169/68 (*SEG* 25.118, lines 2–7; *IG* II² 911, lines 1–5).
 Skirophorion 30, 168/67 (*IG* II² 945, lines 2–5).
 (Month not preserved) 30, 306/5 (*IG* II² 472, lines 2–6).
 (Month not preserved) 30, 305/4 (*IG* II² 797, lines 3–6).
 (Month not preserved) 30, 285/84 (*IG* II² 660, lines 25–27).

³⁹For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 25 above) 165.

⁴⁰For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 33 above) 238.

⁴¹For the archon-year, see Habicht (note 10 above) 144 (soon after 261); Osborne (note 12 above) 241 (260/59–256/55).

This evidence gives us the following totals for meetings of the Assembly during the period of the twelve tribes:

DAY OF MONTH	NUMBER OF MEETINGS	DAY OF MONTH	NUMBER OF MEETINGS
1st	0	16th	6
2nd	0	17th	1
3rd	0	18th	12
4th	0	19th	6
5th	0	20th	1
6th	0	21st	15
7th	0	22nd	5
8th	0	23rd	6
9th	13	24th	0
10th	1	25th	7
11th	15	26th	0
12th	2	27th	1
13th	1	28th	2
14th	2	29th	14
15th	0	30th	18

These figures reveal that the information found in Dem. 24.20 is roughly correct: out of the 126 regular meetings for which we know the day of the month, 90 or 71% fell on the 11th (ἐνδεκάτη), on the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, or 23rd (περὶ τὴν εἰκάδα), or on the 29th and 30th (περὶ τὴν τριακοστήν).⁴² Remarkable also is the fact that none of the days for which no meetings are attested is in the immediate temporal vicinity of the dates listed in the scholium. The only day that has a sizeable number of meetings attested and falls outside these dates is the 9th. Yet we should note that of the thirteen meetings attested for that day, four

⁴²I have omitted from these totals the meetings on Skirophorion 30, 169/68 (*IG* II² 911, lines 1–7) and Skirophorion 30, 168/67 (*IG* II² 945, lines 2–5) since they were *synkletoi ekklesiai*. The reason for calling these special extra meetings on the last day of the year was probably a large volume of business that had to be completed before the end of the year. I imagine that in these cases a regular meeting had been held the day before, but the Assembly had been unable to get through everything that had to be done before the end of the year, necessitating an extra meeting on the following day.

occurred in Elaphebolion, a month in which the Assembly could not meet on the 11th because of the Dionysia.⁴³

There is another possible way of explaining the high number of meetings on the 9th. The scholium indicates that there was some flexibility in the scheduling of the second and third meetings, which respectively occurred "around the twentieth" and "around the thirtieth." The inscriptions show that such flexibility did indeed exist. The inscriptions also suggest that the same flexibility existed in the scheduling of the first meeting for it often fell on the 9th. Note that if we include the meetings "around the eleventh" along with the meetings around the twentieth and thirtieth, we arrive at a total of 106 meetings out of all those attested, or 84%. I suspect that the author of the scholium was misled here by the text he was commenting on. He read in Dem. 24.20 that the Athenians regularly held a meeting of the Assembly on Hekatombaion 11 to discuss laws, and apparently concluded that the first meeting of the Assembly in the following months normally occurred on that day instead of "on or around the eleventh" as was actually the case. Whatever the true explanation, it is clear that the information about the normal meeting days of the Assembly found in the scholium is roughly correct. Where its author found this information remains something of a mystery, but there can be no doubt about its reliability. That in turn makes it probable that the rest of the information found in the scholium on Dem. 24.20 is also reliable for the period of the twelve tribes.

But what about the period of the twelve tribes when a prytany was longer than a month and when there must have been four months in which there were more than three regular meetings? There is no evidence for the period before 360, but the literary sources and inscriptions provide us with dates of forty meetings for the last fifty years of the period of the ten tribes.⁴⁴ One might expect the schedule to have been different during this period, but the evidence, which I present below, suggests otherwise:

Evidence for the Dates of Meetings of the Assembly in the Period of the Ten Tribes

- 1st: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 2nd: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.

⁴³ Mikalson (note 5 above) 185.

⁴⁴ See note 5.

- 3rd: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
 4th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
 5th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
 6th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
 7th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
 8th: Elaphebolion (?) 8, 326/25 (*IG* II² 359, lines 2–7).⁴⁵
 Aeschines (3.66–67) alleges that in 347/46 Demosthenes drafted a motion to have the Assembly meet on Elaphebolion 8 of that year, but does not reveal whether or not the proposal secured approval. Hansen claims that the phrase ἐνταῦθ' ἔτερον νικᾷ ψήφισμα Δημοσθένους in the next section shows that Demosthenes “proposed and carried both decrees,” i.e., both the proposal mentioned in this section and the previous one to have the Assembly meet on Elaphebolion 8. Hansen’s point rests on an inference from Aeschines’ use of the word ἔτερον, but the inference is unwarranted. The adjective merely distinguishes the second decree from the first. There is no implication about the fate of the first decree.⁴⁶
- 9th: Metageitnion 9, 333/32 (*IG* II² 338, lines 1–5).
 10th: Skirophorion 10, 331/30 (*IG* II² 349, lines 3–7).
 11th: Hekatombaion 11, 356/55 (*IG* II² 127, lines 4–7).⁴⁷
 Hekatombaion 11, 352 (Dem. 24.26).
 Hekatombaion 11, 323/22 (*IG* II² 365, lines 1–4).
 Boedromion 11, 320/19 (*IG* II² 380, lines 2–6).
 Maimakterion 11, 319/18 (*Hesperia* 9 [1940] 345–48, no. 44 [Schweigert] lines 4–8).
 Gamelion 11, 314/13 (*IG* II² 450, lines 1–6).

⁴⁵In “How Often did the Athenian Assembly Meet?” (note 4 above) 373, note 29 I cast doubt on the traditional restoration of *IG* II² 359 to give a meeting on Elaphebolion 8. Thanks to Professor Habicht, I was able to examine a squeeze of this inscription in the Epigraphical Library at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Autopsy obliges me to admit that the letter after ὀδόνι in line 5 appears to be an iota, making the restoration [ἵσταμένου] hard to avoid. For a full discussion of the text of this inscription, see C. Schwenk, *Athens in the Age of Alexander: The Dated Decrees of ‘The Lykourgan Era’ 338–322 B.C.* (Chicago 1985) 308–13.

⁴⁶Compare the use of the word at Aeschin. 3.252. Here ἔτερος is used to refer to another person who was prosecuted for deserting Athens during the crisis after Chaeroneia, but was acquitted by one vote. One cannot infer from the use of ἔτερος the fate of the previous person mentioned, since that person was in fact convicted and executed. In similar fashion, one cannot infer the fate of Demosthenes’ first proposal at Aeschin. 3.66–67 from the use of the word ἔτερον when referring to the second proposal.

⁴⁷The month and day of the month are not given, but the date must be Hekatombaion 11 since the decree was passed on the eleventh day of the first prytany.

- Thargelion 11, 332/31 (*IG* VII 4252, lines 2–7, and 4253, lines 2–7).
 Thargelion 11, 330/29 (*IG* II² 351, addenda, lines 2–7).
 (Month not preserved) 11, 333/32 (*IG* II² 340, lines 1–7).
- 12th: Elaphebolion 12, 319/18 (*Hesperia* 7 [1938] 476–79, no. 31 [Crosby] lines 1–7; see also Meritt, *Athenian Year* 122).
 Mikalson, *Sacred and Civil Calendar* 28 believes that Dem. 24.26 refers to a meeting of the Assembly on Hekatombaion 12, 352, but Hansen, *GRBS* 23 (1982) 332, note 5 correctly observes that the passage refers to a meeting of the *nomothetai*, not of the Assembly.
- 13th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 14th: Thargelion 14, 330/29 (*IG* II² 352, lines 2–10).
 Posideon 14, 320/19 (*IG* II² 381, lines 2–8, and 382, lines 2–7).
- 15th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 16th: Pyanopsion 16, 329/28 (*IG* VII 4254, lines 2–7).
 Skirophorion 16, 347/46 (Dem. 19.58).
- 17th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 18th: Elaphebolion 18, 347/46 (Aeschin. 2.61; 3.68; *IG* II² 212, lines 55–57).
 Skirophorion 18, 335/34 (*SEG* 21.272, lines 2–7).
- 19th: Elaphebolion 19, 347/46 (Aeschin. 2.61; 3.68).⁴⁸
 Elaphebolion 19, 332/31 (*IG* II² 345, lines 2–7. Cf. *IG* II² 346 and 347).
 Mounichion 19, 319/18 (Plu. *Phoc.* 34.1–37.1).
- 20th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 21st: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 22nd: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 23rd: Thargelion 23, circa 327/26 (*IG* II² 1673, lines 9–10).
- 24th: Metageitnion 24, 362/61 ([Dem.] 50.4).
- 25th: Elaphebolion 25, 347/46 (Aeschin. 2.90; 3.73).
 (Month not preserved) 25, 334/33 (*IG* II² 335, lines 1–7).
- 26th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
- 27th: Skirophorion 27, 347/46 (Dem. 19.60).
 (Month not preserved) 27, 336/35 (*IG* II² 328, lines 1–6).

⁴⁸Hansen "Reply," (note 4 above) 43–44 draws attention to Aeschin. 2.53 and argues that the meetings of Elaphebolion 18 and 19, 347/46 constituted one double meeting, not two meetings. But Aeschines is inconsistent when referring to these meetings: in other places he refers to these meetings with the plural (Aeschin. 2.60, 65, 67. Cf. Dem. 19.13). This means that Aeschines' language is not a reliable guide and is thus a poor support for Hansen's view. What should be trusted is the official language of the decree of Demosthenes that set the dates for these meetings. Quoting from this decree, Aeschines (2.61) quite plainly refers to two meetings (δύο ἐκκλησίας).

- 28th: There is no indisputable evidence for a meeting on this day.
 29th: Thargelion 29, 338/37 (Aeschin. 3.27).
 (Month not preserved) 29, 327/26 (*IG* II² 356, lines 1–8).
 30th: Maimakterion 30, 321/20 (*Hesperia* 30 [1961] 289–92, no. 184 [Meritt] lines 3–7).
 Gamelion 30, 318/17 (*Hesperia* 4 [1935] 35–7, no. 5 [Oliver] lines 1–2).
 Elaphebolion 30, 328/27 (*IG* II² 354, lines 2–7).
 Elaphebolion 30, 320/19 (*IG* II² 336b, lines 5–7).
 Skirophorion 30, c. 330/29 (*IG* II² 415, lines 7–11).
 Skirophorion 30, 322/21 (*IG* II² 375, lines 1–7).⁴⁹
 (Month not preserved) 30, 341/40 (*IG* II² 229, lines 2–7).
 (Month not preserved) 30, 337/36 (*IG* II² 242, lines 2–5).
 (Month not preserved) 30, 336/35 (*IG* II² 330, lines 47–49).
 (Month not preserved) 30, 335/34 (*IG* II² 330, lines 1–4).
 (Month not preserved) 30, 327/26 (*IG* II² 357, lines 2–6).

This evidence gives us the following totals for meetings of the Assembly during the last fifty years of the period of the ten tribes:

DAY OF MONTH	NUMBER OF MEETINGS	DAY OF MONTH	NUMBER OF MEETINGS
1st	0	16th	2
2nd	0	17th	0
3rd	0	18th	2
4th	0	19th	3
5th	0	20th	0
6th	0	21st	0
7th	0	22nd	0
8th	1	23rd	1
9th	1	24th	1
10th	1	25th	2
11th	9	26th	0
12th	1	27th	2
13th	0	28th	0
14th	2	29th	2
15th	0	30th	11

⁴⁹The inscription gives the Thargelion as the month, but this must be an error for Skirophorion. See Schwenk (note 45 above) 449–51.

Although the sample for this period is smaller than that for the period of the twelve tribes, the totals for the 11th and the 30th stand out: these two days alone account for almost half of the meetings attested in this period. If we combine the totals for the days indicated in the scholium, we find that they make up 28 out of 41 attested meetings, or 68%, a figure that is strikingly close to the 71% for the period of the twelve tribes. The circumstances surrounding the meetings of Metageitnion 24, 362/61, Elaphebolion 19, 347/46, Elaphebolion 25, 347/46, and Skirophorion 16, 347/46 indicate that they were probably σύγκλητοι ἐκκλησίαι.⁵⁰ If we deduct them from the total number of regular meetings in this period, we arrive at a figure of 27 out of 37 attested meetings, or 71%, a figure that is even closer to the one obtained for the period of the twelve tribes. And if we add the meetings "around the eleventh," the figure rises to 30 out of 37 meetings, or 81%, as compared with 84% for the period of the twelve tribes. These figures make it certain that the information contained in the scholium to Dem. 24.20 is reliable for the last fifty years of the period of the ten tribes.

The normal schedule of regular meetings of the Assembly was obviously dictated in both periods by the festival calendar. Out of the first eight days of each month, seven were monthly festival days.⁵¹ Even though the fifth was not a festival day in any month except for Boedromion, it appears that the *prytaneis* usually waited until the eleventh to summon a meeting of the Assembly, though in the period of the twelve tribes a meeting might sometimes occur on the ninth. Since the Assembly had to hold forty regular meetings during the year in the period of the ten tribes, and probably thirty-six a year in the period of the twelve tribes, there had to be a meeting about once every ten days. That necessitated a meeting at the very end of the month, since the Assembly normally did not meet again until the ninth or eleventh of the following month. The remaining meeting then had to fall on a date roughly midway between the other two, that is, "around the twentieth."⁵²

⁵⁰The meeting of Metageitnion 24, 362/61 was called in response to news about dangerous developments in several areas. The meetings of Elaphebolion 19 and 25 were obviously additional meetings called to deal with the extra business arising from the negotiations for the Peace of Philocrates. The meeting of Skirophorion 16, 347/46 was summoned to deal with the proposals brought back by the Second Embassy from Philip which demanded immediate action.

⁵¹Mikalson (note 5 above) 13–20.

⁵²This reveals that Hansen's claim that in the period of the ten tribes what mat-

We can now return to our point of origin. Our examination of the evidence, both epigraphical and literary, has revealed that the information about the normal schedule of Assembly meetings found in the scholium on Dem. 24.20 is accurate for the period of the ten tribes beginning at the latest around 360 and also for the period of the twelve tribes. Where the author of this scholium found this information we do not know; Theophrastus' *Nomoi* and Philochorus' *Atthis* are possible candidates. Whatever his source, his information is clearly reliable. And that ought also to apply to his statement that the Athenians normally held three meetings of the Assembly each month, but might in emergency circumstances hold an extra meeting. As the scholium on Dem. 19.123 tells us, these extra meetings were called σύγκλητοι ἐκκλησίαι.⁵³

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tered in the scheduling of meetings of the Assembly was "the day of the prytany, and not the day of the month" is mistaken (Hansen *GRBS* 23 [1982] 331–50 = *Athenian Ecclesia* [note 4 above] 83–102).

⁵³I would like to thank Professor J. Mikalson for supplying me with references to the relevant inscriptions published since the completion of *Sacred and Civil Calendar*. I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor C. Habicht for his generous help and encouragement. Professor Habicht read over an earlier draft of this article and provided me with information about Hellenistic chronology. He also enabled me to make use of the resources of the Epigraphical Library at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. In addition, I would like to thank Professor M. Dilts and Professor S. V. Tracy, who were kind enough to answer my inquiries about the Demosthenic scholia and Attic inscriptions respectively. Finally, thanks are due to the journal's anonymous referee, who made several useful suggestions. None of these persons is to be held responsible for any remaining errors.

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PALLIATA TOGATA: PLAUTUS, *CURCULIO* 462–86

The choragus' speech in *Curculio* is perhaps the strangest passage in all of Plautus. It is also one of the most important for an understanding of Plautus' technique; for even if Fraenkel was right in proposing that the speech replaces a parabasis in Plautus' original,¹ there can be no doubt that the content of most of the speech, with references in each line to places in the city of Rome, is Roman.² Nevertheless, the speech

¹ Eduard Fraenkel, *De media et nova comoedia quaestiones selectae* (Göttingen 1912) 98–99. Cf. Henry W. Prescott, "Inorganic Roles in Roman Comedy," *CPh* 15 (1920) 270. My own suspicion, given Plautus' love of conspicuous "metatheatrical" devices like this one and the virtual nonexistence of such devices in extant New Comedy, is that Plautus created the passage from scratch. An intriguing though unprovable explanation of the similarities noted by Fraenkel between the choragus' speech and the parabases of Aristophanes is that Plautus himself, inspired by reading some Old Comedy, decided to incorporate a "parabasis" in this play. Cf. Ettore Paratore, *Plauto, Curculio (Il Gorgoglione)* (Florence n.d.) 19.

² Although the authenticity of the passage is now generally accepted, a few words in its defense are perhaps in order. The major argument of those who have considered the speech an interpolation has been the reference to a basilica in line 472, for Livy seems to imply that no basilica existed before Cato built the basilica Porcia in 184, the same year Plautus died (26.27.2–4, 39.44.7). See Friedrich Ritschl, *Parerga zu Plautus und Terenz, Vol. I* (Berlin 1845, repr. Amsterdam 1965) 207; H. Jordan, "Die parabasis im *Curculio* des Plautus," *Hermes* 15 (1880) 134–35; Peter Langen, *Beiträge zur Kritik und Erklärung des Plautus* (Leipzig 1880, repr. Hildesheim 1973) 280; August Mau, "Basilica," *RE* 3.1 (1897) 84; Ch. Huelsen, *The Roman Forum*, trans. Jesse Benedict Carter (New York 1909) 13–14; Gianfilippo Carettoni, "Esplorazioni nella basilica Emilia," *NSA* 73 (1948) 128; Harold B. Mattingly, "The First Period of Plautine Revival," *Latomus* 19 (1960) 231–35; Luigi Crema, "L'architettura romana nell'età della repubblica," *ANRW* 1.4 (1973) 641. In the last decades, however, several plausible cases have been made for a building which Plautus could have called a basilica at the site of the basilica Aemilia in the earliest years of the second century B.C., and topographers have begun to take the existence of such a building for granted. See George E. Duckworth, "Plautus and the Basilica Aemilia," in *Ut pictura poesis: Studia latina Petro Iohanni Enk septuagenario oblata* (Leiden 1955) 59–65; Günter Fuchs, "Zur Baugeschichte der Basilica Aemilia in der republikanischen Zeit," *MDAI (R)* 63 (1956) 14–25; Lawrence Richardson, Jr., "Basilica Fulvia, modo Aemilia," in *Studies in Classical Art: A Tribute to Peter Heinrich von Blanckenhagen*, ed. G. Koepke and M. B. Moore (Locust Valley 1979) 210; Jean-Michel David, "Le tribunal dans la basilique: Évolution fonctionnelle et symbolique de la république à l'empire," in *Architecture et société de l'archaïsme grec à la fin de la république romaine* (Rome 1983) 220, n. 10; Pierre Gros, "La basilique de forum selon Vitruve: La norme et l'expérimentation," in *Bauplanung und Bauthorie der Antike* (Berlin 1983) 50, 69, n. 76; Filippo Coarelli, *Il*

has been remarkably neglected. Although the choragus' tour has continued to be an invaluable source for topographers,³ no study of the passage itself has appeared since the early years of this century,⁴ and many of the choragus' references remain obscure; and while the satiric content of much of the speech has not gone unnoticed,⁵ the passage has generally been explained as a time-filling digression, with little relation to the rest of *Curculio*.⁶ I propose to reexamine the speech to see if any additional sense can be made of its numerous vague references, and to reconsider its role in the play as a whole. A major effect of the speech on its original audience, I shall argue, would have been to force them to recognize the applicability to their own lives of the humor and satire found throughout *Curculio*. Plautus accomplishes this effect by eliminating the distinctions between the imaginary world presented on stage and the "real world" of Rome.

The presence of the choragus is itself an effective means of removing such distinctions. His appearance as a character in the play is "metatheatrical," as many modern critics would describe it, for he is part of the apparatus of production; indeed, if Donatus is right, he sometimes acted as stage manager (ad Ter. *Eun.* 967). His entrance thus equates pretense and performance, as do similar "metatheatrical" references throughout Plautus' *corpus*.⁷ At the same time, the choragus

Foro Romano 2: Periodo repubblicano e augusteo (Rome 1985) 138; and, especially, Marcello Gaggiotti, "Atrium regium—basilica (Aemilia): una insospettata continuità storica e una chiave ideologica per la soluzione del problema dell'origine della basilica," *ARID* 14 (1985) 53–80.

³In addition to the works cited in note 2 above, see Donald R. Dudley, *Urbs Roma* (Aberdeen 1967) 75–78; and G. Cressedi, "Il Foro Boario e il Velabro," *BCAR* 89 (1984) 252.

⁴The last two were Gustav Friedrich, "Die Parabase im *Curculio* des Plautus," *Jahrbücher für Classische Philologie* 143 (1891) 708–12; and Hermannus Bosscher, *De Plauti Curculione Disputatio* (Leiden 1903) 71–112.

⁵See, for example, Luciano Perelli, "Società romana e problematica sociale nel teatro Plautino," *StudRom* 26 (1978) 317; and Jean-Marie André, "L'argent chez Plaute: Autour du *Curculio*," *Vichiana* 12 (1983) 23.

⁶See, for example, Giusto Monaco, *Teatro di Plauto 1: Il Curculio* (Rome 1963) 75; W. Beare, *The Roman Stage*³ (London 1964) 65–66.


⁷On Plautine "metatheatre," see Marino Barchiesi, "Plauto e il metateatro antico," *Il Verri* 31 (1969) 113–30; Gioachino Chiarini, *La recita: Plauto, la farsa, la festa* (Bologna 1979); Gianna Petrone, *Teatro antico e inganno: Finzione plautina* (Palermo 1983); Niall W. Slater, *Plautus in Performance: The Theatre of the Mind* (Princeton 1985); Frances Muecke, "Plautus and the Theater of Disguise," *ClAnt* 5 (1986) 216–29.

has a place beyond the company performing the play in the wider world of Rome, for he is hired by the aedile out of that wider world to provide the actors with costumes (*Per.* 159–60).⁸ In his opening lines the choragus takes advantage of his own incongruous position to suggest that “Epidaurus” and Rome are one, with the production itself serving as a bridge between the two. He begins by admiring the good luck of Phaedromus in finding Curculio: clearly we are in Epidaurus (462–63). He then moves to the production of the play: he is concerned about his costumes, but not too concerned, for his business is with Phaedromus, not Curculio (464–66). The actor playing Phaedromus must be the *dominus gregis*, who rented the costumes from the choragus. Finally, he steps beyond the production into the world of the audience: “sed dum hic egreditur foras commostrabo quo in quemque hominem facile inveniat is loco ne nimio opere sumat operam si quem conventum velit” (466–68). The choragus’ words encourage the audience to realize that in what follows the joke will be at least in part on them, for his “si quem conventum velit” implies that he assumes members of the audience would wish to associate themselves with the shady characters he is to describe.

The first stop in the ensuing tour sets the tone for what is to follow: “qui peiurum convenire volt hominem ito in comitium” (470). Of Plautus’ eighteen uses of *periurus* outside of this passage, fourteen refer to pimps. Ballio includes *periurus* in his list of “verba quae in comoediis solent lenoni dici” (*Pseud.* 1081–82), and the prologue of *Captivi* cites the *periurus leno* as one of the stock characters which that play lacks (57). Terence, in his only use of *periurus*, has the pimp Sannio take the adjective for granted as an epithet of his profession: “leno sum, fateor, pernicies communis adulescentium, periurus, pestis” (*Ad.* 188–89). *Periurus* is thus so closely tied with pimps in Roman comedy that Plautus’ audience cannot but have thought of that stock character here. They will be surprised and amused to learn that this *periurus* is not a pimp of comedy, but someone speaking before the tribunal of the *praetor urbanus* in Rome, which in Plautus’ day was in the *comitium*.⁹

⁸On the choragus, cf. Otto Frederkshausen, *De iure Plautino et Terentiano* (Göttingen 1906) 68; and Catharine Saunders, *Costume in Roman Comedy* (New York 1909) 17–19.

⁹Johan Louis Ussing, *Commentarius in Plauti Comoedias* (Copenhagen 1875–1892, repr. with addenda by Andreas Thierfelder, Hildesheim 1972) 2.565 = 1.591; Boscher (note 4 above) 76. Cf. Milphio’s description of the *advocati* hired by Agorastocles as



comitiales meri (Poen. 584), and Agorastocles' request that these same *advocati* meet him in *comitio* (Poen. 807).

The satirical reference to the praetor's tribunal is especially effective because it comes in this play, where the praetors' courts have played a conspicuous role. As the play begins Phaedromus claims that he will not leave Planesium's door, even if he is called to a lawsuit (5), and Palinurus, Planesium, and Phaedromus pepper their dialogue with legal language (30–32, 35–38, 47–48, 162–64, 174, 212). More importantly, Cappadox and Lyco both see the praetor's court as a place where they can get out of paying debts. Lyco first enters with a confident claim that he is rich, so long as he doesn't repay the deposits people have left with him (373). If anyone demands said deposits, he will simply go before the praetor, as all *argentarii* do (375–81). We later learn that Lyco nearly did plead before the praetor to avoid paying the ten minae he owed to the pimp (679–85). After Phaedromus pretends to act as praetor in deciding between Cappadox and Therapontigonus (701–17), the pimp also tries to avoid paying what he owes the soldier by means of a trip to the real praetor (721–22). By suggesting that *periuri* can be found in the *comitium*, Plautus makes clear that machinations such as those of Lyco and Cappadox are Roman as well as Greek phenomena.

Plautus has prepared his audience somewhat for this sudden switch to Roman topography with some conspicuous Roman references earlier in the play, including puns by Lyco and Curculio on the words *comitium* and *forum*, the very places the audience will visit with the choragus (400–3).¹⁰ Nevertheless, the effect of this and the ensuing references to Roman locales must have been stunning, for they are not merely references to things Roman, but the most blatant possible reminders that the production occurs in the city of Rome. All distinction between play, production, and “real life” has been obliterated; and as the physical landscapes of “Epidaurus” and Rome become one, the audience is forced to recognize the applicability of the Epidaurian social landscape—lying pimps, for example—to their own city, Rome.

The choragus' next stop is the shrine of Venus Cloacina, where, he says, one can find someone *mendax et gloriosus* (471). Again he suggests a stock comic character, for hearing *gloriosus* without an accompanying noun, the audience would think of the *miles gloriosus*. Plautus uses the adjective *gloriosus* eleven times elsewhere, six times of soldiers, and both Plautus (*Capt.* 58) and Terence (*Eun.* 31, 38; cf. *Cic. Amic.* 26.98) cite the *miles gloriosus* as a stock character. Curculio him-

¹⁰ On the Roman references throughout *Curculio*, see Lucienne Deschamps, “Epidauré ou Rome? A propos du *Curculio* de Plaute,” *Platon* 32–33 (1980–81) 151–77.

self identifies Therapontigonus as simply *gloriosus* (633: *ut fastidit gloriosus*). Most telling of the power of the unaccompanied adjective is the prologue of *Miles*, where Palaestrio says simply that the Latin version of the play will be called *gloriosus* (87). Everyone in the audience will know he means *Miles Gloriosus*: it remains only for Palaestrio to establish who the *miles gloriosus* is (88–89).¹¹

Why *milites gloriosi* around the *Cloacinae sacrum*? Pliny records a legend that after their reconciliation Romulus' Romans and the Sabines under Tatius purified themselves with myrtle at the site of this shrine, and he suggests that *Cloacina* (he spells it *Cluacina*) comes from the verb *cluere*, 'to purify' (*HN* 15.36.119; cf. Serv. ad *Aen.* 1.720). This has led several scholars to posit an association between the shrine, myrtle, and purification before marriage.¹² Pliny also reports, however, that myrtle was worn by victorious generals in *ovationes* (*HN* 15.38.125; cf. Gell. *NA* 5.6.20). As Coarelli has observed, on the shrine as portrayed on coins of L. Mussidius Longus (BMCRR 4242–54) are two statues of goddesses. That on the left holds myrtle, while her partner is armed with a helmet and a shield.¹³ It therefore appears that the shrine of Cloacina was associated not only with purification before marriage, but also with purification after battle, though direct evidence of such purification is lost. Plautus has soldiers performing such a purification in mind when he refers to the shrine. By calling them *gloriosi* he produces scathing satire of Roman military men, suggesting that some of them are no different from the stock soldiers of his plays.¹⁴

Next the choragus suggests that *sub basilica* one can find *dites damnosi mariti* (472). *Damnosi* in a comic setting must be men squandering money on whores. Plautus uses *damnosus* five other times. Three times it refers to men ruined by pimps and prostitutes (*Pseud.* 415, where it is joined with *amatores*; *Truc.* 63, 82). Lydus uses it in an

¹¹ On the affinity of *gloriosus* and *miles gloriosus*, and the resulting uncertainty over the actual title of *Miles*, cf. Alfred Fleckeisen, "Zu Plautus *Miles Gloriosus*," *RhM* 14 (1859) 628–29.

¹² C. C. van Essen, "Venus Cloacina," *Mnemosyne* Ser. 4, 9 (1956) 137–44; Robert Schilling, *La religion romaine de Vérus depuis les origines jusqu'au temps d'Auguste* (Paris 1954) 210–15; Jean Gagé, *Matrcnalia* (Brussels 1963) 91–95.

¹³ Filippo Coarelli, *Il Foro Romano 1: Periodo arcaico* (Rome 1983) 87.

¹⁴ On the Roman characteristics of the Plautine *miles gloriosus*, see John Arthur Hanson, "The Glorious Military," in *Roman Drama*, ed. T. A. Dorey and Donald R. Dudley (New York 1965) 55–61. Plautus appears similarly to suggest that some Roman generals are *gloriosi* at *Bacch.* 1072–73 and *Truc.* 482–96.

active sense to describe *Amor*, *Voluptas*, and the other deities Pistorclerus associates with the home of the Bacchides (*Bacch.* 117). Epidicus, when he steals money from Periphanes to buy a girl, calls the old man *damnosus* (*Epid.* 319). Terence has Chremes call the spendthrift lover Clitopho a *ganeo damnosus* (*Haut.* 1034).¹⁵ The *damnosi* here are not *adulscientes* like Clitopho, however, for they are married and rich. Such a combination—married, rich, and a lover—suggests the comic *senex amator*. Again the choragus humiliates the Roman victims of his satire—those who hire the prostitutes on the north side of the forum—by equating them with a “Greek” stock character.

Where there are *senes amatores*, we would expect to find another stock character, the prostitute. Plautus does not disappoint us, but he does add an unexpected twist, for the choragus suggests that we look in or near the basilica to find not female but male prostitutes: *scorta exoleta* (473).¹⁶ Also *sub basilica* with the prostitutes and their potential lovers are *qui stipulari solent*. Joined as they are by *que* to the *scorta*, *qui stipulari solent* appear to be pimps, demanding money for the services of the prostitutes, as the *lena* of *Cistellaria* says she always does (375).¹⁷ The juxtaposition of rich lovers, prostitutes, and pimps will become especially funny—and damning to the *dites amatores*—less than twenty lines later, when Curculio condemns *lenones*: “nec vobiscum quisquam in foro frugi consistere audet; qui constitit, culpant eum, conspicitur, vituperatur, eum rem fidemque perdere, tam etsi nil fecit, aiunt” (502-4). Nor need we assume with Mattingly that reference to pimps here contradicts Curculio’s later claim that while bankers cheat people in public, pimps *in occultis locis prostant* (507).¹⁸ The pimps, prostitutes, and lovers all lurk discreetly in the shadows of the basilica, and much of the humor here, as elsewhere in the speech, is that the choragus loudly proclaims actions which are supposedly performed in secret.

¹⁵ Cf. Ussing (note 9 above) 2.565 = 1.591.

¹⁶ Nearly all commentators and translators have assumed that the *scorta* here are female, but the *TLL* (5.2.1543, lines 11-12) suggests that *scorta exoleta*, like *exoleti* elsewhere in Latin literature, are male. That this is correct is confirmed by *Poen.* 17, where the prologue modifies *scortum exoletum* with a masculine adjective. Cf. Karlhans Abel, *Die Plautusprologe* (Mülheim-Ruhr 1955) 146, n. 559. On male prostitutes elsewhere in Plautus see Saara Lilja, *Homosexuality in Republican and Augustan Rome* (Ekenäs 1983) 30.

¹⁷ Cf. Jordan (note 2 above) 130; Aurelio-Giuseppe Amatucci, review of Bosscher, *De Plauti Curculione Disputatio*, *RFIC* 32 (1904) 331.

¹⁸ Mattingly (note 2 above) 234.

Stipulari, however, is used of any formal oral agreement,¹⁹ and it was the form of contract used when money was lent at interest.²⁰ Given, then, that *tabernae argentariae* were here on the north side of the forum, directly next to the basilica,²¹ *qui stipulari solent* could also be *argentarii* and their customers.²² The ambiguity is deliberate. Elsewhere Plautus associates prostitutes, pimps, and bankers, as Diniarchus places them all together *circa argentarias* (*Truc.* 66–73). Here Plautus goes one step further: by using a phrase which could mean pimps or bankers, he foreshadows Curculio's rebuke to Lyco that *argentarii* are no better than *lenones* (506).

When he moves northeast of the basilica to the *forum piscarium*, the choragus remains in the world of comedy; for the market offers not ordinary Romans buying provisions, but *symbolarum conlatores*, stocking up for dinner parties (474). Such preparations for parties and banquets are a topos of Roman Comedy (e.g., *Cas.* 490–503, 719; *Men.* 208–13; *Merc.* 754; *Mostell.* 66–67; *Truc.* 740; *Ter. Ad.* 117, 964; *Naev. frag. com.* 50; *Caecil. frag. com.* 180). Plautus' only other reference to a dinner for which the guests contribute *symbolae* is the party of Stichus and his fellow slaves (*Stich.* 432, 438), in a passage set emphatically in a Greek milieu (*Stich.* 446–48) which is probably a parody of dinners elsewhere in comedy.²³ Likewise Terence, in conspicuously Greek settings, refers to comic *adulescentes* arranging dinners with *symbolae* (*An.* 88; *Eun.* 540).²⁴

¹⁹*Dig.* 45.1. Cf. Max Kaser, *Römisches Privatrecht*⁶ (Munich 1968) 37–38. Plautus himself uses *stipulari* and *instipulari* of Simo (*Pseud.* 1069) and Ballio (*Pseud.* 1077) agreeing to pay money if Pseudolus accomplishes his ruse, and of Labrax agreeing to pay Grumio a talent for the return of his chest (*Rud.* 1381).

²⁰Francis de Zulueta, *The Institutes of Gaius, Part II: Commentary* (Oxford 1953) 149.

²¹Coarelli, *Foro Romano* 2 (note 2 above) 150; Jean Andreau, "L'espace de la vie financière à Rome," in *L'urbis: espace urbain et histoire (I^{er} siècle av. J.-C. – III^e siècle ap. J.-C.)* (Rome 1987) 159. Richardson (note 2 above) 211 suggests that at the time of *Curculio* the *tabernae argentariae* on the north side of the forum had not yet been rebuilt after the fire of 210 (Livy 26.27.2–4), and temporary *tabernae* were in the basilica itself. Cf. Gros (note 2 above) 65, n. 13; and Gaggiotti (note 2 above) 55.

²²So Bosscher (note 4 above) 84. Andreau's objection (note 21 above) 161 that the choragus would not refer to a professional class such as *argentarii* in such a vague way is unconvincing, given the vagueness of references throughout the passage.

²³Epidicus also jokes about *symbolae* prepared for his shoulder blades when he fears a beating (*Epid.* 125).

²⁴That dinners provided with *symbolae* were not considered ordinary events in

The north side of the forum, then, is crowded with characters like those one might find in the supposedly Greek setting of the *palliata*. As he reaches the easternmost side of the forum, the *forum infimum*,²⁵ the choragus temporarily abandons the characters of comedy and provides the only fulfillment of his promise to speak of *probi* as well as *improbi*: here walk the *boni homines atque dites* (475). *Boni homines* for the upper class is very respectful Roman language, as far removed from the shady world of comedy as the choragus will get; yet even here the verbal echo of *dites* reminds us that we are not that far from the other rich men of Rome who are far from *boni*.

The next line reveals that the *boni* have been included merely for the sake of contrast with poorer people who put on airs, pretending to be *boni* and *dites*; for the choragus continues, “in medio propter canalem, ibi ostentatores meri” (476). The *ostentatores meri* are probably the loiterers to whom Paulus’ epitome of Festus refers: “canalicolae forenses homines pauperes dicti, quod circa canales fori consisterent” (40 Lindsay). That loiterers already abounded in the middle of the forum in Plautus’ day is evident from the desire of Cato the Elder to cover the forum with sharp stones in order to discourage such loitering (Plin. HN 19.6.24).

The choragus spends more time on the next group than on anyone else:

confidentes garrulique et malivoli supra lacum,
qui alteri de nihilo audacter dicunt contumeliam
et qui ipsi sat habent quod in se possit vere dicier (477–79)

Who are these nasty talkers, and why are they near the Lacus Curtius? The lines have generally been taken to be a reference to gossips loitering in the forum.²⁶ This explains well why they are *garruli* and enjoys the parallel of the gossips whom Gelasimus says are *malevoli* in *Stichus* (208, 385). It is not clear however, why gossips should be *confidentes* or speak *audacter*: they seem to be doing nothing particularly daring. In

Rome even much later is evident in *Bibl. Vulg. Prov.* 23.21, where *dantes symbola* is used for the Hebrew *zolel*, which means a frivolous squanderer or glutton.

²⁵On the identification of the *forum infimum*, see Ussing (note 9 above) 2.566 = 1.592.

²⁶Friedrich (note 4 above) 711; Bosscher (note 4 above) 86; Philip Corbett, *The Scurra* (Edinburgh 1986) 31.

the five other passages where Plautus uses *contumelia* of words rather than of general mistreatment or bad reputation, the *contumelia* is an insult or accusation spoken directly from one person to another, not anything spoken behind one's back (*Asin.* 489; *Bacch.* 267; *Men.* 520; *Pseud.* 1173; *Truc.* 299). Terence does have Geta say to Demipho: "absenti tibi te indignas seque dignas contumelias numquam cessavit dicere hodie" (*Phorm.* 375–77). Though the *contumeliae* are not spoken directly to Demipho, they are specific accusations, not idle gossip, and Terence finds it necessary to stress that Demipho, the victim of the *contumeliae*, was *absens*; *dicere contumeliam* with a dative by itself apparently would imply that Demipho was present to receive the insults.

Plautus' *supra lacum* provides a clue as to who the *malevoli* might be, for nearly all scholars who have studied the praetors' tribunals have concluded that the tribunal of the *praetor peregrinus* was located just to the west of the Lacus Curtius.²⁷ The *confidentes* and *garruli* of the cho-

²⁷Huelsen (note 2 above) 149–53; Harriet Dale Johnson, *The Roman Tribunal* (Baltimore 1927) 48–53; Carlo Gioffredi, "I tribunali del Foro," *Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris* 9.2 (1943) 268–71; Erik Welin, *Studien zur Topographie der Forum Romanum* (Lund 1953) 75–96; Lawrence Richardson, Jr., "The Tribunals of the Praetors of Rome," *MDAI(R)* 80 (1973) 223–24; Jocelyn Penny Small, *Cacus and Marsyas in Etrusco-Roman Legend* (Princeton 1982) 79–82. Huelsen, Johnson, Welin, Richardson, and Small all argue, based on their interpretation of the *anaglypha Traiani*, that the statue of Marsyas, which Porphyry and pseudo-Acro seem to place near the tribunal (ad. Hor. *Sat.* 1.6.120), was located near the Lacus Curtius. Gioffredi (256–57), Mario Torelli (*Typology and Structure of Roman Historical Reliefs* [Ann Arbor 1982] 96, 99–106), and Coarelli (note 2 above) 35–38 have argued persuasively that the statue of Marsyas was not in the forum, but in the *comitium* next to the Ficus Ruminalis, and that the fig tree and the statue of Marsyas on the *anaglypha* are not carved *in situ*, but are presented as symbols, separate from the buildings of the forum carved on the rest of the blocks. Even without the statue of Marsyas, however, it remains probable, as Gioffredi has argued (268–71), that the tribunal of the *praetor peregrinus* was located here, given the inscriptions in the pavement to the west of the *lacus* and on the balustrade of the *lacus* itself of "L. Naevius L. F. Surdinus Pr. inter civis et peregrinos" (*CIL* 6.1468, 31662; cf. Pietro Romanelli, "L'iscrizione di L. Nevio Surdino nel lastricato del Foro Romano," in *Gli archeologi italiani in onore di Amedeo Maiuri* [Cava dei Tirreni 1965] 381–90), and the fact that the Lacus is a *puteal*, necessary for a tribunal. Welin (95–96) provides a list of passages where Plautine characters speak of going to the praetor *in foro*, proving the likelihood that the *praetor peregrinus* was already present near the Lacus Curtius in Plautus' day. Torelli (101) suggests that any attempt to locate the tribunals is futile, as they moved. As Johnson (32) and Richardson ("Tribunals" 219) point out, however, it is most likely, given the

ragus are those who are brazen enough to accuse others before the praetor even though they are guilty of worse crimes themselves. Plautus thus returns to the world of the praetors' courts and once again draws a connection with the rest of the play, where, as we have seen, the praetors play an important part in the machinations of Lyco and Cappadox.

Moving to the south side of the forum, the choragus first calls attention to the *tabernae veteres*, where, he says, one can find "qui dant quique accipiunt faenore" (480). Andreau has suggested that those lending money here are not *argentarii* like Lyco, but are moneylenders like the *danistae* of *Epidicus* and *Mostellaria*.²⁸ While Andreau is correct that Plautus distinguishes between moneylenders and *argentarii*, and he usually presents the *argentarii* as keeping money on deposit rather than lending money,²⁹ Plautus ignores the distinction in *Curculio*, where Curculio accuses Lyco and all *argentarii* of destroying people with *fenus* (508).³⁰ Nor is it likely that the *tabernae veteres*, which were, after all, also called *tabernae argentariae*,³¹ lacked *argentarii*. Thus, having hinted at *argentarii* in the reference to *stipulatio* above, Plautus now makes clear that the third of the plays' three main antagonists, like the pimp and the braggart soldier, would feel right at home in the Roman forum.

Nor is the choragus through with *argentarii*. His next stop is behind the temple of Castor and Pollux, where he claims to know of those *quibu' credas male* (481). Cicero reveals that the tables of money-changers were near the same temple (*Quinct.* 4.17), and two inscriptions refer-

limited space available and the generally conservative nature of the Romans, that the tribunals usually stayed in the same place, only being moved on very special occasions. Indeed, both examples of moved tribunals cited by Torelli are cases where special circumstances demanded that they be moved: 215 B.C., when the praetors erected *tribunalia* outside of the city gate in order to prove to the populace that they did not fear Hannibal (Livy 23.32.4), and 48 B.C., when Caelius moved his tribunal near that of C. Trebonius in order to hear the complaints of those unhappy with his colleague's decisions (Caes. *BCiv.* 3.20.1).

²⁸ Jean Andreau, "Banque grecque et banque romaine dans le théâtre de Plaute et de Térence," *MEFR* 80 (1961) 481, n. 1; "L'espace" (note 21 above) 161.

²⁹ Andreau (note 21 above) 157–59. Cf. Charles T. Barlow, "Bankers, Moneylenders, and Interest Rates in the Roman Republic" (Diss. North Carolina 1978) 68–72.

³⁰ *Argentarii* are also clearly lenders of money at *Cas.* 25.

³¹ Coarelli (note 2 above) 142. Cf. Tenney Frank, *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome I* (Baltimore 1933) 206.

ring to *argentarii post aedem Castoris* confirm this location.³² There is no reason to doubt that in Plautus' day as well a group of *argentarii* worked *post aedem Castoris*.³³ One begins to get the impression that untrustworthy *argentarii* like Lyco are everywhere around the choragus' forum.

Moving farther south, the choragus suggests that on the *vicus Tuscus* one can find *homines qui ipsi sese venditant* (482). Some have suggested that *sese venditant* is a scornful reference to manual workers.³⁴ In *Miles*, however, after Sceledrus sees Philocomasium in the arms of Pleusicles, he complains: "non ego possum quae ipsa sese venditat tutarier" (312). The direct parallel shows that Plautus speaks not of workers here, but of prostitutes. *Ipsi* reveals that the prostitutes are once again male (or both male and female), but they are a different class from the *scorta exoleta* above, for they are not the property of pimps, but sell their own services.³⁵

The choragus' last stop is the Velabrum: "in Velabro vel pistorem vel lanium vel haruspicem" (483). This line has been regarded by many as an interpolation. It is the only reference in the speech to any place beyond the immediate borders of the forum, and it is difficult to find a verb upon which the accusatives of the line can depend.³⁶ The line can stand, however, and no lacuna need be postulated, if we consider that the choragus is beginning to ramble at the end of his speech. His rambling is reflected in his geography, for he moves beyond the parameters within which he has thus far remained (he does not, however, become completely arbitrary in his choice of locations, for he continues only a slight way south of the forum). It is also reflected in his syntax. He indulges in a long string of objects (483–484; 485 is an interpolation: see

³² *CIL* 6.363 reads *genar post aedem Castoris*; *CIL* 6.9177 reads *genarius pos aed cast*. The editor of *CIL* 6 has restored *argentarius* in both inscriptions.

³³ Andreau (note 21 above) 160 argues that since Plautine characters always mention the forum when they speak of bankers and loans, all *argentarii* and *faeneratores* in Plautus' day were in the forum. Surely, however, this does not preclude the presence of bankers as close to the forum as behind the temple of Castor and Pollux.

³⁴ Ussing (note 9 above) 2.567 = 1.593; Francesco M. de Robertis, *Lavoro e lavoratori nel mondo Romano* (Bari 1963, repr. New York 1979) 57, n. 25.

³⁵ Cf. Lilja (note 16 above) 30. For prostitutes on the *vicus Tuscus*, cf. pseudo-Acro ad Hor. *Sat.* 2.3.228.

³⁶ Jordan (note 2 above) 127–28; Bosscher (note 4 above) 88–89; Andreas Thierfelder, *De rationibus interpolationum Plautinarum* (Leipzig 1929, repr. Hildesheim 1971) 55.

below), and he is interrupted by the entrance of Curculio, Cappadox, Planesium, and Lyco before he can get to the verb (486).³⁷

Another objection to the line is that while throughout the rest of the speech the choragus keeps his promise to point out those worthy of praise or blame, this line seems a neutral list of professions.³⁸ If we consider other references to the three businesses in Plautus, however, it becomes apparent that the very job titles may have carried with them a perception of *vitia*. In *Poenulus* Adelphasium calls low-class prostitutes *pistorum amicae* (266), and Ergasilus considers *pistores* and *lanii* to be nuisances (*Cap.* 807–9, 818–22). Ballio suggests that *lanii* are like pimps, for they make money *iurando iure malo* (*Pseud.* 197). Another passage in *Pseudolus* reveals that the term *lanius* was also used of executioners (332).³⁹ *Hariolae* and *haruspicae* are among those who, Periplectomenus fears, would swindle his wife out of his money (*Miles* 693).⁴⁰

Another shared feature of the *pistores*, *lanii*, and *haruspices* is that, although they are all Roman,⁴¹ each is also a conspicuous feature in the background of the world of the *palliata*. The workplace of the *pistor*, in addition to being a stop for characters in Plautus preparing dinners (*Asin.* 200; *Capt.* 160–61; *Trin.* 407), is a place feared by disobedient comic slaves (e.g., *Asin.* 709; *Bacch.* 781; *Epid.* 121; *Mostell.* 17; *Pseud.*

³⁷ It would thus be appropriate to replace the period at the end of line 484 with punctuation suggesting an incomplete sentence. Pliny's statement (*HN* 18.28.107) that Rome had no bakers until the war with Perseus (171–168 B.C.) can offer no help here (*pace* Ritschl [note 2 above] 207), for the *pistores* here may well be millers, as they are in *Asin.* 709, *Capt.* 807, and *Epid.* 121. Furthermore, at *Asin.* 200 the *pistor* is clearly a baker (*a pistore panem petimus*), and the *pistor* is probably a baker as well in *Capt.* 160–61 (Hegio says Ergasilus' "troops" must include *Pistorenses*) and *Trin.* 407 (*pistor*, along with *pisca-tor*, *lanii*, *coqui*, and other sellers of food, is someone who has received part of Les-bonicus' squandered fortune). It is unlikely that these last three passages are all interpola-tions, or that they use *pistor* in a sense which would be strange to Plautus' Roman audience. It is therefore most reasonable to assume simply that Pliny is wrong, and that he relied upon a source which, like so many Roman authors, exaggerated the *parsimonia* of the *maiores*.

³⁸ Ussing (note 9 above) 2.568 = 1.594.

³⁹ For the bad reputation of *lanii*, see also Cic. *Off.* 1.42.150; Sall. *H.* Frag 1.63 M; Livy 22.25.18–19; Val. Max. 3.4.4; Mart. 6.64.21, 7.61.9–10.

⁴⁰ For other implied or direct criticism of *haruspices* and *harioli*, see Ennius *scen.* 319–23 V; Cato *Agr.* 5.4; *Rhet. Her.* 4.49.62; Cic. *Div.* 1.2.4, 2.3.9–10; *Nat. D.* 1.20.55, 1.26.71; *Verr.* 2.2.10.27, 2.3.11.28.

⁴¹ For the Romanness of *lanii* in particular, see Eduard Fraenkel, *Elementi Plautini in Plauto* (Florence 1960) 121, 125, 408–13. *Haruspices*, of course, are of Etruscan origin and therefore would be a Roman rather than a Greek phenomenon.

494; Naevius *frag. com.* 114; Ter. *An.* 199; *Haut.* 530; *Phorm.* 249). *Lani- enae* are taken for granted as an aspect of the topography of Plautus' and Terence's "Greek" cities (*Capt.* 818, 905; *Epid.* 199; *Pseud.* 197, 327; *Trin.* 407; Ter. *Eun.* 257). *Haruspices* play an important role in *Poenulus* (456^b, 463, 746, 791, 1206, 1209), and are mentioned elsewhere (*Amph.* 1132; *Miles* 693; Ter. *Phorm.* 709). The prologue to *Menaechmi* includes *hariolus* in a list of potential comic characters (76), and Naevius wrote a *Hariolus* (*frag. com.* 20–24).

The final victims of the choragus' abuse are the most bewildering. The manuscripts read, "vel qui ipsi vortant vel qui alii subversentur praebeant" (484). As it is impossible to make any sense out of "qui alii subversentur,"⁴² it is best to accept Ussing's emendation, "qui aliis ubi vorsentur." It has been suggested that the line refers to homosexual prostitutes, who play both the passive role (*ipsi vortant*) or the active (*aliis ubi vorsentur praebeant*).⁴³ Even if we remove line 483, so that 484 is an additional description of the prostitutes in 482, the line remains exceedingly obscure with this interpretation. Nor does this reading explain the switch of verbs. Surely if Plautus wanted to say, "they play the active and passive roles," he would have kept *verto* in both clauses. Adams offers no parallels for *verto* or *verso* with reference to sex in his *Latin Sexual Vocabulary*.⁴⁴ Ussing, stumped at the line, suggested that perhaps the reference is to dice playing, but we would expect verbs of throwing rather than turning for such activity.⁴⁵ Paratore's proposal that Plautus refers to people who sell stolen goods is plausible, but only a guess.⁴⁶

Perhaps we are asking too much in trying to tie the choragus down to a specific activity. If we read, with Lipsius, *vorsant* for *vortant* we get the same verb in both clauses and some reasonable parallels elsewhere in Plautus. In several passages Plautus uses *verso* of cheating. Dordalus, for example, cries at Toxilus, "quomodo me hodie vorsavisti" (*Per.* 795), and Chrysalus, about to deceive Nicobulus, boasts, "vorsabo ego illunc hodie, si vivo, probe" (*Bacch.* 766; cf. *Asin.* 180; *Cist.* 94; *Caec. frag. com.* 244; and *versutus* at *Asin.* 119, 255; *Cas.* 489; *Epid.* 371;

⁴²For a valiant attempt, see Félix Gaffiot, *Le subjonctif de subordination en latin* (Paris 1906) 30–31.

⁴³Boscher (note 4 above) 90; Lilja (note 16 above) 30.

⁴⁴J. N. Adams, *The Latin Sexual Vocabulary* (Baltimore 1982).

⁴⁵Ussing (note 9 above) 2.568 = 1.594.

⁴⁶Paratore (note 1 above) 85, n. 3.

Pseud. 1017, 1243). Each of these parallels, admittedly, includes a direct object of *verso*, but there may be a parallel for *verso* as “cheat” without an object in Vergil. Servius records an alternate reading of *versare dolo* for *versare dolos* at *Aen.* 2.62. Whether or not Vergil himself wrote *versare dolo*, the alternate reading is early enough to suggest that a classical reader of the *Aeneid* could have construed *versare dolo* as “to deceive through guile.”⁴⁷ The choragus thus begins the line by saying that on the Velabrum one can find “those who cheat.”

The next phrase is more difficult, for there is no parallel for *versare* in the passive meaning “to be cheated.” *Versari* does, however, appear to be able to carry the sense of “indulge in deception.” Pseudolus, quizzing Charinus on the *malitia* of Simia, whom the latter has proposed as an assistant in the deception of Ballio, asks, “scitne in re advorsa vorsari?” (*Pseud.* 745). While *vorsari* here is generally read as simply equivalent to *se agitare*,⁴⁸ Pseudolus is in fact asking a series of questions about Simia’s abilities as a deceiver. It makes sense, therefore, to translate Pseudolus’ question, “can he carry on his trickery when things get tricky?,” in which case *vorsari* serves as the intransitive equivalent of *versare*.⁴⁹ Our line thus reads, “either those who themselves cheat (*scil.* “people”), or those who offer to others places where they can carry out deception.”

We know that numerous merchants and businesses, including many of questionable repute, were on the Velabrum.⁵⁰ Plautus himself refers to a dishonest cartel of oil merchants there (*Capt.* 489). The *qui vorsant*, those who cheat, are the merchants, deliberately left undefined to give the impression of a general atmosphere of deception on the Velabrum. *Qui aliis ubi vorsentur praebeant* are those who provide stalls to the petty businessmen on the hill. The implication is that anyone who acquires such a stall has “highway robbery” in mind. Plautus changes

⁴⁷Servius is thus correct to assume an implied *Troianos* and to associate *verso* here with *versutus*, but he need not read *versare* as equivalent to *evertere*.

⁴⁸Gonzalez Lodge, *Lexicon Plautinum* (Leipzig 1904–1933) 2.847. Cf. Pierre Flobert, *Les verbes déponents latins des Origines à Charlemagne* (Paris 1975) 416–17.

⁴⁹This sense of *vorsari* provides a humorous double-entendre in the *Amphitruo*, where Mercury says he has disguised himself, “ne qui essem familiares quaerent, vorsari crebro hic quom viderent me domi” (127–28).

⁵⁰*CIL* 6.9671 (*negotiator penoris et vinorum*), 9993 (*vinarius*), 9184 (*argentarii*), 33933 (??) *urarius*), 37803 (??) *arius*); Hor. *Sat.* 2.3.229; Samuel Ball Platner, *A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome*, completed and revised by Thomas Ashby (London 1929) 550; Cressedi (note 3 above) 252.

from the indicative *vorsant* to the subjunctive *praebeant* because he moves from those who cheat as a matter of course (this is consistent with the indicatives in the rest of the passage) to those who would offer a place of business, if anyone should ask for one.

The manuscripts include one final line in the choragus' list: "dites, damnosos maritos apud Leucadium Oppiam" (485), a line correctly rejected by almost all editors. It is most unlikely that Plautus would repeat *dites, damnosos maritos* from 472, and now that there is general consensus that the reference to the basilica is not an anachronism, there is no *a priori* reason for rejecting that line. 485, with its reference to a specific madam, has the ring of a topical allusion added by an actor, and the hiatus after *Leucadium*, while not unparalleled, is jarring.⁵¹

Thus the choragus, although he steps more emphatically and for a longer period of time into the "real world" outside of his play than any other Plautine character, never actually leaves the supposedly non-Roman world of comedy; he maintains the pretense of being in Epidaurus, and he includes throughout his tour characters reminiscent of more typical comic scenes. The resulting identification of actors' pretense and audience's reality would have been especially effective if, as is probably the case, the spectators themselves stood and sat in the midst of the places the choragus pointed out.⁵² While our evidence for the locations of theatrical performances in Plautus' day is meagre, what information we do have suggests that during the *ludi Romani* and funeral games plays were probably performed in the forum.⁵³ As has been long

⁵¹ Cf. Ussing (note 9 above) 2.563 = 1.594; Thierfelder (note 36 above) 32–33. Paratore ([note 1 above] 18; *Il teatro di Plauto, con particolare riferimento al Curculio* [Rome 1957] 355–56) tried to save 485, at the expense of 472, on the grounds that Giuseppe Lugli told him in private conversation of evidence for a brothel in the forum in Plautus' day. It is not clear what evidence Lugli may have had in mind, but the most likely candidate is the building he calls a *lupanare* in his *Monumenti Minori del Foro Romano* (Rome 1947) 147–50. Lugli himself, however, dates the "brothel" to the first century B.C. both in *Monumenti Minori* and in his later *La Tecnica Edilizia Romana* (Rome 1957) 1.311, 587. Furthermore, Lugli's building is near the temple of Antoninus and Faustina, to the northeast of the forum; even if it did exist in Plautus' day, the choragus would not have made such a radical topographical jump in his orderly tour of the forum and its surroundings. Cf. Ernest Nash, *Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Rome*² (New York 1968) 1.209.

⁵² Gaggiotti (note 2 above) 60 proposed this possibility, but did not elaborate on its defense or its consequences.

⁵³ Catharine Saunders, "The Site of Dramatic Performances at Rome in the Time of Plautus and Terence," *TAPA* 44 (1913) 92–95. Cf. Romolo A. Staccioli, "Spettacoli antichi e moderni al Foro Romano," *Capitolium* 36 (1961) 18–22.

observed,⁵⁴ the choragus' tour is both restricted and orderly. It includes only places in the immediate vicinity of the forum, east of the western end of the *comitium*. It is most unlikely that, if the play were performed at some other location, Plautus would have discussed only this small area, or that the choragus would have been so careful to lead his spectators from the *comitium* east along the north side of the forum to the *forum piscatorium*, then back through the middle of the forum to the west of the Lacus Curtius, then along the south side of the forum to the temple of Castor and Pollux, and finally south a little to the Velabrum. Given, then, that the choragus does not mention such places farther west in the forum as the temples of Saturn or Concordia, there is every indication that he speaks from a stage just south of the *comitium*, facing east. Almost everything on the tour would be visible to the choragus and his audience,⁵⁵ and spectators would actually be watching the play from some of the locations cited.

At several points in the speech the choragus takes advantage of the presence of the audience to make jokes at their expense. Livy reports of 208 B.C.: "eo anno primum ex quo Hannibal in Italiam venisset comitium tectum esse memoriae proditum est, et ludos Romanos semel instauratos ab aedilibus curulibus" (27.36.8). The close connection between the covering of the *comitium* and the *ludi Romani* implies, as Huelsen observed, that the *comitium* was customarily covered for the *ludi*, probably so that wealthier citizens could watch the gladiatorial games and, presumably, the plays, protected from the elements.⁵⁶ If this is in fact the case, the choragus' location of the *periurus* in the *comitium* is a double joke: he satirizes the perjurers who plague the praetor's court daily, and he rather daringly mocks the wealthy, who watch him from the Roman equivalent of box seats.⁵⁷ Other spectators, watching from the balconies which lined the north side of the forum, would bear in part the brunt of Plautus' references to *dites damnosi mariti sub basi-*

⁵⁴ Ussing (note 9 above) 2.565 = 1.591; Huelsen (note 2 above) 14; Duckworth (note 2 above) 59.

⁵⁵ Possible exceptions are the *forum piscarium*, which may have been obscured from view by the basilica, the area behind the Temple of Castor and Pollux (though the audience would have been able to see the temple itself), and the Velabrum, which may have been hidden behind the *tabernae veteres*.

⁵⁶ Huelsen (note 2 above) 5; Saunders (note 53 above) 95.

⁵⁷ Cf. *Aul.* 718–19, where Euclio accuses those who sit and laugh at him of being thieves, disguised in fine clothing.

lica.⁵⁸ The choragus mocks the very last rows of his audience, standing just to the west of the *cloaca maxima*, when he refers to the *ostentatores meri*. Finally, the choragus himself is probably standing on a stage *supra lacum*. His reference to the *garruli* speakers of *contumeliae* is in part a bit of self-mockery, as he acknowledges that his own speech and those of the actors are often unjustified *contumeliae*.

In both its context and its content, then, the speech breaks down the barriers between what the audience sees on stage and their own experience. Plautus chooses for the speech the choragus, a character who himself bridges the gaps between pretense, performance, and reality; and by pointing out places visible from the stage the choragus unites Rome and "Epidauros" physically. Plautus encourages this sense of unity by refusing to distinguish between characters and actors at the beginning of the speech, and by including in the choragus' list of laughable people many who seem to belong in the supposedly Greek world of the *palliata*. Double-entendres, in which the choragus refers both to what goes on daily in the places he points out and to the audience or actors currently present, reenforce this lack of distinction. Plautus makes the speech relevant to *Curculio* in particular by including in the forum characters similar to Cappadox, Therapontigonus, and Lyco, and by referring twice to the praetors' courts, which play an important role in this play.

In one way more than any other Plautus takes advantage of this juxtaposition of the real and the imaginary to make a satirical point. What stands out most in the Epidauros of *Curculio* is deception. Like most of Plautus' plays, *Curculio* is about deceit: the intrigue of the parasite to gain his patron's beloved.⁵⁹ The additional dishonesty of the pimp Cappadox comes as no surprise. By adding his portrayal of the *trapezita* Lyco, however, Plautus paints a picture of an Epidauros with a greater share of deceit than an average comedy requires. Lyco, who is barely necessary to the plot and whose scenes show clear evidence of Plautine reworking of the Greek, shows continually a willingness to

⁵⁸On the balconies, called *Maeniana*, see Coarelli (note 2 above) 146; Gaggiotti (note 2 above) 60. The *Maeniana* probably lined the southern side of the forum as well, and spectators may have watched from the area directly in front of the porticoes, so that Plautus' references to *apud Cloacinae sacrum* and *sub veteribus* may also be double-entendres.

⁵⁹On the importance of deception throughout Plautus, see Petrone (note 7 above) 1-93, 203-9.

deceive for profit. The combination of Curculio, Cappadox, and Lyco all deceiving leaves the impression of an Epidaurus in which deception reigns.

At various points in the play Plautus hints that such widespread deception is not only to be found in Epidaurus. When the cook jokes that Cappadox, being a perjurer, should sleep in the temple of Jupiter rather than Aesculapius, Cappadox responds, "siquidem incubare velint qui peieraverint, locu' non praeberi potis est in Capitolio" (268-69). The audience, it will be recalled, can in all likelihood see the Capitolium over the top of the backdrop of the stage. Lyco in particular bridges the gap between Epidaurus and Rome. While he himself is generally called by the Greek name *trapezita*, he and the other characters refer to his class by the Latin term *argentarii*, so that Plautus makes clear that he satirizes the bankers of his own city.⁶⁰

The choragus removes all doubt that Plautus' satire of deception applies to the spectators themselves, for as he moves from the imaginary Epidaurus through the current performance to the audience's Rome, he takes the theme of deception with him. He begins by praising Curculio's skill as a trickster: the parasite is a *nugator* and a *sycophans* and a *halophans* (462-63).⁶¹ When the choragus reveals his own fear that Curculio will walk off with his costume, he extends the idea of deceit from within the imaginary world of the play to the performance, from the character Curculio to the actor playing Curculio. He then reveals that the actor playing Curculio is not the only performer who is unconcerned with *fides*, for he adds: "quamquam cum istoc mihi negoti nihil est: ipsi Phaedromo credidi; tamen adservabo" (465-66). The implication of the lines is that the choragus doesn't really care about the costumes, for he can still hold Phaedromus responsible.⁶² His own attitude is thus reminiscent of that of Cappadox and Lyco, both of whom

⁶⁰On Plautus' use of *trapezita* and *argentarius*, see G. P. Shipp, "Plautine Terms for Greek and Roman Things," *Glotta* 34 (1955) 139-41; Andreau (note 28 above) 468-79, 488-89; Maria Vittoria Giangrieco Pessi, "Argentarii e trapeziti nel teatro di Plauto," *Archivio Giuridico* 201 (1981) 59-97.

⁶¹The precise meaning of *halophanta* is obscure, but, the context here and in the parallel cited by Nonius ("halofantam mendacem velit" (p. 120 Lindsay = *Inc.com.* 20)), suggests that it is some kind of trickster. Cf. Friedrich (note 4 above) 709; J. B. Hoffmann, "Zum Wesen der sog. polaren Ausdrucksweise," *Glotta* 15 (1927) 49; *TLL* 6.2519, lines 61-84; Deschamps (note 10 above) 163, n. 95.

⁶²Cf. *Trin.* 858, where the sycophant says of Megaronides: "ipse ornamenta a chorago haec sumpsit suo periculo."

were completely unconcerned with the logistics of their transactions with Therapontigonus, so long as each got his money. Although he promises, when he enters the world of the audience, that his guide to the forum and its surroundings will include those who are *sine vitio* and *probi* as well as the *vitiosi* and the *improbi* (469), nearly every stop, as we have seen, is filled only with the latter, especially with those who deceive: *periuri*; *mendaces*; husbands deceiving their wives; prostitutes and pimps, always considered dishonest; *ostentatores*; people who make false accusations; bankers *quibus credas male*; butchers, known to be cheats, and seers, known to be charlatans; and finally, simply "those who deceive." The audience can draw only one conclusion: lack of *fides* is as widespread in their own Rome as it is in Curculio's Epidaurus.

Scholars have quite rightly observed that the location of the *palliata* in Greece allowed Plautus' audience smugly to enjoy watching very "unRoman" behaviour, confident that the immoral and ridiculous people on stage were far removed from their own lives.⁶³ With the choragus' speech, however, Plautus deals that smugness a devastating blow. To an audience with even the slightest perceptiveness, the speech must have been as disconcerting as it was amusing, for it suggests in a far from subtle way that the separation the Romans liked to assume between themselves and the "Greeks" they laughed at in comedies was in fact nonexistent, and that even with respect to the all-important Roman quality of *fides*, many in the very presence of the audience were no different from the *Graeculi* on stage. Many a spectator must have gone home agreeing with the sympathies expressed by Curculio earlier in the play: "*nec mihi placet tuom profecto nec forum nec comitium*" (402-3).⁶⁴

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⁶³ E.g., George E. Duckworth, *The Nature of Roman Comedy: A Study in Popular Entertainment* (Princeton, N.J. 1952) 69; Raffaele Perna *L'originalità di Plauto* (Bari 1955) 225; Walter R. Chalmers, "Plautus and His Audience," in *Roman Drama*, ed. T. A. Dorey and Donald R. Dudley (New York 1965) 24; Erich Segal, *Roman Laughter: The Comedy of Plautus*² (Oxford 1987) 31-41.

⁶⁴ My thanks to Craig Kallendorf, Jerzy Linderski, Steven Oberhelman, Brian Reinhardt, and the anonymous reader for *AJP* for advice and assistance.

A PHILOLOGICAL NOTE ON THE SCIPIONIC CIRCLE

For over a century the concept of the Scipionic circle has exercised a profound influence upon modern interpretations of Roman literary history, but within the past 25 years or so, some scholars have called into question the whole notion of the Scipionic circle by pointing out the extravagance of modern claims and by even doubting its existence.¹ This note attempts to contribute to the current revisionist trend by examining the context and meaning of section 69 of Cicero's *De Amicitia*, the single most important *testimonium* on this matter.

Latin lexica show that *grex* has as its primary meaning 'a herd of quadrupeds' or 'a flock of birds', but it also has a secondary meaning of 'group' or 'crowd' when applied to people. Both uses of the word are found in Cicero, but modern scholars have generally taken *grex* in section 69 of *De Amicitia* to mean 'group'. A close examination of the passage and its context shows that Cicero never intended *grex* to have the meaning which moderns have placed upon it. In this passage Cicero is considering the question whether new friends should be preferred over old ones. He illustrates the question by pointing to man's use of horses. He next passes on to the idea that exceptional individuals should treat their friends as though they were their equals, and he alludes to Scipio as a prime example of this principle in practice. Throughout this discussion (67–69) Cicero's use of the verb *anteponere* serves to link his horse illustration with that of Scipio, who is thus likened to one who stands apart from the common herd (*grex*) of Roman politicians. *Grex* therefore has nothing to do with a coterie of philhellenic *literati*:

Existit autem hoc loco quaedam quaestio subdifficilis: num quando amici novi, digni amicitia, veteribus sint anteponendi, ut equis vetulis teneros anteponere solemus. Indigna homine dubitatio. . . . Novitates autem si spem adferunt, ut tamquam in herbis non fallacibus fructus appareat, non sunt illae quidem repudiandae, vetustas tamen suo loco conservanda: maxima est enim vis vetustatis et consuetudinis. Quin in ipso equo, cuius

¹ See, for example, A. E. Astin, *Scipio Aemilianus* (Oxford 1967) 294–306; H. Strasburger, "Poseidonius on Problems of the Roman Empire," *JRS* 55 (1965) 41 and "Der Scipionenkreis," *Hermes* 94 (1966) 60–72; and J. E. G. Zetzel, "Cicero and the Scipionic Circle," *HSCP* 76 (1972) 173–79.

modo mentionem feci, si nulla res impediatur, nemo est quin eo quo consuevit, libentius utatur quam intractato et novo. . . . Sed maximum est in amicitia parem esse inferiori; saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege. Numquam se ille Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio anteposuit, numquam inferioris ordinis amicis.

Although *grex* is used here in connection with people, the phrase *ut ita dicam* ("so to speak" or "as it were") shows that Cicero's Laelius is speaking metaphorically, and that *grex* therefore does not mean 'group' or 'crowd of people'. In section 55 of the same dialogue there is a similar use of this phrase to underscore another metaphor. By overlooking the significance of *ut ita dicam*, modern scholars have been misled by the semantic ambiguity of *grex*. In keeping with the whole tenor of the dialogue, Scipio is singled out as one who has excelled all other Romans in military and political affairs, but who still treats his relatives and fellow aristocratic friends as his equals. Thus when viewed in the overall context of the dialogue, Cicero's *De Amicitia* 69 cannot be used as the *locus classicus* for the modern term and concept of the Scipionic circle.

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HORACE, MERCURY, AND AUGUSTUS, OR THE POETIC EGO OF *ODES* 1-3

In the thirty years which separated Horace's publication of *Odes* from Catullus' death, life changed dramatically at Rome. The republic collapsed. Julius Caesar seized power and was assassinated. Thousands were killed in the civil wars, their property confiscated and distributed to the victorious veterans; and Augustus established the principate, granting himself effective political control, while preserving the forms of republican government. It was in this twilight time, between the republic and the empire that Horace's *Odes* were written. Historically speaking, they are poems of transition. Caught between the worlds of the republic and the empire, they negotiate a middle path between public engagement and private withdrawal.¹ To understand the nature of that path, this essay will examine *Odes* as a crucial moment, in which the new model of autonomous poetic subjectivity created by Catullus, and founded on Alexandrian aesthetics, was partially reintegrated into the communal and political life of Rome.²

In particular, it will examine how Horace used structural and thematic elements to recast personal, political, and poetic problems in terms of one another, engendering an open-ended dialectic between the poems themselves, their social context and the reader who strives to understand them. In this way, Horace allows the private world of lyric to engage the public and political realms, without denying the relative autonomy of each. Key to this understanding will be the assumption that *Odes* are a planned poetic collection and that the links between poems are as important as the individual odes themselves.³ The links

¹W. R. Johnson, *The Idea of Lyric* (Berkeley 1982) 144.

²Kenneth Quinn, *The Catullan Revolution* (Cambridge 1969) 24-26; see also his *Catullus: an Interpretation* (London 1972) 215; and H. D. Rankin's "Catullus and the Privacy of Love," *WS*, N. F. (1975) 74.

³That Horace's *Odes* constitute a consciously composed collection is not in doubt. See Matthew Santirocco's *Unity and Design in Horace's Odes* (Chapel Hill 1986), and William Nethercut's review "Sequential Reading and Heterogeneity in Augustan Poetry: Matthew Santirocco's *Unity and Design in Horace's Odes*," *Helios* 14 (1987) 64-80. See also David H. Porter's *Horace's Poetic Journey: A Reading of Odes 1-3* (Princeton 1987), which, while valuable, encourages a common fallacy of reading ancient texts which argues that they could only be read in the order they were written on the scroll (Cf. John Van

themselves can be either thematic or formal. This essay, however, will concentrate on those represented by Mercury, Augustus, Maecenas, the Sabine farm, and the fusion of the Latin and Greek literary traditions in *Odes*.

In terms of the arrangement of the collection itself, I shall contend that, though the abstract schemata found by writers such as Dettmer may have the virtue of showing the care that went into crafting *Odes*, in themselves these patterns have little interpretive significance. They often represent more the reader's will to fix a diverse group of poems within the confines of a preconceived pattern than the real complexity of Horace's collection.⁴ Indeed, there are virtually as many patterns of arrangement operative in *Odes* as there are trajectories of reading. For each rereading is also a restructuring of the collection: not because the links the reader perceives between the poems are "subjective," but rather because the relays between them are so numerous, so subtle, and so overdetermined, that they can never all be present to his or her mind at any one time. They exist, instead, in a constant process of realignment and reinterpretation, at each point that the reader engages the text. Through this process, Horace creates an ever more complex image of the poetic ego which is projected by *Odes*, an image which is, nonetheless, never fully present in any one reading.⁵ It is for this reason that *Odes* are an unending source of intellectual stimulation and aesthetic refreshment.

Poems 1.9 and 10 will serve as our entrance points to the collection. Both are modelled on poems by Alcaeus: 1.9 on fragment 338⁶ and 1.10 on 308.⁷ The differences between these poems and their Alcaean

Sickle, "The Book-Roll and Some Conventions of the Poetic Book," *Arethusa* 13 [1980] 5-6). Charles Witke, *Horace's Roman Odes: A Critical Examination*, Mnemosyne Supplement (Leiden 1983) has shown that skipping around was possible and that collections demanded to be "imaginatively reordered" 13-15.

⁴Helena Dettmer, *Horace: A Study in Structure*, Altertumswissenschaftliche Texte und Studien, vol. 12 (Hildesheim 1983). See the fold-out chart at the end of the book.

⁵Kenneth J. Reckford, *Horace*, Twayne World Author Series, no. 73 (New York 1969) 16-17; Johnson (note 1 above) 142; and Witke (note 3 above) 15. For Horace saying he wishes his poems to be carefully reread see *Sat.* 1.10, 72-74.

⁶R. G. M. Nisbet and Margaret Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book 1* (Oxford 1970) 116-17; and Richard Heinze, *Q. Horatius Flaccus Oden unde Epoden*, erklärt von Adolf Kiessling (Berlin 1930) 48.

⁷Nisbet and Hubbard (note 6 above) 125-28; Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford 1957) 161;

models are several. First, poems 1.9 and 1.10, unlike fragments 308 and 338, occupy a determinant position within a larger, poetic ensemble constructed by the author. Consequently, they exist in a very different relationship to one another than did their Alcaean models. They have been placed next to one another for a reason, and thus their relation to one another, even if not immediately apparent, demands to be interpreted.

Not only, however, do poems 1.9 and 10 belong to a planned collection, they also occupy a crucial position within it, marking what is generally considered to be the end of the "Parade Odes." The name of this sequence alludes to the fact that each of the first nine poems of the collection is composed in a different Greek meter. Together they form a sort of procession, the function of which is to introduce *Odes*' unprecedented metrical variety.⁸ Poem 10, as the poem that marks the end of the procession, is thus the first to repeat a meter already used in the collection.

The point of this show of technical virtuosity ought not be lost on the modern critic. Horace was the first to use many of these meters in Roman poetry, and his success at adapting the Latin tongue to the rigors of Greek metrics constitutes an important aspect of his artistic achievement. The significance Horace attached to this *tour de force* can be seen in the last poem of the collection, where the poet describes himself as "ex humili potens / princeps Aeolium carmen ad Italos / deduxisse modos" ["Rising to prominence from humble origins, the first to have translated Aeolian song into Italian rhythms"].⁹ This act of translation sanctifies him as a poet, crystalizing his vocation in a feat of cross-fertilization, which in itself synthesizes a moment of pure aesthetic will with a deep sense of cultural nationalism. For Horace not only underlines the nature of his accomplishment in these lines, he also proclaims Rome the cultural equal of Greece.

Horace's use of Greek meters also underlines the literate and self-

Heinze (note 6 above) 53; Porphyryon, *Acronis et Porphyryonis Commentarii in Q. Horatium Flaccum*, ed. Ferdinand Hauthal (Amsterdam 1966, original Berlin 1864-66) 40, all citations from this edition.

⁸Santirocco (note 3 above) 14-41; Johnson (note 1 above) 123-24; Witke (note 3 above) 12.

⁹3.30.12. Niall Rudd, "Horace," *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature*, Vol. 2, part 3, ed. E. J. Kenney (Cambridge 1983) 81; Johnson (note 1 above) 124; see also Acro's and Porphyryon's scholia on these lines (note 7 above) 378-79; and Commager's remarks *The Odes of Horace* (Bloomington 1967) 158.

conscious nature of the collection, since these meters were in no sense the native rhythms of Italian song. They placed demands on the language which it could not always easily accommodate, upsetting its natural word order and creating a poetry which, even within the confines of the individual poem, existed not so much as direct oral expression, but as a visual and spatial ordering, inviting multiple readings, multiple temporalities.¹⁰ The meters then become an index of the presence of an inward turning, of a conscious rupture with orality's sense of immediacy and communal context, even as they also speak the language of appropriation, of Rome's political and cultural hegemony within the Mediterranean world.

Other indications of the significance of poems 9 and 10 can easily be found. One is Horace's choice of meter. Poem 9 is the first poem in the collection written in Alcaic strophes. The reason for using this form in the final poem of the "Parade Odes" would appear to be honorific, alluding to the special place Alcaeus occupies in the collection. For it is Alcaeus whom Horace sets forth as his primary model and the Alcaic strophe is statistically the most common meter in the collection, so that when grouped with the Sapphic, also used by Alcaeus, it accounts for 63 percent of the poems in *Odes*.¹¹ Poem 10, in turn, is in the Sapphic meter and the pairing of these two poems, both derived from Alcaeus and both in Aeolian meters, would appear to be a programmatic statement announcing not only Horace's literary genealogy, but also providing a foretaste of the remainder of the collection.¹² Confirmation of this reading can be found in the opening and final poems of the collection in which Horace specifically defines his lyric vocation as a continuation of the tradition of Sappho and Alcaeus.¹³

Finally, it should be noted that poem 10's position as the first poem in the collection to repeat a meter has still a further significance. For the meter it repeats is the same meter as the second poem in the collection.

¹⁰ Johnson (note 1 above) 125–25; L. P. Wilkinson, *Golden Latin Artistry* (Cambridge 1963) 218–20. See Nietzsche's famous evaluation of Horace, *Werke, Taschenausgabe* (Leipzig 1906) 10, 343; cited by Commager (note 9 above) 50.

¹¹ See *Epis.* 1.19.28–29. L. A. Moritz, "Snow and Spring: Horace's Soracte Ode Again," *G & R* 23 (1976) 169–70; Santirocco (note 3 above) 19 and 41; Nisbet and Hubbard (note 6 above) xii–xiii.

¹² Porter (note 3 above) 12–13; Santirocco, "Horace's Odes and the Ancient Poetry Book," *Arethusa* 13 (1980) 51.

¹³ 1.1.34; see also 1.26.11, a poem in Alcaics preceded by one in Sapphics and followed by another in Alcaics.

This second poem, however, is in one sense the first poem of the opening sequence, since 1.1 by virtue of its meter and its programmatic function can be said to stand outside the "Parade Odes," inasmuch as it and the last poem of the collection are the only odes in the first Asclepiadean meter. Together they form a sort of frame which both announces Horace's lyric vocation and celebrates its consummation.¹⁴ Thus, poems 2 and 10 stand at the beginning and end of the opening sequence, bracketing it with Sapphic strophes.

This formal connection between 1.2 and 1.10 is also recapitulated on the thematic level. Where 1.2 ends with the *princeps* being envisioned as an earthly manifestation of Mercury, poem 10 is a hymn to Mercury himself. Their use of the god, however, is not identical. In poem 2, Mercury is the last in a catalogue of deities, and as Augustus, he is invested with a clear political significance. In poem 10, he stands alone and is celebrated in a thoroughly Greek setting as a patron of poetry and the arts, with no mention of Roman political life.¹⁵ This linking of 1.2 and 1.10, because they share both a common meter and the figure of Mercury, would appear to be confirmed by the fact that the third poem in Sapphics in the collection is a hymn to Augustus. Thus the reader sees a pattern form: 1.2 presents Augustus in the guise of Mercury; 1.10 is a hymn to Mercury himself; and 1.12 a hymn to Augustus.¹⁶

This conjunction of poetry and politics constitutes one of the primary motifs of the collection and one of the crucial axes around which the Horatian poetic ego revolves. It points not only to Horace's personal interest in politics and his conversion to the side of Augustus from the republican cause, but also to the patronage he received from Maecenas, the *princeps*' trusted advisor and regent in his absence. This connection with Maecenas is not merely based on an inference gathered from the interplay of Horace, Augustus, and Mercury in this sequence of Sapphic poems, however, but forms an integral part of the collection itself. For Maecenas too has a series of poems which are dedicated to him, and these poems, in turn, intersect both this first Sapphic sequence as well as several others in the collection. Thus 1.1 ends with the name *Maecenas*, while the last word of 1.2 is *Caesar*, so

¹⁴Porter (note 3 above) 3; Santirocco (note 12 above) 50; (note 3 above) 150. For the way poem 1 anticipates the rest of the collection, see Fraenkel (note 7 above) 230.

¹⁵Santirocco (note 3 above) 43, see also 23; and Porter (note 3 above) 15.

¹⁶Santirocco (note 3 above) 44–46.

that the close connection between these two men and their relation to both Horace's lyric aspiration and personal welfare is evoked at the collection's very beginning. By the same token, both 1.2 and 1.1 owe a large debt to Pindar, and so prepare the astute reader for other, more substantive relations between the two poems. The personal, political, and poetic relation between all three of these men is in turn alluded to again in 1.3, which is dedicated to Vergil, Horace's friend and the man who had introduced him to Maecenas. Finally it is not accidental that the collection's fourth poem in Sapphics, 1.20 after 1.2, 10, and 12, is itself addressed to Maecenas. Nor is it insignificant that 1.20 occupies the exact mid-point of book 1, as do two other poems on Maecenas, 2.12 and 3.16, in their respective books.¹⁷ Thus the first four poems in Sapphics in book 1 would appear to make up a coherent sequence, which in turn intersects with other groups of poems throughout the collection.¹⁸

Finally, before moving on to a close reading of poems 1.9 and 1.10, it would be useful to address, in general terms, why Horace chose Alcaeus as his primary model for *Odes*. While scholarship on this question remains divided, a general agreement about Horace's desire to reinvent the ancient sense of *communitas* that lay behind archaic lyric and was lost in Alexandria seems to be shared by most readers. Horace wished to reinvent the life of the public poet who was an open participant in the life of the community and a voice for what he considered its better elements.¹⁹ But to do this in the context of the early empire Horace also had to reinvent Alcaeus himself. He had to ignore the ancient lyricist's agitation against Pittacus and his open hostility to those who like Horace, the son of a freed slave, had risen from the lower ranks of society to prominence and respectability.²⁰ Moreover, Horace was both unwilling and unable to participate in the communal oral culture upon which archaic lyric thrived. On the one hand, he was not prepared to give up the isolation from the masses and the self-con-

¹⁷Santirocco (note 3 above) 24–25 and 132; (note 12 above) 52; Porter (note 3 above) 13.

¹⁸Additional evidence that these four poems do indeed constitute a sequence can be found in book 3, where a similar linking of the first four poems in Sapphics to one another can be found. Santirocco (note 3 above) 52, 127–31, 141 and 160; Fraenkel (note 7 above) 187, 259 and 290; and Porter (note 3 above) 43.

¹⁹Margaret Hubbard, "The Odes," *Horace*, Greek and Latin Studies: Classical Literature and its Influence, ed. C. D. N. Costa (Boston 1973) 12.

²⁰Santirocco (note 3 above) 71–72; Rudd (note 9 above) 81–82.

scious mode of composition which his Alexandrian inheritance demanded (*Odes* 3.1.1–2 and *Sat.* 1.10.72–76). On the other, Alcaeus' social context no longer existed. As Fraenkel observes, "For Horace there exist no singers, no festival ceremonies, no tradition which he can follow."²¹

Alcaeus thus becomes Horace's ideal predecessor only by not being Alcaeus.²² The Lesbian lyricist, as he appears in *Odes*, has had all his historical specificity removed. In the person of Horace, he has become the public-spirited citizen (1.32.5), patriotic but unwilling to disturb his *otium* to become involved in Augustan politics.²³ An example of this withdrawal can be seen in 2.16, where after saying that all the world seeks *otium*, Horace continues:

non enim gazae neque consularis
 summovet lictor miseros tumultus
 mentis et curas laqueata circum
 tecta volantis.
 . . . mihi parva rura et
 spiritum Graiae tenuem Camenae
 Parca non mendax dedit et malignum
 spernere vulgus.

For neither riches nor the consul's lictor clear the mind of its wretched agitation nor do panelled ceilings of the cares which fly round them. . . . To me though Fate has granted a modest acreage and the slender inspiration of the Greek Muses, as well as the ability to spurn the vicious crowd.
 (2.16.9–12 & 37–40)

Yet even in this ostensible withdrawal from public life which separates Horace from Alcaeus, politics maintains its omnipresence. For the modest acreage Horace talks about here is his Sabine farm, a gift from Maecenas. This farm was particularly important to Horace because it reestablished his financial independence after it had been lost in the civil war, when he had fought with Brutus against Octavian at Philippi and his father's estate was confiscated.²⁴ Yet it was a financial independence which was in the last instance dependent on his having won the

²¹ Fraenkel (note 7 above) 284–85.

²² Johnson (note 1 above) 144; Nisbet and Hubbard (note 6 above) xii; Fraenkel (note 7 above) 30 and 36.

²³ Fraenkel (note 7 above) 174–75 and 213–14; see 1.32.3–12.

²⁴ Rudd (note 9 above) 57.

favor of Maecenas, and this favor itself was dependent in turn upon his poetic talents, so that the topics of politics, public involvement, financial security, private independence, and poetic practice become indissolubly linked to one another. Thus for Horace public life was not the antithesis of poetic and private independence, but its necessary precondition.

This linkage is perhaps most clearly seen in Poem 3.4, one of the "Roman Odes," where Horace directly addresses the past, present and future of Rome itself. He begins the poem by telling a fantastic story of his early childhood: how he was protected by certain deities who in the form of doves carried him to Mt. Vulture and wrapped him in myrtle leaves, signifying his consecration as a poet. In the sixth strophe he identifies his protectors as the Muses (*Camenae*), and explicitly links them to his later acquiring the Sabine farm, as well as his being saved from the falling tree and the battle of Philippi. Horace knows that the leisure he enjoys at the Sabine farm and at the other resorts he mentions is owed in the first instance to the Muses, and in the last to Maecenas and Augustus.²⁵

vester, Camenae, vester in arduos
tollor Sabinos, seu mihi frigidum
Praeneste seu Tibur supinum
seu liquidae placuere Baiae.

Yours, Muses, yours, I am carried to my farm in the Sabine hills, or
should it be my wish to cool Praeneste, or sloping Tibur, or to clear Baiae.
(3.4.21-24)

As such the Sabine farm will occupy a privileged place in Horace's lyric discourse signifying at one and the same time his rejection of a traditional Roman political career, and his necessary attachment to the most powerful people in Rome. It is simultaneously the place of poetic and political engagement, as well as private withdrawal, and as such it shows the fundamental personal and cultural differences which separate Horace's world from that of Alcaeus.

Having now established the general place of poems 1.9 and 1.10 within the collection as well as their engagement with the problematic

²⁵James P. Holoka, "Horace, Carm. 3.4: The Place of the Poet," *CB* 52 (1976) 41-46.

of public and private life, let us examine their more immediate relation to one another. On this level, the initial point of interest is the observation that together these two poems describe a circular pattern, moving from old age to youthful vigor in the first poem and from birth to death in the second. Thus it can be said that they exist in a complementary relationship to one another and that as a unit they describe the full cycle of human existence.

In poem 1.9, this circular aspect is not immediately apparent, and so I shall begin with it. To understand the poem, it is necessary to realize that literal and figurative levels of meaning co-exist in it, inviting multiple readings. These readings allow 1.9 to interact with other poems in the collection on a number of planes simultaneously.²⁶ Nonetheless, the profoundly polysemic nature of the poem has not always been recognized. Indeed, the notion that it might be read in other than a straightforward, literal manner was long rejected and only gradually won favor because of its ability to explain certain presumed inconsistencies, which were thought to mar the poem.

The poem begins with Mt. Soracte in winter, then moves to a drinking party indoors, whence follows a brief exhortation to the poet's companion to enjoy life while he still can. It ends with an open air scene of young lovers exchanging pledges (*pignera*) in the shadows. The difficulty consists in how we get from the winter landscape which begins the poem to the open air activity which brings it to an end. Fraenkel puts the problem as follows:

We have to admit that as a whole the poem falls short of the perfection reached by Horace in many of his odes. Its heterogeneous elements have not merged into a harmonious unit. Line 18 *nunc et campus et areae* ["now the campus Martius and the piazzas"] and what follows suggest a season wholly different from the severe winter at the beginning. This incongruity cannot be removed by any device of apologetic interpretation.²⁷

Yet "devices of apologetic" interpretation are precisely what have revived interest in the poem. The revival began some ten years before

²⁶The co-existence of the literal and the figurative is not an exclusively modern idea, but was recognized in the critical practice of Roman and late Hellenistic antiquity, see Maurice P. Cunningham, "*Enarratio* of Horace *Odes* 1.9," *CP* 52 (1957) 102.

²⁷Fraenkel (note 7 above) 177.

Fraenkel, when Wilkinson argued that the poem should be read "symbolically," noting that the first strophe called to mind old age and by inference death, while the last two evoked youthful vigor. This reading, with minor modifications, is now widely accepted.²⁸

The central moment of the poem according to this interpretation is lines 15–18 ("nec dulcis amores / sperne puer neque tu choreas, / donec *virenti canities* abest / morosa": "Neither spurn sweet loves nor fail to join in the dance, boy, while the enfeebled *white hair* of age is still absent from your *green youth*"). In particular the conjunction of *canities* ("grayish–whiteness; hoariness; age") with *virens* ("verdant; vigorous, flourishing") is of great import. This collocation, made possible by a slight disturbance of normal word order, highlights the contrast between youth and age, and demands that strophe 1 be read in a new light. More specifically, it calls attention to a new understanding of the role of Mt. Soracte, which Horace describes as *candidus* ("dazzling, white") with deep snow. *Candidus* is, of course, cognate with *canities*, so that the link between the description of the mountain in lines 1–2 and the concept of old age is made explicit.²⁹

This new reading of strophe 1 is confirmed by an examination of its diction, in particular its use of terms which imply cold and paralysis such as *laborantes* to describe trees bent over with the snow. There is also a marked contrast between the frigid immobility described in lines 3–4 ("geluque / flumina constiterint acuto": "the streams are frozen with bitter cold"), the loosening signaled by the imperatives of strophes 2 and 3 (*dissolve*, "dissolve"; *deprome*, "to bring out"; *permitte*, "allow"),³⁰ and the youthful movements implicit in the final verb *repetantur* ("let be sought").³¹

²⁸ Wilkinson, *Horace and his Lyric Poetry* (Cambridge 1946) 131–32; cf. Santirocco (note 3 above) 44; Commager (note 9 above) 271–73; L. A. Moritz (note 11 above) 175–75; C. C. Esler, "Horace's Soracte Ode: Imagery and Perspective," *CW* 62 (1969) 300–2; M. G. Shields "Odes 1.9: A Study in Imaginative Unity," *Phoenix* 12 (1958) 171–73. Those who refuse to accept a figural reading are forced to make assumptions not derivable from the text. Thus Lawrence Catlow, "Fact, Imagination, and Memory in Horace: *Odes* 1.9," *G & R* 23 (1976) 74–81 assumes "a slight break in the dramatic movement between stanzas 2 and 3, while Horace's wants are satisfied," and that "Horace is obviously Thaliarchus' guest." Peter Connor, "Soracte Encore," *Ramus* 1 (1972) 102–12 posits that "the poem presents two real persons," and denies its grammatological nature, by asserting the control of a "speaking voice."

²⁹ Cunningham (note 26 above) 101; Shields (note 28 above) 168–69.

³⁰ This sort of mediating position between paralysis and movement is also occupied by the other verbs in strophe 3. Thus we find the verb *stravere* ("to calm," from *sterno*

By the same token, it seems clear that Mt. Soracte must have largely a figurative rather than literal sense in the poem. For, as Niall Rudd has pointed out, it would have been impossible to see it from a Roman house, inasmuch as they did not have outward facing windows. Consequently, its sense must be sought in other spheres than that of straightforward literal description. It must function poetically. This is confirmed by the fact that Soracte, as Servius in his commentary on Vergil notes, was sacred to the dead, and so already possessed a conventional literary status related to the themes of old age, paralysis, and frozen cold.³² Thus at the beginning and end of the poem the reader finds a series of oppositions between old age and youth, death and life, stasis and movement, cold and warmth, winter and summer, which the middle strophes mediate, and which find their poetic center at line seventeen's juxtaposition of *virens* with *canities*.

To sum up, then, these oppositions can be said to describe an arc which begins at old age and ends at youth. Poem 1.10, on the other hand moves in precisely the opposite direction beginning with Mercury's ancestry, progressing through the deeds of his childhood, and ending with his role as *psychopomp*, the leader of souls to Hades. Thus 1.10 completes the curve started by 1.9, allowing the two poems to form a circle and reinforcing the sense of them as a set, a sense already implied by their both being modelled on poems by Alcaeus, and by the importance of their meters and position in the collection. As a set they testify to a predominance of artistic self-consciousness over the Alcaean predominance of occasion and social context, and project the image of a Horatian ego which exists not only as the content of its discourse but also as "a will to style," itself dependent on the presence of certain social and historical conditions embodied in the poet's relation of patronage to the political forces of his day.³³

To pursue this investigation further, though, we must now examine

recalling line 1's *stet*, with its suggestion of "fixity") in conjunction with "ventos aequore fervido / deproeliantis," so that the notions of agitation and calm tend to balance and negate each other. The same can be said of "nec cupressi / nec veteres agitantur orni."

³¹ For a fuller explanation of this verb see Charles E. Bennett's *Horace: Odes & Epodes* (New Rochelle, New York 1981, original 1901) 212.

³² Rudd, "Patterns in Horatian Lyric," *AJP* 81 (1960) 391; (note 9 above) 100.

³³ Ludwig Voigt, "Horaz-Merkur-Augustus (zu Hor. c. 2.17, 1.2)," *Gymnasium* 89 (1982) 486. Many thanks to Jeff Grossman for his help with the German.

an even more complex level of self-consciousness, visible in these poems when they are read as part of a larger dialectic between Greek and Roman culture which extends throughout *Odes*, and which we have already noted constitutes an important part of Horace's self-definition as a poet. One of the ways Horace leads us into this examination is by beginning 1.9, an essentially Greek poem making direct reference to Alcaeus, with the image of Mt. Soracte, a piece of Italian geography. This concrete detail instantly localizes the poem, even as it identifies it as a cultural hybrid. Yet this is only the most obvious level on which this phenomenon is in evidence. For the opening strophe, as we shall now see, in conjunction with a more overt reference in strophe 2, also leads us to think of the Sabine farm, and hence of the role Horace's mixing of Greek and Latin poetic elements played in establishing his personal and political position in the early principate.

The path which leads to these reflections is not an obvious or direct one, but the cumulative evidence is quite strong. We can begin with the observation that it is reasonable to infer from Horace's mention of Soracte and the description of the frozen trees and rivers which surround it that the setting is rural. The exact view of the mountain that is being described is not specified and probably, as Nisbet and Hubbard argue, not supposed to correspond to any precise referential context.³⁴ The next move is to ask: what is the commonly assumed referent when a rural setting is mentioned in *Odes*? The answer would have to be the Sabine farm. It matters little that Mt. Soracte itself was probably not visible from what is thought to have been its location, for as was already noted one could not see Soracte from any Roman home anywhere and the mountain itself has primarily a figurative rather than a literal function in the poem. What is important, however, is to recognize that Horace himself knows that he need only mention the countryside, and his readers will think of the Sabine farm. This is shown by the final strophe of 2.16, where the mere mention of *parva rura* ("a modest farm") has led most commentators to assume (and there is no reason to think otherwise) that the reference is to the Sabine farm.³⁵

By the same token, the Sabine farm itself often functions as a

³⁴Nisbet and Hubbard (note 6 above) 116–17.

³⁵Bennett (note 31 above) 294; Hans Peter Syndikus, *Die Lyrik des Horaz* (Darmstadt 1972) 452–53; Nisbet and Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book II* (Oxford 1978) 270; Quinn, *Horace: The Odes* (London 1980) 231.

symbol of Horace's contentment with his lot in life, his refusal to seek wealth and power, and hence his acceptance of the limits of mortality. This can be seen specifically in the sequence of poems 2.13–18, which begins with Horace telling a humorous story in Alcaic strophes of how one day when wandering about his Sabine farm a tree fell and nearly killed him. This mention of death allows Horace to modulate into a vision of the underworld in which a crowd of surrounding shades listens in silent awe to Sappho and Alcaeus, and to envision poetic immortality in the person of those two Greek poets whom he claims as his models. Poems 2.14 and 2.15, in turn, deal individually with the themes of mortality and greed, juxtaposing the poet's awareness of the necessity of death with the foolishness of a man who wastes his life in the pursuit of private wealth as opposed to public virtue (2.15.10–14).³⁶ In 2.16, Horace contrasts his own contentment (i.e., with the *Graia Camena* and *parva rura*) with the greed of a man who pursues ostentatious wealth and political power, unaware that "Abstulit clarum cita mors Achillem." In 2.17, Horace assures Maecenas, after the great man's recovery from a serious illness (mentioned in 1.20), that he will not die before the poet, and proceeds to tell how Faunus, the son of Mercury, saved Horace from the tree on the Sabine farm, a feat later credited to the Muses (*Camenae* 3.4.27). Finally in 2.18, Horace's possession of the Sabine farm ("satis beatus unicus Sabinis," 14), his poetic genius, and his refusal of direct participation in the political life of Rome are contrasted with the behavior of the *avarus*, who in his pursuit of wealth and power destroys the livelihood of his less fortunate neighbors (21–28). He thus displays a failure to understand his own limits, since he is every bit as subject to death as the lowest slave (29–40). As Commager writes, "The poem rests upon a series of antitheses, the principle one being between the figurative house of death and the house of the *avarus*, with a further contrast lying between the house of the *avarus* and the Sabine farm."³⁷

Thus 2.13–18 place directly before us Horace the poet, keenly aware of his own mortality, the beneficiary of the patronage of the powerful but seeking no power for himself. Nonetheless, the message presented by this sequence and the figurative role the Sabine farm plays in

³⁶ Santirocco (note 3 above) 157–59.

³⁷ Commager (note 9 above) 84–89. 1.9 itself can also be said to develop these topics, first presented in 1.4 and more explicitly dealt with in 1.11, see Santirocco (note 3 above) 24 and 44; and Porter (note 3 above) 17.

it is not as simple as it seems. In 2.18, Horace not only contrasts the *parva rura* of the Sabine farm with the palatial villa of the *avarus*, he also tells us that the rich and powerful seek him out because of his "fides et benigna ingeni vena" ("good faith and fruitful vein of genius," 10–11). Later in 3.30, he claims to have made the transition from humble origins (*ex humili*) to a position of importance (*potens*). Yet that importance does not consist in political power as conventionally understood, but in his having been the first to have brought Greek lyric meters into Latin poetry (13–14). It is precisely this moment of artistic self-consciousness which has allowed him to claim poetic immortality (*exegi monumentum*). Thus in a paradoxical sense the Sabine farm comes to stand both as the symbol of his acceptance of the limits of mortality on normal human existence, even as it also stands as an earthly token of the poetic immortality yet to come.

Returning to 1.9, this complex web of associations becomes even more important in understanding the significance of the first strophe's rural setting when direct reference to the Sabine region is made in the second strophe, the last two lines of which end with the words *Sabina* and *diota*. Collectively, they refer to a wine bottle which Horace's companion Thaliarchus is supposed to be opening: "Dissolve frigus ligna super foco / Large reponens atque benignius / Deprome quadrimum *Sabina*, / O Thaliarche, merum *diota*." ("Put another big log on the fire, dissolve the cold, and bring out the mellower four year old wine in the two-handled Sabine bottle," 5–8). Yet this is a paradoxical wine bottle, since it is bilingual. For the word *diota* is not Latin but Greek, and thus strictly a "*Sabina diota*" could never exist. Rather it must have some further significance than simple reference to an actual physical object and, in part, function as an emblem of the poem's own hybrid nature. Like Mt. Soracte in strophe one, it represents that conflation of Greek and Roman cultures which defines Horace's poetic vocation. Indeed, the word *diota* in its root meaning of "two eared," and so "two handled," is emblematic of its own doubleness and its figurative role in the poem. Nor is this conflation of Roman and Greek elements limited to 1.9. In fact, it is a theme and a rhetorical figure which runs throughout the collection.

Thus in 1.1, immediately after referring to the "Lesbian lyre," Horace addresses Maecenas and says that he would reach the pinnacle of success if Maecenas were to include him in the ranks of the *lyricis vatibus*. Here again the phrase is "two-eared." For, though it can be translated simply as "lyric poets," such a rendering fails to capture the

phrase's real significance, because, while *lyricus* is Greek, *vates* is an exclusively Latin word which is not strictly equivalent to the Greek *poeta*, but implies a prophetic power rooted in the deepest recesses of early Italic religion and culture.³⁸ As such, the phrase *lyrici vates* and the poetic program it announces represent a conflation of languages and terms very similar to that found in *Sabina diota*.³⁹ Moreover, the *lyrici vates* are directly linked in the preceding line to the *Lesbium barbiton* ("Lesbian lyre"), which first announces Horace's program of imitating Alcaeus and Sappho, and is picked up again in 1.32, another poem written in Sapphics, with the phrase "age dic *Latinum*, / *barbite*, *carmen*, / *Lesbio* primum modulate civi." ("Come then lyre, first tuned by the Lesbian citizen, and sing a Latin song," 3-5).

A similar phenomenon can be seen in 3.30 as well, where Horace claims to have been the first to have "*Aeolium carmen ad Italos / deduxisse modos*" ("to have translated Aeolian song into Italian meters"). The conflations here are numerous. Beginning with *Aeolium carmen*, *carmen* is an exclusively Latin word for "song" unrelated to the Greek word *poema*, so that in a strict sense an *Aeolium carmen* would be a contradiction in terms, just like a *Sabina diota* or a *lyricus vates*. Second, the *modos* or "rhythms" Horace used were not Italian, but Greek, so that the idea of translating *Aeolium carmen* into *Italos modos* would appear to raise the paradoxical nature of Horace's rhetoric to the second power, inasmuch as the linking of the two multiplies the layers of conflation exponentially. Third, the verb *deduxisse* is itself a reference to another level of Greek influence mediated through Latin, as Ross observes, making reference to Vergil's *deductum carmen* in the *recusatio* at the beginning of *Eclogue* 6, a manifesto for Alexandrian and Callimachean poetics. Moreover, the conjunction of these two levels of Greek influence, with the acknowledgement of the Italic element, also situates Horace's discourse within the current political environment in Rome by acknowledging that, while using the same Alexandrian aesthetics as the neoterics, he and Vergil are able to discuss matters of central importance to the people of the Italian peninsula.⁴⁰

Finally, in the last strophe of 2.16, we can see that these rhetorical

³⁸ Santirocco (note 3 above) 22; Nisbet and Hubbard (note 6 above) 15; Quinn (note 35 above) 121.

³⁹ L. A. Moritz (note 11 above) 171.

⁴⁰ David Ross, *Backgrounds to Augustan Poetry: Gallus, Elegy, and Rome* (Cambridge, MA 1975) 134-36. See also Quinn (note 35 above) 296-97.

conflations signifying the amalgamation of Greek and Roman elements in the collection are directly linked to both the Sabine farm and Maecenas himself. Of particular interest is the link Horace makes between the *Graia Camena* and his own *parva rura*, or between the "Greek Muses" and the Sabine Farm:

. . . mihi parva rura et
spiritum Graiae tenuem Camenae
Parca non mendax dedit et malignum
spernere vulgus.

Camena is an exclusively Latin word for the goddess whose inspiration brings forth poetry, which, like the examples just adduced, has no direct relation to its Greek counterpart, *Musa*. Thus the notion of a *Graia Camena* is also "two eared." In this case, however, as with *deduxisse* in 3.30, it is also linked to Alexandrian poetics through the phrase *tenuis spiritus*, or "slender inspiration," which alludes to Callimachus' emphasis on small highly polished compositions and a learned style. *Camena* is also the term used for the Muse in the passage from 3.4 looked at earlier in relation to Horace's receiving the Sabine farm, and it is no accident that Horace's Greek inspirations, both archaic and Alexandrian, are here again linked to the farm, for it is the successful melding of the Roman, the Greek, and the Hellenistic which in large part defines Horace's artistic accomplishment.⁴¹

Moreover, in 2.16 Horace's *parva rura* also function as a metaphor for his style of life, his concentration on simplicity and his withdrawal from the pursuit of public honors and vast wealth, so that in contrast to the wealthy Grosphus, the poem's addressee, Horace says, "vivitur parvo bene, cui paternum / splendet in mensa tenui salinum" ("that man lives well with *little*, for whom the ancestral salt cellar shines on his *slender* table," 13–14). Yet as can be seen from the use of the adjective *tenuis* in this context as well as in the final strophe where it characterizes Horace's Callimachean inspiration, Horace's life and poetry are viewed as reflecting one another. As Santirocco observes, "This is made explicit in 2.16 where the poet's simple fare (*mensa tenui*, 14) corresponds to his simple Muse (*spiritum Graiae tenuem Camenae*, 38)."⁴² By the same token, the *parvus* of lines 13–14 also picks up the

⁴¹ Ross (note 40 above) 149; and Fraenkel (note 7 above) 176.

⁴² Santirocco (note 3 above) 80.

parva of *parva rura* in the final strophe, so that the Sabine farm itself becomes a symbol of Horace's poetry, of his satisfaction with his lot in life, and hence of his personal independence.

Yet, the Sabine farm, while evoking that independence, is also the sign of his most visible and immediate connection to Roman political life. It is no accident that the poem immediately following this mention of Horace's *parva rura* (2.17) is an address to Maecenas, a piece which also has direct connections to 1.10, through its naming of Horace as a *Mercurialis vir* and its mention of Faunus—the son of Mercury—as the deity who saved Horace from the falling tree on the Sabine farm.⁴³ More importantly though, poem 2.17 is thematically linked to another poem in the collection, 1.20, which openly alludes to the *Sabina diota* of 1.9: “Vile potabis modicis *Sabinum* / Cantharis, *Graeca* quod ego ipse *testa* / conditum levi, datus in theatro / cum tibi plausus, / Care Maecenas eques.” (“You will drink cheap *Sabine* wine in modest tankards, which I myself put up and sealed in a *Greek jar*, when you were cheered in the theater, dear Maecenas, the knight,” 1–5). Here again the Greek jar filled with Italian wine is a transparent metaphor for Horace's poetic practice, which at the same time recalls Horace's receiving the Sabine farm from Maecenas.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the occasion when Horace put up this wine is the same as that recalled in 2.17: i.e., when Maecenas, after a long illness, returned to the theater and was greeted with loud applause. As was just noted, 2.17 also links Horace to Mercury, who, in turn, is identified with Augustus in 1.2, and in *Satire* 2.6 credited with Horace's acquisition of the Sabine farm. In addition, 1.20, as noted above, is through its use of the Sapphic strophe linked to 1.2, 1.10, and 1.12, so that a coherent pattern linking Horace, Maecenas, Augustus, the Sabine farm, the mixture of Greek and Latin elements in Horace's poetry, and the god Mercury emerges.

Returning to 1.9, we see sandwiched between *Sabina* and *diota* the name *Thaliarchus*, a Greek word which means “master of the revels.” It is a name which can be read in two different fashions. If we assume that this ode despite its Roman coloring is basically a Greek poem, then

⁴³Likewise, Horace plays on the fact that Maecenas' name is an anagram for *Camenas* in *Epis.* 1.1, where he asserts that Maecenas himself has always been his chief inspiration and Muse. Steven Oberhelman and David Armstrong, “Poetic Practice and Epicurean Theory: Horace, *Satires* 1.4 and 1.10,” Department of Classics Colloquium, The University of Texas at Austin, April 26, 1988.

⁴⁴Santirocco (note 3 above) 156.

Thaliarchus stands as a sort of archetypical sympotic host, a "master of the revels" whose sole purpose is to allow Horace, the Roman, to make certain quasi-philosophical statements, in an otherwise Greek context, on the inevitability of old age, death, and the necessity of enjoying life while it is possible. Yet if the context is Roman, the reading of the poem changes dramatically. As Nisbet and Hubbard point out, the tasks Thaliarchus is asked to perform were those of a slave.⁴⁵ Given that most middle and upper class Romans had Greek house slaves, the average Roman reader would have automatically assumed that the Greek who was asked to perform these chores was anything but the "master" of the revels. The issue of slavery, of course, had a special relevance to Horace, the son of a freed slave, and it was the Sabine farm which most definitively separated him from that past, confirming him as a member of the landed aristocracy. This reading of *Thaliarchus* as referring to a slave gains strength when in strophe 4 Horace addresses him as *puer*. One possible meaning of this term is, of course, to denote the youth of Thaliarchus when compared to Horace and hence to be part of the movement from old age to youth which characterizes the poem as a whole. Yet *puer* was also a common form of address to slaves just as *boy* was in the American South. Horace himself uses the term in that sense at 3.14.17, and any Greek addressed as *puer* in a Roman home and asked to build a fire and pour the wine would have certainly been a slave.

Thus it becomes possible to read 1.9 in at least two ways. On the one hand, it can be read as an exercise in literary imagination, in which case the Greek elements in the poem stand as the marks of literature itself, as the definitive dividing line between the poem and social life. Or, on the other, 1.9 can be read as taking place in a Roman setting, in which case Thaliarchus, a slave, would stand as an instantiation of the class nature of the society. Neither of these readings excludes the other, rather they coexist. Thus, in addition to the opposition of age and youth, as well as that between Greek and Roman culture and public and private, there exists within the confines of 1.9 the possibility of a further freeman/slave opposition, and with it the question of the social structure of Rome itself. The relation between these various levels of reading cannot be fixed in any definite hierarchy, rather they remain unstable, existing in kaleidoscopic relation to one another which changes according to the context in which the poem is read. At the center of these

⁴⁵Nisbet and Hubbard (note 6 above) 117.

shifting levels, however, remains the figure of Horace himself, no longer an abstract will to artistry, but now marked by a rich set of historical determinations, an identifiable set of social connections, and a personal history which at once is derived from the text and provides the paradigm through which it becomes intelligible.

Turning, then, to the "Hymn to Mercury," one last important question remains: what purpose is served by placing a strictly literary hymn (i.e., having no connection to actual cultic practice) to Mercury in this prominent position in the collection? Or more specifically, why Mercury? One answer is that Mercury as inventor of the lyre is a god of poetry and of culture generally (1.10.6 and 3.11.1–4). Horace thus addresses him as "Mercuri, facunde nepos Atlantis, / qui feros cultus hominum recentum / voce formasti . . ." ("Mercury, eloquent grandson of Atlas, you who civilized the wild ways of primitive men by giving them speech"). By the same token, Faunus, the son of Mercury, was also directly connected to poetry both in the mythological tradition and in *Odes* themselves.⁴⁶ Thus, as Kenneth Reckford notes, "It is not by chance that the god Mercury plays such a significant role in Horatian poetry. [He] perceived this god as a related being and grasped him as a felicitous symbol of his own kind."⁴⁷

Yet it is not just because of Mercury's relation to poetry and the arts that Horace chose to put 1.10 in this particular position in the collection. Other reasons can also be cited. For example, 1.10 is the first hymn to appear in *Odes*. It thus subtly recalls the Alexandrian edition of Alcaeus that began with the poem on which 1.10 is based.⁴⁸ This, however, is not the first poem in the collection to allude to Alcaeus' hymn; that is 1.2, the poem in which Augustus is said to be a manifestation of

⁴⁶For Mercury, see Voigt (note 33 above) 487–88 and 497; Christoff Neumeister, "Horaz und Merkur," *Antike und Abendland* 22 (1976) 187; Putnam, "Mercuri, facunde nepos Atlantis," *CP* 68 (1974) 215–17; Virginio Cremona, *La Poesia Civile di Orazio* (Milan 1982) 124. For Faunus, see Johnson (note 1 above) 48. In 2.13 where Horace recounts his run in with the tree, from which he later credits Faunus with saving him (2.17), the incident introduces a vision of Sappho and Alcaeus. Faunus also appears in 1.17 where his yearly progress from Arcadia to the Sabine farm precedes another evocation of Greek lyric in the person of Anacreon. There follows a return to the wine metaphor in strophe 6, when Horace promises Tyndaris that she will sample *pocula Lesbii*, if she will only visit Horace on his farm. Fraenkel (note 7 above) 205–7; Johnson (note 1 above) 140–42.

⁴⁷Reckford (note 5 above) 194.

⁴⁸Santirocco (note 3 above) 21.

Mercury. Poem 1.2 can also be thought of as a sort of hymn, although it lacks the traditional form, and, as the first poem in the collection after the proem, it too recalls the position of Alcaeus' hymn. This relation between 1.2 and the hymn by Alcaeus, of course, only becomes apparent in retrospect. The reader must have read 1.10 before he can see this aspect of 1.2. It would seem, then, if we want to discover the motivation behind 1.10, we should also understand its relation to 1.2. More specifically, we should understand what this relation between Mercury and Augustus might mean to Horace himself.

In this regard, a number of possible connections between Horace, Augustus and Mercury can be found in poems throughout the collection. In 2.7, for example, Horace credits his having been saved at the battle of Philippi to Mercury (9-13). The context here is important, since Horace tells this story after he welcomes back Pompeius, a friend from his youth who unlike Horace had continued his opposition to Octavian after the defeat of the Republican army. The parallel between Pompeius' situation and that of Horace a few years earlier is explicit. Although both fought against Augustus at Philippi, Horace had since been rehabilitated, and Pompeius, having finally submitted to Augustus, was now to receive the same treatment. In another poem, 2.17, Horace labels himself a *Mercurialis vir* and credits Mercury's son, Faunus, with having saved him from the tree, the story of which is told in 2.13. Poem 2.13 in turn also shares certain definite traits with 2.7, so that the falling tree and Horace's being saved at the battle of Philippi both participate in the same matrix of concerns. Both are written in the Alcaic strophe, both involve miraculous escapes from certain death through divine intervention, and both make open allusions to the archaic Greek poetry on which Horace based his own.

Finally, both of these miracles are later credited to the Muses in 3.4, showing that what really saved Horace on both occasions was not Mercury or his son but poetry. Even here though, it is not just poetry as an abstract aesthetic experience, but poetry in the context of a patronage system grounded in the social and political realities of Rome. The chief difference between 2.7 and 2.13 then, as Santirocco notes, is that "in C. 2.7 the escape is from politics with a hint of the power of poetry, whereas in C. 2.13 the context is poetic with a hint of politics."⁴⁹ The final clue to solving the riddle of the function of Mercury in *Odes* is

⁴⁹Santirocco (note 3 above) 87-90; Neumeister (note 46 above) 186.

found in *Satires* 2.6.1–5 where Horace credits Mercury with having provided the Sabine farm. The connection between these various aspects of Mercury and how they relate Horace to both Maecenas and Augustus is not hard to find. Horace needed the Sabine farm precisely because he had fought on the wrong side at Philippi and had lost his father's estate. It was his poetry which saved him from the consequences of this act, and he received the farm because of his poetry.⁵⁰

Other more historically determined links between these poems and the figure of Mercury can also be found, beginning with poem 2.17. Thus while Fraenkel argues that Horace's reference to his being a *Mercurialis vir* represents nothing more than Horace's catering to Maecenas' astrological beliefs, such a reading does not exclude the possibility that the same poem could also participate in the overall matrix of concerns which I have just outlined. Indeed, this reading reinforces such an interpretation. For, as Ludwig Voigt points out, Mercury in his astrological aspect is responsible for "orators, philosophers, architects, and musicians." Furthermore, Fraenkel's reading also ignores the presence of Faunus, who, like Mercury, is suggestive of poetry, but played no role in astrology.⁵¹ *Mercurialis vir*, however, would also have had another sense to most Roman readers, that of "merchant," since Mercury was the god of trade and commerce as well as of thievery and of passage from the realm of the living to that of the dead. His province was the entire realm of exchange whether verbal, monetary, or metaphysical. *Mercurialis* thus appears in *Satire* 2.3 as the cognomen of a successful merchant, Damasippus, who went bankrupt (25–27).⁵² While Horace is in large part being ironic in this allusion to Mercury's more mercenary aspect, it should be noted that Mercury, as the inven-

⁵⁰ Neumeister (note 46 above) 191; Commager (note 9 above) 171, n. 23. See Rudd's related argument (note 9 above) 104. A version of this thesis was first put forth by Heinze (note 6 above) 52–53. It was long considered refuted by Fraenkel (note 7 above) 163–65. Heinze had weakened his case by assuming that Horace had a personal relationship with Mercury. Fraenkel rightly argued that this was an "*interpolatio Christiana*." Yet, when responding to Heinze's central point that the poems which feature Mercury should be read in terms of one another, Fraenkel's response is inadequate. "Surely Horace did not expect the reader . . . to search the volumes of *Q. Horati Flacci opera*. . . ." Fraenkel, in fact, refutes his own argument. He adduces numerous Greek texts which Horace echoes, but never explains why the reader would recognize these allusions, but not those to the author himself. See Neumeister (note 46 above) 185.

⁵¹ Fraenkel (note 7 above) 164; Voigt (note 33 above) 482; Santirocco (note 3 above) 104 and 158.

⁵² Voigt (note 33 above) 484 and 490; Putnam (note 46 above) 215.

tor of the lyre and writing, was also responsible for Horace's *merces* ("wage, income, rent") in the form of the Sabine farm.

This mercantile aspect of the god also plays an important role in the vision, found in 1.2, of Augustus as Mercury, where his twin aspects as both the god of trade and the patron of eloquence come together in the image of a beneficent ruler who will bring peace and prosperity to Rome after decades of turmoil. Thus, Horace begins 1.2 with a series of images which describe natural disasters, metaphorical storms of civil strife, and impending foreign conflicts. He then asks what god can he call upon to save the city. The answer of course is Mercury in the form of Augustus. In this context, as Fraenkel notes, Mercury is Augustus' ideal counterpart.⁵³

The comparison, however, is not quite that simple. Augustus was "the restorer" of the republic, but he was also the faction leader who had avenged the assassination of his uncle, and who along with Marc Antony and Lepidus had placed the names of hundreds of citizens on the proscription lists. Consequently, even though Horace's *Odes* were written some twenty years later when Octavian was no longer a young terrorist but *Pater Patriae*, it is possible to detect an admonitory note in the circumlocution by which Mercury and Augustus are equated in 1.2: "*almae* filius *Maiae* patiens vocari ultor *Caesaris*" ("son of *nurturing* *Maia* who allows himself to be called the avenger of *Caesar*"). The implicit message is clear. Augustus is to be a healer not an aggressor, to use reason not force. This same theme is taken up in 3.4 where Horace specifically draws a connection between Augustus' self-restraint and his accepting the counsel of the Muses, alluding thus to still another aspect of Mercury, and one which figures prominently in 1.10, that of the inventor of the lyre: "*Vos Caesarem altum, militia simul / fessas cohortes addidit oppidis, / finire quaerentem labores, / Pierio recreatis antro. / Vos lene consilium et datis et dato / gaudetis, almae*" ("You refresh great *Caesar*, when he has dispersed his exhausted men in various towns and seeks a respite from his labors in the Pierian cave. Oh *nurturing* Muses, you give gentle counsel and cause him to whom it is given to rejoice").

The connection between 1.2 and 3.4 becomes even stronger in the lines which follow. Here Horace recounts the Giants' assault on Olym-

⁵³ Fraenkel (note 7 above) 247-49; Cremona (note 46 above) 124-25 and 137-38; Voigt (note 33 above) 490-93.

pus and how Jupiter repelled them.⁵⁴ The lesson he draws is clear. The Giants had great strength, but that was all. They lacked precisely that *lene consilium* which the Muses, and implicitly Horace, provide: "*Vis consili expers mole ruit sua*" ("Force *untempered by counsel* falls beneath its own might"). As Commager writes, "The line is at once the poem's official moral and an epitaph for the giants. . . . Where the Olympians affirm a stable order (45–49), their opponents threaten an unnatural confusion: Uprooting mountains and forests in their struggle (51–56), they represent the same disruptive force as did the rain, hail, and floods of *C. 1.2*."⁵⁵ Mercury in 1.2 represents Caesar not as he is but as he should be. And the way he reaches that plane is by listening to the *lene consilium* of the *almae Musae*, the same Muses who earlier in the collection in the guise of Mercury or Faunus had saved Horace from the battle of Philippi (2.7) and the tree on his Sabine farm (2.13 and 17). Consequently, Mercury as the god of exchange, of discourse, of free passage from one world to the next comes to stand not just for the lyre, nor for the benefits Horace reaps from it, but for the total realm of poetry in a Roman context, for its ability to modulate from public to private and back again.

Horace would not have had his *parva rura* were it not for Mercury, for his *Graia Camena*, his *alma Musa*. And the cultivation of the Muse presumes the quiet and isolation, the withdrawal into selfhood and the refining of the aesthetic will which the Sabine farm in both its literal and figurative aspects provides. By the same token, the creation of a private poetry which ultimately engages the public realm, without becoming the discourse of the state, requires the presence of that same set of social, technological, and political conditions which separates Horace's world from that of his Lesbian predecessors. Such a poetry requires that the poet and his audience be literate, that the form of the poetic collection be established as a normative mode of poetic reception, and that there exist a class of people with sufficient standing within the society to be able to command the community's attention while speaking in their own person.

⁵⁴This story is also given in capsule form at the opening of 3.1, where it is specifically tied to Jupiter's possessing *imperium* over earthly rulers and hence being in a position analogous to that of Augustus (5–8).

⁵⁵Commager (note 9 above) 199–207; Cremona (note 46 above) 125; Fraenkel (note 7 above) 281–82; Charles L. Babcock, "Recreatio and Consilium on the Pierian Cave," *CJ* 75 (1979) 7; Holoka (note 25 above) 43.

All of these phenomena as well as their multiple mediations are included in the figure of Mercury. For not only does he metamorphose into other figures—the Muses, Augustus, Faunus—but he also displays a variety of aspects within his own godhead—he is poetry, oratory, commerce, psychopomp, the messenger of the gods, the concrete embodiment of a fusion of Greek and Roman poetic and religious traditions. At the center, however, remains the figure of Horace, and it is only through him and the projection of his poetic ego that we can begin to bring these various realms together. This ego, however, because it is endlessly fragmented and recontextualized within a variety of possible trajectories of reading, can never be fully present. It can never dictate a single, univocal interpretation either of the individual poems or of the collection as a whole. Rather the lyric consciousness of the poet exists as a series of potential poetic sequences which together reflect and refract a finite series of historical, political and personal issues in an infinite variety of ways.

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BRIEF MENTION

GREEK INSCRIPTIONS FROM MACEDONIA AND ASIA MINOR

Inscriptions have been called the flesh and blood of history. New texts which come to light contribute to our understanding of the ancient world in two ways. They add to the sum total of our knowledge and compel us to reinterpret it in terms of the insights they provide. In the past few years we are reminded once again of the truth of this reflection by some texts and studies from Macedonia and Asia Minor.

Philippe Gauthier¹ publishes 7 inscriptions from the Sardis excavations of 1963–64, four long texts and three small fragments. They had originally been entrusted to Louis Robert, whose first volume, *Nouvelles Inscriptions de Sardes I*, with inscriptions of 1958–62, appeared in 1964. Robert's translations of three documents of the reign of Antiochus III (cf. 1–3, *infra*) were published in *Sardis in Prehistoric and Roman Times* (1983). After Robert's death in 1985 these texts, together with his notes, were given to the author, courtesy of J. Robert and G. M. A. Hanfmann. G. gratefully acknowledges his debt to his master in his own exemplary publication. He includes Robert's 1983 translations.

The new texts are:

1. Part of a Letter of Antiochus III to Sardis, on removal of the garrison from the city's gymnasium and restoration of its use to the city. Date: 213 B.C.
2. Parts of three documents on a single stone, a dossier.
 - A. End of a Decree of Sardis (Honors for Queen Laodike?).
 - B. Letter of Laodike to Sardis, thanking the city for the founding of the Laodikeia, *int. al.* Date: 213 B.C.
 - C. Beginning of a Letter of Antiochus III, perhaps the second Letter of Antiochus (cf. 3).
3. Part of a second Letter of Antiochus III, establishing a supply of oil for the gymnasium on a regular basis. Date: 213 B.C.

¹*Archaeological Exploration of Sardis: Nouvelles Inscriptions de Sardes, II*. Geneva, Droz, 1989. Pp. 207. Paper, no price stated. (Centre de Recherche d'Histoire et de Philologie de la IV^e Section de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études, III: Hautes Études du Monde Gréco-Romain, 15).

4. Parts of two documents, a dossier?
 - A. End of a royal letter.
 - B. Decree of Sardis, honoring Heliodorus, son of Diodorus, for serving on *dikasteria* of the city sent abroad. Date: first half of the 2nd century B.C.
- 5,6,7. Fragments of royal documents.

G. discusses several topics in appendices: 1. Script of the documents dated in the reign of Antiochus; 2. Ambassadors of Sardis in the 3rd and 2nd century B.C.; 3. Date of the embassy of Matrophanes of Sardis to Delphi, which is suggested as 226–25; 4. Epigraphical and historical observations on Sardis as a Greek city in Lydia in the 3rd century B.C.

The public buildings of Sardis and the institutions of Greek political life show its Hellenization in the 3rd and 2nd centuries. The “chancery” style of the new inscriptions permits an understanding of this Hellenized Sardis and allows it to be placed in context of other documents relating to the city. The old texts which can now be better understood are *Syll.*³ 548–49 and *Fouilles de Delphes* III, 3.241–42. The former is the Amphiktyonic decree honoring Matrophanes and appointing him *thearodokos* at Sardis of the Pythia and the Soteria, the latter the decrees of Sardis inscribed at Delphi establishing the Panathenaia and the Eumeneia as stephanitic festivals in the first half of the 2nd century.

G. also comments on *Sardis VII,1,2*, published in 1932 by Buckler and Robinson. This is a letter to a city. The text is not complete, but the city in question is said to be ungarrisoned. For this reason earlier scholars, including Robert, felt that it could not be Sardis. G. reaffirms this judgment in reply to the restorations urged by F. Piejko (*AJP* 108 [1987] 707–28).

M. B. Hatzopoulos² publishes a new inscription, from the ancient site of Cassandreia (= earlier Potidaea), acquired by the Epigraphical Museum in 1986 (EM 13476). The text records a grant of land to Limnaios son of Harpalos, not hitherto known but interpreted as a notable of the Macedonian kingdom, possibly one of the *πρώτοι τῶν Μακεδόνων* who supported Lysimachus (Plut., *Pyrrhus* 12.10–11).

The inscription is interpreted as dating in 285–84, by reference in

² *Une Donation du Roi Lysimaque*. Athens, Centre de Recherche de l'Antiquité Grecque et Romaine, Fondation Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, 1988. Pp. 83. 21 pls. 2 maps. Paper, no price stated. (Meletemata, 5).

its preamble to Timesios, priest of Lysimachus, otherwise known from a contemporary decree of Cassandreia honoring an Aitolian (D. M. Robinson, *TAPA* 59 [1928] 227, n. 2; D. Feissel–M. Sève, *BCH* 103 [1979] 299–300, no. 34). By examining the stone of the decree at the modern site of Hagios Mamas, H. also publishes his own text, which corrects those of Robinson and Feissel–Sève.

H. is able to set the new decree in its economic and social context and relates it to two other documents of this period from Cassandreia: (1) a grant of territory by Cassander to Perdikkas son of Koinos, and (2) a document of the second half of the 3rd century, of which only the heading is preserved. In citing both of these for study in connection with the new EM inscription, H. does his own careful investigation and is able to produce texts which improve those which have been previously published. For the former he uses previously unpublished notes of C. Edson and a squeeze made by him and deposited in the Institute for Advanced Study. For the latter, from inspection of the stone in the Thessalonike Museum (no. 6818), he obtains an important new reading which permits better understanding of the document.

In an appendix H. republishes and improves the text of an honorary decree from Hagios Mamas, which he interprets as coming from Potidaea and, on the basis of historical considerations, dating to 359–57 B.C. Although crucial parts of the text are missing, it apparently confers honors upon Xenokritos son of Amyntas and others. The text had been published originally in majuscule letters by D. M. Robinson (*TAPA* 69 [1938] 60–62). It is not clear whether Amyntas is the Macedonian king of that name. Robinson thought so, but the identification is not certain.

H.'s monograph makes a contribution to Macedonian epigraphy by its able publication of a new document and republication of old ones, all of which shed light on the history of Cassandreia, and its predecessor Potidaea, and the relations of the city with the Macedonian kings in the early years of the 3rd century.

Argyro B. Tataki³ compiles an onomasticon of Beroea as a basis for his study of its population and society. Beroea is cited by Thucydides in the Potidaea campaign of 434 (1.61.4), and habitation there is attested by tombs of the 6th, 5th, and 4th centuries. The earliest names of Beroeans known to us are of individuals who were associated with

³ *Ancient Beroea: Prosopography and Society*. Athens, Research Center for Greek and Latin Antiquity, National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1989. Pp. 572. 10 pls. Paper, no price stated. (Meletemata, 8).

Alexander the Great, two of whom made the journey to Asia Minor with him (Arrian, *Ind.* 18.6 and *Anab.* 3.6.4). The earliest Beroean attested epigraphically is Alexandros Mull[éas or [énas, honored by the award of citizenship in a public decree of Athens (*IG* II² 710) set up on the Athenian Akropolis and dated probably between 286 and 282.

The city became prominent from Early Hellenistic times on, possibly because it was the home of Antigonos Monophthalmos (cf. Edson, *HSCP* 45 [1934] 213–46), was headquarters of the Macedonian *koinon*, and retained this position into the Early Roman Empire. It was the leading city of the 3rd and 4th districts of the Roman province (= Macedonia west of the river Axios) and second city of Macedonia after Thessalonike.

The onomasticon has 1397 names, including Beroeans known from other sites, two-thirds of them from the 2nd–3rd centuries A.D. The names from inscriptions of Beroea and its territory came from ca. 465 published texts, of a present total of more than 630. A large find of manumission inscriptions from the sanctuary of the Mother of the Gods Autochthonous at Leukopetra is now being published by Ph. Petsas. Each name is provided with a lemma, giving date (at least in general), bibliography, type of monument, and discussion of ancient literary references, if any.

T. can draw upon a number of texts which show the continuity of local institutions: gymnasiarchal law of before 167 B.C., decrees honoring gymnasiarchs and other officials in the 1st century A.D., ephebic inscriptions of the 2nd century A.D. The agonistic life of the city is attested by several texts. There is a list of victors, with their events, of the 3rd–2nd century B.C. Regulations of the Hermaia are cited in the gymnasiarchal law, and ecumenical, iselastis, isaktian games are mentioned in an inscription of the 3rd century A.D.

T. recognizes the limitations of evidence based on names but performs a service by casting his net widely in analyzing name-types, frequency, social structure, professions, etc., among a large group of local aristocracy, officials, women, slaves, donors and manumitters of slaves. T. shows the possibilities of the prosopography of a single city, and his book will be useful for comparison with the record of other cities (e.g., Thessalonike, in *IG* X,2,1; Roman Sparta and Epidaurus, Cf. A. J. S. Spawforth, *ABSA* 80 [1985] 191–258).

In concluding, I can only note the appearance of an important inscription from Ephesus on customs legislation for Asia Minor. The preserved text is 154 lines long, with part of the left side of each line

missing and some lacunae elsewhere. A revision of existing legislation commissioned by Nero, it is dated in 62 A.D. but thought to derive from a similar financial revision which goes back to 75 B.C. Now published by Helmut Engelmann and Dieter Knibbe in *Epigraphica Anatolica*,⁴ it is sure to invite and reward careful study.

W. C. W.

⁴*Das Zollgesetz der Provinz Asia: Eine neue Inschrift aus Ephesos. Epigraphica Anatolica* 14 (1989). Pp. x & 206. 10 pls.



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BOOK REVIEWS

RAYMOND A. PRIER. *THAUMA IDESTHAI: The Phenomenology of Sight and Appearance in Archaic Greek*. Tallahassee, Florida State University Press, 1989. Pp. xxxii + 319. Cloth, \$29.95.

This is a difficult book; a cursory account threatens to level its subtleties. It is also an ambitious book, a reformer's manifesto. Prier proposes nothing less than a dramatic discontinuity between an archaic Greek view of language and what has come to be the Western tradition in the philosophy of language; he takes classical philology to task for reading Homer through the views of language found in, among others, Plato, Aristotle, Saussure, Heidegger, Todorov, Foucault, and Derrida. And it is not a book for readers wary of difficult terminology; the vocabulary of phenomenology is used throughout with little concession to the traditionally trained classicist. Nevertheless, if one makes the requisite effort, the terminology well serves the reader, whether in classics or other disciplines.

In the opening pages Prier introduces what he sees as a fundamental mistake in reading archaic Greek: thought and its relation to external phenomena are too often reduced to material terms, a mistake he calls the "hyletic metaphor." Prier sees this metaphor at the root of many of our theories of language, from Plato and Aristotle on narrative and representation, through the common dichotomy of subject(ive) and object(ive), to the split between signifier and signified in structuralism and semiotics. Prier wishes to replace this hyletic metaphor with an experiential relationship between what he calls the "this" and the "other/that." In phenomenological fashion, their material existence is of no concern; projections from the "this" and projections from the "other/that" are what we know, and we know them directly, as experiences. Prier shows how this is characteristic of the early Greek *episteme* by a fine analysis of language for vision in Homeric Greek. His first chapter ("Sight and Cite: The Vocabulary of Sight and Appearance in Homer") discusses the verbs *dokein* ("to seem") and *phainesthai* ("to appear"). Prier demonstrates that a nexus of terms surrounding *dokein* denotes outwardly directed gazes or glances of the perceiver ("this") in response to perceived phenomena ("other/that"). He then contrasts the nexus of terms surrounding *phainesthai*, which denotes projections toward the perceiver from without. *Dokein* marks human responses to phenomena, while *phainesthai* marks projections from the realm of the gods, of divine, powerful, immediate, and true appearance. Prier also finds a vocabulary that names the "place of intermediation" between the inner but outwardly directed terms (*dokein*) and the outer but inwardly directed terms (*phainesthai*). Words such as *leussein*, *thaumazein*, and *sēmainein* "assume their presence primarily through

the emotional and experiential commitment of the participants *and* an affective appearance from without" (71). Wonder is here very important; it is "lodged squarely between the loci of gods and humans, and the *thauma idesthai* takes its place in the 'that' and the 'this'" (96). In this first chapter, Prier is exquisite. He engages his audience with the language of Homer, and demands consecutive thought about difficult passages, lines, words, and phrases. His convincing analysis establishes the philological foundation for the rest of the book. Many specific points, which support the larger arguments, will themselves be of interest to readers of Homer: e.g., Prier's observations on the nuances of the middle voice and the aorist aspect.

The second chapter ("Archaic Semantics: Toward a Theory of the Quantitative Nature of Archaic Verse") begins by censuring classicists, who tend to hold an empirical and grammar-based view of language, which is inappropriate for Homeric texts. He finds the source of this attitude, and its misapplication to archaic Greek, in Aristotle's own hyletic metaphor. Prier argues that Aristotle assumed material things are primary, all else is metaphorical or analogical, while in Homer human experience of phenomena is primary. As an example of modern complicity in this misreading of Homer, Prier focuses on Milman Parry's essay "The Traditional Metaphor in Homer," which, he argues, reduces poetic language to a belittled metaphor. He is also very critical of scholarship on Homeric metrics, while proposing his own approach that emphasizes the experience of sound in an Homeric hexameter line. This experience is measured in intensity, rather than length or time. Prier calls his analysis quantitative in contrast to the Aristotelian qualitative. Our empirical focus on grammar and reference, which is qualitative, makes language seem a medium, behind which lies something more real and primary. In contrast, the Homeric line, read quantitatively, provides what Prier calls a "conrescence," a synthesis of sound and sense in the audience's experience. In this light, Prier makes the provocative claim that Homeric poetry is unmediated human communication, in which signs and referents are undifferentiated. So he defines the formula as "a syntactical phenomenon operating and appearing under similar metrical conditions to express the differentiating and conrescent nature of meaning and signification within archaic language, the aural-oral identity of signifier and signified" (141). Prier then proposes that the word *sēma* in the Homeric text denotes just this synthetic experience of both signified and signifier. This second chapter is, to my mind, weaker than the first. It does extend his discussion of the realm between the "this" and the "that" from vocabulary to verse; but his metrical arguments depend on a number of generative arguments, a type of argument that, in linguistic matters, is weak at best. Like many such explanations, Prier's theories of the hexameter line dismiss a good number of exceptions with a suspect facility. Nevertheless, Prier argues well that the experience of Homeric meter creates an immediate and powerful phenomenological experience of both the "this" and "that," much like the phrase *thauma idesthai* in the previous chapter.

Chapter 3 ("Protonarrative Elements in Homer: In Search of the Qualitative in Language") moves from meter to narrative. Both Plato and Aristotle link the term *diēgēsis* (narrative) to mimesis, i.e., the imitation of something independently existing. This mimetic narration is organized qualitatively around a beginning, a middle, and an end; significance, in these terms, depends on the plot. This is, Prier claims, inappropriate for Homeric language. He enjoins the reader to refrain from "the modern qualitative approach . . . that might be summed up, 'Well, isn't this what the narrative is thematically all about?!' and view the language from a more quantitative approach, i.e., 'Well, what is formulaically and semantically repeated?!'" (175). Homeric poetry, to Prier, is centered neither on mimesis nor on plot, both of which are qualitative. It depends, rather, on a quantitative reading not only of the way the sounds and rhythms of the line create a synthetic experience, but also of the way repetition creates sense and importance. Sounds, words, phrases, passages, and scenes gain significance primarily through recurrence (quantitatively), not through their relations to a plot (qualitatively). This significance in Homeric protonarrative is also tied closely to recognition of the *sēma*. The *sēma* is not, Prier claims again, of some Aristotelian or objective realm, "but [is] enmeshed completely in the experience of the perceiver and the outer impingement of appearance. A *sēma* must, by its recognition, be somewhere 'in between'" (200). The Homeric text represents not subject matter, but phenomenological experience heightened by repetition. As this third chapter draws to a close, Prier takes issue with, among others, Foucault and Todorov. He denies that the "individuated, reflecting self" posited by Foucault has any place in Homer; Foucault's view is said to overplay the "this." Todorov's semiotics, claims Prier, closely tied to narrative as it is, separates signifier and signified in a way that is alien to Homeric language. Instead of these later views, Prier insists on the Homeric area "in between," where unmediated experience, the pivotal *thauma idesthai*, and recognition of the *sēma* all occur.

The fourth chapter ("Archaic Mythocentrism: A 'Level of Composition', or an Answer to the Theories of a Written Word") gives the name *mythos/mytheisthai* to this Homeric protonarrative. He contends that Derrida is essentially correct in perceiving the traditional logocentric basis of our view of language and thought; he takes issue, however, with several of Derrida's resulting claims, which, as Prier sees it, deny humanistic concerns and give too much privilege to writing. Saussure, praised by Prier for his usefulness, unfortunately separated signifier and signified as elements of a sign; Derrida, in turn, completely divorces the signifier from the signified, claiming that all we have is a free play of signifiers. Neither, according to Prier, can account for the pull of Homeric verse and "protonarrative," in which signifier and signified gain their significance by being joined in that experiential, intermediate, phenomenological realm. Prier's consideration of Derrida leads to Husserl and Heidegger; he praises Husserl for his attempt to link Idealism to human experience, but argues against Heidegger's nominalistic linking of being and *logos*. Prier concedes that

Derrida rightly distrusted Heidegger's assumptions, was wary of spatial metaphors for language, and saw the use of considering synchronic and diachronic features in language. But, he argues, Derrida's view of language depends on writing, on narrative, the hyletic metaphor, Platonic eidetics, and Aristotelian ontics, all of which are foreign to Homeric Greek. Prier here shows a careful, though not sympathetic, reading of Derrida and responds to the challenges posed by deconstruction. The arguments are rigorous, persuasive, and welcome in our field, although I miss some acknowledgment of Derrida's playfulness and the stochastic quality of his writings.

By focusing on Homeric *mythos/mytheisthai*, Prier wishes to rid Homeric studies of this logocentrism. Through an analysis of the Embassy to Achilles in *Iliad* 9, he emphasizes that *mythos* is a "direct and present confrontation with the truth." But, lest we too fall into the hyletic metaphor, Prier reminds us that "its 'presence' or 'being' is lodged in the immediate experience of the hearer." *Mythos* expresses the intermediate realm, the realm of wonder and the *sēma*, and is a type of "unmediated" human communication. *Mythos* is thus tied to a kind of phenomenological, experiential truth. Despite certain reservations, Prier allows that Bruno Snell, Husserl, and Saussure thought of language in a fashion that approaches Prier's reading of archaic Greek. He argues further that Jakobsen's work on the synchronic and the diachronic experience of language (which Prier sees as more complex in its expression than Saussure's and more useful than Derrida's) results in nothing less than a quantitative linguistics. Prier draws all these arguments together by rejecting the "anti-humanistic" efforts of deconstruction and affirming the "human caveat," in which he restates that language can only be understood in terms of human activity and human experience.

In the conclusion Prier sums up his argument: a phenomenological approach results in a truly Homeric view of language, which avoids post-Aristotelian views of representation. He insists that "archaic language makes sense only in terms of immediate human experience and perceptions wrought by the workings of the text." He goes so far as to claim: "I have applied the same phenomenological approach to the reading of Homeric texts as any bard might sense in composing and reciting them." Prier is nothing if not bold.

But this boldness is, at times, overbearing. The arguments throughout the book are stimulating and, for the most part, persuasive, but Prier seems to allow only two explanations for views that differ from his own: they are either misguided or dishonest. There is precious little scope left for honest and thoughtful difference of opinion. A number of recent books on the *Iliad* gracefully and convincingly employ a variety of approaches, which seem to enhance, not distort, our reading of the epic. For this reason, I regret the tone of this book, which scolds those who differ as liars or fools. Perhaps a more tolerant pluralism would do more to enhance the "human caveat," so important to Prier, than would such claims to exclusivity. In this light, I must mention that the foreword (not written by the author) does a disservice to the book; it is sarcastic and

condescending in its antithesis between humanism and any ideologically based criticism (especially feminism). Prier's fine book is provocative enough, without the added burden of this needlessly polarizing foreword.

Despite these reservations, this strident, exasperating, and difficult book is superb; it should challenge our most familiar and unnoticed assumptions as we read archaic Greek, with the result that the texts of Homer might startle us anew.

ANDREW SPRAGUE BECKER

VIRGINIA TECH

DANA FERRIN SUTTON, EDITOR. *Dithyrambographi Graeci*. Hildesheim, Munich, and Zurich, Weidmann, 1989. Pp. 125. Paper, DM 39.80.

This book, as the author explains (p. 5) is a "handlist" to the remains of Greek dithyrambic poetry. The bulk of it is occupied by entries on each of the known dithyrambists, in approximately chronological order; there follow *fragmenta adespota*, and fragments dubiously categorized as dithyrambic. The three Appendices list (I) the names of all poets known or conjectured to have composed dithyramps, 102 in number; (II) the titles—again both known and conjectured—of the dithyramps; and (III) the names, so far as they have survived, of the victors in the dithyrambic contests of the Athenian Dionysia and Thargelia.

This is not a corpus in the strict sense, since the verbatim fragments of the dithyramps that are available in Page's *Poetae Melici Graeci* and in the standard editions of Pindar and Bacchylides are not reprinted here, but merely listed by the appropriate fragment-numbers. Thus the book will not be of much help to anyone interested in the *style* of the dithyramb. On the other hand Professor Sutton reproduces *in extenso* all the testimonia that refer to each poet whose work lay primarily in the dithyramb, and those testimonia that concern the specifically dithyrambic poetry of the more versatile lyric masters such as Simonides and Pindar. Particularly welcome is his assemblage, which seems to be complete, of the epigraphic evidence for the dithyrambic contests. It is the testimonia, in fact, that give the book its chief potential value. If one is truly to share the experience of an ancient Athenian at the Great Dionysia, one cannot close one's eyes to the existence of the dithyrambic performances. They occupied, at the lowest estimate, something like one-fifth of the total time given to performance at the festival. Their results were deemed just as worthy of public record as were those of the tragic and comic contests. Finally—and this is surely an important consideration for the historian of Greek drama—the musical, the poetic, and possibly even the histrionic styles evolved in the dithyramb were in constant interplay with those of tragedy and comedy; its repellent or attractive force can still be discerned in Aristophanic comedy and in the later

work of Euripides. Taken as a whole, no book known to this reviewer gives a more powerful cumulative impression of the enormous popularity of the dithyramb in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Those beginners who are surprised, as beginners often are, by the relative prominence given to it in Plato's and Aristotle's accounts of the mimetic arts, will find the complete explanation in these pages; and not only the beginners may be surprised by the vast extent of its documented history, a history that begins two generations before the first certainly recorded dramas, and continues well into Roman times (the latest definite records refer to performances in the last decade of the second century A.D.).

The appearance of this quite comprehensive sourcebook on the dithyramb may well re-awaken interest in this recently rather neglected art, and stimulate further enquiries into it—above all, perhaps, into its complex symbiosis with Attic drama. Unfortunately however, researchers will have to use and quote *Dithyrambographi Graeci* with circumspection. It cannot be ranked, as one might have hoped, as a definitive scholarly reference book, to take its place on the shelf alongside *TrGF*, for the editing is so poor that any conscientious reader must find himself repeatedly driven to check the sources in more reliable texts. No systematic apparatus criticus is provided; thus, for instance, the reader is left to puzzle out for himself the corrupt reading printed in lines 22–23 of Pherekrates' famous fragment 145 K, on the abuse of Mousike (p. 44). On average, every third page reveals some mangling, mutilation, or mispunctuation of the Greek texts. Some of these inaccuracies are easy enough for any reader reasonably competent in the language and metre to correct in stride, such as the curious itacisms *spondeis* for *spondēs* (p. 21), *tois Hellados* for *tēs Hellados* (p. 40); or *Keukadiou* for *Leukadiou* (p. 72); or *ornithōn* unmetrically for *orneōn* in *Ar. Birds* 1406 (p. 50). *Nophobolos* for *niphobolous* in *Birds* 1385 (p. 50) might put more strain on one's emendatory powers; and the omission of the word *technēs*—to the ruination of the sense and metre—from the end of the third line of the inscription on p. 104, bottom, could be repaired only by going back to the source.

One final point: it is well known that the dithyrambos, unlike the majority of lyric poems but exactly like the dramas, were routinely given titles in antiquity. Perhaps the origins of this practice, and its implications for the subject-matter of the dithyrambos and their relation to the dramatic performances, have still not been sufficiently explored. Clearly one prerequisite for the exploration would be a reliable list of the ascertained dithyramb-titles; but unfortunately about two-thirds of the dithyramb-titles given in the course of this book, and assembled in Appendix II, are due to conjectures by Professor Sutton. It is true that on the whole he carefully distinguishes such titles by an asterisk, indicating that the poem concerned was not certainly a dithyramb, or by angle-brackets, indicating that the title has been conjectured from reports of a dithyramb's contents, or, most often, by both (though Appendix II is not altogether accurate

in this regard; for example, the ANTIGONE there attributed to Ion, and the SYROS (?) attributed to Philoxenus, should have been asterisked). But the value of such guesses for any kind of serious research really seems negligible. What possible use could any responsible enquirer make, for instance, of the title *(CHRYSSIPPOS), attributed on p. 27 to Praxilla's dithyrambic *oeuvre* purely on the ground of Athenaeus' statement that somewhere in some poem of unknown genre she described Zeus' kidnapping of Chrysippus?

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EMILY A. McDERMOTT. Euripides' Medea: The Incarnation of Disorder. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989. Pp. 156.

This study traces Euripides' use of the theme of infanticide in *Medea* to create an aesthetic "world from which all order has been pointedly removed" (2). McDermott shows that Euripides augments the disturbing nature of his subject matter by repeatedly confounding audience expectations and by blocking feelings of sympathy for either protagonist. Before these disruptive effects are analysed, however, two chapters are devoted to an attempt to establish that Euripides was introducing a striking dramatic innovation in having Medea murder her children and that he created much suspense by gradually revealing this element of the plot.

McDermott does not often cite secondary material in languages other than English. The footnotes, printed in the back, are rather inconvenient to use because they include no header referring to page or chapter, and because references appear in brief (e.g., as "Easterling, 185") after a first citation, even when the original citation was in a previous chapter. No list of frequently-cited works is included. It is unfortunate that the book was permitted to go to press with internal citations left in proof form (e.g., "see p. 00 above," 107).

McDermott's argument that Euripides was the first to present Medea as an infanticide begins with a rather misdirected refutation of Walter Burkert's view that the deaths of Medea's sons were associated with sacrificial ritual. Only in the last pages of her chapter does McDermott confront the strong and persuasive evidence that Medea's deliberate murder of her children was known in the fifth century and was presented by another tragic author, Neophron, in a play antedating Euripides'. I have treated this evidence myself recently (*TAPA* 119 [1989] 115-35; see also the earlier article by E. A. Thompson, *CQ* 38 [1944] 10-14); and, in spite of Denys Page's arguments (in his 1938 edition), the case for Neophron's priority is strong. McDermott admits that the testimony of Dicaearchus and Aristotle's *Hypomnemata* is persuasive, but she concludes that the result is "perplexity," since "demonstration of a weakness in Page's case is not

tantamount to proof of [Thompson's] own" (23). In fact, the onus of disproving solid ancient evidence lies squarely upon those who wish to eliminate it. Neither Page nor McDermott has succeeded in such a disproof.

The assumption that Euripides invented the infanticide has a strong effect on McDermott's analysis. In 36–37, 91–95, and in the anapaestic sequence at 98–118, the children are repeatedly warned away from their mother, and the possibility that Medea may "do something" to her dear ones is repeatedly raised. McDermott cites some of these lines but argues that, because Jason is blamed for his desertion, our sense of foreboding will be diminished (35–36), while uncertainty will be maintained by the unfamiliarity of the infanticidal version. McDermott's analysis (37–39) shows how the infanticide is dangled before us at the opening, after which the variant version (murder by outraged Corinthians) is misleadingly substituted. It is hard to see the function, however, of hints about Medea's murderous mood, if a story in which Medea laid violent hands on her children had been unknown before the production of Euripides' play (see also the analysis of Bernd Manuwald, *WS 17* [1983] 40–42).

The third chapter examines the contradictory effects of Medea's identification of herself with most women; McDermott demonstrates how the audience, as in the case of the Corinthian threat, is misled and is repeatedly forced to revise its view of the protagonist's character. The horror of Medea's act is enhanced by every available device, including suppression of parallel myths. That she is pictured as a vulnerable woman rather than a supernatural being only increases the impact of her crime (51). In a chapter on "Familial *Trophé*" (81–93), probably the strongest part of the book, McDermott is able to show that the theme of infanticide, repressed during a major segment of the play (lines 131–790), is obliquely presented through a series of scenes centering on children and parenthood. The play's language also repeatedly stresses that Medea has destroyed whole households in Colchis, Iolcus, and in Corinth; and her future role in Athens may be hinted. The effect of all these elements is to set Medea apart as a violator of basic human norms.

Two general points remain for comment. The author rightly mentions that the reconstruction of audience expectations will be central to a study of suspense and layered contradiction and surprise (4). But her analysis seems weak precisely at this point. Whatever blame accrues to Jason, his faults are not likely to make the audience ignore hints that Medea will murder the children. At 1098ff., the author rightly notes the odd moral obtuseness of the chorus, but concludes that their rather fatuous sympathy somehow works to "intensify the audience's horror at Medea's impending crime" (63). A more careful and less arbitrary study of the changing realizations of the audience as they react to the play's many reversals would have enhanced the value of the book.

Second, a claim that disorder is the aim of the artist involves certain dangers, as McDermott admits (5). It is her belief that "used discreetly" this principle will work, but inherent contradictions remain and are rather glaringly presented. At the book's close, we are told that "The stuff of life becomes art

only when an author imbues it with meaning of some sort, communicating to his audience his own interpretation of the facts and values of our world" (113). Must we then conclude that in aiming at "anomaly and confusion" (118) Euripides cannot be aiming at art? Such quandaries are familiar in the history of Euripidean criticism. A definition of artistic function more suitable to drama seems required, one that does not exclude *Medea*, or even the *Oresteia*. (I am by no means as certain as McDermott that *Eumenides* solves all problems presented by the opening play of the trilogy.)

McDermott's focus on *Medea*'s aberrancy sometimes obscures what this figure shares with other tragic protagonists, who also commit atrocious violations of human norms, including the murder of children or parents. Although *Medea* is given less justification than most tragic protagonists, it is through the parallel with other such figures that Euripides can readdress and refigure the traditional dilemma between heroic obligation and family bonds (see recently Helene B. Foley, "Medea's Divided Self," *CA* 8 [1989] 61-85). Disruption of patterns is not the same thing as chaos or random disorder. By presenting us with this aberrant protagonist, Euripides is able to subject both the norms of gender and the ethic of heroism to a painfully intriguing examination.

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JOHN BOARDMAN, N. G. L. HAMMOND, D. M. LEWIS AND M. OSTWALD, EDITORS. *The Cambridge Ancient History*, 2nd ed. Vol. IV: Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525-479 B.C. Cambridge University Press, 1988. Pp. xxi + 928. 20 maps. 84 text-figures. 8 chronological tables. Cloth, \$100.00.

The appearance of *CAH* IV² now brings Archaic Greece within the scope of the new editions of the series. Volumes III.1 on the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Aegean from the 10th through the 8th centuries and III.3 on the expansion of Greece, including Solon and Pisistratus in Athens, were published in 1982. The current volume takes the story from the Pisistratidae to the aftermath of the Persian Wars. Material on Persia, the Persian Empire, Italy, and Carthage is greatly expanded from the 1926 volume. The quality of writing is very high. We note some points of special significance and a few references which escaped the net.

Part I devotes not quite half of its 286 pages to Media and Persia; next, individual chapters, written by specialists with a strong archaeological background, take up the major regions of the empire: Babylonia, Syria-Palestine, Central Asia and Eastern Iran, Indus lands, Anatolia, Thrace, Egypt.

Herodotus remains a major secondary source for all regions, but the individual authors take the reader through archaeology and the available docu-

ments in Near Eastern languages which illuminate his account (i.e., chronicles of Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian kings, Old Persian texts of the Achaemenid kings, the Biblical books of Ezra and Nehemiah, Avestan texts on Zoroastrianism, Aramaic papyri from Egypt).

The Fortification Texts and Treasury Tablets from Persepolis provide important new material on imperial administration, which was not available in 1926. Several chapters (on Media-Persia, Central Asia, Indus lands, Egypt) use them to good advantage in showing the importance of communications in maintaining authority in the empire.

For Media-Persia Young shows that the traditions on the Median kings in Herodotus derived from a national epic or romance on national heroes. The Cyrus tradition, too, is based on romance, influenced by Greek mythology, but a judicious appraisal of the Nabonidus Chronicle, the Cyrus Cylinder, and the Bisitun inscription of Darius shows Cyrus as the true founder of the Persian empire. Darius emerges as an effective administrator and organizer. Both Young and Ray (Egypt) emphasize that the Herodotean view of Cambyses as a madman should be revised.

In looking to Anatolia in the time of Darius and Xerxes, Mellink is careful to provide a broad cultural and historical context for the new Achaemenid presence. One is reminded, for example, that the Persian road system across Anatolia was basically the inheritor of older Phrygian and Hittite routes. The historical record, primarily the account of Herodotus, affords a picture of comings and goings, organization, and names for the period in question. Yet to gauge the cultural impact of the Persian presence in Anatolia, Mellink turns to the evidence of archaeology. Her survey is methodical, with separate sections covering Lydia, Daskyleion, the south coast (Caria, Lycia, Pamphylia), Cilicia, Phrygia, and the east (Pontus, Cappadocia, Commagene, Armenia).

The impact of Persian rule in Anatolia may have been particularly strong at the western satrapal centers of Sardis and Daskyleion and the territories they oversaw. The areas bear witness to the formulation of a distinctive Graeco-Roman cultural *koine* with West Anatolian, specifically Lydian, components, as seen primarily in art and architecture connected with the grave. Anatolians and Persians shared the new expression, e.g., the burial stele of the Persian official Elnap at Daskyleion, and the Graeco-oriental manner in which a nameless Anatolian is depicted in his painted tomb at Karaburun near Elmali. In this process of cultural interplay, individual ethnic identities were not lost: local burial customs, for example, continued in Lydia and elsewhere, while the magi stele from Daskyleion is a firm reminder that Iranian cult held strong in foreign surroundings. The new Turkish excavations at Daskyleion and continuing work at Sardis will no doubt enrich understanding of the cultural dynamics of the period in Western Anatolia.

In other parts of Anatolia, the cultural impact of Persian rule appears to have been less dramatic than in the west, perhaps because of the strength of local traditions and their resistance to change. The absence of the Graeco-

Persian idiom at Xanthos is a case in point, as is the ethnic and linguistic tenacity of the Sidetans, who already had experience in holding their own in the presence of a Greek colony. In Cilicia, which had particular importance as a staging-point for Persian land and sea movements, the local dynasty cooperated with the Achaemenids, but the evidence for cultural interaction is presently limited. At Gordion, which might have been taken by Cyrus as part of his expedition against Sardis, the Persian impact also may have been minimal, even though the site apparently served as an Achaemenid administrative center. Imports and local imitations of Persian finery suggest superficial eastern influence on the Anatolian residents (by now probably a combination of Phrygians and Lydians). Yet figural wall paintings in Archaic Greek style show Phrygian or more broadly Anatolian themes, with no real hint of the Graeco-Persian manner documented in the west.

In Pontus and Cappadocia, a bichrome ceramic tradition (born of older local practices) emphasizes Iranian subject-matter, but it is generally difficult to gauge whether the Persian presence made much of an impact on Anatolian life. Further east, in Armenia and Commagene, the situation is somewhat different because of the relative closeness to Iran. Urtian citadels were reoccupied by Persians, as at Van-Tushpa, while in Commagene and North Syria the Euphrates and its crucial crossing-points seem to have invited a strong Achaemenid concentration. Again, evidence is limited in these parts for assessing the cultural influence of Persian rule on the local population.

Contributors to Part II, on the Greek states, take account of new developments in archaeology, oral composition, epigraphy, and topography, which supplement and illuminate the literary tradition.

Lewis discusses the tyranny of the Pisistratidae (287–302), making good use of the fragment of a 5th century archon list from the Agora which allows an assessment of political patronage by the tyrants. The drawing of a reconstruction of the altar of Pisistratus, son of Hippias, in the sanctuary of Apollo Pythius in Athens, made by W. B. Dinsmoor, Jr. for the Epigraphical Congress in Athens in 1982 and here published by courtesy of the Epigraphical Museum, is, to my knowledge, not available elsewhere.

Ostwald on the reforms of Cleisthenes (303–46) is particularly interesting on the archaic language of IG I³ 105, which he relates to the prerogatives of the Council and Assembly at the time of the reforms. Jeffery applies her extensive knowledge of archaic Greek inscriptions to the Greek states other than Athens before the Persian invasion and to the society of Archaic Greece (347–67). Meiggs–Lewis no. 15 is the correct reference for the bronze quadriga dedicated on the Athenian Acropolis in the late 6th century (362, n. 18).

General trends of the Archaic period to the end of the sixth century are discussed in a single chapter (368–460) with contributions on religion and society (Davies), literature and intellectual ideas (Kirk), material culture (Boardman), coinage (Kraay), and trade (Roebuck). Davis discusses how the state, through public officials, sacred laws, management of festivals, and cult affairs,

enters into religion and abets a process of secularization. Kraay contends (443–45) that the coinage in the Greek cities was originally intended, not for trade, but as a standard medium for payments, used for public purposes, such as taxes, fines, harbor dues, and the salaries of officials.

Murray reasserts the primacy of Herodotus in his discussion of the Ionian revolt, but uses him critically and makes some interesting observations on the possible economic cause of the revolt (461–90).

Hammond, with his excellent knowledge of topography, is illuminating on the campaign of Marathon and the expedition of Xerxes through Salamis (491–591). It should be noted, however, that Megakles, not Themistokles (524), is now the leader in number of extant ostraka (cf. Thomsen, *The Origin of Ostracism* [Copenhagen 1972] 93). The Persian assault on the Athenian Acropolis came through the Sanctuary of Aglauros, now identified on the East slope by an inscription discovered in 1980 (cf. Dontas, *Hesperia* 52).

Barron (592–622) discusses the campaigns of Plataea and Mycale and some of the memorials of the Persian Wars in the succeeding years. Gauer's *Weihgeschenke aus den Perserkriegen* (Tübingen 1968) deserves mention, especially for its drawings of several monuments and excellent photographs of the serpent column, one of which shows some of the letters of the inscription.

For Part III, David Ridgway's elegant synthesis on Italy during the transition from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age and on the Etruscans down to the end of the Archaic period was completed in 1978. The author, foreseeing a delay in publication, released his text for a pre-print as an Occasional Paper of the Department of Archaeology, University of Edinburgh (No. 6, 1981). He was evidently not allowed to update his text, and thus his chapters could not take into account what was arguably the most productive decade in the history of Etruscan studies.

The "Year of the Etruscans" in Italy, 1985, gave rise to numerous exhibitions, catalogues, and other publications at the time of the Second International Etruscan Congress (the first had been held in 1928). The dynamic flow of publications in the 80's encompassed Bologna in the north (*Dalla Stanza delle Antichità al Museo Civico*, ed. C. Morigi Govi and G. Sassatelli [Bologna 1984]; *La formazione della città in Emilia Romagna*, ed. G. Bermond Montanari [Bologna 1987]) as well as Tarquinia in the south (*Tarquinia: ricerche, scavi e prospettive*, ed. M. Bonghi Jovino [Milan 1987]), and Veii, near Rome, where earlier important work was done by Ridgway himself (see the significant reassessment of the Villanovan Quattro Fontanili cemetery by J. Toms, *AION* 8 [1986] 41–97). The book of plates to *CAH* IV was prepared later than the text and there Ridgway has managed, by a judicious selection of illustrations and bibliography, to bring in some of the more recent developments, as well as to address areas such as "Religion," not included in the text as they were in the earlier *CAH*.

E. T. Salmon, the leading authority on non-Etruscan peoples of Italy during the Iron Age, prepared his masterly overview before his death in 1988.

His chapter does not coordinate perfectly with that on the languages of Italy by J. H. W. Penney, since there is some overlap (Inevitably, the definition of the cultures of the mid-Adriatic, the Apulian heel of Italy and the Osco-Umbrian areas requires discussion of inscriptions.) and minor discrepancies. Unfortunately the index is unreliable and does not allow the reader to collate information in this desperately intricate field. (The reader found incomplete indexing, e.g., on Aurunci, Ausones, Opici, Osci, Safina—all important terms for defining the Oscan-speaking peoples.) Penney's overview of the language is especially useful on the spread of the alphabet (though there is no mention of numerals; that the Etruscans gave them to the Romans has been brilliantly argued by P. Keyser, *AJA* 92 [1988] 529–46). The languages covered are Etruscan, Venetic, Raetic, "Lapontic," Novilara, Faliscan, South Picene, Oscan, Umbrian, Messapic and minor Osco-Umbrian dialects.

The considerable material culture of the Faliscans and "situla" peoples of Northern Italy (who spoke Venetic, Raetic, "Lepontic") are not surveyed in this volume. See S. Puglisi, s.v. "Falisca, cultura," *EAA*; F. R. Ridgway, "The Este and Golasecca Cultures: A Chronological Guide," *IBR* 419–511; L. Bonfante, *Out of Etruria: Etruscan Influence North and South*, *BAR* S103 (1981). On the Etruscan language, add F. Roncalli, *Scrivere etrusco* (Milan 1985); L. Bonfante, *Etruscan*, British Museum "Reading the Past" series (1990), which includes the Oscan Agnone Tablet in the British Museum. On Italic languages, add A. Morandi, *Epigrafia italica* (Rome 1982). Erratum: on p. 723, for "late sixteenth-century abecedaria," read "late sixth century."

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WILLIAM C. WEST (PARTS I & II)

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ATTILIO MASTROCINQUE. Lucio Giunio Bruto. Ricerche di storia, religione e diritto della repubblica romana. Trento, Edizioni La Reclame, 1988. Pp. 293. L. 70,000. (Università di Trento. Dipartimento di Storia della Civiltà Europea. Pubblicazioni di Storia Antica).

The subtitle is salutary: for who would have dared to dream that it was possible to cover with print almost three hundred dense pages on the shadowy founder of the Republic? Even Plutarch refrained from composing a life of the Liberator and settled upon the Tyrannicide. But read the subtitle again, carefully: Brutus does not stand solely as the Founder; he is an emblem for the whole of the (not necessarily early) Republic, its history, law and religion. If this

promises an erudite potpourri, our expectations—or fears—are not to be denied.

Take the seven pages (pp. 59–65) the author devotes to the feast of *compitalia*. He diligently summarizes, with full panoply of sources and literature, everything we know of the feast, then goes on to discuss the decree of the senate of 64 directed against the *collegia* and the *ludi compitalicii*; here his presentation is lacunose and careless. In the notorious text of Asconius (*In Pis.*, 7 Clark) he reads (following J.–M. Flambard, *MEFRA* 89 [1977] 118) *magistri ludorum*, but in his comment he writes “Pertanto, i magistri dei collegi solevano fare i ludi compitali come i magistri dei vici li facevano, cioè *praetextati*” (p. 61, cf. 68–69), which presupposes the rival reading in Asconius *magistri vicorum*. And speaking of the *collegia* and of the *cultores Larum* the author (following in the footsteps of many other improvident scholars) falls in a terminological trap of grave consequence failing to distinguish between the *magistri collegiorum* (especially of the professional associations) and the *collegia magistrorum* (like the so-called *magistri Campani* attested in the numerous inscriptions from Capua); for this fundamental distinction, cf. J. Linderski, “Der Senat und die Vereine,” in: *Gesellschaft und Recht im Griechisch-Römischen Altertum* 1 (Berlin 1968) 108–18. Serious, but minor quibbles, one would say. A major question looms: *Quid ad Brutum?* Niente, so far. But let us not despair. The Lares were “anime eroizzate dei defunti,” and hence the feast of the *compitalia* was, at least originally, in the sixth century, a feast of the dead (a proposition not everybody will be rushing to embrace). All that may (or may not) have something to do with the “celebrazione dei funerali di Bruto.” Ecco, the connection with Brutus.

Having thus uncovered the methodology of the book, we can now steel ourselves for a long haul: in thirteen chapters articulated in eighty paragraphs the author talks of a plethora of disparate things:

1) The literary tradition concerning Brutus (pp. 13–35), especially the *Brutus* of Accius. Here I note a truly marvellous discussion of the prophetic reversal of the course of the sun and of its Greek antecedents (Cic., *de div.* 1.44–45 = Accius, *Brut.* 17–38 Warmington 2.560–62); the troubling fact remains that an early Latin *praetexta* presumes the orientation in the Greek manner toward north, and that this orientation seems to be assumed also by the *coniectores* explaining the dream to Tarquinius (on the confusing subject of auspical orientation, cf. J. Linderski, *ANRW* 2.16.3 [1986] 2282–86; *CP* 81 [1986] 339–40).

2) the Roman religion, and in particular

a) the cult of the Lares (pp. 37–41, 59–65 [cf. above], 145–69). Politically “il culto eroico” (a proposition sorely in need of proof) at the crossroads tended to be egalitarian and anti-aristocratic, “potenzialmente monarchico,” hence its utilization by Augustus, as before him by Servius Tullius (p. 165). And it was Brutus who replaced the human sacrifices to the *Mater Larum*, Mania, instituted by Tarquin, by the offering of the effigies (Macr., *Sat.* 1.7.34–35). Brutus emerges as an “eroe sagace” who “compie una mediazione salvifica fra la sfera

del sacro . . . e quella dell'umano" (p. 43), but his literary portrait was progressively purged (particularly by the annalists) from all that bordered on myth or magic while at the same time it acquired features borrowed from the Hellenistic tradition (pp. 48–49).

b) The cult of Liber (pp. 245–75) and Ceres (pp. 119–44). Both cults were closely connected with the plebeian community of early Rome, but the author casts his net wide indeed and discusses everything from the *toga pura*, the *bullā* of the *pueri* to the *fascinū* of Liber, and from the *thriambos* of Dionysus to the Roman triumph to the statue of Marsyas in the Forum (where the accumulation of titles in the footnotes gives absolutely no idea of the substantial divergence of opinion among the adduced authorities). Ceres leads to a discussion (hardly novel) of the *leges sacrae* (pp. 127–31) protecting the tribunes of the plebs (the *bona* of the person who violated a tribune were forfeited to Ceres) and also the Republic itself against any attempt at a *regnum*.

c) The cult of Apollo and the various *ludi* (pp. 51–56, 67–81): the *ludi saeculares* and their projection to the beginning of the Republic, the *ludi Tarentini* and the legend of Valerius Publicola, the *ludi Taurei* and the Sybilline books, the *ludi Romani* and *Plebei* (rightly embracing Piganiol's idea of the high antiquity of the latter games and pointing to L. R. Taylor's demonstration that Cicero was a plebeian, and not a curule aedile, and that consequently the "ludi antiquissimi qui primi Romani appellati sunt" [Verr. 2.5.36] over which Cicero presided, were in fact the *ludi Plebei*).

3) The institutions and the history of the early Republic (pp. 171–233): the aediles (and their custody of the texts of the laws), the consuls (and all the often trodden question of the *praetor maximus* and the *clavis annalis*), the *comitia tributa* and the *comitia tributa plebis* (accepting the fuzzy theory of R. Develin (*Athenaeum* 53 [1975] 302–37) that there existed only one kind of the *comitia tributa*, the plebeian, but rejecting his contention that the patricians were not allowed to vote in the tribal assembly), and finally the auspices and their connection with the *curiae*: "il diritto agli auspici pubblici spettava ai patrizi non tanto in quanto patrizi, ma in quanto curiali" (i.e., the members of the *curiae* [p. 233]). A nice phrase, but what does it actually mean?

It is easy to be critical, and yet Mastrocinque in stressing the religious elements of the regal and early republican tradition, and the subsequent refurbishment of that tradition by the antiquarians and the annalists, who all looked toward Greece, is on the right track. But the question obtrudes: is that track going in the right direction? The book glistens with erudition, and bristles with footnotes, but the nature of the field is such that erudition, footnotes and the author himself must disappear in the black hole of Archaic Rome to emerge as another footnote.

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JOHANNES HAHN. *Der Philosoph und die Gesellschaft: Selbstverständnis, öffentliches Auftreten und populäre Erwartungen in der hohen Kaiserzeit*. Stuttgart, F. Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, 1989. Pp. ii + 236. Paper, DM 48. (Heidelberger Althistorische Beiträge und Epigraphische Studien, Bd. 7)

Scholars weary of doxography will find this a very refreshing book. H. focuses deliberately on the external aspects of the philosopher's role, in hopes of clarifying both how he saw himself (his *Selbstverständnis*) and what his contemporaries expected of him (their *Erwartungshorizont*). It is H.'s thesis that imperial society had an unequivocal conception of how a philosopher was to be known, built almost entirely on his appearance and behavior, and that a philosopher, in order to be recognized as such, had to embody these expectations.

H. takes the profitable step of treating the philosopher's external appearance as a means of communication. Not all sects looked alike, as Lucian's *Sale of Lives* makes plain, but, however unrelated to content, the relevant external features were carefully cultivated by philosophers and symbolically potent to their contemporaries. The philosopher was able to serve as judge and mirror of his social environment only by *leaving* it to some degree. This voluntary loss of social position was compensated by the gain of certain special privileges, chiefly *parrhesia*, the right of censuring with impunity those who are socially or numerically superior. (Comparative material on the anthropology and theory of asceticism would validate H.'s insight here, and add resonance to his exposition.) Obviously this model posed problems for those philosophers who were socially well-integrated and desired to remain so. H. points out that the Stoa tried to harmonize these opposing tendencies (not the least part of its appeal, one may suspect). B. Shaw's essay on Stoicism as ideology, *Latomus* 44 (1985), might have been useful here.

A study that aims to define the contours of the philosopher's persona under the empire has to reckon with the notorious polymathy of the Second Sophistic. H. tackles this problem, a scholarly Tar Baby if ever there was one, in chs. 4 and 8, attempting to distinguish sophists from philosophers. The social reality he is up against is very complex: in some technical fields, from law to dream-interpretation, a distinction is taken for granted, while in everyday life, at least among the privileged elite, there appears to have been considerable blurring of roles. (Philostratus is no help here, H. maintains, because he is really interested only in *ex tempore* speaking ability. H. might have mentioned that a notable difference in Pollux's treatment of philosophers and sophists is that among the synonyms and phrases under the latter rubric, references to money and fees abound, whereas there are no such references at all under the rubric "philosopher.")

Only some philosophers also had a reputation for sophistic activity. H. shows us how Apuleius, a denizen of the "*Grauzone sophistisch-philosophischer Polymathie*," is, for the purposes of his trial, painfully stylized in his self-

presentation as a philosopher. This proves that the outlines of the type at least were clear. H. feels certain that the ancient onlooker always knew what sort of speaker he was watching. How would he tell them apart? By what they wore, for one thing, but mainly by their βίος. H. idealistically wants to see the βίος as something deeper than an artifice of self-presentation. This is why he is unwilling to take the obvious step of saying that Apuleius *was* a philosopher—when it suited him.

When H. discusses the attitude of philosophers to rhetoric, he observes that as the two disciplines became progressively indistinguishable, their rivalry intensified. Philosophers resented the rhetoricians' use of classic philosophical texts (reading Plato for his prose). But philosophers needed rhetorical skill themselves. There was really no clear distinction between "private" lectures to small groups of students and "public" performances. Plutarch (*On Listening to Lectures*) contrasts the sort of behavior expected at a philosophical and a sophistic lecture: those listening to a philosopher should not insist on pure Attic language or flowery effects, but should monitor instead their own emotions and assess their own spiritual state to see if it has in any way been amended. Needless to say, this distinction was not always observed, as the phenomenon of the *Konzert- or Salonphilosoph* shows. Maximus of Tyre and others of his ilk, like Favorinus, are a bit of an embarrassment for H. He tries to draw a distinction between "moralizing" and "philosophical" speech-making, but in an age when the popular conception of philosophy has pretty well boiled down to ethics, this will not work. He also tries to reclassify Maximus as "really" a sophist after all, but when the taxonomic effort breaks down like this, readers may rightly question whether it is worthwhile.

When wealthy philosophers like Dio and Plutarch undertook civic duties at home, they did so as leading citizens, not as philosophers (ch. 14). The inscriptions that honor various local euergetists with the title of philosopher show what combination of political and moral virtues the cities expected their leading citizens to embody. Thus, whether or not they could string together a syllogism, people like the Spartan Q. Aufidenus Sidectas, ὁ φιλόσοφος, received their due meed of glory: διὰ τε τὴν τοῦ βίου σεμνότητα καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολιτεύμασιν μεγαλοφροσύνην.

Philosophers had duties abroad on behalf of their cities first and foremost because they were members of the upper classes (ch. 15). These errands provided opportunities for public performances. Dio's orations to his fellow-citizens and nearby cities do not emphasize his role as philosopher, but his speeches further afield certainly do. This shows the importance of the philosopher's role as a stranger—which could wear off with time. That is why philosophers like Dio (and the cynics) kept traveling: cozy relations with the local aristocracy rule out *parrhesia*. Cities may have found advice easier to take from an outsider; Dio claims he often spoke by invitation. In times of social crisis philosophers could play the role of mediator. When Dio faced bread-rioters in Prusa, it was as a fellow-citizen, but when he faced rioting Roman legions, he



presented himself as a philosopher. (H. seems to harbor no doubts about the historicity of this Philostratean canard, though, for his purposes, apocryphal stories may be more revealing than mere facts.)

No social historian has yet come up with a good answer to H.'s question: what conditions caused a recrudescence of Cynics in the high empire? (Ch. 16). Indeed, were it not for H.'s arguments, there would be a strong temptation to dismiss them as a phenomenon *sui generis*. They addressed a different audience than other philosophers, and used a different language. Their *parrhesia* should be seen as a letting off of steam that did society no harm (and effected no change). One cannot assume that the low status of cynic philosophers meant active partisanship of the lower classes. Conversely, we cannot assume that the popular audience always reacted favorably when cynics attacked wealthy aristocrats: Peregrinus' attack on Herodes Atticus was so poorly received that he had to deliver a retraction.

The phenomenon of pseudo-philosophers—the abuse of the βίος—could not, despite the criticism of the educated fraction of the population, shake the esteem in which cynic philosophers were generally held. H. is very perceptive on the role of professional quarrels and attacks on “false philosophers” in a philosopher's self-definition (ch. 10). Cynics were a thorn in the side of other philosophers (who conceived of philosophy as the privilege of the educated, not for the *sordidi*) precisely because their βίος put them uncomfortably close to the center of the generally accepted paradigm of what a philosopher's life should be.

The philosopher's contacts with the emperor (ch. 17) were stylized in two patterns. In one, we see the philosopher as a privileged private person occasionally receiving favors from the emperor, and perhaps dedicating to him a treatise in return. In the other, we see the ruler being educated at the hands of the philosopher. A variation of this latter pattern is the encounter with the tyrant. In this situation an outspoken cynic might be following a script known also to Jewish and other martyrs. Such encounters, especially if they ended in exile, could constitute a definitive test of the philosopher's genuineness. The type-scene of “the dialogue between philosopher and ruler” is particularly interesting because in it historical reality, popular conceptions, and literary tradition overlap.

It would appear from our sources that few philosophers lived up to their claims—or to popular expectations. But this did not impugn the validity of the paradigm (as Lucian shows us in *Nigrinus* and *Demonax*). The “so-called philosophers” try to drum up a crowd; the real philosopher is simply recognized—by his clothes, his behavior, perhaps even by his charisma. There is a certain something about a philosopher that makes him able to quell riots. This something may indeed be charisma, but it is a little late to introduce Max Weber (in a footnote) on p. 195. Hahn's work in general suffers some impoverishment from its lack of theoretical grounding, if only because, in its absence, a scholar will resort unconsciously to the *Erwartungshorizont* of his own culture. For exam-

ple, the concept of the real "professional" philosopher which H. conjures up to contrast with aristocratic dilettantes is certainly anachronistic. What is to be the criterion backing up the distinction? Certainly not accepting fees. In contemporary culture, a philosopher is assumed to be both financially disinterested and professional—i.e., earning a living at it. The emulsification of this paradox has only been made possible by the institution of the modern university. In this regard Robert Kaster's discussion of the differences between ancient and modern notions of "professional" is exemplary (*Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity* [Berkeley 1988]).

A more serious question is whether a naively essentialist view of "the philosopher" vitiates the thesis of this useful and interesting book. Why should everyone denoted by a single word be part of a unified phenomenon? To what extent does this tactic distort the investigation of antiquity? The central paradigm sketched by H. can have tremendous explanatory power if allowed to function in a sufficiently flexible way. The fundamental tension at the center of it, the philosopher's simultaneous marginality and centrality, his role as a social outsider and at the same time as a prototype of social virtue, mirrors the paradox of a society that expected men to aspire to stand-out status, yet was at the same time intensely conformist. Aristocratic dilettantes, client chaplains of slender means, dazzling *Konzertredner*, itinerant cynics, all these sought to appropriate to themselves as much of the paradigm as they could while challenging the right of other claimants to do the same. Few men achieved universal recognition in the philosopher's role. Those who, like Demonax, appear to have done so anticipate in their transcendent centrality the Late Antique figure of the holy man. In what ways were they different, and how did the transition take place? Apollonios of Tyana is obviously a key figure. Perhaps more of H.'s quietly original work will some day give us an answer.

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MEYER REINHOLD. *From Republic to Principate: An Historical Commentary on Cassius Dio's "Roman History" Books 49–52 (36–29 B.C.)*. Atlanta, Georgia, Scholars Press, 1988. Pp. xxii + 261. Vol. 6, *An Historical Commentary on Cassius Dio's "Roman History,"* ed. P. M. Swan and J. W. Humphrey. (American Philological Association, Monograph Series, 34).

Nachdem seit dem letzten (und einzigen) Gesamtkommentar zu Cassius Dios 'Römischer Geschichte' (demjenigen von Hermann Samuel Reimar, Hamburg 1750–52) nahezu zweieinhalb Jahrhunderte vergangen sind, könnte die Feststellung, ein neuer Kommentar zum Gesamtwerk erfülle ein dringendes Desiderat, fast als Zynismus verstanden werden. Tatsächlich ist es eigentlich

unverständlich, warum die Kommentierung des als Quelle für die Geschichte Roms so wichtigen Autors derart vernachlässigt wurde. Man kann daher den Herausgebern, P. M. Swan und J. W. Humphrey, nicht dankbar genug sein, daß sie das "daunting project" (Reinhold, S. xiii) eines Kommentars zum ganzen Geschichtswerk Dios in Angriff genommen haben. Die durch illustre Beispiele empfohlene Form eines 'Historical Commentary' ist einem Autor, der gewiß mehr sachliches als ästhetisches Interesse erregt, in besonderem Maße angemessen. Aus der auf elf Bände geplanten Kommentarserie liegt nun als erster Bd. 6 über die Bücher 49–52 (36–29 v.Chr.) in der Bearbeitung durch Meyer Reinhold vor. R. ist seit seiner Agrippa-Biographie von 1930 über die Jahrzehnte hinweg als Kenner der Epoche und ihrer Quellen ausgewiesen, und sein Kenntnisreichtum und seine Erfahrung sind dem Kommentar merklich zugute gekommen.

Zunächst ist hervorzuheben, daß der Kommentar in seiner Anlage durchweg überzeugt, indem er dem Leser stets den Überblick erleichtert und ihm jede notwendige Benutzungshilfe bietet: Nach einer Übersicht über "Dio's Life and Career" (S. 1–4, vom Mitherausgeber J. Humphrey) folgt eine generelle Einleitung zu den Büchern 49–52 (S. 5–15: "Dio's Sources for Books 49–52," "Dio's Methods and Style," "On the Date of Composition of Books 49–52," "Dio and Augustus," "Dio and the Third Century"). Die Kommentierung der Bücher 49–52 (S. 17–214) beginnt jeweils mit speziellen Einleitungen zum Gegenstand des Buches, zu Dios Interessen und Einstellung, seinen mutmaßlichen Quellen usw. Die Einzelerklärung ist nach Sacheinheiten gegliedert (z.B., 50.31.1–35.6: The Battle of Actium, S. 113), denen häufig wieder einleitende Orientierungen vorausgeschickt sind. Die Einzelkommentierung wird entlastet durch 17 Appendices zu speziellen oder übergreifenden Problemen (S. 215–40). Fünf Karten (S. 241–45) und Indices (S. 247–61) beschließen das Werk.

Bei der Einzelerklärung zeigt R. den für die Kommentierung eines so umfänglichen Textes unerläßlichen Mut zur Konzentrierung. Indem er sich, wo es zuträglich ist, mit Verweisen auf andere Dio-Stellen begnügt (Dio also aus Dio erklärt) oder sich auf Querverweise im Kommentar beschränkt oder lediglich einschlägige Artikel in Handbüchern nennt (mit Recht verzichtet R. darauf, andernorts leicht zugängliches Material aufzuführen), schafft er Raum für ausführlichere Sacherklärungen, wo es notwendig ist, und für die eingehendere Behandlung historisch relevanter Aussagen. Bei seiner Kommentierung stellt R. die Äußerungen Dios, wenn möglich, in den Rahmen der Parallelüberlieferung und berücksichtigt in sehr reichem Umfang die moderne althistorische Forschung, in erfreulich hohem Grade auch in ihren nicht-englischsprachigen Vertretern. Der Wert und die Stärke des Kommentars liegen in besonderem Maße in dieser umfassenden Aufarbeitung der historischen Forschung zu den von Dio behandelten Ereignissen. Die Auswahl der kommentierten Gegenstände ist sachgerecht, und im allgemeinen erhält man auf alle wichtigeren Fragen eine Antwort bzw. Problembeschreibung oder wird man auf detailliertere Untersuchungen verwiesen. Aus diesen Gründen stellt der Kommentar ein

überaus wertvolles, unverzichtbares Hilfsmittel für alle dar, die sich mit den von R. bearbeiteten Büchern Dios und dem darin dargestellten Zeitabschnitt befassen.

Nicht ganz so überzeugend scheint mir R. in einigen mehr in den philologischen Bereich hineinreichenden Aspekten seines Kommentars (soweit sich solche bei einem Autor wie Dio überhaupt isoliert betrachten lassen) zu sein. Dabei denke ich besonders an die Ermittlung von Absichten und Einstellungen Dios. Freilich bin ich hier in einigen Punkten durch meinen eigenen philologischen Beitrag zu Cassius Dio (*Cassius Dio und Augustus*, Palingenesia 14 [Wiesbaden 1979]) zugegebenermaßen 'Partei', und was ich im folgenden zu bemerken habe, wird daher gewiß andernorts durch 'neutrale' Rezensenten relativiert werden. Zur Begründung im einzelnen:

Bei der genauen Datierung der Entstehungszeit von Dios Geschichtswerk handelt es sich zwar um ein für die Beurteilung etwaiger Anspielungen Dios auf die eigene Zeit wichtiges Problem, aber auch um eines, bei dem zwingende Ergebnisse gewiß nicht leicht zu erreichen sind. Insofern wird man Verständnis für R.s Zurückhaltung auf diesem Gebiet haben. Es ist aber kein glücklicher Einfall, wenn R. seine Skepsis gegenüber der Möglichkeit, die Zeit der Abfassung bestimmen zu können, mit der Ansicht begründet, Dios Aussage über die Zeitdauer der Materialsammlung und diejenige der Abfassung des Werkes könne nicht so verstanden werden, als seien 22 aufeinanderfolgende Jahre gemeint (S. 12). Die Formulierung *ἐν ἄλλοις δώδεκα* schließt es aus, daß darin die zuvor genannten zehn Jahre des Sammelns ganz oder teilweise mitumfaßt sind (Dio 73 [72].23.5). So jedenfalls, wie R. argumentiert, läßt sich die auf vernünftige Gründe gestützte These von Barnes (*Phoenix* 38 [1984] 240–55; Sammeln: 211–20; Abfassen: 220–31, und damit auch Verfassen der Maecenas–Rede in der Zeit des Severus Alexander) nicht angreifen.

Was R. über "Dio's Methods and Style" zu sagen hat (S. 9–11), überzeugt nicht in jeder Hinsicht. R. möchte seine Ansicht, daß Dio "imposed his own persona and was motivated by his own general conception of events" (S. 9) mit Äußerungen des Autors selbst belegen. Jedoch entspricht Dios Aussage (53.21.1), er brauche nicht in die Details zu gehen, sondern beschränke sich auf das, was seinem Geschichtswerk zuträglich sei, einem weit verbreiteten historiographischen Topos (vgl. G. Avenarius, *Lukians Schrift zur Geschichtsschreibung* [Meisenheim / Glan 1956] 127ff.), den sich Dio freilich zu eigen gemacht hat, der aber nichts Spezifisches für ihn aussagt. Charakteristischer wäre da schon Dios sonst in der Historiographie offenbar nicht genannter, von R. nicht vermerkter Grundsatz, allgemeine Einsichten (*λογισμοί*) zu formulieren, die einerseits zum Verständnis der Fakten (*ἔργα*) beitragen, andererseits an ihnen verifiziert werden sollen (46.35.1). Und wenn R. eine Bemerkung Dios (53.19.6) mit den Worten wiedergibt ". . . that he [Dio] will give his own opinion (. . .), whenever he is able, from the abundant evidence he has gathered from his reading, from hearsay, and from personal observation, with judgements that 'do not follow the common report' (. . .)" (S. 9), so kann der geradezu irreführende

Eindruck entstehen, als habe sich Dio aus nahezu unbegrenztem Quellenmaterial sein Urteil bilden können. Tatsächlich lautet Dios resignierende Hauptaussage angesichts einer seit dem Beginn des Prinzipats grundsätzlich verschlechterten Möglichkeit, die historische Wahrheit zu ermitteln (vgl. 53.19.1ff.; die Aussage bezieht sich auf die Zeit ab 27 v.Chr., d.h. sie betrifft Bücher, die in R.s Kommentar nicht mehr erfaßt werden), daß *auch er*, was er darstelle, ohne Gewähr für die Richtigkeit, nur darstellen könne, wie es öffentlich bekannt geworden sei (53.19.6). Der im Anschluß daran vorgetragene Anspruch auf eigene Meinung bezieht sich nur auf die Sonderfälle, in denen er aus den zahlreichen (πολλῶν, nicht: "abundant evidence") ihm zugänglichen Nachrichten etwas über das allgemein Verbreitete hinaus erschließen konnte.

Ebenfalls nicht völlig geglückt sind aus meiner Sicht die Ausführungen, welche R. Dios Einstellung zu Oktavian–Augustus widmet. R. erkennt mit dem Beginn des Prinzipats—ab Buch 51, d.h. nach der Schlacht von Aktium (vgl. S. 12)—eine offenkundige Verschiebung in Richtung auf eine gegenüber Oktavian gewogenere Haltung (S. 8). Weitere Stellen im Werk Dios, die für den Einsatz einer veränderten Einstellung gegenüber Oktavian von Interpreten ebenfalls in Anspruch genommen wurden (Anfang von Buch 53; Buch 53.17–19), werden von R. erwähnt, aber nicht diskutiert (S. 14). Den Grund der Veränderung möchte R. weniger in einem von manchen Forschern vermuteten Übergang zu einer neuen, proaugusteischen Quelle als in des Autors "fervent reaction" auf den Beginn der von ihm bejahten Monarchie sehen (S. 14).—Wenn nun aber die Veränderung so offensichtlich ist, wie kann dann der Einsatzpunkt überhaupt kontrovers sein? Wenn sie—wie R. will—mit Buch 51 einsetzt, warum finden sich dann auch danach noch für Oktavian höchst abträgliche Äußerungen? (Man vgl. z.B., Dios Bericht über das Verhalten Oktavians nach Aktium gegenüber den Besiegten [51.2.4–6], bei dessen Kommentierung R. [S. 124] Oktavian vor Dio geradezu in Schutz nimmt.—Ferner spricht es keineswegs für einen Bewunderer Oktavians, wenn Dio dem römischen Volk vorhält, es habe aufgrund der finanziellen Großzügigkeit Oktavians alle Widrigkeiten vergessen und die Triumphe [des J. 29 v.Chr.] gern angesehen, *als ob* alle Besiegten Angehörige fremder Völker gewesen wären [51.21.3f.]. R. kommentiert diese Bemerkung Dios nicht.—Sodann wirkt Oktavian nach Dios Bericht geradezu verschlagen, wenn er Material, das frühere Anhänger des Antonius belasten kann, angeblich verbrennt, tatsächlich jedoch die Hauptmasse zurückhält und später auch verwendet [52.42.8]). Und wenn die Veränderung nach R.s Meinung autorbedingt ist und mit Dios monarchistischer Einstellung zusammenhängt, warum stellt Dio dann ausgerechnet die konstitutionellen Regelungen des J. 27 v.Chr. als Akt politischer Heuchelei dar (vgl. 53.2.7–53.11), von der vielfach entlarvenden Schilderung des Weges zur Monarchie ganz zu schweigen? Wie man sieht, bleiben hier Fragen offen und kann R.s Konzeption nicht recht befriedigen.

Schließlich scheint mir R. jedenfalls zu voreilig von Dio indirekt wiedergegebene Meinungen mit der Ansicht des Autors zu identifizieren. Das gilt vor allem für die Maecenas–Rede (52.14.1–40.2), in welchem Falle freilich eine

Identifikation besonders naheliegt. Denn es trifft für den speziellen Teil der Rede (52.19ff.) gewiß zu, wenn sie von den Interpreten als politische Denkschrift Dios verstanden wird (Dio verweist 53.15.2 in einer Weise auf 52.25.6f. [Maecenas-Rede] zurück, als habe er dort in eigener Person gesprochen). Aber dennoch ist es zu undifferenziert, wenn R. die (ganze) Rede als "the authentic voice of Dio" (S. 179) bezeichnet. Bekanntlich divergieren die Wertungen der Ausdehnung des Bürgerrechts (*Constitutio Antoniniana*) in der Rede (52.19.6) und in der historischen Darstellung (78 [77].9.4f.) erheblich (was R., S. 189 zu 52.19.6, auch notiert). Wenn man selbst im speziellen Teil der Rede, wie in diesem Fall, mit Idealisierungen rechnen muß, gilt das erst recht für den allgemeinen (52.14–18), in dem sich in Antithese zum Preis der Republik durch Agrippa (52.2–13) eine überaus idealistische Einschätzung der Monarchie findet (52.14.4), die über die wesentlich nüchternere Beurteilung, welche Dio in eigener Person vorträgt, hinausgeht. R. hätte daher 52.14.4 nicht für die eigene Meinung Dios in Anspruch nehmen sollen (S. 86 zu 50.1.2). Auch scheint seine These nicht hilfreich, die Reden seien "not oppositional; the authentic Dio is in both" (S. 170), zumal er wenig später die Frage stellt, ob Dio Agrippa so abwegige Argumente in den Mund lege, daß sie von Maecenas leicht widerlegt werden könnten (S. 173f.).

Wenn im voraufgehenden auch einige Bedenken vorzubringen waren, so werden solche Einwände doch bei weitem aufgewogen durch den hohen Wert, welche der Kommentar für die historische Erklärung der Bücher 49–52 von Dios 'Römischer Geschichte' darstellt. Man kann nur wünschen, daß auch für die anderen Abschnitte des Werkes bald ähnlich kompetente Bearbeitungen erscheinen.

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PAUL PLASS. *Wit and the Writing of History: The Rhetoric of Historiography in Imperial Rome*. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1988. Pp. 182.

Plass seeks to define various aspects of wit and its functions in prose writers of the early empire with special emphasis on Tacitus.

The book is comprised of an introduction and six chapters. In the introduction, P. argues that the wit employed by historians is not the same as that discussed in rhetorical handbooks, though there is some overlap. P. defines wit in the historians of the early imperial era as a combination of quip and epigram, "the former being live, spoken repartee that solidifies into something more weighty when it is fixed in writing or quotation and placed in an anecdotal setting" (6). In its serious aspect wit is "an effective instrument specifically for dealing with the phenomenon of political and moral pathology" (11–12). P. prefers to describe rather than prescribe various facets of wit in the historians since

he believes that they neither conceived of wit as an independent category nor as part of a theoretical notion of the absurdity of political life (7).

P. makes no claim to originality in his observations about the seriousness of wit in the ancient historians, but he does employ "some models for analysis which highlight facets of epigrammatic wit in the historians from new points of view" (12). These models are derived from linguistics, psychology and political science.

In the first chapter, P. considers the range of meaning of *ludibrium* in Roman politics and its role as a premise of historiographic wit "insofar as a major aim of the pointed, epigrammatic style is to replicate the sense of derision that often attached to events" (18). P. argues that Tacitus used wit in his work to reflect the incongruity and absurdity of political life back at a higher level of insight. Chapter two examines various facets of antithetic epigrams as a form of political wit in Tacitus. He considers antithesis as an expression of conflicting codes for discussing moral and political norms, as parody for the purpose of polemic, and as manipulation of the logic governing political language. P. also analyzes certain Tacitean episodes which he believes function almost as antithetic epigrams.

In the remaining chapters P. examines the technique of *para prosdokian* as a "witty protest against improbable reality" (13); enacted wit, such as sadistic practical jokes, metaphor, wordplay, the physical appearance of the emperors and omens; and epigrammatic wit in Seneca the Younger and the declaimers as "symptomatic of a grimly witty attitude toward contemporary political and social reality" (13). The last chapter considers irrationality in the form of paranoid political logic. Comparisons between ancient and modern writers, such as Orwell or Zinoviev, highlight their differences. In recent centuries, writers and philosophers have tended to view irrationality as an objective ingredient of political order, whereas ancient writers like Tacitus saw political irrationality as a result of moral failure in leadership. "Tacitus and Dio recognize, too, that the central conundrum in imperial Rome—freedom preserved only when it is lost—is partly a matter of inherent political logic, but they still treat it mainly in terms of moral incoherence" (103).

P. deserves credit for apparently being the first to assay this topic. Equally creditable is his broad definition of wit to include such things as omens and enacted jokes. The application of modern theories from other disciplines is for the most part helpful and successful. While difficult to read, P's book does not ponderously crush the life out of ancient jokes. On the contrary, P's analyses at times restore to these witticisms their original freshness. His discussion of antithetic epigrams, especially the nuances of *magis . . . quam* antitheses (50–54), is particularly illuminating.

P. convincingly argues that wit can be construed as a form of rhetoric and he tellingly adduces evidence from the ancient rhetorical writers to support his points. So Aristotle on the pleasure of antithetic periods (*Rh.* 1400b29, 1410a20) bolsters P's contention that rhetoric and logic share with wit "a special pleasure

derived from 'getting the point' in one way or another" (40), and Seneca's remarks on *sententiae* illuminate P's discussion of their role in Tacitus (96).

P. also well illustrates the way in which Tacitus uses logical forms to bring out the illogicality and absurdity of contemporary political life. P. is sensitive to the ways in which readers must work to decipher jokes enmeshed in logical structures and grasp various levels of meaning, thus participating more closely in the writer's work and point of view.

Despite these positive achievements, the book has serious flaws, most notably in P's treatment of Tacitus, the major focus of his analysis. The reader is especially dependent on P's interpretation since he takes anecdotes, sentences or even parts of sentences out of context and does not always provide the Latin along with the translation. H. 1.32.1 is less about mob behavior (123) than about the habitual *adulatio* of all classes at Rome. Again, A. 14.64.3 and 16.16 illustrate not so much the "monstrous aimlessness of political violence" (121) as the servile flattery and submissiveness of the upper classes to Nero's tyranny. The opening of Otho's speech at H. 1.37.1 is *not* emblematic of "political vacuity" (121) but is a clever reworking of traditional *topoi* to underline the dangerous position Otho and his troops find themselves in. P. interprets H. 1.17.1 as a statement on Piso's unwillingness to hold power "in time of crisis" (95) when Tacitus' whole account suggests Piso's indifference to power under any circumstances. P. also misses the immediate point of the quip at H. 1.16.4 which in fact concerns the hypocrisy of Galba's presenting Piso for approval of others when his is the only approval that counts (95). There are errors in summarizing H. 1.3.2 (76) and H. 3.51.2 (57), where the moral Tacitus draws comes from the second anecdote, not the first. P. gives H. 3.83 and 1.32.1 as examples of *ludibrium* (16) although Tacitus does not use the word there. And I cannot agree that H. 1.16.1 reveals Galba's self-deception when the whole speech shows a realistic awareness of the limits of *libertas* at Rome (161n7). One can only interpret Ag. 3.2 (62) as a "tribute" to the survivors of the Domitianic terror by ignoring the bitter close of the sentence (*senes prope ad ipsos exactae aetatis terminos per silentium venimus*).

Similar errors occur in non-Tacitean sections. Suetonius *Cl.* 8 describes humiliations visited on Claudius *before* his accession (74). P. mistranslates *portentum* (*Cl.* 3.2) and *monstrum* (*Cal.* 22.1) (74). *Vit.* 10.3 is not parallel with H. 3.39.1 (85); rather H. 3.39.1 is parallel to H. 2.70.1. The footnotes and bibliography are marred by numerous misspellings of scholars' names, e.g., "M. Clark" for "M. L. Clarke" (159; 168).

Students of historiography will be distressed by more substantial matters. P. too seldom differentiates between the different genres and attitudes of the authors he considers, calling Suetonius and Plutarch "historians" (7) (cf. 56), and he dismisses source criticism as not important for his inquiry (11). This is unfortunate since such criticism could have supported his claim that Tacitus, unlike Suetonius, "uses wit organically and at a much higher level" (19). Reference to scholarship on longer stretches of narrative would also have supported

this assertion. For example, in discussing the comic aspects of the Messalina-Silius intrigue in *Annals* 11 (83) P. passes over the work of *inter alios* Dickison, who shows how Tacitus elaborated on a hostile tradition depicting Claudius as a comic character which is apparent also in Suetonius and in the *Apocolocyntosis* (S. K. Dickison, *Latomus* 83 [1977] 634-47). Large topics such as narrative patterns (88), Tacitus' religious views (76), and his thoughts on cycles of history (55) are alluded to or briefly discussed without providing the reader adequate bibliography. Finally, P. cites sentences out of context from speeches in *Histories* as Tacitus' own views (42; 55).

While enhancing our pleasure and understanding of the serious function of wit in Tacitus, P., perhaps unintentionally, through a highly repetitive format and with an argument which does not develop very much, gives the impression that political absurdity and fatuity are virtually the only themes of Tacitus' major works. This reductive effect ignores not only the complexity and ambiguities of the narrative texture but also Tacitus' own distinguished public career, his allusions to the value of contemporary history and to the virtues of men and women of his own day.

For all these reasons, I cannot recommend this book for any but advanced students. Despite its flaws, P. should be commended for this pioneering effort. The attentive reader will see in its pages many avenues for further research.

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C. B. R. PELLING, EDITOR. Plutarch, *Life of Antony*. Cambridge University Press, 1988. Pp. xiv + 338. Cloth, \$47.50; paper, \$16.95. (Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics)

Pelling (henceforth, Pe.) has produced a major commentary on what many would consider to be only a minor work of ancient literature. *Ant.* is, to be sure and as Pe. remarks, the longest of the *Lives*, and this richly detailed and meticulous commentary may help to establish the claim that it is also the "finest" (p. vii). The Introduction treats the life, writings and outlook of Plutarch (henceforth, Pl.) (sect. 1); presents a preliminary analysis and "appreciation" of *Ant.* (sect. 2); gives an extended account of the points of comparison between *Ant.* and its mate, *Demetrius*, in which are discussed the contents of the rather perfunctory formal synkrisis with which the pair concludes, specific links between the careers of the two men as Pl. presents them within the *Lives* themselves, and—interesting but not quite so germane—Pl.'s methods and purpose generally in these comparisons (sect. 3); analyzes Pl.'s sources and his use of them (sect. 4); and, as an added bonus for a wider range of readers, discusses Shakespeare's reliance in *Antony & Cleopatra* upon Pl. via North's translation,

which was itself beholden to Amyot's (sect. 5; the debts and divergences are taken up in detail at relevant points in the commentary).

In the text itself Pe. follows Ziegler save for 42 differences listed on pp. 45–47. The book's bulk, some 210 small but densely packed pages, consists in a detailed commentary in which (naturally) historical matters get most attention. Pe. notes Pl.'s debts to sources extant (e.g., Cicero's *Second Philippic*) or lost (Augustus' *Memoirs*, which Pl. refers to at chs. 22.2 and 68.2; the former citation Pe. suggests Pl. might have got at second hand and the latter he may have misunderstood). Pe. also detects numerous details from C. Asinius Pollio's history of the Civil Wars, which Pl. probably knew at first hand, and which was "less hostile to A[ntony] than most versions" (p. 27). "Much of the political detail of *Ant.* is probably owed to him," according to Pe. (p. 28). Pl.'s other main non-extant source was Q. Dellius, ὁ ἱστορικὸς, who is cited for a detail at ch. 59.6 and mentioned also at ch. 25.3, an "accomplished survivor" according to Pe. (p. 185), who quotes Messala Corvinus' description of him as "the circus-jumper of the civil wars"; he had transferred allegiance from Cassius to Antony, whom he deserted for Octavian in 31. His account of the Parthian War was almost certainly Pl.'s main source for that campaign (chs. 37–52) and Pe. posits his influence at various other points (Cleopatra's barge and her riotous feasting of Antony at Tarsus in 41 B.C., chs. 26–27; Antony's gifts of territory to Cleopatra in 37–36 B.C., ch. 36.3–4; and probably elsewhere). An extremely interesting category of sources is one which only an enquirer of Pl.'s catholic tastes and interests would know and avail himself of: the oral traditions about Antony's philhellenism which were apparently alive in Greece down to Pl.'s own day (ch. 23.2–4, with Pe. p. 175); reports about Cleopatra's last days that go back to an account of her personal physician Olympus, whom Pl. mentions at ch. 82.4 (anonymous eyewitnesses are referred to at ch. 77.3 and Pe. suggests Olympus here as well); and a story of Cleopatra's ship with Antony on board being pursued and almost rammed by Eurycles of Sparta (ch. 67.3–4), which may have been passed along to Pl. by one of the man's descendants (Pe. p. 286, citing C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* 41). Family traditions were very much alive in Pl.'s circle and twice he specifically draws on them to fill out his narrative. At ch. 28.3ff. he recounts some stories that he says he had heard "many times" from his grandfather Lamprias, whose informant was a physician from Amphisssa named Philotas, who had been a medical student in Alexandria, and he reports Octavian's exactions in Greece in preparation for the Actium campaign on the authority of Pl.'s great-grandfather Nicarchus (cf. 68.7). Harder to evaluate are incidents which appear plausible but where Pl.'s account cannot be matched with or checked against other sources; Pe. is inclined to accept the details of the "Samian interlude" in spring 32 B.C. (ch. 56.6–10) and the story of Antony's near capture just before the battle (ch. 63.9–11). Most intractable of all—and this is a relatively large category—are those details which seem, on admittedly rather subjective grounds, to rest on no external authority whatever. These Pe. treats as "creative elaborations" or "imaginative reconstructions," in

other words, sheer inventions on Pl.'s part: not necessarily false, but not verifiably true either (see Sect. 4 [iii] of the Intro., pp. 33–36, with copious cross-references to particular places in the Commentary). To choose just one example, Pe. thinks that in composing Cleopatra's farewell at Antony's tomb (ch. 88.4–7) Pl. was "probably fabricating the whole episode" (p. 316).

A somewhat smaller but still very prominent class of material in the annotation concerns literary and linguistic topics. Pe. has extremely interesting and valuable remarks on Pl.'s choice of words, on his use of literary and stylistic figures, and on his quotations from or allusions to earlier authors. I found particularly stimulating his analyses of chs. 9.5–9 (pp. 137–38), 24.1–8 (pp. 176–77), 25.1 (pp. 184–85), 26 (pp. 186–87), 66.7 (pp. 284–85); and cf. his comment on ch. 83, Octavian's visit to Cleopatra: "P[1].s account is subtle and comparatively restrained, but even more tantalizing than Sh[akespeare]'s adaptation . . ." (p. 313). Pe. makes a convincing case that "the literary allusion [to Soph., *Oed. Tyr.* 4–5 at ch. 24.3] marks an important moment" (p. 178; but he also suggests that Pl. may have misunderstood it) and he finds "richly suggestive" the allusion at ch. 25.3 to Homer, *Il.* 14.162 (p. 186, and cf. his remarks on the brief quote from Eur., *Her.* 1250 at ch. 62.2 [p. 270]). On the other hand, I think it is stretching things to see a connection between Octavia's appeal to her brother at ch. 35.3 (she "urged him with many prayers and many entreaties not to permit her, after being a most happy, to become a most wretched woman," tr. Perrin) and Tecmessa or Deianeira (p. 215), nor does Pl.'s use of *προσθήκη* at ch. 62.1 seem to me to owe anything to Demosthenes 3.31 (p. 269). In numerous places Pe. hears echoes of Vergil's Dido (and Aeneas) in the way Pl. presents Cleopatra; cf. his commentary on chs. 26.6–7 (*Aen.* 1.726–27), 53.9–10 (*Aen.* 4.333–61), 59.1–2 (*Aen.* 4.193–94). As Pe. rather oddly puts it in his note on ch. 36.5 (the discussion involves whether or not Antony and Cleopatra were "really married," as Pl. himself avers at *Comparison* 91 [4].2), "as elsewhere, Dido owes something to Cl." (p. 220). And there are negative echoes as well: in her farewell at Antony's tomb, Cleopatra "does not curse O[ctavian] as Dido curses Aeneas" (p. 317). Pe. has enlightening remarks on the pains taken by Pl. to create striking visual effects; see his Commentary at pp. 187 (ch. 26), 307 (ch. 77.3) and 320 (chs. 85–86, Cleopatra's death: "no scene is finer than this"). He rescues Pl. from the charge of merely "padding" his account with a series of anecdotes (pp. 192–93 on chs. 28–29). On a more mundane level he gives assistance (although perhaps not as often as more inexperienced students might like) with Pl.'s sometimes peculiar Greek (e.g., pp. 190 on ch. 26.6–7, 229 and 231 on ch. 41, and 283 on ch. 66.2), and he does not hesitate to correct the translations of Perrin and Scott Kilvert when he feels it necessary to do so.

At times we are given more information than we want or really need (e.g., pp. 213–14 on background to ch. 35, the conference of Tarentum in 37 B.C.) and there are stretches where the Commentary seems to get bogged down in details; I found little daylight in the densely historiographical information about the Parthian campaign (pp. 220–43 on chs. 37–52), although Pe. usefully points the

contrast with Actium (pp. 220–21). From a certain point of view the historical climax of *Life* occurs in the account of Actium (chs. 56–69), but here Pl. disappoints for, from his account as from the others that survive, “[i]t is very hard to reconstruct the actual fighting” (p. 280).

Readers of *Life* who are not especially interested in Pl.’s use or modification of his sources, or his choice of words and techniques of description, will probably focus attention on his presentation of Antony’s character and his susceptibility to the dominating influences of the women with whom he was involved, Fulvia, Octavia and Cleopatra. Pl.’s portrayal is consistent and rather two-dimensional: Antony is the simple, even bluff, commander of men, ready to shine when a military situation concentrates his considerable soldierly abilities, but pliant and acquiescent when a strong woman may wish to exercise her control over him. He is loyal and generous to his troops (and to defeated enemies), and a hard campaigner. In the field he is ready to fight to the end, even in a losing situation, partially out of loyalty to his men and an unwillingness to betray their trust in him. Actium is the crushing exception, at least as Pl. tells it. “No sooner did he see [Cleopatra’s] ship sailing off than he forgot everything else [and] betrayed and ran away from those who were fighting and dying in his cause” (ch. 66.8, Perrin’s trans.; Pe. suggests that this may be a misunderstanding of a preconceived plan to “break away” from a naval encirclement by Octavian and Agrippa, in an effort to live and fight another day, preferably on land). Pl.’s picture of the abyss of Antony’s humiliation is striking: when he had gone on board Cleopatra’s ship Antony “went forward alone to the prow and sat down by himself in silence, holding his head in both hands” (67.1, Perrin).

Of course, Actium was not the end of the story of Antony and Cleopatra. Her mesmeric influence had been a unifying theme in the earlier chapters, but with Antony’s suicide at Alexandria she becomes the heroine of the piece, and Pl.’s biography turns into “more than a *Life of Antony*” (Pe. p. 322). Even in the earlier chapters Pl. has shown a tendency to omit “awkward and gruesome facts” about Cleopatra (Pe. p. 192), but in Alexandria in the summer of 30 B.C. everything negative and petty, all hints of opportunism and treachery such as other sources contain, are totally suppressed; Pl.’s portrayal of her last days shows her with “more loyalty, determination, and dignity” than she has in other accounts (Pe. p. 315) and she rises to the full splendor and tragic stature of Horace’s *non humilis mulier* (*Odes* 1.37.32).

A few items will slip past the most industrious and helpful commentator. Some may be puzzled (as I was) by the exact point of the *sophisma* used by the physician Philotas to deflect his fellow diner at Antyllus’ table (ch. 28.8–9; Pe.’s ref. to Plato, *Gorg.* 482e does not seem to me to be enlightening) and students may want to know something about Solon’s laws regulating conception (ch. 36.7). But Pe.’s pages sparkle with witticisms and *aperçus*, from which I shall, in conclusion, quote just a few examples. On Pl.’s comment that when Cleopatra went to visit Antony at Tarsus in 41 B.C. she was at her physical and intellectual peak: “[P]l. puts the height of beauty encouragingly late and the height of

intellectual power depressingly early: Cl[*eopatra*] was 28" (p. 186). On Cleopatra's ability to speak a variety of foreign languages (ch. 27.4–5): "Had A[ntony] enumerated Cl[*eopatra*]'s charms, one doubts if he would in fact have dwelt on her flair for languages" (p. 191). Pe. remarks that Pl.'s verdict on Antony's behavior at Actium is restrained and "carries psychological conviction. . . . P[l].'s moralism is not primarily that of approval or disapproval, but rather gives insight into a great man's frailty" (p. 254). And again, "P[l].'s heroes are individuals, and public men: but his sensibility to the family [of which Pe. gives examples in his note on Cleopatra's lament at Antony's tomb, ch. 84.4–7], and to private love and grief, is typical of his humanity" (p. 317). It is hard to imagine that anyone in the foreseeable future could feel a need to redo or improve upon Pe.'s commentary.

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DUNCAN FISHWICK. *The Imperial Cult in the Latin West: Studies in the Ruler Cult of the Western Provinces of the Roman Empire*. Volume I, 1–2. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1987. Pp. xi + 1–194, pls. 1–38; vi + 195–371, pl. 39–73. Gld. 220 (set). (*Etudes préliminaires aux religions orientales dans l'Empire romain*, 108)

If the past is assuredly "another country," the landscape of the Greco-Roman world is nowhere more foreign than in its polytheism. Yet even in ancient religion there are degrees of unfamiliarity: Homer and his poetic successors have invested the Olympian gods with a living presence which at least makes their worship somewhat comprehensible. But the practice of ruler-worship seems particularly uncongenial to moderns, not because it is irrational, but because we tend to see in it only craven sycophancy without any genuine "religious" content. Thus, in the past fifty years, the cold impersonality of the ruler-cult has inspired less research than almost any other area of ancient religion.

A century ago, scholars like Beurlier, Toutain, Kornemann and Krascheninnikoff produced valuable studies of Roman emperor worship but the first comprehensive treatment was that of Lily Ross Taylor, *The Divinity of the Roman Emperor* (1931), which has long remained the most useful general book on the subject. More recent synthetic treatments of the Greek and Roman ruler cult by Taeger (1960) and Cerfaux and Tondriaux (1957) are, for quite different reasons, unsatisfactory as general texts nor have they contributed to our understanding of the Roman imperial cult. A new synthesis remains a desideratum,

*This review was written in the hospitable surroundings of the Institute of Classical Philology at the University of Thessaloniki and I wish to thank Prof. J. N. Kazazis for his friendly generosity.

for scholars of ancient religion or of Roman politics, as well as for historians of other societies who look to Rome for comparanda.

During the past twenty-five years a steady stream of learned and illuminating papers has established Duncan Fishwick as the world's leading authority on the imperial cult in the western provinces of the Roman Empire. These specialized studies examined in turn the literary, epigraphic, archaeological and numismatic evidence for the worship of the Roman emperors, and they contain careful descriptions and analyses of specific provincial or even municipal cults. In 1978 Fishwick provided an overview of one aspect of his subject in "The Development of Provincial Ruler Worship in the Western Roman Empire," *ANRW* 2.16.2, 1201–53. The subtitle of the present work might lead one to believe that it is nothing more than the republication of these earlier papers. Those papers do constitute about a third of the two books under review, but even they have been revised and sometimes substantially reworked. Future volumes promise to provide a synthesis as well as a comprehensive analysis of the imperial cult in the West—a contribution that is likely to remain for decades the fundamental treatment on the subject.

These two volumes—in fact Parts 1 and 2 of Volume One—include a lengthy "Introduction" on the antecedents of the Roman imperial cult, Book I (a dozen new and republished studies on the establishment of the imperial cult at the provincial level throughout the Latin areas of the Empire), and two brief, previously published, Appendices. Future volumes promise specialized essays on conceptual topics like the emperors' *genius* and *numen*, Augustan gods, and Augustan abstractions. At a more general level, there will be a short monograph on liturgy and ceremonial in the East as well as the West, and an epilogue on the theology of the Roman emperor. Fishwick also plans a "synopsis of the main development of provincial, municipal, private and military cults of the emperor in the provinces of the Latin West." This is a hugely ambitious program and one can only hope that the succeeding volumes, with the bibliography and indices that are absent from the first two, will appear expeditiously.

In his lengthy "Introduction" (3–93) on the Hellenistic and Republican background of the Roman imperial cult, Fishwick enters into, for him, unfamiliar ground and makes a substantial contribution. His description of this material is typically unassuming: "until a detailed treatment puts in an appearance, the introductory chapters may perhaps stand in their own right as a convenient outline, a modest supplement to L. R. Taylor's still fundamental account." This well-documented and clearly written account is far more than a modest supplement. In it Fishwick traces the Greek worship of living men from its origins in the hero-cults of Classical Greece through the great expansion in the Hellenistic ruler-cult, and proceeds to discuss the changing concepts of divine honors, the goddess Roma, divine honors for Romans in the Greek world, and finally the introduction of divine honors for Caesar and Augustus into the material in the West and Rome itself. While Simon Price covers some of this material in the second chapter of his provocative *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult*

in Asia Minor (1984)—a book which only reached Fishwick in time for inclusion in the Addenda—that stimulating account forms part of a larger argument and is necessarily far more selective. Fishwick's excellent synthesis accepts the traditional view that the motivation behind the Hellenistic ruler cult and its Roman successor was essentially political; Price has powerfully challenged that view and any later synthesis will surely have to take account of his arguments, though Fishwick in his Addenda stands his ground. These introductory chapters draw particularly on the detailed work of Alföldi, Bowersock, Classen, Habicht, Mellor, Nilsson, Nock, Taylor, and Weinstock, though Fishwick is quite prepared to disagree with any of them. (It must be said that he is among the most gentlemanly of antagonists: generous in agreement and gently discreet in disagreement.) He is, for example, cool toward Weinstock's suggestion of hero cults of divine ancestors (save in the case of Romulus), and is elsewhere skeptical of Weinstock's treatment of Julius Caesar's divinity. While derivative, these chapters are not uncritical and they constitute the best account currently available on the antecedents of the Roman imperial cult.

There will inevitably be regrets that Fishwick did not make this introductory section a bit fuller. In a few sentences on post-Classical Greece he mentions the growth of individualism, the intensification of personal piety and religiosity, Euhemerism, skepticism toward the gods, and the rise of powerful monarchs as the causes of the spread of ruler cults. Though a bit facile, these generalizations have much to commend them, but they are a bit hard to swallow in such a straight dose. When we hear of the "syncretism of Greek and Persian" elements in the state cult of Antiochus of Commagene (18), we might like some discussion of those Achaemenid antecedents. Fishwick finds the roots of the Hellenistic ruler cult in earlier Greek practice, rather than in Pharaonic influence, but his brief account of Alexander at Siwa (9) comes close to contradicting this point. It is ungrateful to wish that the author had issued an expanded version of these introductory chapters as a separate book; teachers should ensure that, despite the forbiddingly technical title and the format of the overall work, students find their way to this excellent introduction.

The first volume also contains two other essays: "Roma and Augustus" and "Divus Augustus." These new essays draw on the author's earlier monograph in *ANRW*. Fishwick is here on his home turf, intimately familiar with the entire range of evidence and prepared to suggest the precise meaning of titulare and iconography, as on the altar of Roma and Augustus at Lugdunum. He establishes clear distinctions between the official provincial cults and other cults, whether regional like the *ara Ubiorum* or municipal. His conclusions are not original but reinforce the "law" which Krascheninnikoff expressed in 1894: the official imperial cult was established first in the recently conquered western provinces while the more highly romanized provinces (Africa, Narbonensis, Baetica) did not receive cults until the Flavian era. This argument is a thread linking the essays on Augustus with previously published essays on the imperial cult in individual provinces. "We must always remember that in the west the

imperial cult at the provincial level was basically a political device designed to weld the empire together in loyalty to the head of the empire" (273). The imperial cult was not created at a single stroke; it was fashioned by successive emperors to address their own political concerns. Augustus used the cult in unsettled areas; Vespasian used it to link to his new dynasty provinces long loyal to Rome; Trajan brought it to new areas along the Danube; and even the Severi reshaped the Gallic cult in the aftermath of civil war.

Just as many of these essays are well known, the strengths of Fishwick's scholarship are familiar to scholars in the field. He is a careful empirical researcher who analyzes in great detail each inscription or artifact. (The generous collection of plates includes important inscriptions, coins as well as reconstructions of temples and cult centers.) There is no complex theoretical structure and few hobby horses in his work; only wide learning and common sense. In the West where the history of the imperial cult must be squeezed from the laconic and formulaic career inscriptions, Fishwick's painstaking care has, over the years, yielded important results. But there are times in the past when we would have liked him to be more daring, to venture conclusions not wholly supported by the evidence, to go beyond the technical problems to bring more flesh and blood to the priests of this remote cult who competed ceaselessly for the honors associated with it. He knows this material better than anyone, and we look to him for explanation as well as description. The synthetic sweep of the introductory chapters seems to transcend those limitations and we can hope for similar breadth on imperial theology, ideology and ceremonial in the future volumes.

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MANFREDUS HAINZMANN AND PETRUS SCHUBERT, EDITORS. *Corpus inscriptionum latinarum consilio et auctoritate Academiae Scientiarum Rei publicae Democraticae Germaniae editum. Auctarium inscriptionum lapidariarum latinarum provinciae Norici usque ad annum MCMLXXXIV repertarum Indices (ILLPRON indices). Fasc. 1-3.* Walter de Gruyter, Berlin & New York, 1986.

The accessibility of the Latin lapidary inscriptions of Noricum is much enhanced by the publication of three of a projected four volumes of computerised indices. Mommsen's *CIL* iii.2 of 1873 contained just over one thousand inscriptions. The *Auctarium*, incorporating inscriptions subsequently published in *CIL* (down to 1902) or discovered more recently (down to 1984), catalogues one thousand, nine hundred and eighty-nine.

The first fascicle contains a catalogue of all the readable and non-Christian Latin inscriptions on stone. (Texts from mosaics, clearly Christian inscrip-

tions and mere incomprehensible fragments are listed in the concordance which follows.) The transcriptions, which expand abbreviations and indicate conjectured readings, provide an overview of the inscriptional evidence for the province. This is particularly useful because many of the original collections of inscriptions will be inaccessible to scholars outside Austria and its environs. The desirability of a comprehensive collection makes one (exigently) wish that an indication of provenance and a selection of previous editors' notes could have been incorporated. Scholars who wish to exploit this material in historical argument, but are not acquainted at firsthand with the admirable work already done on each individual document by local archaeologists, epigraphers, and specialists in the whole Alpine area will find no short cuts to the knowledge so painstakingly achieved and published. But, now that texts are being stored in machine-readable form, let us hope that bibliography can be continually added, and that historians will eventually have access to a cumulative data-bank. Not surprisingly, since the pioneering computer-index of *CIL* VI was edited by E. J. Jory of the University of Western Australia over a decade and a half ago, it is in Australia that the greatest progress seems to have been made towards computerised data-banks of inscriptions which cast light on specific topics. But the gigantic task of a comprehensive collection of Latin inscriptions with commentary remains for the future.

The second fascicle contains indices of words and numbers in alphabetical order. I am never sure who will want to know about the incidence of numerals, but if you would like to find out that 'XVIII' occurs only twice (as an age at death), then this is for you. The printing-style has been improved since Jory and these indices are therefore very easy to read. As usual, they give a line of text with the indexed word appearing in the middle. The *Auctarium* numbers on the right margin enable reference to be made to the catalogue for the full context. Users of other indices will know that the need to search a noun (for example) under various cases and spellings can be a hindrance. The *Auctarium* will earn their gratitude by the parallel index in Fasc. 3, which re-lists all occurrences under the nominative. One can see at a glance, therefore, that the *cognomen* Masculina occurs twice, Masc(u)linus four times, Masc(u)lus nineteen (not to mention some more instances in filiation). Compared with a mere dozen examples from the inscriptions of Rome (which show no Masculinae), the popularity of these names vividly suggests the more macho culture of the residents of the Alpine province. Such Latin-sounding individuals will appear together with kinsmen who bear pre-Roman names such as Buccio or Biraco. Turning the pages at random, the reader will be impelled to ask if Mar(?cia) Salbia was particularly unlucky to have her husband killed by barbarians in the legionary *canabae*, and will find that the stone was shared by another widow who commemorates her 70-year-old husband as also *interfectus a barbaris*, and that there is one other example of a widow using these three words about her husband and another where the tribe responsible for the husband's death is named. The Marcomannic War is vividly evoked by the annals of the poor. Or one might

seek out the connections, habitats and employments of a particular group, as the *Barbii* and their freed slaves and descendants and *liberti* of their freed slaves have been traced in their diaspora from central Italy via Aquileia to Noricum and elsewhere. (See J. Šašel, "Barbii," *Eirene* 5 [1966] 117–37.) Or one might attempt to assess the incidence of intermarriage between Italians and Celts, or the impact of the army on local culture or the relative popularity of various cults.

The *Auctarium* will facilitate the use of the inscriptions of Noricum as historical documents. Scholars will look forward to the appearance of the fourth fascicle, which will contain indices of names and subjects.

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RECITATIVE ANAPESTS AND THE AUTHENTICITY OF *PROMETHEUS BOUND*

Mark Griffith's important and useful 1977 book assembled a wide range of metrical and stylistic data, and concluded from it that *Prometheus Bound* is likely not to be the work of Aeschylus.¹ While Suzanne Saïd has recently criticized the validity of Griffith's conclusions in the lexical sphere and a study of sentence structure published in the same year as Griffith's book reached a conclusion opposite to his,² his analysis of the metrical data has gone substantially unchallenged. Much of the material catalogued and discussed by Griffith relies heavily on earlier studies, but one of his most original and striking chapters concerns *Prometheus'* use of recitative anapests; even reviewers who favor Aeschylean authorship have acknowledged this chapter to contain one of the most powerful arguments against authenticity.³

It is the intent of the present paper to suggest that closer analysis of the data, distinguishing between actors' anapests and choral anapests, yields a different conclusion. For purely numerical counts of metrical patterns to be valid as indices of authenticity, the patterns in question must be phenomena of more or less unconscious preference.

¹M. Griffith, *The Authenticity of 'Prometheus Bound'* (Cambridge 1977).

²S. Saïd, *Sophiste et tyran ou le problème du Prométhée enchaîné* (Paris 1985) 32–36, 65–73; S. Ireland, "Sentence Structure in Aeschylus and the Position of the Prometheus in the Corpus Aeschyleum," *Philologus* 121 (1977) 189–210. E. Flintoff, "The Date of the Prometheus Bound," *Mnemosyne* 39 (1986) 84–86, argues that *Prometheus Bound* influenced Epicharmus and must therefore date to Aeschylus' time, rather than later, although I am not convinced that we can pinpoint Epicharmus' dates so precisely as to determine which part of Aeschylus' career *Prometheus* belongs to. M. L. West, "The Prometheus Trilogy," *JHS* 99 (1979) 130 was certainly premature in judging the controversy settled once and for all on the basis of Griffith's work.

³See especially C. J. Herington, rev. Griffith (note 1 above), *PhQ* 58 (1979) 117, and *AJP* 100 (1979) 420. Also, cf. reviews by A. F. Garvie, in *JHS* 99 (1979) 173, M. Davies, in *CR* 29 (1979) 6, and R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Studies in Aeschylus* (Cambridge 1983) 176.

If it can be shown, as I believe it can for Aeschylus, that patterns are sometimes deliberately chosen for contextual reasons, mere counts come to be of less value unless carefully coordinated with these contextual parameters. I would argue that actors' anapests, particularly in the work of Aeschylus, tend to exhibit different patterns from those of the more common choral anapests, whether for the sake of distinctive characterization or as emotional markers. The apparent eccentricity of *Prometheus*' anapests relative to those in Aeschylus' other plays may therefore be due to their being mostly actors' anapests.⁴ On the other hand, the passages of choral anapests in *Prometheus Bound* and in the fragments of *Unbound* exhibit patterns which conform almost exactly to Aeschylus' norms for choral anapests. I believe that scrutiny of *Prometheus*' anapests within this framework not only fails to prove the play's inauthenticity, but in fact tends to support the case for seeing it as a genuine work of Aeschylus.

One might object right away that the very fact of *Prometheus Bound* featuring more use of actors' anapests than choral anapests is itself indicative of an un-Aeschylean technique, more in line with late fifth-century tragedy.⁵ But it should be noted that *Eumenides* also features extensive use of actors' anapests, in the divine character of Athena, as opposed to sparing use of choral anapests. Anapestic dimeters may well have been thought a metrical form of particular dignity, especially suitable for the entrance and speech of divinities,⁶ and thus

⁴In *Prometheus Bound*, 215 out of 239 metra are actors' anapests. This compares with 15 out of 199 in *Persians*, 75 out of 243 in *Agamemnon*, and none in *Suppliants* and *Choephoroe* (out of 86 and 101 metra respectively). However, at 71 out of 88, *Eumenides* has a proportion of actors' anapests approaching that of *Prometheus*.

⁵Griffith (note 1 above) 111–15 surveys the arguments against *Prometheus*' anapests in terms of dramatic structure. However, since the three other plays of Aeschylus using actors' anapests (*Pers.*, *Ag.*, *Eum.*) all integrate the anapests into the dramatic structure somewhat differently from each other, it would be hazardous to think that we know what Aeschylus was or was not capable of doing in this regard. S. G. Brown, "A Contextual Analysis of Tragic Meter: The Anapest," in J. H. D'Arms and J. W. Eadie, eds., *Ancient and Modern: Essays in Honor of Gerald F. Else* (Ann Arbor 1977) 47, 51–59, 66 n. 25, 67–69, 75–76, studies Aeschylus' dramatic use of anapests relative to that of Sophocles and Euripides, and generally finds *Prometheus*' anapests more in line with Aeschylean usage than with either of the other two dramatists.

⁶In addition to Athena in *Eumenides*, compare Heracles in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* (1409–51), Thanatos in Euripides' *Alcestis* (29–36), or Artemis in *Hippolytus* (1283–95). Brown (note 5 above) 48 associates the anapests especially with "a change in levels of

amply attested in *Prometheus*, where the actors are all, with the exception of Io, divine. It should further be noted that *Prometheus Unbound*, which must, I think, be conjoined with *Prometheus Bound* in terms of authenticity,⁷ does seem to have utilized choral anapests to a much greater degree, featuring an extended anapestic parodos of the type quite familiar in Aeschylus, but uncommon in Sophocles and Euripides.⁸

I. PERIOD LENGTH

The importance of differentiating between actors' anapests and choral anapests is immediately apparent from consideration of period length (i.e., the ratio of anapestic metra to clausular paroemiacs): one of Griffith's chief grounds for doubting that *Prometheus*' anapests are Aeschylean is their average period length of 13.9, as opposed to a range of between 5.0 and 8.7 for the other plays of Aeschylus.⁹ If anything, Griffith understates the problem, since the correct figure for *Prometheus* by my calculation is not 13.9 but 15.9; however, the range for the other plays of Aeschylus is also higher, by my calculation extending from 5.0 (*Choephoroe*) to 9.4 (*Persians*).¹⁰ What these raw figures con-

reality within a mimetic event," including entrances and invocations of both gods and royalty.

⁷Griffith (note 1 above) 245-52 regards it as possible that *Prometheus Unbound* was a genuinely Aeschylean play, with *Prometheus Bound* being a monodrama written in response to it. Here, I must agree with the reservations of Herington, rev. Griffith (note 1 above), *AJP* 100 (1979) 424-25, who notes the numerous stylistic, metrical, structural, and thematic similarities between the two plays. See also Winnington-Ingram (note 3 above) 177-78 who stresses that *Prometheus Bound* at many points looks forward to another play even as clearly as *Suppliants* and *Agamemnon* do. The notion that another poet would "respond" to an Aeschylean play by writing a drama consciously leading up to it in plot is without parallel; sequels work better either as recastings of the same events (e.g., Sophocles' or Euripides' *Electra*) or as plots constructed around subsequent events (e.g., Euripides' *Orestes*).

⁸Three of the six other plays of Aeschylus have such a parodos (*Pers.* 1-64; *Suppl.* 1-39; *Ag.* 40-103). In the rest of extant Greek tragedy, we see it only in Sophocles, *Ajax* 134-71, and Euripides, *Hecuba* 98-153.

⁹See the figures in Griffith (note 1 above) 71-72.

¹⁰My figures are 5.0 (*Choe.*), 6.6 (*Suppl.*), 8.0 (*Eum.*), 9.0 (*Ag.*), 9.4 (*Pers.*), 15.9 (*PV*). These figures differ from Griffith's for all the plays except *Choe.* and *Eum.*, largely on grounds of different textual readings (I use Page's OCT text; Griffith uses the older

ceal is the fact that the ratio is lower for the other plays of Aeschylus because, with the exception of *Eumenides*, they consist overwhelmingly of choral anapests. Paroemiacs are frequently used as a paragraphing device in long choral passages such as *Pers.* 1–64, *Ag.* 40–103, or *Suppl.* 1–39, and often even in much shorter choral passages such as *Pers.* 140–54, *Ag.* 355–66, 1331–42, *Choe.* 306–14, or *Eum.* 307–20. *Prometheus*, on the other hand, has no long choral passage and only two fairly short ones (*PV* 277–83, 1063–70), neither of which exhibits any particular need for division. Actors' anapests normally do not use a paroemiatic except at the end of the passage (*Eum.* 1009 being the sole exception in Aeschylus).¹¹ Hence, it should come as no surprise that the average period length is higher for *Prometheus Bound*, in which actors' anapests predominate.¹² Indeed, the average period length specifically for actors' anapests in the other plays of Aeschylus is 12.4 (with the range being *Pers.* 15.0, *Ag.* 12.5, *Eum.* 11.8); at 16.5, the average period length of actors' anapests in *Prometheus* is somewhat higher, but not out of range.¹³

OCT of Murray) and different decisions about what to exclude or not exclude as melic anapests. See n. 15 and Tables 1 and 4 below. Griffith's figure for *Prometheus*, however, is wrong even under his own counts of anapests (236 metra—he may be omitting three metra with uncertain readings, which nevertheless must be counted to determine period length) and paroemiatics (15). That such an important figure as this should be miscalculated or misprinted in Griffith's book raises some troubling questions about the reliability of his statistics in cases where he is not deriving them from the work of other scholars.

¹¹*Eum.* 1009 is exceptional because it marks a change in Athena's addressee in 1010 (ὄψεῖς δ' . . .), as she turns away from the Furies to address the citizens of Athens. There is no way that 1003–9 (addressed to the Furies) and 1010–13 (addressed to the Athenians) could be part of the same period; this has nothing to do with considerations of period length. On the other hand, Sophocles (*Trach.* 1173; *OC* 1753, 1763) and Euripides (*Med.* 170, 1089, 1097, 1104; *Hipp.* 1350; *Tro.* 104, 109; *Ion* 88, 93, 101) make more extensive use of paroemiatic paragraphing in actors' anapests, even in contexts not involving a change of address. *Prometheus* (which does not use paragraphing paroemiatics) is in this respect Aeschylean and unlike the technique of the other two tragedians.

¹²The predominance of actors' anapests also explains the higher average period lengths evident in the work of Sophocles and Euripides; see the figures in Griffith (note 1 above) 71–72.

¹³It is certainly credible that we could have a range between 11.8 and 16.5 for actors' anapests in Aeschylus (a total difference of 4.7), given that Sophocles' anapests exhibit a range between 7.5 in *Trachiniae* and 15.0 in *Philoctetes*, both plays featuring almost exclusively actors' anapests (a total difference of 7.5). In Euripides, the range is even wider, from 6.2 in *Rhesus* to 20.0 in *Hippolytus*, again plays mostly featuring actors' anapests (a total difference of 13.8).

II. METRON TYPES

Griffith's other main argument against *Prometheus*' anapests is the pattern of anapest-spondee-dactyl combinations in each metron:¹⁴ as can be seen from Table 1, *Prometheus* shows a stronger tendency to favor SA (spondee-anapest), less use of DS (dactyl-spondee), far less use of AA (anapest-anapest), and far more use of SS (spondee-spondee) than the other plays of Aeschylus. However, Griffith's figures for *Persians* were seriously distorted by his decision not to count lines 909-30; if these lines are included, as I have done in Table 1, one can see that the percentages for *Prometheus Bound* are in fact quite close to those for *Persians*, not differing by more than four points in any category. Since *Persians* is one of the two other plays of Aeschylus with the broadest statistical sample (199 anapestic metra), this similarity of proportions makes it difficult to rule out *Prometheus* as Aeschylean on these grounds.

Data of this sort can sometimes be deceptive because of the possibility of sampling error—i.e., statistical deviation from the actual norm due to mere chance; the probability of such deviation grows as the sample size becomes smaller. In comparing a range of figures for *Prometheus Bound* with the other surviving plays of Aeschylus, we are really comparing two samples, each of which may be in some degree unrepresentative of its author's normative technique. The possibility of sampling error is thus even greater. There is a fairly simple statistical operation, known as the "chi-square test," which allows us to estimate the probability of any statistical difference or set of differences being due to mere chance.¹⁵ This test is defined by the formula

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{(f_i - F_i)^2}{F_i}$$

where n is the total number of statistical categories examined, multiplied by the number of samples compared, f_i the observed number (not the observed percentage) in each category for each sample, and F_i the

¹⁴Griffith (note 1 above) 68-70.

¹⁵For a fuller discussion of the chi-square test and its applications, see the standard textbook of G. W. Snedecor and W. G. Cochran, *Statistical Methods* (Ames 1967) 20-29, 215-19, 228-31.

TABLE 1. Types of Anapestic Metra in Aeschylus (Total)¹⁶

	SA	DS	SS	AS	AA	DD	SD	AD	No. of metra
<i>Pers.</i>	28%	30%	14%	10%	17%	1%	1%	0%	197
<i>Suppl.</i>	24	29	6	16	20	3	0	1	86
<i>Ag.</i>	21	33	5	11	24	3	1	1	243
<i>Choe.</i>	18	44	8	12	18	0	0	1	101
<i>Eum.</i>	25	33	1	16	18	3	1	2	88
Aeschylus	24	33	7.5	12	20	2	0.5	1	715
PV	31	26	16	14	12	1	0	0	239

expected number in each category for each sample (based on whatever hypothesis is being tested). In analyzing the use of different anapestic metron types, $n = 16$ (eight different metron types \times two samples, those for *Prometheus* and the rest of Aeschylus), f_i is the actual count of each metron type for each of the two samples, and F_i the expected count on the hypothesis that the figures from the two samples should be the same (calculated here by adding the actual counts for each metron type in both samples, divided by the total number of metra in both samples [here, 965], then multiplied by the total number of metra in each sample). The calculated value of χ^2 can then be located on a standard statistical chart, relative to the number of degrees of freedom (i.e., the number of independent variables in the equation), which will tell one what the probability is of a given set of statistical differences being due to chance.

¹⁶There are some differences between my figures and those given in Griffith's Table 2 (note 1 above) 69. As noted in n. 10 above, these differences may be due to textual readings (Griffith, for instance, follows Murray in accepting Weil's conjecture in *Suppl.* 10 and thus reading the line as a paroemiac rather than as an anapestic dimeter with a lacuna) or to different definitions of melic anapests. I exclude as melic only those anapests which are actually combined in a continuous passage with other non-anapestic meters, whereas Griffith's criteria seem more subjective (see his remarks on pp. 68–69). In contrast to Griffith, I therefore exclude *Ag.* 1455–57, 1489–93, 1513–17, 1537–47, all part of choral ephymnia and clearly set apart from Clytemnestra's genuinely recitative anapests. But I include *Pers.* 908–30 (which Griffith excludes for the purpose of counting metron types, but curiously decides to include for the purpose of counting paroemiacs); for further justification of my view here, see n. 23 below. At least in the case of *Persians*, the inclusion of these lines makes a substantial difference in the total statistical result.

It is unfortunate that Griffith makes no use of the chi-square test or any other index of statistical accuracy, since his study is based on statistical evidence. Nevertheless, application of this test to the anapestic metron types of *Prometheus* relative to the other plays of Aeschylus confirms Griffith's conclusion of significant difference: $\chi^2 = 33.54$, with seven degrees of freedom, which yields an infinitesimal probability (less than 0.1%) that the anapestic ratios of *Prometheus* were merely due to random variance. However, it is also significant to note that the chi-square test yields comparable results when applied to *Persians*: $\chi^2 = 23.15$, with seven degrees of freedom, which is somewhat lower than the figure for *Prometheus*, but still indicates only an infinitesimal probability of the difference being due to random variation. Since the authenticity of *Persians* is not in doubt, something else must be operative in determining an author's ratio of anapestic metron types within each play.

I believe that Aeschylus' selection of anapestic patterns can be shown to be consciously related to context in many cases, especially (although not exclusively) in actors' anapests, and that such considerations may explain why we find somewhat higher percentages for SA and SS in *Prometheus*, along with somewhat lower percentages for DS and AA. Indeed, none of the three sequences of actors' anapests in the certainly authentic work of Aeschylus conforms to the statistical norms. A chosen pattern may be repeated or avoided to give a passage a distinctive metrical signature or tone characteristic of the personage who delivers the anapests. The most extended system of actors' anapests in Aeschylus is that of Athena in *Eumenides* (*Eum.* 927–1013), in the scene reconciling the Furies and establishing them as new divinities on Athenian soil. Out of 71 anapestic metra here, only one takes the form SS,¹⁷ as opposed to a range between 5% and 14% for the other

¹⁷It may be significant that this one SS-metron comes at the beginning of 1010, immediately after the unusual paragraphing paroemiac in 1009 (on which, see n. 11 above); it is also the only anapestic dimeter in the play with word overlap between the metra. The intended effect may be to set off Athena's speech to the mortal Athenians as sharply different from her speech to the Furies—heavier, more imperious. Lines 1010–13 are in fact the final anapestic lines delivered by Athena, inaugurating the torchlight procession which concludes the trilogy. The complete avoidance of SS until this emphatic point must have been consciously intended.

plays of Aeschylus.¹⁸ This deliberate avoidance of the all spondaic metron may be designed to give Athena's speech a lighter and quicker character, dominated by anapests and dactyls, but without the slow, ponderous weightiness of SS metra; this lighter tone is altogether appropriate to the context, which is one of reconciliation, celebration, and relief from the tragic conflicts of the preceding trilogy.

We find the very opposite happening at the end of *Persians*. In many ways, the plot and imagery of this play build up to the climactic entrance of the defeated Xerxes, whose first speech (*Pers.* 908–17) is delivered in anapests. The opening words δούστηνος ἐγώ take the form of the metron SA, which is then repeated throughout Xerxes' lament as a sort of rhythmic echo: indeed, 6 of the 15 metra in this short speech take the form SA, including a consecutive run of three such metra in lines 911–12.¹⁹ SA is not the most favored metron form in Aeschylus (DS is), but its repetition here may be intended to lend weight and gravity to Xerxes' lament: by beginning the metron (and here, usually beginning the dimeter) with a spondee, it slows the tempo and adds solemnity. This effect is carried even further by the anapests of the chorus in response to Xerxes (lines 918–30), where the dominant metrical form becomes SS (9 metra out of 21).²⁰ Normally the least frequent of the five principal combinations (see Table 1), SS here stands as the most frequent,²¹ lending the chorus' lament an even graver and heavier tone, particularly apparent in the three all-spondaic dimeters (SSSS).²² The sorrow and grief of the chorus for the Persian disaster, which re-

¹⁸ With $\chi^2 = 4.85$ (one degree of freedom), the ratio of SS metra in *Eumenides* has a random probability of only about 3%. It therefore seems unlikely that the low frequency of SS in the play occurs by chance, particularly considering the emphatic transitional position of the one SS metron.

¹⁹ Moreover, in five of eight cases in this passage, SA is in the emphatic opening position in the line. We have a total distribution of 40% SA, 20% DS, 7% SS, 20% AS, 7% AA in this passage.

²⁰ In addition, we should note that the paroemiac in line 921 and the proceleusmatic in 930 both begin with SS.

²¹ The total distribution for lines 918–30 is SA 10%, DS 24%, SS 43%, AS 14%, AA 10%. The random probability of such a high SS proportion in a passage of this length is less than 0.5% ($\chi^2 = 13.17$, one degree of freedom), and thus highly significant in statistical terms.

²² These are extremely rare, occurring twice in *Prometheus Bound* (PV 93, which is Prometheus' first anapestic line and indeed the first in the play, and PV 1076, spoken by Hermes in a run of four consecutive SS metra), but nowhere else in Aeschylus.

ceives its final confirmation with Xerxes' appearance onstage, is effectively and resonantly expressed by the slow and heavy metrical form.²³

The overall metrical ratios of Clytemnestra's anapestic system in *Agamemnon* (Ag. 1462–1576) are not much different from the norm, but there are some passages within her anapests which show significant choice of patterns for emphasis. Most noticeable are the striking dactylic runs at lines 1525–27 (describing Agamemnon's killing of Iphigeneia) and lines 1552–54 (describing Clytemnestra's killing of Agamemnon). Broadhead has noted Aeschylus' general preference for avoiding more than one dactyl within a dimeter, since two dactyls will tend to give the line a dactylic shape rather than an anapestic one.²⁴ But in these two passages, Aeschylus seems intentionally to have broken this rule. In lines 1525–27,

ἀλλ' ἐμὸν ἐκ τοῦδ' ἔρνος ἀεθρὲν
τὴν πολυκλαύτην
Ἴφιγένειαν ἀνάξια δράσας
ἄξια πάσων μηδὲν ἐν Αἰδοῦ . . . ,

we have an unbroken sequence of no fewer than seven dactylic metra, three of the form DS on each side surrounding a metron of the form DD in the middle (where Iphigeneia is named). The overlap Ἴφιγένειαν ἀνάξια, failing to observe the usual diaeresis between anapestic metra, helps to create the rhythm and flow that one might expect from dactylic hexameters or lyric dactyls; nothing could be further from anapestic

²³ As noted in n. 16 above, Griffith excludes these lines as melic anapests, as does F. Kussmahly, *Beobachtungen zum Prometheus des Aeschylus* (Progr. Berlin 1888) 8. Lines 922–30 of this passage are indeed marked by Doric α-forms and a proceleusmatic at the end instead of the usual paroemiac; but it would be better to view these lines as transitional rather than as truly melic, since they strictly observe metron diaeresis (unlike melic anapests) and their contiguity to the chorus' unquestionably recitative lines 918–21 invites us to see the passage as a continuous development of thought. See the discussions of H. D. Broadhead, *The Persae of Aeschylus* (Cambridge 1960) 287, and A. M. Dale, *The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama*² (Cambridge 1968) 54. Even if we do regard these anapests as melic, this does not explain the preponderance of SS, since no one has yet demonstrated that melic anapests feature ratios of metron types different from recitative anapests. Indeed, the distinction between "recitative" and "melic" may be overplayed: what is usually called "recitative" might better be viewed as a "reduced melodic" form, as recently argued by G. Nagy, *Pindar's Homer: The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past* (Baltimore 1990) 45–49.

²⁴ Broadhead (note 23 above) 285.

dimeters. Although shorter, the dactylic run is even more striking in lines 1552–54, from Clytemnestra's next speech, picking up where she left off in 1529:

τοῦτο· πρὸς ἡμῶν
κάππεσε κάτθανε, καὶ καταθάψομεν
οὐχ ὑπὸ κλαυθμῶν τῶν ἐξ οἴκων, . . .

Most significant is line 1553, a dimeter consisting entirely of dactyls (DDDD), a rare form not elsewhere found in Aeschylus.²⁵ Fraenkel notes that the dactylic rhythm is highlighted by the Homeric forms *κάππεσε* and *κάτθανε*, and the epic word *κλαυθμῶν*.²⁶ Even more clearly than in lines 1525–27, we see the dactyls associated with death, and the repeated *κατα*-prefix suggests the intuitive idea that the dactyl represents falling.

However, after the adversative *ἀλλ'* in line 1555, we see a complete change of rhythm, with no dactyls at all in the remaining lines, but a strongly anapestic sequence:

ἀλλ' Ἰφιγένειά νιν ἀσπασίως
θυγάτηρ, ὥς χρή,
πατέρ' ἀντιάσασα πρὸς ὠκύπορον
πόρθμευμ' ἀχέων
περὶ χεῖρα βαλοῦσα φιλήσει. (Ag. 1555–59)

The passage interweaves AA, SA, and AS, with overlap being used in lines 1555 (SAAA), 1557 (AAAA), and in the anapestic paroemiac 1559 (~~~~~) to create a sense of flow reminiscent of melic anapests. Iphigeneia, whose passive death had previously been described amid falling dactyls, is here treated as a character very much alive in the Underworld: the verbal energy of the all-anapestic dimeter in line 1557 rhythmically evokes the image of the young girl running up to meet her father. This anapestic dominance is continued in Clytemnestra's final speech (1567–76), where dactyls are rare and unemphatic,²⁷ and the

²⁵The one other case of such a line known to me in all of Greek tragedy is Euripides, *Hipp.* 1361, which is followed by yet another DD metron (for a run of three).

²⁶E. Fraenkel, *Aeschylus: Agamemnon* (Oxford 1950) III, 734. Augments are not normally dropped in anapests. Fraenkel also notes that *κλαυθμός* is not elsewhere used in tragedy, and thus has a distinctly epic flavor.

²⁷There are only three DS metra in Ag. 1567–76 (at 18%, about half the usual frequency). We do not see more than one dactyl in any given line in this passage, and with

form SA is most common (at 41%, twice its frequency in the rest of *Agamemnon*). Since the dactyls have appeared in lines 1525–27 and 1552–54 as a leitmotif evoking the cycle of death and murderous revenge, it is appropriate that Clytemnestra avoid them in 1567–76, where she expressly voices the wish that the cycle should now cease. The emphatic shift in metrical tempo and rhythm, which begins at line 1555 and continues into the next speech, underscores the rhetorical shift at this point away from confrontation with the chorus over the past and toward Clytemnestra's hopes for a future when the accounts will be balanced and the bloodshed at an end.²⁸

This use of significant runs of a single metrical pattern is not limited to actors' anapests. There are at least two highly visible cases of this phenomenon in the anapestic parodos of *Agamemnon*, the first at its opening (Ag. 40–43):

δέκατον μὲν ἔτος τόδ' ἐπεὶ Πριάμου
μέγας ἀντίδικος
Μενέλαος ἀνάξ' ἦδ' Ἀγαμέμνων,
διθρόνου Διόθεν καὶ δισκήπτρου. . . .

The anapestic character of the parodos is strongly established by the run of four AA metra at the beginning, interrupted only with the naming of Agamemnon, which with its dactylic rhythm (ἦδ' Ἀγαμέμνων) marks an emphatic reversal and stands out markedly from the otherwise purely anapestic context (continued in the next line). By breaking the anapestic rhythm, the name acquires a special resonance. We see a similar phenomenon with the first naming of Agamemnon's wife and counterpart, Clytemnestra (Ag. 83–86):

σὺ δέ, Τυνδάρεω
θύγατερ, βασίλεια Κλυταιμῆστρα,
τί χρέος; τί νέον; τί δ' ἐπαισθομένη,
τίνος ἀγγελίας . . . ;

the exception of the monometer line 1568, there are always at least two anapests in any line containing a dactyl, thus emphasizing the anapestic character of the verse here.

²⁸Critics have sometimes seen a shift in the character of the dialogue at about this point, as Clytemnestra comes to recognize the primacy of the family's destiny in events. See, for instance, G. J. P. O'Daly, "Clytemnestra and the Elders: Dramatic Technique in Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 1372–1576," *MH* 42 (1985) 5–9. However, I would place the actual turning-point at 1555, as argued, rather than at 1552.

Here at the beginning of the third major section of the parodos,²⁹ the purely anapestic rhythm of the opening is resumed, to be interrupted only by the name Clytemnestra. The metron in which the queen is named takes the form AS, and is thus less disruptive of the anapestic context than Agamemnon's naming in line 42, but it still stands as the only metron not fully anapestic in a context of six other metra all of which take the form AA.³⁰ Of course, both names have to interrupt their contexts, because they cannot take an anapestic shape. But Aeschylus without doubt did wish to give them special emphasis by embedding them within otherwise purely anapestic contexts.

Having established that Aeschylus did select metrical patterns for literary purposes, particularly (though not exclusively) in the actors' anapests, let us consider whether this may be the case with the anapests of *Prometheus Bound*. As we have observed, one of its principal noteworthy features is the high proportion of SS and low proportion of AA relative to the other works of Aeschylus. But much of this is due to the tumultuous exchange between Prometheus and Hermes in the exodos, where we see 24% of the metra with the form SS, and only 6% with the form AA;³¹ this is indeed quite striking, since AA is usually more than twice as common as SS in Aeschylus. We also observe the same tendency, to a lesser degree, in the earlier anapests of Prometheus (14% SS, 12% AA).³² As we have seen before, a preference for spondees gives the verse a special gravity and seriousness, such as befits the cosmic conflict enacted here, and coming into sharpest confrontation in the exo-

²⁹The parodos appears to be structured around δέκστων μὲν ἔτος τόδ' . . . (40), ἡμεῖς δέ . . . (72), and σὺ δέ . . . (83). For the coordination of the first two terms, see Fraenkel (note 26 above) II, 27. σὺ δέ . . . can only work as an additional term parallel to ἡμεῖς δέ . . .

³⁰In addition, we should note that the anapestic run is prepared for by an AA-paroemiac in 82, and closed by a SA-paroemiac in 87. Accordingly, there are no disruptive DS, SS, or DD metra anywhere in this strongly anapestic period.

³¹The heavily spondaic character of this exchange is reinforced by two of the four paroemiacs taking the SS form. Note also the four consecutive SS metra in 1075-77. The exodos compared to the rest of the play in terms of SS and AA yields $\chi^2 = 8.31$ (with two degrees of freedom), for a probability of less than 2% that its deviation could be due to random sampling error. Despite their marked difference from the rest of the play, Prometheus' and Hermes' anapests here amount to 83 metra, constituting well over one-third of all the anapestic metra in the play; they are thus quite significant in their impact on the composite figures for *Prometheus Bound*.

³²Here again, the spondaic character is reinforced by three out of the six paroemiacs being of the SS type.

dos. It is significant that the anapests of Ocean and Io (characters not directly involved in the conflict) do not exhibit the same preference, but a more normal proportion (10% SS, 18% AA), as do those of the chorus (8% SS, 17% AA).

The other aspect of *Prometheus*' anapests which has drawn attention is the preference for SA over DS as the primary metron form. This preference seems to be distributed over most of the play,³³ with the exception of Hermes' anapests (22% SA, 37.5% DS) and the chorus' (25% SA, 33% DS). However, I am not persuaded that much significance should be attached to this, given that the figures for *Prometheus Bound* in proportional terms are fairly close (31% SA, 26% DS), as they are for *Persians* (28% SA, 30% DS) and *Suppliants* (24% SA, 30% DS). Indeed, the wide range of figures that we see within *Oresteia* (with *Choephoroe* at 18% SA, 44% DS and *Eumenides* at 25% SA, 33% DS) should make us suspicious of the idea that Aeschylus necessarily used these in a fixed and reliable proportion.³⁴ Indeed, we cannot rule out the possibility that the ratios for SA and DS in *Prometheus* are merely due to sampling error.³⁵ Even if we accept that the seeming preference for SA in *Prometheus* was not accidental, it could be because SA (with its spondaic opening) seemed heavier and more ponderous, thus fitting the play's overall mood; it is noteworthy that the anapestic system with the highest concentration of DS in Aeschylus is the hopeful and excited kommos of *Choephoroe*,³⁶ suggesting that DS was sometimes felt to

³³ One can note that there seems to be somewhat more SA in the first half of the play (up to line 565), whereas SA and DS are about even in the second half. But I am not sure that this is of any significance.

³⁴ There is a total difference of 18% (25%–18% for SA, 44%–33% for DS) between the figures for *Choephoroe* and *Eumenides*, as opposed to a difference of only 7% (31%–28% for SA, 30%–26% for DS) between the figures for *Prometheus* and *Persians*, 10% between *Prometheus* and *Suppliants*, or 13% between *Prometheus* and *Eumenides*. Indeed, *Choephoroe* reveals a 14% difference relative to the closest play of Aeschylus (*Agamemnon*) and is further from all the other plays than *Prometheus* is.

³⁵ $\chi^2 = 6.14$, with two degrees of freedom, for SA and DS in *Prometheus*, yielding a probability of random sampling error near 5%—the borderline figure in statistical analysis. To put this in perspective, at least four of the 90 plays Aeschylus wrote might have had this ratio of SA and DS, or an even more divergent one, merely due to chance and independent of any contextual factors.

³⁶ SA and DS are roughly equal in the anapests of the first part of the kommos, but after *Choe.* 372, we see a decided shift to DS, which accounts for 14 out of 24 metra (58%), as opposed to no SA or SS. When compared to the rest of *Choephoroe*, $\chi^2 = 11.02$ (with four degrees of freedom), giving a probability of less than 2% that this is due to random sampling error. This striking dactylic movement comes at the point when the siblings'

give the verse a lighter and more active texture, quite out of keeping with the static character of *Prometheus Bound*.

In sum, there is nothing in *Prometheus Bound*'s selection of metron types which is inconsistent with Aeschylus' demonstrable technique of significant patterning; on the contrary, there is much here that resembles Aeschylus' technique. To the extent that the play's patterns differ from the "normal" percentages for each metron type, it can be linked with contextual factors. The question remains whether this kind of significant patterning in the anapests was also employed by the other tragedians or was distinctively Aeschylean. One finds some evidence for it in the actors' anapests of Sophocles: in Heracles' *deus ex machina* at the end of *Philoctetes* (*Phil.* 1409–17, 1449–51), we observe a heavy concentration of SS and very little use of dactyls (33% SS, 6% DS).³⁷ The same pattern can also be found in the anapestic dialogue surrounding the entrance of the agonized Heracles in *Trach.* 974–1003 (28% SS, 9% DS). As in Aeschylus, the spondee gives a sense of gravity and laborious movement, as opposed to the dactyl, which is perhaps the lightest of the three feet (and thus to be avoided in contexts like these). What is perhaps most striking about Sophocles, however, is that these two short passages (18 metra and 46 metra respectively) are the only clear cases of such significant patterning, even though Sophocles uses actors' anapests more extensively than Aeschylus. Euripides, who uses actors' anapests even more than Sophocles, offers no example of an entire speech or system with abnormally high proportions of a single

prayer makes contact with Agamemnon and they are filled with an active resolve to avenge his death. In this regard, the dactyls bear the same overtones we perceived in Clytemnestra's amoebaeon in *Agamemnon* (particularly *Ag.* 1525–27 and 1552–54), reflecting the cycle of death and revenge, which is now being renewed. That *Choe.* 372 marks a critical transition point in the kommos is also indicated by the structure of lyric stanzas: the three strophic sets of *Choe.* 315–71 are interwoven, and after the anapests of *Choe.* 372–79 a new sequence of three strophic sets is introduced, interwoven among each other in exactly the same order. W. C. Scott, *Musical Design in Aeschylean Theater* (Hanover 1984) 88–89 notes that this new sequence initiates the movement toward a more persistent and uniform metrical pattern, as opposed to the shifting variety of meters in the first group of three strophes and antistrophes. Indeed, the dactylic patterns in strophe and antistrophe reinforce what we observe in the anapests after *Choe.* 372.

³⁷This compares with 15% SS and 23% DS for *Philoctetes* as a whole (Griffith's figures), which is fairly representative of the general tendency in Sophocles. Compared to the rest of *Philoctetes*, there is only a 2.5% probability of the SS and DS ratios in Heracles' lines being random ($\chi^2 = 7.61$, with two degrees of freedom).

TABLE 2. Types of Anapestic Metra in Sophocles' *Ajax* and Euripides' *Medea*

	SA	DS	SS	AS	AA	DD	SD	No. of metra	χ^2	Prob.
<i>Ajax</i>										
Chorus	27%	18%	11%	21%	23%	0%	0%	84	2.09	70%
Tecmessa, 201-62	26	30	7	17	20	0	0	54	3.53	50%
Teucer, 1402-7	37	11	7	15	26	4	0	27	2.02	70%
TOTAL	28	21	9	19	22	1	0	165		
<i>Medea</i>										
Chorus	35	39	6	5	14	1	0	83	8.12	9%
Medea, 96-167	31	28	3	12.5	16	9	0	32	1.52	80%
Nurse, 98-172	29	35	8	17	12	0	0	104	3.12	55%
Medea, 1391-1404	20	27	20	27	7	0	0	15	6.74	15%
Jason, 1389-1414	38	18	15	12	9	6	3	34	3.72	45%
TOTAL	32	32	8	13	12	2	0	268		

metron type.³⁸ At most, one finds a couple of lines where there may be emphatic runs of a single metron (as in *Hipp.* 1361-62, where DDDD is followed by DDDS, accenting Hippolytus' lament, or in *Med.* 1412-14, where Jason's lament is concluded with four consecutive SA metra and a SA-paroemiac).

For reasons of space, I am not giving detailed breakdowns for all the plays of Sophocles and Euripides, but in Table 2 I record the metron frequencies for various parts of *Ajax* and *Medea*, the extant plays of each author which feature the most use of both choral and actors' anapests. In addition, I have calculated chi-squares for each section relative to the play as a whole, along with the probabilities of the distributions being due to random variation (in performing this calculation, metra of the type DD or SD were counted with DS, to avoid the statistical distortion possible with extremely small categories). As can be

³⁸One can note that the climactic anapestic dialogue of Jason and Medea (*Med.* 1389-1414) features a proportion of SS (16%) which is twice as high as in the play overall (8%), and lower proportions of AA (8%) and DS (20%), as opposed to 13% and 32% respectively in the play as a whole. But the percentage differences are still fairly low and the sample small; this is certainly not as striking as what we find either in Aeschylus or *Prometheus*, or even sometimes in Sophocles. As noted in Table 2, the overall chi-square for Jason and Medea here does not yield statistically significant results.

TABLE 3. Types of Anapestic Metra (Choral)

	SA	DS	SS	AS	AA	DD	SD	AD	No. of metra
Aesch. <i>Pers.</i>	27%	31%	14%	9%	17%	1%	1%	0%	182
<i>Suppl.</i>	24	29	6	16	20	3	0	1	86
<i>Ag.</i>	20	33	4	11	28	2	1	1	168
<i>Choe.</i>	18	44	8	12	18	0	0	1	101
TOTAL	23	34	8	11	21	2	0	1	554
<i>Prom. Bound</i>	25	33	8	17	17	0	0	0	24
<i>Prom. Unbound</i>	24	29	10	14	24	0	0	0	21
Soph. <i>Ajax</i>	27	18	11	21	23	0	0	0	84
<i>Ant.</i>	30	24	11	15	19	0	1	0	107
Eur. <i>Medea</i>	35	39	6	5	14	1	0	0	83
<i>Hecuba</i>	42	23	3	18	13	2	0	0	101

seen, no section reaches the threshold of 5% probability customarily required for establishing statistical significance; only the choral passages in *Medea* even come close, but this is largely due to their low figure for AS, which seems unlikely to have been intentional marking.

The picture is not much different for the other plays of Sophocles and Euripides. Readers other than myself may be able to locate something significant in the figures for different sections of their plays. Except for the cases mentioned, I cannot. Accordingly, my conclusion is that significant anapestic patterning was most important in the work of Aeschylus. To the extent that one believes such patterning to exist in the anapests of *Prometheus Bound*, as I have argued that it does, this play is more likely to be Aeschylean than the work of a later poet. If the technique of anapestic patterning was unfamiliar to Euripides and used only sparingly even by Sophocles, it seems improbable that it would be practiced by an otherwise unknown tragedian with the degree of skill which we see in *Prometheus'* exodos.

We typically see less patterning in choral anapests, and where we do see it, it is either a direct result of choral interaction with a dramatic character (as in *Pers.* 918–30 or *Choe.* 372–478) or it is limited to a few significant lines (as in *Ag.* 40–43, 83–86). Choral anapests may therefore be more reliable as the indicator of an author's normative prefer-

ences than actors' anapests, particularly in the work of Aeschylus, where as we have seen, every system of actors' anapests is somehow marked. Although the two passages of choral anapests in *Prometheus Bound* are brief (24 metra in all), they are relatively unmarked in emotional terms and thus may be a good barometer of the author's natural tendencies. It is striking that these two passages, along with the three anapestic fragments from *Prometheus Unbound* (frag. 190–92),³⁹ reveal ratios of metron selection which almost exactly match those for the other plays of Aeschylus, as is shown by Table 3.

Indeed, *Choephoroe* is the Aeschylean play which stands out here, because of its high dactylic percentage (44% DS) related, as we have seen, to contextual factors; the figure of 15% SS in *Persians* may also be to a lesser extent contextually related, as is the figure of 28% AA in *Agamemnon*. Otherwise, the figures for choral anapests in the plays of Aeschylus are remarkably consistent and correspond closely with the two *Prometheus*-plays. For comparison, I have included figures for the two plays of both Sophocles and Euripides which contain substantial choral anapests. It can readily be seen that the figures for the *Prometheus*-plays match Aeschylus better than the other two playwrights; although the wide variation in figures between the two plays of Euripides should give us some hesitation about assuming that an author's technique is necessarily consistent.⁴⁰ What one does typically find in the anapests of Sophocles, both choral and actors', is a tendency to prefer SA over DS;⁴¹ characteristic of Euripides is slightly less use of SS and AA than in the other two tragedians.⁴² In all these regards, the choral anapests of *Prometheia* fit in best with Aeschylus, although the samples are too small to be of much probative value.

³⁹On the necessary connection of the two *Prometheus*-plays, see n. 7 above.

⁴⁰The total figures for eight plays of Euripides, as recorded by Griffith (note 1 above) 69 suggest that the difference between *Medea* and *Hecuba* may to some extent have been a matter of chronological development, with Euripides tending to favor SA more heavily in his later work.

⁴¹Based on the figures in Griffith (note 1 above) 69 we see a range of 22%–35% for SA in Sophocles (with an overall average of 29%), a range of 13%–29% for DS (with an overall average of 23%).

⁴²Again based on the figures in Griffith, one finds a range of 3%–10% for SS in Euripides (with an overall average of 6.7%) and a range of 13%–21% for AA (with an overall average of 15%).

III. CLAUSULAR PAROEMIACS

Griffith also examines the types of paroemiacs used in *Prometheus Bound*, and notes preferences which are quite different from the norm. Based on my own counts, I present the evidence in Table 4. Although *Prometheus*' most favored paroemiac (SA/- - -) is indeed the one most favored in Aeschylus generally, it uses this form to an even greater degree than the other plays and also shows a strong tendency to use the paroemiac SS/- - -, perhaps the least favored of the five major types (although at 32%, *Persians* approaches the 40% figure for *Prometheus*). It is not clear that we can really conclude much from this, given that the total number of paroemiacs tabulated for each play (and particularly for *Prometheus*, with only 15) is so small.⁴³ The clausular nature and emphatic position of the paroemiacs may make them especially important for conscious patterning: it therefore should not surprise us that the paroemiacs reinforce the tendency to give this play's anapests a spondaic emphasis, as we have observed in our discussion of the metron types. Indeed, the SS-paroemiacs are concentrated in precisely those portions of the play's anapests which we have observed with a higher than average frequency of SS-metra—the exchange between Prometheus and Hermes in the exodos (lines 1040–93, where two of the four paroemiacs are SS), and Prometheus' amoebaeon exchange with the chorus (lines 136–92, where three of the four paroemiacs are SS).

Less easy to explain is *Prometheus*' exceptionally high percentage of paroemiac overlap (i.e., lack of full diaeresis between the two halves of the paroemiac). This tendency toward overlap cannot be attributed merely to carelessness or lack of skill on the part of the play's author, since the general practice of overlap between the metra of anapestic dimeters is if anything more restrained in *Prometheus Bound* than in either *Agamemnon* or *Choephoroe*.⁴⁴ Paroemiacs in tragedy have al-

⁴³ Percentages of paroemiac types seem not to be at all reliable for authenticity purposes. Using the figures which Griffith (note 1 above) 73 records for Sophocles and Euripides, we find a range of 0% to 50% for the SA-paroemiac in Sophocles, 14% to 57% in Euripides, and of 25% to 71% for the SS-paroemiac in Sophocles, 14% to 67% in Euripides.

⁴⁴ L. Parker, "Some Observations on the Incidence of Word-End in Anapestic Paroemiacs and its Application to Textual Questions," *CQ* 8 (1958) 89 counts only four one-syllable overlaps in *Prometheus*, *Suppliants*, *Seven*, *Eumenides*, and *Persians* combined, as opposed to thirteen in *Agamemnon* and four in *Choephoroe*. Griffith (note 1 above) 70–71 finds the two-syllable overlap μελιγλώσσοις in *PV* 172 very disturbing. This

TABLE 4. Types of Clausular Paroemiacs in Aeschylus

	SA	DS	SS	AS	AA	No. of paroemiacs	% with overlap
<i>Pers.</i>	25%	20%	30%	15%	10%	20	25%
<i>Suppl.</i>	23	23	15	23	15	13	38%
<i>Ag.</i>	26	19	4	19	33	27	37%
<i>Choe.</i>	35	25	5	15	20	20	35%
<i>Eum.</i>	27	18	9	27	18	11	18%
TOTAL	27	21	12	19	21	91	32%
<i>PV</i>	47	0	40	7	7	15	80%

ways been regarded as more amenable to overlap than anapestic dimeters, and in some contexts we find that the poet elects to use it quite extensively, as in *Prometheus Bound* (twelve out of fifteen paroemiacs),⁴⁵ in the *Agamemnon* parodos (five out of nine paroemiacs), or in Sophocles' *Electra* (six out of seven paroemiacs).⁴⁶ This may in part be due to the general tendency of SS-paroemiacs to utilize overlap (perhaps to break up the monotony of four successive long syllables);⁴⁷ it is no surprise that both *Prometheus* and Sophocles' *Electra* feature heavy use of this particular paroemiatic. But beyond this factor, the seeming preference for paroemiatic overlap which we find in these plays may reflect a desire to emphasize the paroemiatic as a single continuous met-

is rare, paralleled only in frag. 192.4 Nauck (from *Unbound*) and in Sophocles, *Tr.* 985 (which Griffith tries to dismiss as "lyric," despite counting these lines as recitative earlier in his study). We should consider the possibility that *PV* 172 is a line intentionally structured with an odd metrical shape for literary effect, since Prometheus is here rejecting the efficacy of Zeus' persuasive rhetoric (καί μ' οὔτι μελιγλώσσοις πειθοῦς/ἐπαοιδάισιν θέλξει . . .). The jarring break in metrical form itself effects the loss of language's usual powers of charm and magical potency.

⁴⁵The same tendency did not necessarily characterize *Unbound*. The one paroemiatic we have from this play (μαλακοῦ προχοαῖς [τ'] ἀναπαύει = frag. 192.6 Nauck) does not have overlap, if we delete the τ', as virtually all editors do.

⁴⁶The figures given in Griffith (note 1 above) 73 show that Sophocles generally uses more overlap in paroemiacs than Aeschylus, but uses it far more in *Electra* than in any other play (although at 60%, *Ajax* is also high). The small number of paroemiacs and the amount of variation from play to play (ranging from 29% in *Oedipus at Colonus* to 86% in *Electra*) suggests that this is not a useful index for authenticity.

⁴⁷Six out of eleven SS-paroemiacs in the other plays of Aeschylus have overlap, as opposed to a general overlap frequency between 18% and 36%.

rical unit rather than as a catalectic dimeter. However we explain these overlaps, the variations evident in the paroemiacs of all three tragedians and the small statistical samples involved make it difficult to use paroemiacs as a reliable criterion of authenticity.

Our argument has been that contextual factors play a decisive role in determining such phenomena as anapestic period length, metron type-selection, and selection of paroemiacs. Accordingly, raw statistical tables, such as those employed by Griffith, are by themselves inadequate for assessing authenticity. Statistical analysis must make use of appropriate tests for random variation. Even more importantly, we must also examine *how* metrical phenomena are employed, differentiating between actor and chorus, taking note of conscious metrical patterning within a specific context or within the speech of a certain character, and moreover attuning our ears to the ever-modulating tempos and sonorities of language which it is the function of metrical form to shape. In these terms, I have tried to show that Aeschylus is in fact the most self-conscious and adroit of the three tragedians (at least in regard to anapestic usage), and that *Prometheus*' sophisticated use of anapests accords better with his technique than with that of the others. While this is far from constituting absolute proof of the play's authenticity, I hope that my arguments at least would give some pause to those who feel that the play's un-Aeschylean authorship has already been proven by metrical statistics.

To be sure, there are many other metrical and stylistic arguments which have been made against *Prometheus Bound*. What is most impressive about Griffith's work is its cumulative impact, ferreting out deviations from Aeschylean "norms" in area after area. But as I have suggested, our whole concept of what constitutes a "norm" may need rethinking. Studies have shown that factors of context and conscious technique also played a part in lyric meters⁴⁸ and the iambic trimeter.⁴⁹ However, the impact of these factors for the *Prometheus*-question has

⁴⁸ See, for example, J. N. Rash, *Meter and Language in the Lyrics of the Suppliants of Aeschylus* (New York 1981); Scott (note 36 above) 22-133; C. Chiasson, "Le-cythis and the Justice of Zeus in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*," *Phoenix* 42 (1988) 1-21.

⁴⁹ Although this issue has not yet been studied much in regard to Aeschylus' use of the trimeter, one may compare M. D. Olcott, "Metrical Variations in the Iambic Trimeter as a Function of Dramatic Technique in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* and *Ajax*," (Diss. Stanford University 1974), and Dia M. L. Philippides, *The Iambic Trimeter of Euripides: Selected Plays* (New York 1981) 47-108.

been neglected. For instance, could the dactylo-epitrites in *PV* 526–44 and 887–900, unique in Aeschylus, have somehow reflected the influence of Pindar, so visibly identified with this meter and apparently a major influence on *Prometheus*' plot and description of Aetna's eruption (*PV* 351–72)?⁵⁰ Could *Prometheus*' striking non-observance of verse-end (as reflected in its high use of Sophoclean enjambment, interlinear hiatus, and final monosyllables)⁵¹ have something to do with the chained Titan's noted ἐλευθεροστομία (*PV* 180)—his one means of transcending the bonds which hold him in place? Such questions cannot be answered without further study. But until they are, it would be highly premature to conclude on stylometric grounds that *Prometheus Bound* cannot be the work of Aeschylus.

The external evidence in favor of the play's authenticity remains overwhelming,⁵² and neither Griffith nor anyone else has yet presented a convincing account of how a *Prometheus*-play by another fifth-century tragedian could come to be identified as Aeschylus'.⁵³ The burden of scholarly proof must therefore rest with those who would argue that *Prometheus*' metrical deviations *cannot* have been due to contextual factors or conscious experimentation, but must have been the pure

⁵⁰For Themis' prophecy concerning Zeus' possible overthrow in *I.* 8.31–45 as the probable source for *Prometheus*' prophecy, see L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar* (London 1932) I, 287–88 and II, 379–80; G. Norwood, *Pindar* (Berkeley 1945) 259, n. 20; J. H. Finley, Jr., "Pindar and the Persian Invasion," *HSCP* 63 (1958) 128–29; A. Köhnken, "Gods and Descendants of Aiakos in Pindar's Eighth Isthmian Ode," *BICS* 22 (1975) 33–34, n. 19; V. di Benedetto, *L'ideologia del potere e la tragedia greca* (Torino 1978) 72; M. Griffith, *Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound* (Cambridge 1983) 224, 251; Saïd (note 2 above) 190, n. 25; L. M. Slatkin, "The Wrath of Thetis," *TAPA* 116 (1986) 12, n. 30; T. K. Hubbard, "Two Notes on the Myth of Aeacus in Pindar," *GRBS* 28 (1987) 12–13. For the influence of Pindar's description of Aetna's eruption in *P.* 1.15–28, see M. Griffith, "Aeschylus, Sicily and Prometheus," in R. D. Dawe, ed., *Dionysiaca: Nine Studies in Greek Poetry* (Cambridge 1978) 118–20. On both points, see also West (note 2 above) 147.

⁵¹For the evidence on these features, which seem to be the most troubling aspect of *Prometheus*' trimeter usage, see C. J. Herington, *The Author of the Prometheus Bound* (Austin 1970) 37–40, 46–49; and Griffith (note 1 above) 87–91, 96–101.

⁵²This is surveyed by Herington (note 51 above) 17–20, and again in rev. Griffith (note 1 above), *AJP* 100 (1979) 421–24.

⁵³As we have noted (note 7 above), Griffith is particularly unsatisfactory in attempting to separate *Prometheus Bound* from the rest of the trilogy. O. Taplin, "The Title of Prometheus Desmotes," *JHS* 95 (1975) 185–86, has argued that the epiclesis *Desmotes* and all other such epicleses were Alexandrian, making it quite easy for different *Prometheus*-plays to be confused. But I believe that this argument has been well refuted by West (note 2 above) 131.

FICTIONAL NARRATIVE IN THE *CYROPAIDEIA*

We can share the lament of Xenophon, beginning his *Cyropaideia*, that mankind seems ungovernable. The evidence of bad government and revolt is all around us. It is Xenophon's response to this situation that is distinctive. He chose to tell a story, the story of one man whom he had heard actually was able to govern not just a city, but the greatest empire that the Greeks knew. In telling his story, Xenophon composed the first extant novel, and demonstrated the power and flexibility of fictional prose narrative. His work is heavily influenced by earlier narrative in poetry and prose, and yet developed new possibilities and emphases. In this article I shall first offer some general thoughts on the difference of the *Cyropaideia* from Herodotus and Thucydides and the rationale of his choice of didactic narrative, and then consider four aspects of Xenophon's fiction: the *Cyropaideia* as a utopian narrative, the dimensions of time and space, some features of narrative structure, and the treatment of characters.¹

FICTION

I have used the term "fictional narrative," but I must note at once that Xenophon nowhere states or even implies that the *Cyropaideia* is fiction. On the contrary, in introducing his narrative of Cyrus, he suggests that he has made inquiries: "we shall try to give an account of what we have found out and what we think that we have learned about him." It is only rather far on in the story, in fact, that the reader concludes that the story should not be taken literally. The notice of Cyrus' parentage and the account of Persian customs could easily fit what we might call history: a carefully researched factual account. Even the series of conversations and anecdotes of Cyrus' youth might be encountered in a Greek historical account, as we know from the example of Herodotus. It is rather the unrelenting accumulation of long dialogues—that between Cyrus and Cambyzes at the end of Book 1 runs

¹James Tatum, *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction: On the Education of Cyrus* (Princeton 1989) provides an excellent point of departure. Among other recent studies of Xenophon, V. J. Gray, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* (Baltimore 1989) is especially helpful on his use of dialogue in narrative.

some 21 pages—and the incredible success of Cyrus in dealing with friends and foes that force the reader to treat Xenophon's narrative of the past as fiction. In this straightforward narrative, no individual item is incredible, but the accumulation of victories on the personal and military level gradually leads the reader to reconsider his initial evaluation of the work.² Without attempting to demarcate precisely what limits there might have been between factual and fictional narrative in Xenophon's day, it is possible to say that Xenophon has chosen to tell a story of which the verifiable factual content is a very small percentage of the whole.

Historical writers of the fifth century, most notably Herodotus and Thucydides, had justified their endeavor by appeals to their method. Herodotus in his preface noted his desire to preserve and understand the past, gave a sample of the oral traditions upon which he would draw, and pointedly claimed that he would start from what he himself knew, showing no partiality (1.1–5). In his first chapters Thucydides stressed the analytical and investigatory effort needed to ascertain the truth, and presented a schematic example of his mode of intellectual inquiry by analyzing the growth of unified action and maritime power, with especial attention to the Trojan War (1.1–23). What is striking about Xenophon is that he makes no stronger claims to accuracy or method than he does. "Recognizing that this man has been far superior in ruling men, and is worthy of admiration, we have considered who he was, in terms of his family, nature, and training. Therefore we shall try to give an account of what we have found out and what we think that we have learned about him" (*Cyr.* 1.1.6). There is no overt claim to factual accuracy, no statement on the difficulties of ascertaining the truth, especially concerning a distant period and country, no allusion to the weakness of memory or the reliability of his informants. The allusion to investigation conflicts with the absence of historiographical pretensions. If the reader of the *Cyropaideia* is reassured by the author's claims, he will expect something less imaginative than is in fact the case.³

This is not to say that there is no historical information in the

²In the *Anabasis* and the *Hellenica*, Xenophon's accounts of leaders (Cyrus the younger, Clearchus, Xenophon, Agesilaus) seem relatively reliable because the successes are limited.

³S. W. Hirsch, "1001 Iranian Nights: History and Fiction in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*," in *The Greek Historians. Literature and History. Papers presented to A. E. Raubitschek*, ed. M. Jameson (Saratoga, CA 1985) 65–85, at p. 69 overstates Xenophon's pretensions to accurate research. Nor does Xenophon in the *Cyropaideia* examine the underlying causes of events in the manner of Herodotus or Thucydides.

Cyropaideia. Xenophon does on occasion accurately preserve customs—such as wearing high-soled shoes—or names, at least within the limitations of his own knowledge. But these items are subservient to the narrative, the source of which is Xenophon's invention, not historical tradition or research.⁴ The question whether Xenophon had access to and was influenced by Iranian oral tradition is still not resolved, but it is apparent that whatever Xenophon took from Iranian tradition was taken because it fit his own ideal of a ruler, not because he wished to retell or recreate a historical past.⁵ Xenophon shapes a story of Cyrus which is composed of dialogues that were never spoken, battles that never took place, and people summoned and dismissed from the written page without any shadow of historical reality. Even the general historical framework, which Xenophon might have been expected to keep as accurate as possible, shows extensive deviations from other traditions, and can only be ascribed to unknown Persian traditions by a naive insistence on Xenophon's determination to report the past as faithfully as possible. Central to the novel is Cyrus' relation to Media. Whereas all our other sources—including Xenophon in the *Anabasis* (3.4.8, 11–12)—report that Cyrus led a revolt against Media and established Persian rule over that country, before conquering Lydia and Babylon, in the *Cyropaideia* Xenophon has Cyrus aid the Medes as allies, and ascribes the victories over Lydia and Babylon to his activity as Median vassal.

⁴Cf. Hirsch (note 3 above) and his *The Friendship of the Barbarians: Xenophon and the Persian Empire* (Hanover and London 1985) 85–91. However, I do not agree with Hirsch's general argument that Xenophon has framed his narrative from elements of authentic Persian tradition. Xenophon's portrayal of Persian educational practice was strongly influenced by Spartan methods and by Xenophon's own notions: see P. Briant, "Institutions perses et histoire comparatiste dans l'historiographie grecque," in *Achaemenid History II: The Greek Sources*, ed. H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg and A. Kuhrt (Leiden 1987) 1–10, esp. 7–8. Recent Achaemenid studies have challenged our understanding of the Persian empire and of the reliability of our Greek accounts, whose sources of information and interpretation of Persian history and culture are extremely difficult to define. See e.g., D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Cincinnati 1977); P. Briant, *Rois, Tributs et Paysans*, *Annales littéraires de l'Université de Besançon* 269 (Paris 1982); M. A. Dandamaev and V. G. Lukonin, *The Culture and Social Institutions of Ancient Iran* (Cambridge 1989); and the series *Achaemenid History I–III* (Leiden 1987–88).

⁵See Wolfgang Knauth and S. Nadjmabadi, *Das altiranische Fürstenideal von Xenophon bis Ferdousi* (Wiesbaden 1975); H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, "The Death of Cyrus: Xenophon's *Cyropaideia* as a Source for Iranian History," in *Acta Iranica* 25, ser. 2, vol. 11, *Papers in Honour of Professor Mary Boyce*, part 2 (Leiden 1985) 459–71; A. Cizek, "From the Historical Truth to Literary Convention: The Life of Cyrus the Great viewed by Herodotus, Ctesias, and Xenophon," *AC* 44 (1975) 531–52; and R. Drews, "Sargon, Cyrus, and Mesopotamian Folk History," *JNES* 91 (1974) 387–93.

The figure of his overlord, the Median king Cyaxares, son of Astyages, is an invention, a necessary part of his revised history.⁶ The creation and selection of narrative episodes, the temporal and geographical framework in which they are set, and the mode in which the reader is expected to respond are fictional.

The overt purpose of the narrative is didactic,⁷ as stated in the preface: to allow the reader to learn how one man, Cyrus, was able to govern successfully an enormous empire. But the fact that Xenophon does not present a historical account of Cyrus means that the figure of Cyrus is not a literal model of historical action—like Pericles or Antiphon in Thucydides—but an imagined ideal of how one man might act to govern well. In the course of the narrative, that is, the reader comes to realize that Xenophon is writing not in the indicative but the subjunctive mood, not about things or people as they have been, but as they might be. In this respect the *Cyropaideia* is much closer to Plato's dialogues, especially the great dialogues of the middle period such as *Gorgias*, *Symposium*, or *Republic* than to the histories of Herodotus or Thucydides. Plato narrates dialogues which purportedly took place in Socrates' lifetime, to suggest means of conceptualizing the major problems of human affairs, while simultaneously presenting Socrates as a model of a successful human life. Xenophon narrates the events and conversations of Cyrus' life to suggest means of governing men, presenting Cyrus as a model of successful rule. Both use a fictional mode to present what they perceived as fundamental truths.

DIDACTIC NARRATIVE

That fictional narrative could be didactic—indeed that it was a natural means of conveying both abstract and concrete truths—was a

⁶In Herodotus it is the name of King Astyages' father. Since Greeks frequently named the eldest child for the grandfather, Xenophon's invention has a specious probability. The very existence of a Median empire may be doubted: see H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, "Was there ever a Median Empire?" in *Achaemenid History III: Method and Theory*, ed. A. Kuhrt and H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (Leiden 1988) 197–212.

⁷The problem of the definition of the genre of Xenophon's work arises partially from the unity of concerns (historical, biographical, didactic, philosophical, political, and educational) which are more commonly separate in modern thinking. See H. R. Breitenbach, *Xenophon von Athen* (Stuttgart 1966) 1707–8 (Sonderdruck from *RE*, IX A), and especially Tatum (note 1 above) 3–35, who illustrates the interrelation between the history of the reception of the work, the successive readings of the *Cyropaideia* over the centuries, and the ascription of genre.

fundamental feature of Greek culture, deriving from the richness of mythical thought and expression. The Homeric poems, because they enshrined attitudes toward the divine, models of behavior to be imitated or avoided, cultural values, and examples of generalship or social conventions, came by the fifth century to be used for didactic purposes. Folk tales and animal fables taught moral truths and practical wisdom, and even drama could be conceived as first and foremost didactic. A story was expected to convey truth, quite apart from the existence of a historical referent. The unusual step, in Greek terms, was not the invention of fiction, but rather the claim of some writers, represented for us by Herodotus and Thucydides, that they could present a larger truth even while maintaining precise historical referents. Although rightly considered historians, even they frequently used fictional modes of narration, and were ready when necessary to sacrifice unhelpful factual precision to a truthful account. Xenophon and Plato, in their different ways, reassert for prose the right to present the truth without focusing on the validity of the historical referent.

There are three principal reasons to use narrative in a didactic or philosophical presentation, and all are important in the *Cyropaideia*. The first is utility: a narrative is highly effective in conveying complicated information or concepts. Mankind universally experiences events as a sequence in time, a series of episodes strung together by the experience of personality. Narrative reproduces this chain, creating a vivid sense of the reality of the actions described. This reality may be felt at several levels: if the actions narrated have nothing overtly incredible about them, the audience may accept them as possible events, part of a past which existed in this or a similar way. If the actions are contrary to common experience, the audience will use a variety of strategies to maintain meaning: the actions may be placed in a distant time or space (as with much of Odysseus' adventures), or seen as a mode of presenting a universal truth (as with animal fables). But in any case the ease of visualization, even of improbable events, enhances the effort to understand and interpret. By its very existence, a narrative can persuade us that the events narrated have a higher level of probability and of actualization than events not narrated. Thus, when Xenophon recounts how Cyrus was able to manage his temperamental and jealous king, Cyaxares, the technique employed is both more comprehensible and more convincing than if it had been presented in abstract form. Narrative used this way is an extended use of teaching by example.

As Aristotle remarks, fables are convenient to the orator, because often it is difficult to find real events which provide a suitable paral-

lel.⁸ The parables of Jesus illustrate the usefulness of fictional narrative for moral instruction. Such stories profit from the effort needed by the audience to search for meaning and apply it personally. They allow the teller to teach at the level that each hearer is ready for, because the subtlety and richness of the lesson is regenerated by the hearer himself, who finds in the narrative points of application to his own circumstances and preoccupations. In the case of the *Cyropaideia*, the narrative permits and generates audiences of different types, including those never anticipated by Xenophon.

An extended narrative also permits the interweaving of themes—e.g., of love and loyalty, and their varied presentation in different characters or situations. In this way Xenophon can distinguish the friendship of two Persians close to Cyrus, Hystaspas and Chrysantas, or the treatment of two conquered kings, Croesus and the Armenian. The use of dialogue permits the author to incorporate discussions from different points of view within the narrative framework.⁹ The narrative mode, recounting a series of actions, gives scope for instruction or comment on a broad variety of topics. Xenophon's focus for the greater part of the narrative on military campaigns arises from his own assessment of the role of the general in all aspects of military life, from shaping a group of associates to share command to training troops, or planning a military operation. Furthermore, for Xenophon, the army is an example of social organization which can serve as a model for a well-run state. Thus the narrative of the campaigns can teach on many levels, from the nature of friendship or of love to the training of new recruits.

The second advantage of narrative is pleasure: good story-telling delights the mind and ear, and prompts us to ask for more. The reader enjoys the story, and is eager to press forward to hear what happens next. Far from needing to sugar the cup, the narrator combines delight and utility in one smooth mixture. Although for various reasons Xenophon's charm is less attractive to contemporary readers than it has been in some earlier periods, nevertheless even we find ourselves drawn into the story, curious about how Cyrus will handle the next situation presented to him, whether at the dinner table or in a battle, whether prompted by a love-struck subordinate or an envious friend.

⁸ Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2.20.7, 1394a, where he notes that actual historical examples are more useful, since the future tends to resemble the past.

⁹ On Xenophon's dialogue techniques see Gray (note 1 above) and the unpublished study by D. L. Gera, "The Dialogues of the *Cyropaideia*" (D. Phil. thesis, Oxford 1987).

Finally, the narrative mode aids accurate recall. A story is easier to recall than an abstract concept or argument, and the memory bears with it all the conviction and pleasure of the initial hearing or reading. Herodotus knew this well and depends on well-told stories to establish his major points, most notably in the Croesus narrative. In Xenophon, the success of Cyrus' self-restraint toward Panthea and the contrast between the views of happiness of Croesus and Panthea are both vivid in themselves and easy to recall, so that the lesson of virtue is not only learned and accepted, but remembered and available for use.

IDEALIZATION AND UTOPIA

It is sometimes said that Xenophon creates an idealized account of ancient Persia. There is truth in this statement, but it is necessary to specify what precisely is meant. Xenophon does not suffer from nostalgia: he does not think that once the world was better, but has now deteriorated. Nor would his own experience of the duplicity of Artaxerxes and Tissaphernes permit him any illusions about oriental monarchy, which might lead him to propose a historical Cyrus as a model for Greek governance. Such an interpretation would read into the *Cyropaideia* a historicism which is not there. If Xenophon was aware of his own invention, as he surely must have been, then he knew that the Persians and Cyrus were not as he described them. We cannot accuse Xenophon of looking back at a rosy past, filling in details "as they must have been." Xenophon's idealization is essentially utopian, like Plato's *Republic*. It describes not what has been, but what ought to be.

A utopia holds out a vision of what life could be, if certain conditions were valid: if men were reasonable, or just, or peaceable, or some other condition equally lacking in the real world. Often these utopias are set in far away places, even at the ends of the earth, or on a different planet, of which a traveller brings back a tale. Or the distance might be temporal, in the past, or future. Some describe a dream of what was, and has been lost: the Garden of Eden, a golden age; others a dream of what might be, if only men could learn and change.¹⁰ Xenophon's uto-

¹⁰See H. Braunert, *Utopia: Antworten griechischen Denkens auf die Herausforderung durch soziale Verhältnisse*, Veröffentlichungen der Schleswig-Holsteines Universitäts-Gesellschaft, N.F. 51 (1969); B. Kytzler, "Utopisches Denken und Handeln in der klassischen Antike" in *Der utopischen Roman*, ed. R. Villgrader and F. Krey (Darmstadt

pia is of the latter type. The story of Cyrus is not a historical account of what happened, but a visionary account of how a government might be organized by a true leader, and how we the readers might act if we shared his qualities.¹¹

In this utopian vision, the *Cyropaideia* functions on several levels. The work presents an image of how men might interact to form a political entity, first a successful army, and then an imperial state. In delineating this picture, Xenophon is able to express innumerable notions and suggestions about friendship, military organization and planning, and governmental relations and structures.¹² But the central focus of the work is not on this social aspect of government, important as it is, but on individual excellence, that is on the special qualities of his hero. It is these qualities, which derive from natural ability, suitable nurture, especially the training of his father, and a passion for self-improvement, which permit Cyrus to form the personal, military, and civic relationships and structures which permit him to be the perfect leader. The quality which Cyrus shows above all else is his ability to control his own actions and desires, to shape himself according to what is best. Being best, others then can recognize and accept the appropriateness of his rule.

The *Cyropaideia*, then, is not a novel of imperial rule, but a novel of virtue, of relating to others, whether superiors, equals, or subordinates, and especially of governing one's own desires. The utopian vision of Xenophon can be read in different keys. It applies first of all to the individual citizen, the *kalos kai agathos* seeking his proper role in society, especially as a leader in his polis and its army. Constantly the reader is invited to think as Cyrus does, to apply to his limited field of action the same reasoning and self-discipline which Cyrus applies to all matters, from the smallest military detail to the governance of the em-

1973) 45-68; H. Flashar, *Formen utopischen Denkens bei der Griechen*, Innsbruck Beiträge zur Kulturwissenschaft, 3 (1974); and J. Ferguson, *Utopias of the Classical World* (Ithaca, NY 1975).

¹¹Cf. M. M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination* (Austin 1981) 147 discussing the temporal inversion of mythological thinking: "A thing that could and in fact must only be realized exclusively in the *future* is here portrayed as something out of the *past*, a thing that is in no sense part of the past's reality, but a thing that is in its essence a purpose, an obligation."

¹²See J. Luccioni, *Les idées politiques et sociales de Xénophon* (n.p. 1947) and N. Wood, "Xenophon's Theory of Leadership," *C&M* 25 (1964) 33-66.


pire. Xenophon did not expect his readers to become masters of the world, or even to work toward a Greek empire: he still belonged to the polis system in which he grew up. At the time of writing, he had returned to Athens, and was fully aware of the problems facing the restricted democracy which governed the city.¹³ His audience is the elite in Athens and other Greek cities, who aspired to command, influence, and leadership. His view is conservative and hierarchical but tied to a free rather than an authoritarian society, since any citizen with the requisite virtues can aspire to greatness. He hopes that his readers, inspired by his vision of an empire ruled by a virtuous leader, will enact in their own lives and in their own polis the virtues he describes.¹⁴

At the same time Xenophon is considering the case of great men, who possess power and hope to exercise it more fully. He himself has known ambitious leaders such as Cyrus the Younger and Agesilaus, both of whom contribute to his portrait of Cyrus the Great, and who, under other circumstances, might have become great monarchs. Other contemporary figures would have been in his mind and the minds of his readers: Dionysius and Dion in Syracuse, Jason of Pherae, the Macedonian monarchs, various Persian satraps who not infrequently revolted against the king. In *Hiero* Xenophon explored the possibility of a tyrant becoming, or pretending to become, a just monarch. For such men, greater than the ordinary private citizen, and for all who were concerned with their activity, his account of Cyrus the Great demonstrated that power and greatness could only come by keeping one's own desires under careful control, by constantly thinking of the needs of one's allies and one's subjects and winning them with generosity, while keeping a cool eye on the realities of power.

Finally, for the Greek states as political entities, the *Cyropaideia* shows that the organization of armies and the maintenance of alliances, the main means of exercising power, depend on careful planning, constant thought for the training and goodwill of their troops, and the same self-control, foresight, and generosity toward allies which was recommended to powerful individuals.

¹³He returned to Athens ca. 365. The *Cyropaideia* would have been completed sometime after this (see E. Delebeque, *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon* [Paris 1957] 404-9; Breitenbach [note 7 above] 1742). His work *Revenues* reflects his preoccupation with current Athenian affairs.

¹⁴On the power of a utopian vision to "help us build bridges between the world we want to inhabit and the world we must," see K. J. Reckford, *Aristophanes' Old-and-New Comedy* (Chapel Hill and London 1987) 327.



Xenophon constructs a utopian vision of the individual as political agent in an imagined historical setting. Plato confirms the interchangeability of the imagined and the historical utopia in his own treatment of the ideal state of the *Republic*. In that work, Socrates and his friends determine to construct in discourse (λόγῳ) a model of the good city. When it is finished, they recognize that this city, situated ἐν λόγοις, does not exist anywhere on earth, nor does it matter whether it does or ever will, since it functions as a model only (*Rep.* 472D, 592A–B). Sometime later, when he wrote *Timaeus* and *Critias*, Plato completely transformed this notion.¹⁵ Socrates in *Timaeus* expresses the wish to see his state in action:

I felt like someone who saw beautiful animals either in a painting or actually living, but standing still, and desired that he might see them moving and engaged in a contest worthy of their physical appearance. This same feeling I felt regarding the state which we described. I would love to hear someone narrate the contests which this city wages, those which it fights against other cities, entering into warfare in a worthy manner, and during the war revealing in its relations with the other cities the qualities suitable to its system of education and rearing, both in action and verbal exchange. (*Tim.* 19B–C)

Timaeus responds to this request, not with a continuation of the description of the ideal state, but with a historical account: Socrates' ideal city is exactly like the ancient and forgotten city of Athens of 9000 years ago, of which Solon had learned from the Egyptians. "The city and the citizens which you described yesterday as a myth (ἐν μύθῳ), we shall transfer into reality (ἐπὶ τᾷληθεῖ), and assert that those citizens whom you imagined are our actual ancestors" (*Tim.* 26 C–D). With such a verbal trick, Plato transfers an imaginary world into the distant historical past, guaranteeing its truth with a complex apparatus of testimony concerning the Egyptian priests, written documents, and the oral tradition of the story from Solon to Critias.¹⁶ Xenophon prefers for his

¹⁵These works are usually placed between Plato's return in 360 from his third trip to Sicily and his death in 348/7. They may have been written after the *Cyropaideia*.

¹⁶See especially *Tim.* 20D–23D; *Critias* 106 B–108 D, 113 A–B. On Plato's fictional primeval Athens, see H. Herter, "Urathen als Idealstaat," *Palingenesia* 4 (Wiesbaden 1969) 108–34; L. Brisson, "De la philosophie politique à l'épopée: le Critias de Platon," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 75 (1970) 402–38; C. Gill, "The Genre of the Atlantis Story," *CP* 72 (1977) 287–304; and "Plato's Atlantis Story and the Birth of Fiction,"

utopia a much more recent yet still distant past, the principal features of which are no less imaginary.

PRESENT AND PAST

The *Cyropaideia* is set in an imagined past, but depends on a constant awareness of the present to achieve its goal of future development and change. The link to the contemporary world is achieved by several devices. Most obvious are the preface and epilogue, which frame the utopian narrative with the dismal reality of the present: the ungovernability of humankind, stated in abstract generalities in the preface, and in the dreary recital of Persian history in the epilogue. The book begins from the observation of the difficulty of human governance:

The thought has come to us how many democracies have been overthrown by those who wished to live otherwise than in a democracy; how many monarchies, how many oligarchies have been rejected by different populaces, and how many of those who have tried to be tyrants have been overthrown immediately or, if they manage to survive for a time as rulers, are admired as wise and fortunate men. . . . When we considered this, we decided that it is easier for a mortal man to rule every other animal than to rule men. (Cyr. 1.1.1, 3)

The epilogue (Cyr. 8.8) demonstrates that this general state of affairs is applicable to contemporary Persia as well, despite the institutions established by Cyrus. Persia needs the lessons of Xenophon's Cyrus just as much as the Greeks, despite the continuing existence of many institutions established by him. The ideal prince can establish good laws, but the laws and institutions are not sufficient in themselves to guarantee the health of the civic structure.¹⁷

This is the ground of reality from which Xenophon's vision rises. I

Philosophy and Literature 3 (1979) 64–78. On Plato and history, see K. Gaiser, *Platon und die Geschichte* (Stuttgart Bad Cannstadt 1961); R. Weil, *L'archéologie de Platon* (Paris 1959). The fictional element in the *Republic* is stressed by H. Flashar, *Formen utopischen Denkens bei den Griechen, Dies philologici Aenipontani* 3 (Innsbruck 1974).

¹⁷Xenophon's *Lacedaemonian Constitution* is similar: after a presentation of the marvelous laws of Lycurgus, Xenophon notes that the contemporary Spartans do not live up to its standards, and in fact reverse them (*Lac. Pol.* 14).

do not see the epilogue, as Tatum does, as deconstructing the vision of the text,¹⁸ but rather as reaffirming the necessity of the vision by recalling the real world. The final chapter both disassociates the narrative from the instability of the contemporary world and reminds us of the need for the virtues Cyrus embodies. Xenophon confronts the reader with the necessity of profiting from his vision and changing his own life.

The second means of creating awareness of the present are the constant references to Persian customs which continue still to the present day: *eti kai nun*. These suggest a relation between the world of Cyrus and contemporary Persia, and enhance the probability of the fiction without comprising its utopian nature. They help us to accept the possibility that there could be a man with Cyrus' self-control and ability to manage others, and that rational and just institutions can be established in a state.¹⁹ Many of these references recall earlier observations in the *Anabasis* and the *Hellenica*. At the same time, they set up an expectation of the permanence of Cyrus' institutions, which will be abruptly (but not surprisingly, in the light of the preface) thwarted in the final chapter contrasting Cyrus' practices with those of contemporary Persia.

Finally, there is the constant interrelation between the readers' awareness of the present in his own behavior and feelings and the world of Cyrus. The involved reader—and here the modern reader has more difficulty in entering into the interaction presumed by Xenophon—in

¹⁸Tatum (note 1 above) 215–39. Tatum is right, however, in noting the bond between epilogue and text, even as the epilogue contradicts the ideal world of the foregoing narrative. The various attempts to attack the authenticity of the epilogue (see most recently Hirsch [note 4 above] 91–97) fail to accept the connection between the unfavorable view of contemporary Persia and Xenophon's invented world. On the accuracy of Xenophon's statements in this chapter, see Briant, "Institutions perses . . ." (note 4 above) 8–9; H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, "The Fifth Oriental Monarchy and Hellenocentrism: Cyropaedia VIII viii and its Influence," in *Achaemenid History II* (note 4 above) 117–31.

¹⁹I note thirty-seven such statements in the body of the *Cyropaidea* (1.2–8.7): *eti kai nun* twenty times, *kai nun eti* fifteen times, and once each *hōsper nun* (6.1.27) and *par' hēmin* referring to Xenophon's contemporaries (1.2.6). This is not a complete count of present references: note, for example, the extended description in the present tense of Persian educational practices, 1.2.2–14. See in general Delebecque (note 13 above) 394–409. Seventeen occur in 7.5.37–8.18, referring to the various customs and institutions established by Cyrus after he became king of Babylon. These serve as the basis for the criticism of the contemporary Persians in 8.8, since the practices continue but the spirit is not observed. The final chapter, with its rapid temporal alternation, uses adverbs pointing to the present twenty-five times.

following Cyrus' responses to everyday situations involving family members, superiors, and subordinates, is continually reminded of his own and his contemporaries' attempts to deal with the same situations, and is forced to compare his and their reactions to those of Cyrus. This constant dialogue of the reader with the text and oneself—Would I have acted this way, spoken this way? If not, why not? Would this response really have achieved that result? Have I tried it?—brings the utopian vision actively into the reader's world in a way that Plato's *Republic* does not, and creates the opportunity for learning and for change. That the *Cyropaideia* was in fact read this way in antiquity is evident from the comments of Cicero and other ancient writers.²⁰ The procedure in challenging the reader to think out his own response to the situations faced by Cyrus is similar to that invoked by Greek tragedy, and by Plato in his dialogues. The reader is not allowed merely to be an observer, but by the very immediacy and relevance of the situation becomes a participant.

For this reason Xenophon makes no real attempt to recreate the historical reality of the Persian past. As has been noted by Anderson,²¹ the description of the great battle of Thymbrara between Cyrus and Croesus, and of other battles as well, must be seen from the point of view of contemporary tactics rather than those of two centuries earlier. For the same reason, the frequent dialogues discuss contemporary Greek questions, on the effectiveness of punishment, on the happy life, on the power of love, and so on. They are aimed at contemporary audiences, and make no attempt to portray ancient Persian ways of thinking.

TIME

I have discussed how Xenophon's didactic purpose and utopian vision shape the narrative of the *Cyropaideia*. Three points remain to be considered, the nature of time and space in the *Cyropaideia* itself, the narrative structure of the work, and the function of characters in the

²⁰ Cicero not only held up the Cyrus of the *Cyropaideia* to his brother Quintus as a model for a Roman proconsul (*Ad Q. fratrem* 1.1) but himself used the *Cyropaideia* as a handbook when in command of Cilicia (*Ad fam.* 9.2.5.1).

²¹ J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1970) 170. Anderson argues that Xenophon had the battle of Leuctra in mind when framing his account: cf. pp. 191, 218.

narrative. These are large topics, and the last has been treated at length by Tatum, but a few observations can help clarify the nature of Xenophon's fiction.

Mikhail Bakhtin in a suggestive essay develops the notion of the *chronotope*, the particular blend of time and place which distinguishes different types of novels.²² Time in the *Cyropaideia* is perhaps most closely comparable to Bakhtin's notion of "biographical time," fittingly enough, since in fundamental aspects this is a biographical novel. But there are four distinct phases of temporal movement in the *Cyropaideia*. The first, occupying all of Book 1 after the preface, is developmental: the narrative unfolds the growth of the young Cyrus in a series of episodes.²³ Even at the age of twelve, after the customary Persian training, Cyrus is still incomplete, and his immaturity is revealed in his actions. He is envious of his grandfather's wine-pourer; he is uncertain how to help his friends; he rushes precipitously forward in the hunt and in warfare, like a noble but untrained dog. But the long dialogue with his father which ends the first book establishes Cyrus' maturity and his understanding of the characteristics necessary in a leader.

The remaining books, 2–8, are not developmental but static: they unfold for the reader the mature Cyrus, who has learned to deal with all situations. The effect is a time, in Bakhtin's words, which

discloses character but is not at all the time of a man's 'becoming' or growth. . . . Historical reality itself, in which disclosure of character takes place, serves merely as a means for the disclosure, it provides in words and deeds a vehicle for those manifestations of character; but historical reality is deprived of any determining influence on character as such, it does not shape or create it, it merely manifests it. Historical reality is an arena for the disclosing and unfolding of human characters—nothing more.²⁴

²²Bakhtin (note 11 above) 84–258: "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel."

²³1.2.1–6.46. The book is divided according to Cyrus' age: 2.1 his birth; 2.2–3.1 his Persian education to age 12; 3.2–18 age 12, the court of Astyages; 4.1–15 age 12–15, activities in Media; 4.16–30 age 15–16, military action and recall to Persia; 5.1–6 age 17–30, in Persia. Within this framework the major episodes are his dinner dialogue with Astyages (3.4–12), the dialogue with his mother Mandane on learning justice (3.13–18), his hunting (4.5–15), the Assyrian skirmish (4.16–24), the anecdote of the kiss (4.27–28), Cyrus' mandate to lead a Persian army to support Cyaxares (5.4–14), and the dialogue with his father Cambyses (6.2–46).

²⁴Bakhtin (note 11 above) 141. Bakhtin is thinking especially of Plutarchean biography, to which the description is rather less apposite than to the *Cyropaideia*.

Tatum has noted that despite all his achievements, in Book 8 when Cyrus returns to Persia, he is still a *pais*, still a youth as when he left Persia at the end of Book 1.²⁵ One explanation for this paradoxical situation is that Cyrus has not in fact changed in the intervening books: he has won wars, acquired friends, defeated enemies, but there has been no further development beyond the lessons which his father confirmed at the end of Book 1.²⁶

This long central narrative is broken into three parts, the campaigns leading to the defeat of Assyria (Babylon), 2.1.1–7.5.36, the first year of Cyrus' reign as king of Babylon (7.5.37–8.6.19), and his death in old age (8.7). The first part shows a continuous narrative movement, marked by the series of campaigns and battles which comprise the great war with Assyria. In this section Xenophon marks time in several different ways, but chiefly as an indeterminate period (usually of preparation) followed by a carefully marked sequence of days (usually a battle and its aftermath).²⁷ Thus in the case of the campaign against Croesus culminating in the battle of the Thymbrara and the capture of Sardis, extending through Books 6–7, we find that the decision to continue the war, Cyrus' long-range preparations, the decision to attack, and the march to the battleground at Thymbrara (6.1.1–6.3.37) are not defined temporally. The following four days (6.4.1–7.3.16) are carefully marked: Day 1 (6.4.1, τῇ δ' ὑπεραίρῳ πρῶ), the battle; Night 1 (7.1.45, ἤδη σκοταῖος), Croesus' flight; Day 2 (7.2.2, ἐπειδὴ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο), the attack on Sardis; Night 2 (7.2.3, τῆς ἐπιούσης νυκτός), the assault on the wall; Day 3 (7.2.4, ἅμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ), Cyrus enters Sardis, and a bit later the

²⁵ Cyr. 8.5.22, cf. Tatum (note 1 above) 76–78. Cyrus' first 18 years are treated in 1.2–1.5.1, the next 12 to age 30 at 1.5.2–4. At 30 he goes to help Cyaxares: the first year is treated in 2.1–6.1, the second year 6.2–8.6.19, the later years at 8.6.20–23, and his old age and death at 8.7.

²⁶ For similar reasons, the progress of the years is carefully marked in Book 1, as Cyrus goes through the various stages of his education, but the bulk of Books 2–8 cover only three years (2–7.5.36, the two years of the Assyrian War, and 7.5.37–8.6.19, the year of setting up government in Babylon). The remaining years of his life until the moment of his death are dealt with in a few summary sentences 8.6.19–23.

²⁷ The marked time sequences of the *Cyropaideia* are: 1) the Armenian campaign (2.4.9–3.2.31, 5 days), 2) the first Assyrian campaign (3.3.1–5.1.30, three days, a march [3.24–28], and another four days), 3) the march to Gobryas' land (5.2.1–5.3.1), 4) the Thymbrara campaign (6.1–7.3.16, preparations plus four days), 5) the siege of Babylon (7.4.16–7.5.36, preparations [7.4.16–7.5.14] plus two days), 6) Cyrus' first year (7.5.37–8.6.19 one year). Between 3) and 4) and between 4) and 5) there are indeterminate periods, 5.3.2–5.5.48 and 7.4.1–15.

troops breakfast (7.2.8, ἀριστοποεῖσθαι), followed by the dialogue with Croesus; Night 3 (7.3.1, ἐκοιμήθησαν); Day 4 (7.3.1, τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ), Cyrus' meeting with Panthea. Time seems to end with Panthea's death: the next sequence begins at 7.4.1 with the vague ἐκ δὲ τούτου. The first indeterminate period, presumably several months, occupies 30 Oxford Classical Text pages; the four days of the battle and its aftermath 23 1/2: length of treatment has no relation to length of time. Even within the clearly defined sequence of days, Xenophon is using the temporal markers merely to define the narrative structure, not to establish a true chronology. We certainly are not to imagine that Panthea has been sitting on the ground with her dead husband's head on her lap for three days, when Cyrus goes to see her on the third day after the battle. Rather, Xenophon's narrative has been occupied with other matters: now finally Cyrus can be allowed to turn to personal feelings. Moreover, until Cyrus had held his conversation with Croesus on the happy life, and Croesus uttered his fatuous satisfaction at living as soft and care-free as a woman, Xenophon was not ready to introduce the contrasting heroic figures of Abradatas and Panthea, who expressed in their actions the truly happy life shaped by virtue. Panthea is forced to wait with her husband's corpse until the narrative is ready for her.

The account of Cyrus' first year at Babylon is timeless, treating the various measures and practices which Cyrus instituted to establish his rule: his "trick" to create a new relation with his friends, a typical dinner, defining court practice, the first great ceremonial procession, and so on. These present the first occasion of a practice as an undefined statement of the practice as it would continue throughout Cyrus' reign. The time notices which appear within these episodes are limited to them, to clarify the sequence of actions within the episode.²⁸ The whole process is conceived as occupying one year, a purely formal unit, marked by a striking phrase, "when the year had come full circle" (8.6.19), and the notice of a review of the troops: 120,000 cavalry, 2000

²⁸E.g., in the account of the trick on his friends: "at dawn" he presents himself to all (7.5.37), "evening arrived" before his friends could see him (7.5.39), "on the next morning" the situation threatens to repeat itself, and Cyrus presents his plan (7.5.41). On Cyrus in Babylon, see A. B. Breebaart, "From Victory to Peace: Some Aspects of Cyrus' State in Xenophon's *Cyrupædia*," *Mnemosyne* 36 (1983) 117-34 which examines the stages by which the monarch's virtue was channeled to his subjects. While presented as temporal, they are in fact arranged schematically, according to the relation of different social groups to the monarch.

chariots, 600,000 infantry. A summary account of the intervening decades, running perhaps three-quarters of a page (8.6.20–23) bridges the gap to the fourth section.

The precise length of the gap is not stated, but at 8.7.1 Cyrus is now an old man, whose mother and father have long since died. The time is marked by notices of campaigns against Syria and Egypt, and an extremely formal definition of the boundaries of the empire to the east, west, north, and south: the Red Sea, the Black Sea, Cyprus and Egypt, and Ethiopia, limits uninhabitable because of heat, cold, water, and desert (8.6.20–21). Cyrus, residing in the middle of this empire, now lives in a timeless repetition of actions, moving on a regular round between his three capitals: “thus they say he led his life in springtime warmth and freshness all the time.” All countries and cities send him of their abundance, and he shares with all. The timeless repetition is continued at the beginning of the next section, with the words οὕτω δὲ τοῦ αἰῶνος προεκχωρηκότος and the statement “Cyrus comes to Persia for the seventh time,” where the present tense and the number seven indicate undetermined length of time.²⁹

The final section of Cyrus’ life is devoted to the omens and prayers before his death, and his speech to his friends and family. Again time notices serve merely to structure the narrative: Cyrus dreams at night, sacrifices the next morning, eats nothing for two days, and on the third day delivers his speech and dies. The days provide a framework for Cyrus’ arrangements with the gods and his advice to those who survive him.

The four sections of the life thus mark off four special times: youth and growth, military campaigns and accession to power through winning of friends and defeat of enemies, devolution of the monarch’s virtue through friends to subjects, and finally last testament and death. Xenophon marks the stages of Cyrus’ youth to delimit the periods of his different studies, but the remaining sections are viewed in the timeless biographical mode, with no sense of growth or development of Cyrus in time.

²⁹No intervals are stated, so the visits do not define a determined chronological period. Αἰών itself is a poetic word, used here and in Cyrus’ prayer at 8.7.3 for its epic connotations. At 8.6.19 Xenophon’s Cyrus would have been ca. 30–31 years old, and seems to have died much later (Deinon says he lived till 70, *FGrHist* 692 F 10). Our evidence indicates that Cyrus conquered Babylon in 539, and died in 528.

SPACE

The space defined in the *Cyropaideia* is similarly a construct of the author's fiction, determined less by physical reality or the knowledge of the Persian Empire acquired by the Greeks or by Xenophon in his travels, than by the needs of the narrative. Cyrus acts in a vaguely marked world of several major states: Persia, Media, Assyria, Armenia, and Lydia. Other peoples figure as allies of one or the other side: Egyptians, Hyrcanians, and so on. No specifics are given of boundaries, rivers, or mountain ranges, except that an unnamed river flows through Babylon (7.5.8), and the Pactolus is near Sardis (6.2.11, 7.3.4). Only eight cities are named in the body of the narrative. Two are named several times: Babylon, the capital of Cyrus' opponent and the seat of his own kingdom after his victory, and Sardis, Croesus' capital. The others are Thymbrara, the site of the great battle (6.2.11, 7.1.45), Cyllene and Larisa, the "Egyptian" cities of Aeolis (7.1.45), Lacedaemon (6.2.10), Caystroupedion (2.1.5), and Ecbatana and Susa (8.6.22–23).³⁰ This meager list should be compared with the numerous place names of Herodotus or Thucydides. Herodotus, for example, records the march of Xerxes from Cappadocia to Sardis with seven named cities.³¹ In the *Anabasis*, when describing the expedition of the younger Cyrus from Sardis to Cappadocia, Xenophon names eight cities on the route.³² The same could have been done with Cyrus the Great's supposed march to Sardis, or any other of his expeditions. The fact that it was not points to a quite different conception of historical space in the *Cyropaideia*.³³

Cyrus' actions, whether said to be in Media, Persia, or one of the other states, always occur in a dislocated and unspecified area, with almost none of the precise topographical and ecological detail familiar

³⁰Xenophon names the Euphrates often in the *Anabasis*. The location of the battle of Thymbrara is taken from the battle of Agesilaus outside of Sardis in 395 B.C., recorded by Xenophon at *Hell.* 3.4.21–24 and *Ages.* 1.28–32, cf. Diod. Sic. 14.80. Larisa, and no doubt Cyllene, was known to Xenophon from Agesilaus' campaigns: cf. *Hell.* 3.1.7; Caystroupedion from the expedition of Cyrus, *Anab.* 1.2.11.

³¹From Critalla in Cappadocia Xerxes successively passes to Celaenae, Anaua, Colossae, Cydrara, Callatebus, and arrives at Sardis (*Hdt.* 7.26.1–31).

³²Colossae, Celaenae, Peltae, Ceramon agora, Caystroupedion, Thymbrion, Tyraiaeon, Dana (*Anab.* 1.2.5–20).

³³No location is given for the significant meeting of Cyaxares and Cyrus after Cyrus' victories, which is simply in the borderlands (ἐν τοῖς μεθόχλοις) of Media and Assyria, nor to the Armenian king's capital, nor to the territory of Gobryas or Gadatas.

from the *Anabasis*. Thus although the setting is within the territory of the Persian Empire of Xenophon's day, it is not firmly located in the context of contemporary geographical and ethnographical knowledge of the region, but rather in an undifferentiated "Asia," a kind of "every-territory," in which the important facts are not the precise nature of a given river, mountain, city, or country, but universal problems of warfare and administration.³⁴ To display his virtue Cyrus must have enemies, so there must be an Assyria, a Lydia, an Armenia, but the nature of these places is not dictated by geography but by didactic convenience. Cyrus must demonstrate how to seize beforehand a mountain retreat, or how to defeat raids from mountaineers, so Armenia is mountainous.³⁵ The countries do not figure as real places, simply the proper locale for specific types of action. In the same way nothing is made of the difficulty of Cyrus' march to Thymbrara and Sardis, with three hundred war-chariots, or of Croesus' problems in transporting 120,000 Egyptians by sea to Lydia (6.2.10), or other such details. Xenophon's Persia is a notional country, which offers few obstacles to the reader transposing the lessons of Cyrus' life into his own world. Only the factor of size, in terms of men and distance, indicates the disproportion between Cyrus' achievement and that which might be imagined of a Greek general or polis.³⁶ The actual locations are influenced but not set by earlier tradition. Xenophon found it useful to play his own account of the battle of Croesus and Cyrus and the fall of Sardis against that of Herodotus, so he makes Sardis a locale for action. But another famous Herodotean locale, Cyrus' final confrontation with the Massegetae on the Araxes frontier, is ignored.

In analyzing Xenophon's decision to employ a Persian setting, therefore, what emerges is not that Xenophon is exploiting his first-hand knowledge of the territory and its varied peoples, flora, and fauna,

³⁴Xenophon is sometimes quite vague about geography: e.g., the Assyrians at 1.5.2 conquer Syria and Arabia, but also the Hyrcanians, and besiege the Bactrians, before engaging with Media. Even places which Xenophon knew and had described in the *Anabasis*, such as Armenia, are left indeterminate; though the mention of the Armenians' neighbors the Chaldeans surely refers back to the incident described at *Anab.* 4.3.4.

³⁵*Cyr.* 2.4.24; 3.1.2, 4; 3.2.1–14.

³⁶Bakhtin (note 11 above) 99–100 associates this sort of abstract space with the adventure-time of the Greek romances. "What happens in Babylon could just as well have happened in Egypt or Byzantium." This is true of the *Cyropaideia* in so far as Cyrus might have as easily conquered any other kingdom as Armenia, and the great battle of Thymbrara might as easily have taken place elsewhere.

but that he has suppressed this knowledge and generalized his presentation, employing specific items only as subordinate to his narrative purpose. The world of the *Cyropaideia* is not contemporary Persia pushed back into an early historical period, but a universal territory, localized for convenience in the general space occupied by the Persian empire.

Why then speak of Persia at all? What effect did Xenophon hope to achieve? I have already noted the usefulness of a historical setting—a reference to an empire known to have existed, and to a king renowned as a great leader—and the ties with the present which Xenophon was able to establish by his references to Persian customs and contemporary Persian degeneracy. Natural additional motives would have been Xenophon's own experience and fascination with Persia, and the reading public's curiosity about a nation so vast, powerful, and different from themselves. Xenophon's contact with and admiration for Cyrus the younger and the Persian virtues which he thought he embodied no doubt played an important part. Most important, perhaps, was that this setting permitted him to universalize his thinking to encompass the highest values both of the Greek polis and of the Persian ruling class.³⁷

SEGMENTATION OF MINOR NARRATIVES

The discussion of time has indicated that the structure of the *Cyropaideia* is episodic, grouped around major incidents such as campaigns or dinner parties, each marked by an independent time frame. The sequence of these episodes forms the narrative background of the book. Another narrative technique is employed in recounting the major subplot, the story of Panthea and Abradatas. This is told in segments interspersed in the course of Books 4 to 7, fitting each segment into a suitable context within the larger story of Cyrus. Apparently this method of telling a story was an innovation in prose: we see no evidence for the technique in Herodotus or Ctesias. In the *Odyssey*, Homer had shown what could be done by following several narrative strands simultaneously (Odysseus' adventures, the suitors and Penelope, Telemachus' travels), and then bringing them together into one tale. Herodotus had experimented with having a character from one story appear in another. Croesus is at the center of his own complex of tales, but also is

³⁷On the influence of Persian values (as Xenophon understood them) in Xenophon's conception of an ideal ruler, see Knauth and Nadjmabadi (note 5 above) 40–64.

introduced as an adviser to Cyrus the Great in the campaign against the Massegetae, and as a scorned adviser to Cambyses. Artabanus figures as advisor to Xerxes in several episodes, and other figures reappear in Herodotus' narrative from time to time. The Herodotean story perhaps closest in technique to that of Panthea is the two-part tale of Pythius the Lydian, who first is honored by Xerxes for feeding his army, then punished for requesting that his son be spared from the expedition (Hdt. 7.27–29, 7.38–39). The two halves of the account are complementary, revealing the two sides of despotism, generosity and arbitrary cruelty. But exactly because of its function in revealing Xerxes' despotism, the story is not permitted to develop its own shape as a novella.³⁸ The Panthea story, on the other hand, is carefully developed in four acts (after the tantalizing preliminary reference to the beautiful captive at 4.6.11), each of which is significant for the development both of the novella subplot and the account of Cyrus' success. A review of the scenes will make this clearer.

The beautiful captive: a story in four acts

Prologue. Cyrus is awarded "the most beautiful woman in Asia" (4.6.11).

Act I. The power of love (5.1.2–18): Cyrus reveals his self-control and self-knowledge.

Cyrus appoints Araspas custodian of the woman, Panthea.³⁹ In the dialogue which follows, Araspas reports her extraordinary beauty, but Cyrus, wary that her beauty will cause him to fall in love and distract him from his duty, refuses to see her. Araspas insists that love is subject to rational control and that there is nothing to fear. After the dialogue, Xenophon as narrator notes that Araspas soon "was captured by love, and perhaps suffered nothing surprising."

Act IIa. Cyrus saves the impetuous lover and the captive (6.1.33–44): Cyrus finds the right use for a brave but weak subordinate and gains a major ally through his self-control.

Cyrus decides to send Araspas as a spy against Croesus. A flashback reviews how Araspas, overcome by passion, attempts first to seduce then to violate Panthea, and how Panthea rejected him and warned Cyrus.

³⁸The figure of Pythius did attract other fuller tales: see Plutarch *Mul. virt.* 262D–263C and P. A. Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods* (Cambridge, MA 1965) 120–24. Thucydides through his divisions by years achieved some of this effect, e.g., the stories of Corcyra and Plataea.

³⁹Xenophon identifies Araspas as an old friend of Cyrus, referring to 1.4.26, where no name is given. Otherwise Araspas appears only in the episodes of the Panthea story.

Cyrus, without anger, insisted that Araspas use persuasion, not force, with Panthea. However, his messenger Artabazus⁴⁰ reproached Araspas with impiety, injustice, and lack of self-control. Araspas' fear of Cyrus and the expectation in others' minds that he will become his enemy permits Cyrus to set up a pretence that they have in fact quarreled and Araspas has deserted to the enemy: in fact he will be a spy. Araspas joyfully accepts the opportunity to show his worth.

Panthea, on the other hand, respecting Cyrus for his treatment of her, engages to win over her husband Abradatas, the prince of Susa, as an ally, replacing the supposed loss of Araspas. Abradatas, persuaded by Panthea's words and Cyrus' actions, eagerly joins his whole force of one hundred chariots to Cyrus' army.

Act IIb. Araspas returns from his spy mission (6.3.14–20).

Araspas now furnishes valuable information on Croesus' troops and dispositions, which permit Cyrus to frame the tactics which will result in victory.

Act IIIa. Abradatas receives the most dangerous position in Cyrus' formation (6.3.35–36).

Act IIIb. The leave-taking of Panthea and Abradatas (6.4.2–11).

Panthea tenderly sees Abradatas into his chariot, as he leaves to join Cyrus' forces at the battle of Thymbrara. She urges him to fight bravely to repay Cyrus for his generous treatment of her.

Act IVa. The death of Abradatas (7.1.29–32).

Abradatas makes a valiant charge against the massed Egyptian contingent and breaks their line, but is thrown from his chariot and killed.

Act IVb. The lovers reunited (7.3.2–16).

After the battle, Cyrus hears of the brave death of Abradatas, and goes to where Panthea sits with her husband's body. He states the honors he is planning for Abradatas and his willingness to marry her to whom-ever she wishes, and departs. Panthea kills herself over the body of her husband.

The story of Panthea has the form of a romance: a loving married couple are separated when the woman is captured by a king. The woman resists seduction and rape by her guardian, supported by the good king. The faithless guardian redeems himself by going on a dangerous spy mission. The couple is reunited when the woman persuades her husband to join the king as ally. Because of their own high standards of behavior, and to please the king, both man and woman are eager that

⁴⁰ Artabazus is himself erotically attached to Cyrus: see the story of the kiss at 1.4.27–28 (with 8.4.27), although he is not named until 6.1.9.

he fight in the forefront of the battle. The man is killed fighting bravely, and the woman, unable to endure separation, kills herself on his body. All this story could have been told as a unit, in connection perhaps with the aftermath of the battle of Thymbrara. But by breaking the story into segments Xenophon redefines its nature, creating a series of lessons on the relation of personal virtue to long-term goals and values.

The beauty of Panthea permits Xenophon to display concretely and memorably the forethought, self-knowledge, and sexual self-restraint which he considers essential in a leader. Cyrus is not without feeling, or asexual: on the contrary, he sees himself as naturally prone to be defeated by the passion of love when he has contact with a beautiful woman. But not being as rashly self-confident as Araspas, he sternly reins in his natural desire to see Panthea, because at the time he must be occupied with more important matters. His awareness of his long-term goals prohibits self-indulgence; his self-knowledge keeps him from putting himself in a position where he would no longer be able to control himself. Araspas provides the counter-example, the man who by recklessly indulging in the sight of Panthea's beauty, is smitten by love, and led first to violate his trust by attempting to seduce Panthea, and then to violate his own sense of honor and justice by threatening to rape her.

Araspas' failure permits Xenophon to demonstrate Cyrus' management of his associates, in particular how he attempts to find the proper job for each person. Cyrus is not offended by Araspas' failure: he realizes that Araspas has yielded to human nature, as he himself might have done, and that Araspas can once more be useful when the circumstances change. Xenophon permits Cyrus' initial error in making Araspas the guardian so that he can demonstrate the technique of converting a potential enemy to an ally by modifying the situation in which he is operating. Coupled with this knowledge of human nature is an absolute freedom from possessiveness or defense of privilege. Cyrus does not feel threatened or challenged by Araspas' behavior, exactly because he recognizes it as a human failing rather than betrayal or rivalry. While others presume that Cyrus will consider Araspas an enemy, he himself is seen scheming with Araspas against Croesus, the real enemy. The scheme is successful, and Cyrus gains information significant to the following victory.

In addition, the story reveals—what has already been demonstrated in other cases—that generous, honest, and self-restrained treatment of others will win even enemies to one's side: Abradatas defects to Cyrus as a result of the treatment his wife has been given, and in fact

becomes the most valuable of Cyrus' allies, the one who by his fearless attack on the Egyptians determines the victory over Croesus. Xenophon draws a direct line between the self-knowledge and self-restraint of the commander and his military success. Cyrus initially refuses to see Panthea, for fear that he be distracted from more important duties. What Cyrus does not know is that this decision will in fact empower him to fulfill those very duties, by giving him special advantages in the campaign against Croesus.

Finally, the scene with Panthea and the mutilated corpse of Abradatas reminds the reader of the tragic nobility of bravery, and the honor that it is due. Simultaneously it draws a startling contrast with the fatuous figure of Croesus, who as a commander should know the true value of virtue. Instead, in his immediately preceding dialogue with Cyrus on the nature of the happy life (7.2.15–29), Croesus had said that Cyrus now had given him happiness (εὐδαιμονία), because he had made him like a woman, comparing his future state to that of his wife, who lives softly and without worry supported by her husband. Panthea, a different kind of wife, gives the lie to this definition: true happiness lies in encouraging virtue in oneself and others. Abradatas, though now a mutilated corpse, has met “the finest end” (τὸ κάλλιστον τέλος) and Panthea's love has been more of an ornament to him than all the rich garments Cyrus could bring (cf. 7.3.7, 11).

In his treatment of the Panthea novella, Xenophon's narrative originality in dividing the story into episodes and interweaving it with the main story line of Cyrus' campaign has permitted him to develop dramatically and persuasively the moral virtues which underlay Cyrus' military victories. As the cruelty of the Assyrian and the weakness of Croesus assure their defeat, Cyrus' self-knowledge and self-restraint assure his success.⁴¹

CYRUS' PAIDEIA

The static nature of time in the *Cyropaideia* has important consequences both for the understanding of character and the meaning of *paideia* in the title and throughout the novel. The narrative discloses

⁴¹This lesson of the narrative is reinforced by many other narratives, some of which are also broken into segments, such as the intertwined stories of Gobryas (4.6.1–10; 5.2.1–22, 5.3.1–14; 7.5.24–32) and Gadatas (5.2.28–29, 5.3.15–33, 5.4.1–6; 7.5.24–32).

Cyrus' character, reveals the nature of his training (παιδεία) and in the process trains the reader as well, by describing Cyrus' words and behavior in particular, difficult situations and in relating to particular characters. The major emphasis of the work is on Cyrus as an example for the education of the reader, not on Cyrus' own education.

In so far as a principal facet of Xenophon's ideal leader was the ability to wage war effectively, the military situations of the narrative form a kind of handbook of military training, strategy, and tactics. An unusual economy prevails in Xenophon's account, quite different from the narrative technique of Herodotus or Thucydides. In these historians, repetitive patterns are employed to allow the reader to understand the underlying similarities of apparently diverse historical events. Xenophon, working not from history but from invention, employs a series of episodes, of which each is independent, and each conveys a particular lesson.⁴² The result is a narrative which is simple compared to that of the historians, linear rather than interwoven, and requiring much less of the reader.

A short example will clarify my point: there are several campaigns involving marches to a battle area, but only one such journey is described in detail, the march to Thymbrara. First, Cyrus in a long speech (6.2.25–41) explains to his commanders the needs of the fifteen-day march. They will have to prepare grain for the march, and should at once become accustomed to drinking water, since wine will be scarce on the march and their bodies will need time to adjust to the change. Likewise they should prepare clothes and bedding, preserved meats, handmills, medical supplies, tools for reworking weapons and for clearing roads, men trained in bronzeworking, carpentry, and leather work with their tools, and sutlers to supply a market when needed. The speech reads like a modern traveler's guide, listing all that might be necessary before a trip. The march itself follows, and again Xenophon specifies precisely the order of march, the position of the baggage train under various conditions, and the manner of reconnoitering (6.3.1–6). The purpose of the passage is evidently to set forth Xenophon's ideas of the preparations and formation needed for a long march. The information appears only here; in narrating other campaigns, Xenophon treats

⁴² Similarly Xenophon avoids problems which do not interest him in this context, such as the difficulty of training the newly formed Persian cavalry (cf. 4.3.3–14, 4.5.43–49; 5.2.1), treated in his *Hipparchicus* and *Peri hippikēs*.

other problems, such as the use of deception in concealing the attack against the Armenians as a hunting expedition (2.4.18–32).⁴³

CHARACTERS

Just as incidents are determined by the nature of the lesson Xenophon intends to impart, so also are the characters with whom Cyrus deals. The characters of the *Cyropaideia* depend for their existence on their role in Xenophon's scheme of virtue, not a historical tradition or earlier historical narratives. Xenophon does use characters with historical names, and some of these are tied to historical actions, but he refuses to let historical tradition determine his story.

Consider his treatment of women. Herodotus and Ctesias, our best representatives of the Greek tradition on Persia before Xenophon, both place royal women at the center of their accounts of oriental monarchy. From Candaules' wife to Amastris the wife of Xerxes, from Semiramis to Parysatis, Herodotus and Ctesias introduce powerful, intelligent, vengeful, dangerous women, who assume power and dominate their hapless spouses.⁴⁴ Harem intrigues and bedroom plots were a standard feature of rule in the orient. Xenophon himself notes in the *Anabasis* the major role played by Parysatis in protecting Cyrus the younger and encouraging his revolt against his brother. When we turn to the *Cyropaideia*, we are in a different world. Only four women are brought to our attention, Panthea, Cyrus' mother Mandane, and the wives of the Armenian king and of his son Tigranes.⁴⁵ Panthea, as has been seen, is the opposite of the dangerous women of Herodotus and Ctesias: she is intelligent, brave, and strong-minded, but sees herself in relation to her husband, who gives meaning to her life, and whom she joins in death. Mandane is the caring mother, thoughtful for the growth

⁴³ At 7.4.16 a sentence covers the return march from Sardis to Babylon, the conquest of the Phrygians, Cappadocians, and Arabs, and the equipping of 40,000 more cavalry. Actions of these types have already been treated, and so are of no interest.

⁴⁴ Cf. recently H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, "Exit Atossa: Images of Women in Greek Historiography on Persia," in A. Cameron and A. Kuhrt (eds.), *Images of Women in Antiquity* (London 1983) 20–33 and "Decadence in the Empire or Decadence in the Sources? from Source to Synthesis: Ctesias," in *Achaemenid History I: Sources, Structures and Synthesis*, ed. H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (Leiden 1987) 33–45.

⁴⁵ Cyrus' wife, the daughter of Cyaxares, is a silent figure at 8.5.18–20, 28.

of her child, but set aside when Cyrus joins a man's world.⁴⁶ She is a far cry from Parysatis, attempting at all costs to advance the position of Cyrus the younger. In the small scene allotted to her, Tigranes' wife reinforces the loyalty and affection shown by her husband. Her pride in his virtue introduces the theme which will be developed in the Panthea story. Here also erotic attachment is indicated without elaboration ("Then, as was to be expected after such a conversation, they lay down with each other").⁴⁷ The two are close, and she accompanies her husband in Cyrus' army. The wife of the defeated Armenian king appears briefly in a lesson on the use of wealth. As Cyrus leaves Armenia, she meets him, and gives him the gold which previously had been hidden in the ground. Cyrus returns it to her, so that she can use it to furnish fine weapons for her son, and a decent life for her family, adding that only bodies should be buried, not gold.⁴⁸ Xenophon has consistently challenged the Hellenic tradition on Persian women to present figures of virtue and display Cyrus' leadership.⁴⁹

The wives of the Armenian king and of Tigranes are two examples of many minor figures which Xenophon introduces briefly for a particular purpose, then dismisses. The gloomy taxiarch⁵⁰ Aglaitadas objects at a dinner party to the laughter of Cyrus' comrades. His criticism provokes a discussion on the proper season and role of humor, at the end of which Aglaitadas himself is brought to smile by a witticism (2.2.11–16). The Sacan wine-pourer of Astyages arouses the envy of the young Cyrus for his influence on the king (1.3.8–11, 1.4.6); Sambulus, one of Cyrus' officers, is teased by him for his ugly companion (2.2.28–31). Daiaphernes, who thought he would appear more independent if he did not immediately respond to Cyrus' summons, is given a lesson

⁴⁶ *Cyr.* 1.2.1, 1.3.1, 13–18, 1.4.1. Cyrus consults her together with his father concerning his marriage (8.5.20, 28); both parents die long before Cyrus (8.7.1).

⁴⁷ *Cyr.* 3.1.41, cf. 3.36–37, 43. Xenophon recalls the scene at 8.4.24.

⁴⁸ *Cyr.* 3.3.2–3.

⁴⁹ Women do not play a large role in Xenophon's historical works. In the *Hellenica*, there is only the local dynast Mania (3.1.10–16, 26–27) and Parapitas, who appears as mother of Pharnabazus' son (4.1.39–40). The women in the *Anabasis* are more powerful, and occasionally have a sexual role: Parysatis the queen mother (1.1.1, 3, 1.4.9, 1.7.9; 2.4.27), the Cilician queen Epyaxa, who aided Cyrus and perhaps shared his bed (1.2.12–20), Cyrus' Phocian mistress, Aspasia (1.10.2–3), and the wife of Gongylus, who aided Xenophon (7.8.8–9).

⁵⁰ Note the reference to his character: τὸν τρόπον τῶν στρυφνοτέρων ἀνθρώπων.

(8.3.21–22).⁵¹ These figures and others like them are introduced once, play their scene, and then are never heard from again.⁵²

There are thirteen major figures: the members of Cyrus' immediate family, Astyages, Cambyses, Cyaxares, and Mandane; his allies the Persians Chrysantas and Hystaspas, the Mede Artabazus, the Assyrians Gadatas and Gobryas, the Armenian Tigranes, and Panthea and Abradatas; and his enemy Croesus. These can serve multiple functions, but always their appearance and behavior is dictated by the particular qualities in Cyrus which their interaction with him will reveal. A review of two encounters between Cyrus and his uncle, Cyaxares, who becomes king of Media and Cyrus' overlord, will illustrate the practice. As has been seen, the figure of Cyaxares does not appear in our record apart from the *Cyropaideia*, and must be seen as a creation of Xenophon's imagination.

The first encounter is when Cyrus is a young man, accompanied on a hunt by Cyaxares, who is older but has not yet assumed the throne from his father Astyages.⁵³ In his youthful eagerness Cyrus rushes ahead of his cautious uncle, pursuing first a stag, and then a boar. Cyaxares protests, and fears king Astyages' anger, but Cyrus is determined to bring back his trophies despite the risk. Cyaxares yields to him, saying, "Do as you wish, since you already seem to be king." The words are prophetic of Cyrus' future power over his uncle, even after Cyaxares becomes king. The whole scene conveys Cyrus' prowess and determination to excel, as well as his ability to manage even his seniors. Nevertheless, as appropriate to the developmental stage of the narrative, Cyrus has not shown wisdom either in pursuing his quarry so rashly nor in confronting his uncle so directly. He has still much to learn.

The second occasion comes much later, after Cyaxares has become king and enlisted Cyrus' aid in the great war against the As-

⁵¹ Again he is characterized appropriately: σολοικότερος ἄνθρωπος τῷ τρόπῳ.

⁵² There are some 55 persons named in the *Cyropaideia*, of which approximately 33 appear on a single occasion. About 20 names appear in catalogues, marching orders, or battle lists but are repeated nowhere else. These people, such as Andamias, leader of the Median infantry (5.3.38) or Euphratas, commander of the siege machinery (6.3.28), serve to make the narrative more precise and real. At the same time, they exemplify Xenophon's idea of leadership, which includes knowing the names of subordinates, as Cyrus explains at 5.3.46–50.

⁵³ *Cyr* 1.4.7–9. See also the full treatment of Cyaxares by Tatum (note 1 above) 115–33.

syrians.⁵⁴ Despite Cyaxares' caution and disinclination to pursue the enemy, Cyrus has managed the war so successfully that the Assyrians are defeated and Cyrus returns triumphant to the king. Far from being content, the king is frustrated and enraged because Cyrus has done battle without his approval and conquered while he was partying and sleeping. The scene is set: how will Cyrus deal with a superior jealous of his achievements, unwilling to take risks himself, and pained at the glory won by others, even when done in his name and to his advantage? The problem is common in business and even academic life today; it must have been common as well in Xenophon's society, with its emphasis on personal honor and achievement. In the background there lie echoes of Achilles' quarrel with Agamemnon. Like Agamemnon, Cyaxares is a ruler who is basically good-hearted, but weak and resentful of the obvious superiority and dynamism of someone under him.

Accompanied by his victorious and booty-laden army, Cyrus presents himself to Cyaxares, but the king refuses his kiss of greeting and turns away weeping.⁵⁵ Cyrus does not become angry or challenge the king, but gently leads him by the hand to a secluded spot under some palm trees, has the king sit upon pillows, and then himself sits beside him to discuss the matter. The scene, of course, recalls that of the conversation on the grass between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus, when their relations had become difficult.⁵⁶ In the long dialogue that follows, Cyaxares touchingly speaks of his feelings of shame, frustration, and anger when he sees Cyrus taking his men from him, and winning the glory that should be his.⁵⁷ Although Cyrus argues that the victory was won for him, Cyaxares is not mollified, accurately describing the feelings of one who is dominated by the benevolence of another more dynamic person: "You know that the greater these benefactions of yours are, the more they weigh on me" (5.5.25). Finally Cyrus promises to demonstrate in deed that the Medes respect Cyaxares and honor him. He returns to his army, and the Median commanders who had accompanied him, encouraged by Cyrus, do in fact come forward with great

⁵⁴ *Cyr.* 5.5.5–36.

⁵⁵ *Cyr.* 5.5.6: καὶ ἐφίλησε μὲν οὐ, δακρύων δὲ φανερός ἦν.

⁵⁶ See *Hell.* 4.1.29–40 and Gray (note 1 above) 11–78, "Conversationalised Narrative."

⁵⁷ Similar feelings of alienation had caused the Armenian king to kill Tigranes' sophist counsellor (3.1.38–40). In that case, the parallel between the sophist and Socrates is patent, so that Xenophon in the scene with Cyaxares is also suggesting that the Athenians' execution of Socrates was natural, though wrong.

honors for Cyaxares, so that he feels he is honored as a king should be. From that point forward Cyaxares accepts Cyrus' predominant role and does not oppose him. It is of course obvious that the honors paid to Cyaxares are dependent upon Cyrus' good will, and not an independent achievement of the king. Yet Cyrus, by his willingness to give the pre-eminent honor to Cyaxares, being satisfied himself with second place, is able to achieve a stable relation with the king, and be left free to accomplish his own goals. The act requires an extraordinary act of renunciation on Cyrus' part: it is rather as if Achilles had said with good humor, "By all means, Agamemnon, take Briseis. After all, I have been fighting for you, and you as king deserve more honor." The whole scene has been conceived by Xenophon to illustrate his idea of how one might handle the resentment of excellence which Cyrus faced.⁵⁸

CYRUS AS PARADIGM

The *Cyropaideia* is built of such scenes, each an example of virtuous behavior in human relations. Cyrus in this utopian, didactic narrative is an ideal figure, displaying always the paradigmatic behavior envisioned by Xenophon. In his book, James Tatum has examined many of these incidents with a fine eye for detail and the underlying implications of a conversation or a scene. Yet from my own reading of the narrative form of the *Cyropaideia* I would disagree with his analysis in one important particular. Tatum finds that Cyrus is at bottom an actor, consciously manipulating his behavior so as to manage all those with whom he comes in contact, shaping himself anew each time so that nothing will stand in the way of the accomplishment of his goals.⁵⁹ In this view, as Cyrus persuades Cyaxares by pretending to be humble, all the while insisting on his own way and working toward his own imperial goals, so he does with each person he meets. Dialogues do not persuade him, nor do conversations reveal his true character under the banter.

⁵⁸As on other occasions, the reader may not be convinced that this procedure would work. Xenophon himself seems to sympathize with Cyaxares to a certain extent, although his portrait shows a man who has inherited the throne, but is not himself kingly. The power of Cyaxares' words is Xenophon's way of recognizing that the problem envisioned was a serious one. If the narrative is not convincing, it is because Xenophon cannot overcome the reader's sense, based on his own experience, of the way such situations resolve themselves in real life.

⁵⁹See Tatum (note 1 above) 65-66, and often.

Even those fabled lovers, Panthea and Abradatas, learn to their sorrow that Cyrus will use anything, even their love, to achieve his ends. This interpretation reflects our own contemporary sense of skepticism toward authority and our idea of personal excellence. Moreover, it seems to imply that the *Cyropaideia* is a history, and Cyrus a real person, who can be judged on the basis of his actions.

But if what I have argued is true, and the narrative employs a historical setting only to create a utopian vision of ideal human behavior, then the Cyrus portrayed by Xenophon is not an actor who assumes different poses, but one who knows what is right on all occasions, and has such perfect control of himself that he can put his knowledge into action. Because he is the ideal, he has no second thoughts, dialogues do not persuade him, he always triumphs. As I noted in discussing the temporal dimension of this novel, the major part of the book is not developmental but revelatory: the reader is not shown Cyrus working out the difficulties he faces in a dynamic, exploratory way, but Cyrus demonstrating the proper response.

Xenophon's fictional narrative reads like history, but the idealization of Cyrus, the generalization of space and time, and the control over the characters reveal it as something quite different, in which the author attempts to consider the nature of human experience not on the basis of previous events, attitudes, and actions, however broadly understood and interpreted, but by the creative effort of his own imagination. Plato attempted to blend everyday life and philosophical insight in the figure of Socrates, a historical figure idealized beyond recovery.⁶⁰ Xenophon, with his focus on the problems of leadership, especially in war, chose instead Cyrus, a historical conqueror and king, revered as a father by the Persians, as the vehicle for his ideal ruler.

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⁶⁰For one minor yet quite influential incident where Plato reinvented a historical event to convey his philosophical point, see C. Gill, "The Death of Socrates," *CQ* 23 (1973) 25-29.



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ABRUPTNESS IN DEMETRIUS, LONGINUS, AND DEMOSTHENES

Abruptness (διάλυσις), a broken up, resolved, or disjointed quality, is not a trait that most critics of Demosthenic oratory would readily number among the most prominent characteristics of his style. Nevertheless, this is an important concept in the comments of both Demetrius and Longinus, two perceptive ancient critics, about Demosthenic oratory, and it is their analyses that I want to examine in this paper.

Demetrius does not treat Demosthenes's style as such, but he cites passages from the Demosthenic corpus as examples of the various techniques that he discusses. This is especially the case in his discussion of the forceful style (δεινότης; 240–304), where Demosthenes is cited more frequently than any other Greek writer, although even here the references are not exclusively to Demosthenes, and Demetrius does not actually say that Demosthenes is the best representative of the forceful style. From the frequent references, however, we can assume that he considered the style of Demosthenes to be forceful, although he does not really associate his four styles with particular authors as Dionysius of Halicarnassus does. Moreover, in trying to determine what are the sources of force in the style of Demosthenes we should look at those techniques that he illustrates with an example from the Demosthenic corpus. It is probable that passages from Demosthenes would most readily come to mind to exemplify those approaches that Demosthenes used in a particularly effective way, or that were typical of his oratory, especially since Demetrius gives only one example of each trait that he discusses.¹

If we proceed in this way, we discover that Demetrius sees two sources of force in the style of Demosthenes. The first is conciseness (συντομία; cf. 241, 253). His recommendation of praeteritio (263), unanswered rhetorical questions (279), and striking and concise metaphors and similes (272–74), all of which he illustrates with a passage

¹Cf. G. M. A. Grube, *A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style* (Toronto 1961) 55. For the text of Demetrius I have used that of W. Rhys Roberts in the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge 1927). For Longinus I have used the edition by D. A. Russell (Oxford 1964). I have also used the Oxford Classical Text, by Butcher, for Demosthenes (Oxford 1903).

from Demosthenes, is related to the importance of conciseness in a forceful style. There is something concise about appearing to pass over even significant information in order to proceed to more important matters. Unanswered rhetorical questions, likewise, allow the orator to bring up a point without appearing to dwell on it. They force the hearer or reader to answer the question for himself, and this expands the scope of the speech. It forces the audience to think about something that the orator does not actually discuss and allows him, therefore, to say a lot in a few words; and that to Demetrius is the essence of forceful conciseness (241). Images also convey thought quickly and economically.

The second source of force is the abrupt or broken up quality, the use of disconnected elements in a sentence, mentioned at the beginning of this essay.² To describe this phenomenon Demetrius uses the term *διάλυσις*. In section 269, in fact, he says that *διάλυσις* more than any other approach produces force. Although he does not explain exactly what he means by this term, he illustrates it with an example from Demosthenes's speech *On the False Embassy* (314):

πορεύεται διὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς τὰς γνάθους φυσῶν, τὰς ὀφρῦς ἐπηρκῶς, ἵσα βαίνων Πυθοκλεῖ.

He walks through the market-place, puffing out his cheeks, lifting his eyebrows, walking like Pythocles.³

It is clear from this example that *διάλυσις* involves breaking a complex idea down into its component parts and then stating them separately without conjunctions to tie them together.⁴

²The first critic of Demosthenes's style, Aeschines, had also pointed out that conciseness is one of the most prominent characteristics of Demosthenic oratory and that conciseness produces force (2.51). Demetrius may have gotten the idea from him. Aeschines also emphasizes the detail that one finds in Demosthenic oratory, which is filled with facts and figures and specific proposals, and the frequent use of oaths (2.153; 3.82, 98–100). All this detail and documentation, plus the oaths, also tend to give his speeches a broken up quality (cf. Aeschines 3.100), and Demetrius may have gotten this idea from Aeschines as well. Cf. also Hermogenes, *On Types of Style*, tr. Cecil Wooten (Chapel Hill 1987) 89–97; all future references to Hermogenes are to page numbers in this translation.

³Demosthenes's text is somewhat different from the quotation in Demetrius, but that does not vitiate his point.

⁴Cf. the reference to *oratio soluta* in Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik* (Munich 1960) secs. 916–20. Demetrius also says (241) that in a forceful style the use of *κόμματα* . . . ἀντὶ κόλων is very important. *κόμμα* itself, derived from the verb *κόπτω*, means "that which is cut or chopped off" and thus involves the same idea of fragmentation or abruptness as the verb *διαλύειν*.

It is also clear from the comment that immediately follows the example that the lack of connectives is important in producing the desired effect. For two reasons, however, I do not think that *διάλυσις* means simply "lack of connectives," as Grube translates it here. First of all, if that is all that Demetrius had meant, he could have used a simpler example, one that involves merely words rather than phrases that really convey as much information as the main clause does. Secondly, he uses the term *ἀσύνδετον* in the preceding section (268) where he also gives an example. And there it is only the nouns that change. It seems unlikely that he would here devote a whole paragraph to the same phenomenon and give it a different name. Some ancient critics clearly did use *διάλυσις* as a synonym for *asyndeton*.⁵ However, in doing so they were probably focussing, as ancient rhetoricians had a tendency to do, on the purely formal aspects of language as opposed to the effect that such configurations produce.⁶ A lack of connectives does, in fact, produce a broken up or abrupt effect, but it is not the only type of approach that can do that. I would argue, therefore, that *διάλυσις* has a broader meaning here, and that conclusion may be supported by the next two paragraphs of Demetrius's treatise (270, 271).

Demetrius begins the next section (270) by saying that the figure called *κλίμαξ* could also be employed (*λαμβάνοι τ' ἄν*). I assume that he means that it could also be employed in order to produce the same effect as the example listed before, and that effect is probably the general idea of force, since after giving an example he says that without the *κλίμαξ* there is no force (*δαινὸν οὐδέν*). However, the fact that he discusses this figure immediately after *διάλυσις* would seem to indicate that he feels that there is something abrupt or broken up about it as well. The example that he gives from the speech *On the Crown* (179) confirms this suspicion:

οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔγραψα δέ· οὐδ' ἔγραψα μὲν, οὐκ ἐπρέσβευσα δέ· οὐδ' ἐπρέσβευσα μὲν, οὐκ ἔπεισα δὲ Θηβαίους.

I did not say these things and then fail to make a proposal; I did not make a proposal and then fail to go on the embassy; I did not go on the embassy and then fail to convince the Thebans.

⁵The later rhetoricians Alexander and Phoebammon, for example, use it thus; cf. Christian Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* (London and elsewhere, 1832–1836; reprinted Osnabrück 1968) VIII, 469, 514. Moreover, the Latin term *dissolutio*, which seems to be a translation of *διάλυσις*, is usually used in the sense of *asyndeton*; cf. Quintilian 9.3.50.

⁶Cf. Hermogenes (note 2 above) 133.

Here again a complex thought is broken down into its component parts, and they are set side by side in an abrupt way. Moreover, the first two thoughts end with the conjunction δέ, which Demetrius says elsewhere (257) creates a forceful effect, probably because such placement is also abrupt, leaving the impression that the sentence has somehow come up short, that it could continue but does not.⁷ Asyndeton, so clearly important in the example in section 269, can have a similar effect by conveying the same open-ended quality.⁸

Now, in the very next paragraph (271) Demetrius summarizes (καθόλου) by saying:

Καθόλου δὲ τῆς λέξεως τὰ σχήματα καὶ ὑπόκρισιν καὶ ἀγῶνα παρέχει τῷ λέγοντι, μάλιστα τὸ διαλελυμένον, τοῦτ' ἔστι δεινότητα.

This is a difficult passage. Grube translates it:

In general, figures of speech give the speaker an opportunity for histrionic delivery in debate, that is for forcefulness, and this is especially true when connectives are omitted.⁹

If the phrase τὸ διαλελυμένον, however, means simply "lack of connectives" and if that is what διάλυσις also means, this is the third term that Demetrius has used in four short sections to refer to the same phenomenon. However, a participle with the definite article can be used in a general sense.¹⁰ Therefore, I would take this to mean "figures of

⁷Grube (118) says: "What Demetrius has in mind is the abrupt, jerky effect in structure and rhythm of thus ending on a short, monosyllabic, normally unemphatic, particle."

⁸Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.12.4 says that asyndeton gives an amplified effect (ἔχει οὖν αὐξήσιν).

⁹Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.12.2 says that asyndeton and repetitions are appropriate for an actor (ἔστι γὰρ ὑποκριτικά).

¹⁰Cf. H. W. Smythe, *Greek Grammar* (Cambridge 1956) sec. 1124. I am indebted to an anonymous reader for pointing out that the use of the phrase τὸ διαλελυμένον σχῆμα in the nominative in sec. 301 probably justifies taking this as a nominative here. The reprise of the phrase at 301 may also indicate that σχῆμα should simply be understood with τὸ διαλελυμένον just as παρέχει must be understood with δεινότητα. He also pointed out that Demetrius may very well be imitating what he is describing, illustrating an abrupt word order by alternating nominative (σχήματα), accusative (ὑπόκρισιν καὶ ἀγῶνα), nominative (τὸ διαλελυμένον), and accusative (δεινότητα).

speech, especially one that produces an abrupt effect."¹¹ This would mean that Demetrius has in mind not only the *διάλυσις* that he discusses in section 269 but also the *κλίμαξ* that he discusses in section 270 and which is sandwiched in between these two references to abruptness. This would also mean that the reference at the end of paragraph 271 to *τῶν σχημάτων ἀμφοτέρων* may very well refer to *διάλυσις* and *κλίμαξ* rather than to figures of speech and figures of thought, as the phrase is usually interpreted.¹²

Other appearances of forms of *διαλύω* would indicate that Demetrius is thinking of a meaning that is more general than a simple lack of connectives. In section 301 he says:

Καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ διαλελυμένον σχῆμα δεινότητα ποιεῖ, ὡς προλέλεκται, οὕτω ποιήσει ἡ διαλελυμένη ὅλως σύνθεσις.

In light of the argument above I would translate this:

And just as the kind of figure that produces an abrupt effect creates force, so an arrangement that generally breaks up the words will have the same effect.

It is clear from the comments that follow that what Demetrius means here is the abandonment of any sort of regular rhythmical pattern, what in Latin is called, similarly, *oratio dissoluta* (Cicero, *Orator* 196). In other words, this also involves setting elements of the sentence side by side in a seemingly random way. This is also the case with the *κῶλα* in the style that Demetrius calls *ἡ διαλελυμένη ἐρμηνεία* (13), or the disconnected style. He says that the clauses of a sentence in a periodic style (*τὰ περιοδικὰ κῶλα*) are like the stones that are artistically arranged to form a vaulted dome. The clauses in a sentence written in a disconnected style, on the other hand, are like stones that are simply put near one another but are not arranged into any kind of structure.¹³

¹¹This is the general sense in which Roberts translates the phrase, although in his translation he takes it as the object of *παρέχει* rather than as an appositive or qualifier to *τὰ σχήματα*. However, in his note on the passage he admits that it would make more sense if *μάλιστα τὸ διαλελυμένον* were thought of as following *σχήματα*, which is the way that Grube takes it. See the discussion in the footnote above.

¹²This is the way in which both Roberts and Grube interpret the phrase.

¹³Cf. his comments in sec. 31 about the enthymeme and its structure.

In the comments above I have tried to demonstrate, first, that Demetrius thinks of *διάλυσις* as a general concept which involves the breaking up of thought into the separate entities that comprise it and, second, that he associates this abrupt quality with Demosthenes. Let us look now at other characteristics that he seems to link with Demosthenic oratory and see whether they also reveal a broken up quality.

It is possible that the figure that he calls *ἐπιμονή* (synonymity), which he illustrates with an example from Demosthenes, is related to this fondness for breaking up thought in a forceful style. He cites only part of the sentence (280). The whole reads:

νόσημα γὰρ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δεινὸν ἐμπέπτωκεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ πολλῆς τινὸς εὐτυχίας καὶ παρ' ὅμων ἐπιμελείας δεόμενον.

For, gentlemen of Athens, a disease has fallen on Greece, terrible and difficult and requiring much good fortune and attention from you.

Here the piling up of qualifiers describing the disease creates an effect that is similar to that produced by the sentence quoted as an example of *διάλυσις* in section 269. In both examples a complex idea is resolved into its component parts and they are stated separately, side by side. Here the polysyndeton simply emphasizes each element in the description. These two examples illustrate the sort of cumulative effect that Demetrius admires and that he also associates with a forceful style. He says that the effect of a forceful passage should be like that of a boxer throwing rapid punches one after another (274) or of a person reciting poetry with one line inexorably following another (251). Both *ἐπιμονή* and *διάλυσις* pile up bits of information and thus give an intensity to Demosthenes's prose that is similar to the effects conveyed by the images that Demetrius uses to describe a forceful style.

Demetrius also recommends the use of hiatus (299) as an approach that produces a forceful style. In fact, after stating that the smooth type of composition that one associates with Isocrates is not suitable in forceful passages, he rearranges some phrases from Demosthenes to show how the presence of hiatus in the original sentence gives it much more force. Demosthenes's sentence in the speech *On the Crown* (18) reads:

τοῦ γὰρ Φωκικοῦ συστάντος πολέμου, οὐ δι' ἐμέ, οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐπολιτευόμεν πω τότε . . .

When the Phocian war broke out, not on my account, for I was not then in politics . . .

Demetrius rearranges it thus:

τοῦ πολέμου γὰρ οὐ δι' ἐμέ τοῦ Φωκικοῦ συστάντος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπολιτευ-
όμην ἔγωγέ πω τότε.

By comparing these two versions one sees that the hiatus in the original makes the word ἔγωγε stand out from the rest of the sentence,¹⁴ and Demosthenes thus accentuates what is clearly the most emphatic word.¹⁵ However, the presence of hiatus also creates a disjointed, abrupt, or broken up effect, because it separates words from one another.¹⁶ I would see hiatus, therefore, as another example of what Demetrius calls two sections after this (301) ἡ διαλελυμένη σύνθεσις.

Demetrius also recommends (246) the use of words that are hard to pronounce, that create a jerky, jolting effect, as an element that produces force, and once again he gives an example from Demosthenes: ὑμᾶς τὸ δοῦναι ὑμῖν ἐξεῖναι (from you the right to bestow it; *Against Leptines* 2). Here the jolting effect is probably produced by the fact that the sentence ends with five short words in which long syllables predominate (ὑμᾶς τὸ δοῦναι ὑμῖν ἐξεῖναι). Hermogenes points out (63) that ending a sentence with short words creates a halting or disconnected effect, and the long syllables, which make each word weightier, probably only intensify this effect. The repetition of sounds (ὑμᾶς . . . ὑμῖν, δοῦναι . . . ἐξεῖναι) probably also makes the phrase hard to pronounce, as does the hiatus δοῦναι ὑμῖν. Like the many long syllables, this repetition of similar sounds forces the speaker to slow down and to emphasize each word. Demetrius compares the phrase to uneven or bumpy roads (ἀνώμαλοι ὁδοί). In any case, there is clearly an abrupt or disjointed effect here also.¹⁷

Similar to this, but on a larger scale, Demetrius also argues (277–78) that very elegant language, if it is the exception rather than the rule,

¹⁴The final ε, however, is elided in the Oxford Classical Text.

¹⁵Cf. Lionel Pearson, "Hiatus and its Purpose in Attic Oratory," *AJP* 96 (1975) 138–59.

¹⁶Cf. the note on this passage in Grube (note 1 above) 128.

¹⁷Cf. the note on this passage in Roberts's edition (note 1 above) 252.

as it usually is in Demosthenes,¹⁸ can also create force. He gives two examples (*On the False Embassy*, 255; *On the Crown*, 71):

οὐ λέγειν εἶσω τὴν χεῖρά ἔχοντα δεῖ, Αἰσχίνη, ἀλλὰ πρὸς βεβύειν εἶσω τὴν χεῖρα ἔχοντα.

It is not necessary to speak without holding out your palm, Aeschines, but to go on embassies without holding out your palm.

ἀλλ'ὁ τὴν Εὐβοίαν ἐκείνος σφετεριζόμενος καὶ κατασκευάζων ἐπιτείχισμα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν, πότερον ταῦτα ποιῶν ἡδίκηει, καὶ ἔλυσεν τὴν εἰρήνην, ἢ οὐ;

But that one who was appropriating Euboea and setting up a fortress against Attica, by doing these things was he doing wrong and breaking the peace, or was he not?

In each of these examples there is a sudden rise in emotion (ἐπανάστασις). There is also a dramatic change in the language, which is much more balanced than one usually finds in Demosthenes.¹⁹ This abrupt change of tone and language makes the passage stand out from the context in which it appears. In other words, it also creates a sort of jerky, jolting effect.

The comments of Longinus confirm Demetrius's argument that a disjointed or abrupt element is important in the style of Demosthenes. In a comparison of Demosthenes and Hyperides, one of the general terms that he applies to Demosthenic oratory is ἀδιάχυτος (34.3). This adjective is derived from the verb διαχέω and thus basically means not thoroughly dissolved, melted, or fused. In the same passage (34.4) Longinus says that Demosthenes is not a show orator (ἐπιδεικτικός) and that his language is not ὕγρός (smoothly flowing). The latter is a word that Dionysius of Halicarnassus applies to the style of Isocrates (*On Dem.* 20), which Demetrius says (299) is not suitable in the forceful style that he associates with Demosthenes. I would take ἀδιάχυτος,

¹⁸Cf. Hermogenes (note 2 above) 56.

¹⁹Cf. Galen Rowe, "Demosthenes' Use of Language," in *Demosthenes' On the Crown*, ed. James Murphy (New York 1967) 184. In section 278 Demetrius gives only the first part of the sentence. He quotes it more fully in the next section (279), and that is what I have cited. Even here, however, it is very abbreviated. Evidently the sentence was quite well known in antiquity; cf. Hermogenes (note 2 above) 38–40. In the first citation Demetrius also changes slightly the position of the vocative Αἰσχίνη.

therefore, to mean something like what Demetrius means by the term διαλελυμένον.

Moreover, in the passage cited above Longinus argues (34.4) that not only is Demosthenes inspired by more passion than Hyperides but that the former also uses outbursts of emotion in rapid succession, piling one emotion on top of another (τοῖς ἐπαλλήλοις ἐκείνου πάθει-σιν), which is probably related to the fullness (περιουσίαν) that he also admires in Demosthenic oratory. This is very much like the effect of a boxer throwing one punch after another or a person reciting lines of poetry in quick succession that Demetrius (274, 251) associates with a forceful style. In fact, in his discussion of a passage from the speech *Against Meidias* (72) Longinus says (20.2) that the effect of combining a lack of connectives, anaphora, and accumulation of detail (διατύπω-σις)²⁰ is exactly the same as that of someone who delivers one blow after another (τῇ ἐπαλλήλῳ πλήττει φορῶ).

This idea of abruptness appears clearly in the famous comparison of Cicero and Demosthenes (12.4). Demosthenes attains sublimity by means of language that is brusque and concise (ἀποτόμῳ) as opposed to the smooth, flowing language of Cicero (χύσις; see above), and this is why he compares Demosthenes's power to a flash of lightning or a thunderbolt, something that is sudden, abrupt, unexpected.²¹

This is probably seen most clearly in his praise of Demosthenes's use of hyperbaton (22), which involves arranging words and thoughts in an unnatural sequence. According to Longinus, Demosthenes uses hyperbaton more often than any Greek writer, although his inversions are less extreme and unnatural than those in Thucydides (22.3). Demosthenes, he argues, often begins an idea and then before he brings that idea to a conclusion introduces a seemingly unrelated idea. These extraneous comments are so unexpected and tend to suspend the thought so completely that the audience fears that the entire structure of the

²⁰See Russell (note 1 above) 135. Aeschines had also pointed out Demosthenes's use of detail (see note no. 2).

²¹James A. Arieti and John M. Crossett, ed., *Longinus On the Sublime* (New York and Toronto 1985) point out (76) that Longinus here imitates the style of Demosthenes and Cicero. In describing Demosthenes he uses "three quick nouns without connectives." Moreover, it may well be that Longinus feels that it is the "abrupt" or "cut-off" nature of the rhythm of the phrase ὥσπερ νέφος (two longs followed by two shorts) that gives it sublimity. In discussing this (39.4) he uses once again the word ἀπότομον. See Arieti and Crossett, 200. Russell (note 1 above), however, expresses reservations about this interpretation (175). In any case, the sentence is difficult.

sentence might collapse. And then, unexpectedly, the necessary complement turns up at the end of the sentence.²² One effect of this sort of word order is that each of the various ideas introduced is presented discretely and stands out on its own. The thought, in other words, is clearly broken up.²³

This is similar to another technique that Longinus also praises in Demosthenes (27.3). In a sentence in the first speech *Against Aristogeiton* (27) Demosthenes changes person in the middle of the sentence and switches abruptly from addressing the jury to a direct attack on his opponent. This leaves the sense and syntax incomplete and once again breaks up the thought into two discrete units.²⁴

Many of the techniques just discussed are intended to convey to the audience the emotion that the speaker feels. In fact, in addition to the broken up quality of much of his language the presence of emotion in Demosthenes's oratory is another unifying theme in Longinus's comments.²⁵ He says (12.5) that the kind of sublimity that one sees in Demosthenes is usually found in the emotional, intense, strained, even violent passages in which his purpose is to frighten or amaze his audience. Clearly, the use of hyperbaton and anacoluthon convey the image of a man whose emotion has overcome his normal tendency to speak in an orderly way, and this gives an impression of spontaneity to the orator's language. Moreover, when Longinus discusses (20) Demosthenes's combination of asyndeton and anaphora in the sentence from the speech *Against Meidias* already mentioned (72) he especially praises the way in which Demosthenes varies the repeated words and limits himself

²²We see a similar idea in Dionysius of Halicarnassus. In his essay *On Demosthenes* (9) he says that the orator often constructs his sentences like a series of embedded brackets. Before completing the first clause he introduces a second idea and then adds a third before the second is completed. Material completing the second idea follows the third, and the first idea is not rounded off until the second has been completed. Dionysius says that Demosthenes uses this type of sentence more frequently in the political speeches, especially the *Philippics*, and that this is one respect in which he was influenced by Thucydides.

²³Russell points out (note 1 above) 139 that Longinus's own sentence is a good example of what he is discussing.

²⁴Some critics question the authenticity of this speech; see Russell (note 1 above) 146.

²⁵Again Aeschines makes similar observations (cf. 2.3; 3.150–51, 207, 209).

to three or four repetitions, "for monotony expresses quiet, while emotion, being a violent upheaval of the soul, demands disorder" (20.2).²⁶

I hope to have demonstrated that to Demetrius and Longinus abruptness of various sorts is a prominent characteristic of the style of Demosthenes. What I would like to do now is to take a passage from the orator and to illustrate these tendencies in it. I have resisted the temptation to select, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus does (*On Dem.* 9), a fairly extreme example such as the first sentence of the *Third Philippic*. I have chosen rather a fairly typical sentence from the speech *On the Crown* (66–67):²⁷

ἡ τί τὸν σύμβουλον ἔδει λέγειν ἢ γράφειν τὸν Ἀθηναίων (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο πλείστον διαφέρει), ὃς συνήδεν μὲν ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου μέχρι τῆς ἡμέρας ἀφ' ἧς αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα ἀνέβη, αἱ περὶ πρωτείων καὶ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης ἀγωνιζομένην τὴν πατρίδα, καὶ πλεῖω καὶ χρήματα καὶ σώματ' ἀνηλωκυῖαν ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας καὶ τῶν πᾶσι συμφερόντων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀνηλώκασιν ἕκαστοι, ἐώρων δ' αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον, πρὸς ὃν ἦν ὁ ἀγὼν, ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς καὶ δυναστείας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκεκομμένον, τὴν κλεῖν κατεαγότα, τὴν χεῖρα, τὸ σκέλος πεπηρωμένον, πᾶν ὃ τι βουλευθείη μέρος ἢ τύχη τοῦ σώματος παρελῆσθαι, τοῦτο προΐεμενον, ὥστε τῷ λοιπῷ μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης ζῆν;

Or what should the advisor have said or proposed, that is, the one who gave advice at Athens (for this is most important), who knew that from all time up until the day when he himself mounted the speaker's platform always for renown and honor and glory our fatherland had struggled, and more both money and bodies she had expended in her pursuit of distinction and what was beneficial to all than the other Greeks had spent individually on their own behalf, and who saw that Philip himself, against whom we were fighting, for the sake of domination and power had had an eye knocked out, fractured his collar-bone, broken his hand, his leg, whatever part of his body fortune wanted to take, this he let go, provided that for the rest there was a life of honor and glory?

²⁶This is the translation of W. Hamilton Fyfe in the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge 1927).

²⁷Cf. Cecil Wooten, *Cicero's Philippics and their Demosthenic Model: The Rhetoric of Crisis* (Chapel Hill 1983) 34–35. An anonymous reader has suggested that Demosthenes is perhaps imitating the broken nature of Philip's body by the use of the σχῆμα διαλελυμένον here.

First of all, in this sentence as a whole a very complex idea is broken down into its component parts, which are then stated side by side with very few connectives, much like the example of διάλυσις that Demetrius gives in section 269. Moreover, there is an open-ended quality here since bits of information are piled on top of one another with very little indication as to where the sentence is going. The only guiding structure in the long sentence is one μὲν . . . δὲ pair. These bits of information create a cumulative effect that Demetrius compares to a boxer throwing one punch after another (274) and that Longinus (20.2) associates with Demosthenes. This accumulation of detail is also seen in the use of ἐπιμονή which, I have argued, Demetrius also associates with a broken up style: περὶ πρωτείων καὶ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης; ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς καὶ δυναστείας; τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκεκομμένον, τὴν κλεῖν κατεαγότα, τὴν χεῖρα, τὸ σκέλος πεπηρωμένον; μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης. There is in addition hyperbaton, which also creates an abrupt effect, although it is the fairly natural sort that Longinus associates with Demosthenes (22). The phrase τὸν Ἀθήνησιν is separated, clearly for emphasis, from the noun that it describes. Then there is the parenthesis, which also interrupts the thought. Then in the first part of the indirect statement that follows συνῆδεν there are almost two lines of adverbial modifiers before we get to the main thought. Likewise, the genitive τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων is separated from the pronoun ἕκαστοι with which it is construed. Then there is the fairly gratuitous parenthesis πρὸς ὃν ἦν ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγὼν which separates the subject of the second indirect statement from the verbal forms that go with it. And finally toward the end of the passage the long direct object πᾶν ὃ τι . . . precedes the participle with which it is construed. It is so long, in fact, that Demosthenes feels the need to repeat the idea in τοῦτο. None of these inversions are unnatural, but they do contribute to a broken-up effect in the passage.

It has been said that if you want to discover how an author constructs whole speeches, you should look at the way in which he constructs smaller units.²⁸ There is something abrupt or broken up about the general organization of many of Demosthenes's greatest speeches, especially the *Philippics* and the *Olynthiacs*. In these speeches Demosthenes tends to develop only one argument at a time, and he moves quickly, without hesitation, from one argument to another, usually with-

²⁸ W. Ross Winterowd, *Contemporary Rhetoric* (New York 1975) 213.

out indicating to his audience how a new point relates to what precedes or where the argument as a whole is leading, although the arguments are strung together in such a way that it is easy for the reader or hearer to keep his bearings.²⁹ This gives an impetus to the speech, a vigor that gives the impression of spontaneity and reveals an underlying emotion that drives the speaker relentlessly from one point to the next,³⁰ and that is surely a major source of that δεινότης that almost all ancient critics of oratory associate with Demosthenes.

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²⁹Cf. Lionel Pearson, "The Development of Demosthenes as a Political Orator," *Phoenix* 18 (1964) 96.

³⁰Cf. Hermogenes (note 2 above) 92–93 and Demetrius (note 1 above) 300.

CICERO, *PRO CAELIO* 31

necare eandem voluit: quaesivit venenum, sollicitavit quos potuit, paravit, locum constituit, attulit.

quos potuit Π^2 PGEH : quos voluit Π^1 || paravit Π^2 H : paruit P^1 GE : paravit quam V

The lemma contains Cicero's version of the prosecution's account of the actions taken by Caelius to poison Clodia. In a convenient summary of the textual and exegetical difficulties of *Cael.* 31, Kinsey¹ reminds us that the MSS text yields a sense superior to Baehrens' emendation *sollicitavit servos, potionem paravit*² and its later variants,³ and therefore should be retained. Regardless of whether *quos potuit* be taken as referring to Clodia's slaves (so Abrami)⁴ or to those from whom Caelius allegedly purchased the poison (so Sydow),⁵ Baehrens'

¹T. E. Kinsey, "Pro Caelio 31," *Hermes* 94 (1966) 253–54. Kinsey's note is short on bibliography. He does not seem to be aware that both of his interpretations have been put forth by others. The most important among those critics was Sydow (see n. 5 below).

The first critic to urge a return to the MSS text and the "traditional" (i.e., Abrami's) interpretation of the passage was Wageningen in M. T. Ciceronis, *Oratio pro M. Caelio*, ed. I. van Wageningen (Groningen 1908) *ad loc.*

²Aemil. Baehrens, "Ad Ciceronis Caelianam," *RPh* 8 (1884) 41.

³This refers to Klotz' reconsideration of the passage in his "Praefatio" to M. T. Ciceronis, *Scripta quae manserunt omnia* 7, ed. A. Klotz (Leipzig 1919) lx–lxi. Klotz retains the MSS reading but still concerned about the object of *paravit* proposes to delete this verb on the ground that it was originally a gloss on *quaesivit*. Klotz' argument, including his thoughts on the order of the actions, found expression in Austin's transposition of *paravit* to follow *venenum*, in M. T. Ciceronis, *Pro M. Caelio Oratio*, ed. R. G. Austin (Oxford³ 1960) *ad loc.*, and in Gardner's translation of Austin's text, "he procured poison, prepared it" etc., in Cicero, *Pro Caelio*, al., ed. and tr. R. Gardner (Loeb 1958).

⁴N. Abrami, *Commentarius in tertium volumen orationum M. Tullii Ciceronis* (Paris 1631). Abrami's comments on the passage merit full quotation; on *sollicitavit quos potuit*: "sollicitavit Clodiae servos ad necem dominae inferendam," and on *paravit . . . attulit*: "paravit venenum, constituit balneas Senias, in quibus venenum servis Clodiae traderetur, attulit venenum non ipse quidem, sed per Lucium Licinium tanti facinoris administrum." In the context of Abrami's remarks, the first element of Baehrens' conjecture, *servos*, appears to be due to interpretative reading of the text, the second, *potionem*, a wild guess (cf. *Clu.* 173, also 30 and 43, where poisonous drafts play a role).

⁵R. Sydow, "Kritische Beiträge zu Ciceros Reden," *RhM* 91 (1942) 357–58: "Caelius suchte sich Gift zu besorgen, er wandte sich an alle mögliche Personen, er bekam es usw."

insistence that *paravit* must have an object of its own is specious, and his conjecture that it was a *potio*, arbitrary.⁶ With the former interpretation, however, Kinsey recognizes the difficulty of supplying *venenum* as the object of *attulit*:⁷ "He sought for poison, he tried to bribe whom he could, he got them (i.e., the poison and the people to administer the poison), fixed on a place, brought it." Kinsey opts therefore for the other referent of *quos potuit* which removes all obstacles to the free flow of the sentence: "He sought for poison, he pestered those he could (to sell him poison), he got it, fixed on a place (to deliver the poison), brought it." He is right.

It is indeed puzzling that Baehrens' emendation, a flimsy construct at best, should for so long deflect critical attention from the real difficulty of the passage, the problem of integrating the IIPGEH reading with what is concealed in the Cluny tradition's unintelligible *quam* (V = Clark's Σ = Nicolas de Clamanges' hand in Paris. 14749).⁸ But on this, Kinsey's note does not afford any assistance. He rather convinced himself that *quam* does not deserve further consideration: it is not found in the *Oxyrhynchus papyrus*, II,⁹ and the text as it stands gives a satisfactory sense. Unfortunately neither of these premises is as self-evident as Kinsey would like us to believe, and the question of *quam* must be reexamined. To turn first to II, valuable as this witness is, the mixed character of its text does not allow one to draw any firm conclusions as to *quam*. Of special significance, however, are those places where the

⁶See Cicero, *Pro Caelio*, ed. Wageningen, *ad loc.*: "deinde de *potione* nusquam sermo est, ubique de *pyxide* (§61 sqq.)." Kinsey's observation that *pyxis* "does not suggest a *potio*" has also relevance here.

⁷It will be observed that if one follows Baehrens' argument to its strict logical conclusion, his conjecture leaves the question of the object of *attulit* also unresolved. Cf. Cicero, *Pro Caelio*, ed. Wageningen (note 1 above) *ad loc.*: "postremo accepta Baehrensi coniectura tamen *attulit* caret obiecto."

⁸See M. T. Ciceronis, *Orationes: Pro Sex Roscio . . . Pro Caelio*, ed. A. C. Clark (Oxford² 1908); A. C. Clark, *The Vetus Cluniacensis of Poggio in Anecdota Oxoniensia*, Classical Series, pt. 10 (Oxford 1905). The collator of the *vetus Cluniacensis* has been identified as Nicolas de Clamanges by Gilbert Ouy (cf. *Annuaire de l'école pratique des hautes études*, IV^e Section. Science hist. et philol. [1965–66] 259); Silvia Rizzo, *La traduzione manoscritta della Pro Cluentio di Cicerone* (Genoa 1979) 52–53; *Texts and Transmission*, ed. L. D. Reynolds (Oxford 1983) 89.

⁹On the relation of II to the MSS tradition, see *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Part 10, ed. B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt (London 1914) No. 1251; A. Klotz, "Der neue Cicero-papyrus," *BPhW* 34 (1914) 955–60.

Cluny tradition transcends the combined testimony of Π and the Paris family of MSS, and its readings are either true or deserve most serious critical attention: 31 *video auctorem video fontem* V (fort. recte) : *video* (ex *viteo* G² : bis H) *fontem video auctorem* Π PGEH; ib. *verum* Quint. V (recte) : *sed* Π P²GEH : om. P¹; 32 *M. Caelium* V (recte) : *Caelium* Π PGEH; 36 *repellit* V (recte) : om. Π PGEH; 37 *dissice* V (fort. recte) : *disce* Π PGEH : *disice* A. Klotz (fort. recte); 42 *abiecisse et* V (recte) : *abiecisse* Π PGEH. It is also interesting that at 31 Clark, following Wrampelmeyer,¹⁰ prints *tamen ne huic* where V reads *tam ne huic* but Π PGEH, *ne huic*. In other words, it is not clear why in our passage Π 's evidence should count for more than elsewhere, and in the light of these facts Housman's observation regarding *quam* deserves a renewed hearing:¹¹ "Nobody would have wished to insert it, everybody would have wished to omit it; it must therefore be regarded as the remnant of something which Cicero wrote."¹²

This brings us to Kinsey's second assertion that the Π PGEH text is complete and the relevant parts in Cicero's rebuttal of the charge (56–66) corroborate this. In fact, it was Sydow who first quoted two passages bearing directly on the text and interpretation of 31. Using almost identical language on both occasions, Cicero objects at 58 "*ipsius autem veneni quae ratio fingitur? ubi quaesitum est, quem ad modum paratum*" and at 61 "*sed tamen venenum unde fuerit, quem ad modum paratum sit non dicitur*." It is evident that what Cicero finds conspicuous in the formulation of the *crimen veneni* is the prosecution's failure to pinpoint the source (*ubilunde*) of the poison and the nature of the transaction or manner by which Caelius acquired it.¹³ When Kinsey considers the relation of 58 and 61 to 31, he finds an indication of "manner" in *quos potuit*, which begs the question. Nothing could be more

¹⁰H. Wrampelmeyer, *Codex Wolfenbütteleanus Nr. 205, olim Helmstadiensis Nr. 304. Pars I Caelianam spectans* (Hannover 1872) xxxvi and xxxvii.

¹¹A. E. Housman, "Ciceroniana," *JPh* 32 (1913) 267–68.

¹²H. Kasten, *Gymnasium* 70 (1963) 254 attempted to show *quam* as an error in copying. He would trace its origin to *quam* in *habuit quamdiu* (three lines above). For his explanation to work, Kasten assumed that the Cluniacensis read *paruit* with P²GEH. Nicolas de Clamanges inadvertently fixed his eye on what stood next to (*hab*)–*uit* and indicated in the margin of Paris. 14749 what he saw there as referring to (*par*)–*uit*.

¹³Cf. Cic. *Inv.* 38 "in gestione autem negoti . . . quaeretur locus, tempus, occasio, modus, facultas and 41 *modus autem est in quo, quem ad modum et quo animo factum sit, quaeritur*."

natural than to relate *ubilunde* to *quos potuit* and *quem ad modum* to a word connected with *paravit*. This word is concealed in *quam*, and is *quodam modo*.

Aware of its inability to produce at the close of the pleadings any concrete evidence on those points of the *crimen* but ready (and entitled) to debate and anticipate Cicero's objections to the charge, the prosecution employed as vague a language in its formulations as the evidence at hand allowed it:¹⁴ Caelius sought for poison, pestered whom he could, got it by some means or other, etc. The mysterious *quam* does not even have the appearance of a gross corruption; it is an imperfectly copied abbreviation. The ancient note for *quidam* is *q̄*; the usual symbol for *modo* is *m* with a suprascript *o*.¹⁵ The unfixed character of *q* suspensions is well-known, and was the source of confusion not only to medieval scribes but led astray many a modern collator. For all we know, Nicolas de Clamanges saw *q̄m* and copied it as well he could.¹⁶ The sense in which *quodam modo* is used here is the same as at *Fam.* 3, 5, 1 "animadverti enim . . . te omnibus in rebus habuisse rationem ut mihi consuleres statueresque et parares quodam modo omnia quo mea ratio facilius et solutius esse posset"; *Inv.* 1, 40 *spatium quodam modo declaratur*. And as for the rhythms, these are the usual ones which one finds in the interior of most larger rhetorical units of Cicero's (Primmer's system):¹⁷

necare eāndēm vōlūt (33²ξ) — quāēsivīt vērēnūm (sp3ε)
sollicitāvīt quōs pōtūt (11³γδ)
parāvīt quōdām mōdō (22γε)
locūm cōstītūt (33²ε) — āttūlīt (c)

¹⁴Cf. A. H. J. Greenidge, *The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time* (Oxford 1901) 477–79.

¹⁵W. M. Lindsay, *Notae Latinae* (Cambridge 1915) 129 and 322; cf. also other entries for *q*.

¹⁶For other corruptions of abbreviations (in the Cluniacensis or its ancestor?) which may have a bearing on *quam*, cf. *S. Rosc.* 32 *parū* = *per vim*, but esp. *Mur.* 66 *huiusce modiodi* for *huiusce modi*. On the difficulty of deciphering the vetus Cluniacensis, see Guarino, *Comm. in Cic. S. Rosc.* 132: "Franciscus Barbarus dicere ac deplorare solet, occaecatum adeo exemplaris codicem, unde haec exarata est oratio, Florentiae viderat, ut nullo pacto inde transcribi verbum potuerit." For Guarino's *Commentary*, see R. Sabbadini, *Storia e critica di testi latini* (Padua 1971; first ed., Catania 1914) 27 and 41.

¹⁷A. Primmer, *Cicero Numerosus* (Vienna 1968) 132 with n. 44, and his tables at the end of the book; for the relation of rhythm to content, see pp. 239–67.

Except for the cretic at the very end, which has a force of its own, *parum volubiles* cadencies (sp3, perhaps also 22) alternate with *praecipites* (so 33², definitely 11³). The rhythm of *sollicitavit quos potuit* is well suited to express Caelius' anxious importuning of sundry people to provide him with the poison and that of *paravit quodam modo*, his relief at striking a deal.

Quam came to the attention of two critics even before Baehrens' intervention into the text. It was discovered by Wrampelmeyer¹⁸ in cod. Wolfenbuttelanus (now) 338 (Helmst. 304), s. xv, which Clark subsequently demonstrated to be a descendant of the corrected Paris. 14749.¹⁹ Wrampelmeyer proposed to read *(post)quam locum constituit* and exposed himself to the criticism of weakening the pattern of asyndetical ordering and breaking up what was intended as a series. Wrampelmeyer's critic Schöll,²⁰ more concerned about the object of *paravit*, suggested the unlikely *paravit opem*. The text constituted by Baehrens has also undergone further modifications, based on what critics believed lay hidden in V's *quam*. Clark printed in his edition *locum constituit, clam attulit*, removing the text even further from the MSS reading but, more to the point (so A. Klotz in app. cr.), "quo additamento vis orationis imminuitur." Housman, putting, for a change, greater trust in palaeographical possibilities than in Cicero's overall argument, read *horam, locum constituit*. Austin's strong endorsement of this conjecture²¹ did not prevent Kinsey from making the sensible observation that "although a time for handing over of the poison must have been fixed, this is not mentioned in the more detailed account of the affair we have later on, in 61 et seq., presumably because it is of no importance to the case."²²

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¹⁸ Wrampelmeyer (note 10 above) xxxvii.

¹⁹ Clark, *The Vetus Cluniacensis* (note 8 above) v and xii.

²⁰ F. Schöll, "Die Interpolation der Ciceronischen Caeliana," *RhM* 35 (1880) 561, n. 1.

²¹ Cicero, *Pro Caelio*, ed. Austin (note 3 above) *ad loc.*

²² Cousin's eclectic and much altered text, "quaesivit venenum, sollicitavit suos, potionem paravit, quam, loco constituto, attulit, falls on its own demerit, regardless of what Cousin says in its justification. See Cicéron, *Discourse 15: Pour Caelius, Sur les prov. cons., Pour Balbus*, ed. and tr. J. Cousin (Paris² 1969) 79–80.

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THE IMPERIAL WOMEN OF THE EARLY SECOND CENTURY A.C.

I

The imperial women of the period of Trajan and Hadrian deserve close scrutiny, despite the infrequency of the ancient literary references to Pompeia Plotinā, Ulpia Marciana, Salonia Matidia (Matidia the Elder), Mindia (?) Matidia (Matidia the Younger), and Vibia (?) Sabina, and to Domitia Paulina and (Aelia) Domitia Paulina, respectively Hadrian's mother and sister.¹ What scant information there is, however, is commonly construed as revealing an influence these women supposedly wielded with their imperial spouses or relatives. Additionally, this influence is favorably compared to that of earlier and later imperial women, in assertions of the relative power and independence of this most elite category of women from Livia at least through the Severans.² But examination of all epigraphical and other evidence for the second-century imperial women shows that they in fact enjoyed little power and autonomy. Further, the close comparison of this evidence to that for the prototype Livia and some analogous women demonstrates the subservience and impotence of the imperial women of the first half of the second century in comparison to their counterparts in other eras. These

¹See H. Temporini, *Die Frauen am Hofe Trajans* (Berlin and New York 1978) (Plotina and Marciana); A. Carandini, *Vibia Sabina* (Florence 1969); W. Eck, *RE Suppl.* 15 (1978) 131–34, s.v. Matidia, #2, *ibid.*, 909–14, s.v. Vibia(?) Sabina, and *ibid.*, 932–34, s.v. Ulpia Marciana; M.-T. Raepsaet-Charlier, *Prosopographie des femmes de l'ordre sénatorial (Ier–IIe siècles)* (Louvain 1987); J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *Roman Women. Their History and Habits* (London 1962) 133–40. H.-G. Pflaum, "Les Imperatrices de l'époque des Antonins dans l'Histoire Auguste," *Bonner Historia Augusta-Colloquium 1979–81* (Bonn 1983) 245–53, esp. 245–47, basically recapitulates the information of *HA*. Smallwood = E. M. Smallwood, *Documents Illustrating the Principates of Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian* (Cambridge 1966); *IKeph* = C. Börker, R. Merkelbach, et al., eds., *Die Inschriften von Ephesos, Ia–VIII, 2*, *Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 11–17.4* (Bonn 1979–84). Part of this article was presented at "The Lives of Women in Antiquity: Literary Images and Historical Realities," Bowdoin College, April, 1989, whose organizer B. W. Boyd and audience I thank for encouragement and support. I also thank K. J. Rigsby, E. C. Clark, R. J. A. Talbert and the editor and an anonymous reader of *AJP*, for much useful advice.

²E.g., Temporini (note 1 above) 262–63, and *passim*; Balsdon (note 1 above) esp. 134.

findings qualify our understanding of the roles and status of even the most privileged Roman women. Rather than concluding simplistically that Roman women were generally oppressed, however, I shall relate my findings to broader issues of the period.

Any examination of imperial women must start with Livia. In a fundamental article of 1986 N. Purcell explored the role of the "first lady" as Livia defined and embodied it.³ Livia and Augustus worked out the means for the imperial wife to be fully involved in the public life of the Augustan state, and Livia had an unprecedented amount of power and autonomy.⁴ Certain later imperial women can be compared to Livia in their independence and power: the Elder and Younger Agrippinas, Domitian's wife Domitia Longina, and the Severan empresses; even the Antonine empresses, though less forceful, are portrayed as making independent and significant political and sexual choices.⁵ In contrast, the imperial women of the early second century had much less dominating and active roles. Yet it certainly was not the case that imperial marriages or other connections of women to the throne were negligible in Trajan's and Hadrian's reigns. Hadrian's reported statement, for example, that Sabina was so harsh and unyielding that he would have divorced her had he been a private man (*HA, Hadr.* 11.3), indicates the significance marriage had for the *persona* of the emperor.⁶ Other evidence, discussed below, similarly emphasizes the importance of the

³N. Purcell, "Livia and the Womanhood of Rome," *PCPS* n.s. 32 (1986) 78–105.

⁴Purcell (note 3 above) 80–81, 93–96 emphasizes the fear this power occasioned, as witnessed in the *consolatio ad Liviam* (esp. lines 41–50) and Tiberius' later moves to check the growth of Livia's prominence in Rome (*Tac. Ann.* 1.14.1–2).

⁵Agrippina the Elder: Raepsaet-Charlier (note 1 above) #812, 634–35; Agrippina the Younger, #426, 365–67; Domitia Longina, #327, 287–88; the Antonine women: Annia Galeria Faustina (Faustine l'ainée), #62, 78–79; Annia Galeria Faustina (Faustine la Jeune), #63, 80–81; the Severan women: Julia Domna, #436, 373–75; Julia Maesa, #445, 382–83; Julia Soaemias, #460, 394–95. Although Pflaum (note 1 above) 247–51, 253, holds that the two Faustinas never exercised the power of Livia, Agrippina the Younger, or the Severan empresses, sexual and political intrigue is strongly associated with the Faustinae even in *HA* (e.g., *Pii* 3.7, 4.8; *Marc.* 19.2, 24.6; *Avid. Cass.* 7.1). Furthermore, Antoninus Pius' establishment of the *puellae Faustinae* and Marcus Aurelius' of the *novae puellae Faustinae* publicly link these women's names to public benefactions, as had been done with no imperial woman of the previous generation or two (*HA, Pii* 8.1 and *H. Mattingly, Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum*, IV [London 1940] 48, and pl. 8.3–4; *HA, Marc.* 26.6; *ILS* 6065).

⁶See Carandini (note 1 above) 65–68; for Plotina and marriage, Pliny *Pan.* 83. Vespasian and Antoninus Pius preferred concubines to second or later "wives," not

imperial family in the ideology of the time. But it is the abstract, the institution of the imperial marriage or imperial house, that was paramount; this did not translate into personal power for the women figuring in these institutions in either Trajan's or Hadrian's reign.

II

Lineage, high connections, and money are the main constituents of power and prestige for a Roman woman, yet all three characteristics are difficult to discern clearly for the Trajanic and Hadrianic women. Pompeia Plotina, who married into the prominent Ulpian family probably after 70, surely came from an equestrian or senatorial family, whose *origo* was perhaps Nemausus. Her father's praenomen, Lucius, has been restored from the names of her freedmen; her *gentilicium* is known from inscriptions recording her freedmen and from a passage of the *Epitome de Caesaribus* that gives her full name.⁷ From the name of another imperial freedman, a Plotia has been hypothesized as Plotina's mother.⁸ Nothing is reported about either parent.

Ulpia Marciana, Trajan's sister, probably at least ten years older than Plotina and perhaps born ca. A.D. 48, had a more eminent lineage. Her father M. Ulpius Traianus (Traianus pater), a *homo novus* from Spain adlected as a patrician by Vespasian, was *consul suffectus*, perhaps in 70, and held various governorships, including that of Asia.⁹ The

necessarily because they could be controlled more closely: Vespasian's mistress allegedly sold magistracies, procuratorships, and army commands (Dio 65.14.3).

⁷Raepsaet-Charlier (note 1 above) #631, 511-12. The name of her father is inferred from *CIL* VI 1878 = *ILS* 1912, *AE* 1958, 184, and *Epit. de Caes.* 42.21: see H. Chantraine, *Freigelassene und Sklaven im Dienst der römischen Kaiser* (Wiesbaden 1967) 63, n. 10; *idem*, "Freigelassene und Sklaven kaiserlicher Frauen," in W. Eck, H. Galsterer and H. Wolff, *Studien zur antiken Sozialgeschichte. Festschrift Fr. Vittinghoff* (Cologne and Vienna 1980) 393.

⁸C. Plotius Gemellus, *Aug. lib.*, *CIL* VI 24316: Chantraine, *Dienst* (note 7 above) 79-80.

⁹C. Castillo, "Los Senadores Béticos. Relaciones familiares y sociales," *Epigrafia e ordine senatorio*, II (Rome 1982) 514-15, #93; Eck, *RE Suppl.* 15 (1978) 932-34; R. Hanslik, *RE Suppl.* 10 (1965) 1032-35, s.v. M. Ulpius Traianus (pater); Raepsaet-Charlier (note 1 above) #824, 646. The relative ages of Plotina and Marciana are calculated from the customary age difference between Roman husbands and wives; Temporini suggests A.D. 48 for Marciana's birth ("Stammbaum").

identity and background of his wife, the mother of Marciana and Trajan, is unknown.¹⁰ Before 75 and perhaps towards 69, Ulpia Marciana married C. Saloni^{us} Matidius Patruinus, a wealthy senator from Vicetia who was praetor sometime before 78. Their marriage resulted in one daughter, Salonia Matidia (Matidia the Elder), but Marciana was a widow by the time of Trajan's accession.¹¹

Matidia the Elder may have married twice. If her elder daughter's full name was Mindia Matidia, as has been inferred from freedmen's inscriptions, Matidia the Elder's first husband was an L. Mindius who is otherwise unknown, although perhaps a descendant of one of the two senators of this name in Claudius' time.¹² The names of various imperial freedmen suggest that Matidia the Younger's younger sister Vibia (?) Sabina may be the offspring of Matidia the Elder and L. Vibius Sabinus, an Italian senator perhaps from Assisi.¹³ Whereas Matidia the Younger did not marry, Sabina wed Hadrian in 100. She, the great niece of the reigning emperor, was now allied with Trajan's ward, although at that point Hadrian had only reached the quaestorship and his future as Trajan's successor could not have been surmised.¹⁴

Finally, Hadrian's mother and sister: his mother Domitia Paulina, virtually unknown, was from Gades.¹⁵ In addition to her son Hadrian, she bore a daughter, (Aelia) Domitia Paulina, who married L. Iulius Ursus Servianus. This eminent Spanish senator reached his third consulship in 134 after holding the positions of governor in Upper Germany

¹⁰E. Champlin's proposal that she was a Marcia of the renowned Roman family ("Figlinae Marcianae," *Athenaeum* 61 [1983] 263–64) is rejected on chronological grounds by Raepsaet-Charlier (note 1 above) #521, 440.

¹¹Raepsaet-Charlier (note 1 above) #824, 646; for C. Saloni^{us} Matidius Patruinus, see *PIR*¹ S 81, G. Alföldy, "Ein Senator aus Vicetia," *ZPE* 39 (1980) 255–66, and Eck, *RE Suppl.* 15 (1978) 131.

¹²Freedmen: *AE* 1983, 161; *CIL* VI 9021, ?IX 3668. See Raepsaet-Charlier (note 1 above) #681, 547 and n. 35 below; cf. *PIR*² M 597, 598.

¹³Freedmen attested in *CIL* VI 28804, 28789, ?IX 4657, and *AE* 1916, 53, a Vibius who is father of a slave of Sabina Augusta. Sabina's *gentilicium* may have been on a fragmentary inscription found in Phrygian Dionysopolis (*JHS* 50 [1930] 276). For L. Vibius Sabinus, see Raepsaet-Charlier (note 1 above) #681, 547. Raepsaet-Charlier, #681, 546 and A. R. Birley, *Marcus Aurelius*² (New Haven 1987) 244 refute the supposition that Matidia the Elder was married a third time, to Libo Rupilius Frugi.

¹⁴Temporini (note 1 above) 78–86.

¹⁵Raepsaet-Charlier (note 1 above) #330, 292. The information in *P.Fay.* 19, 14–16 (Preisigke B.L., 128), that she lived the same number of years as did Hadrian, is suspect and uninformative.

and in Pannonia.¹⁶ Hadrian had a niece Iulia Paulina, the daughter of (Aelia) Domitia Paulina and L. Iulius Ursus Servianus. Iulia Paulina bore to her husband, Cn. Pedanius Fuscus Salinator, a son, Pedanius Fuscus, whom the dying Hadrian forced to suicide together with his grandfather.¹⁷

By and large, these imperial women came from families only recently important, as Marciana and Matidia the Elder, or from inconspicuous ones, as Plotina and Domitia Paulina, Hadrian's mother. Additionally, the men such women married were part of the new elite, or are obscure to us. Generally the families came from areas far from Rome: northern Italy, southern France, or Spain. The picture fits well the prosopography of this period, which witnesses increasing social and political mobility.¹⁸ On the other hand, the "arriviste" status of these women may be a factor in their relative quietude. They did not have the Roman pedigree and privileged upbringing of a Livia, Agrippina, or Domitia Longina.¹⁹ Their documentation shows nothing comparable to Livia's boastful use of her filiation before the name of her husband in her dedication of the Roman temple of Fortuna Muliebris: *Livia [D]rusi f., uxor [Caesaris Augusti]* (CIL VI 883).²⁰

The families of the Trajanic and Hadrianic women affected their financial standing as well as their presumptions and aspirations: Roman women's fortunes were based on familial inheritance, supplemented by legacies that concomitantly increased their prestige. As now, financial independence was essential to power and autonomy. In theory, most women were not financially independent, since they were under the supervision of their father, their husband, or a tutor. Even emancipated women were supposed to have a guardian, if they were engaged in important financial transactions that might diminish the property. By the second century A.C. the practice seems to have been much less

¹⁶Raepsaet-Charlier (note 1 above) #12, 35-37; for her husband, see *PIR*² I 631, cf. I 569; Castillo (note 9 above) #66, 506-7.

¹⁷See E. Champlin, "Hadrian's Heir," *ZPE* 21 (1976) 79-90, and the stemma accompanying this paper.

¹⁸P. Garnsey and R. Saller, *The Roman Empire. Economy, Society and Culture* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1987) 123; *Epigrafia e Ordine Senatorio*, I, II, Tituli 4 and 5 (Rome 1982) *passim*.

¹⁹Above, n. 5.

²⁰See Purcell (note 3 above) 102, n. 58. Her filiation is also found on the base of a statue raised to her after she received the epithet *Augusta* (CIL 6.882a).

restricting than the legal norms.²¹ Nevertheless, for a woman to be able to display complete freedom of financial action was quite unusual and a mark of honor. Among upper-class women in Rome during the empire, this freedom was reserved for the Vestal Virgins and for women who, according to Augustan legislation, had earned the right by having at least three children.²²

By extraordinary dispensation Livia, and other Augustan imperial women, were also publicly granted this privilege. In 35 B.C., by law, *senatus consultum*, or triumviral edict, Livia and Octavia (Octavian's sister) obtained freedom of financial action as well as the sacrosanctity of tribunes.²³ In A.D. 9 and again later, Livia received special concessions to allow her to inherit from Augustus in excess of the limits imposed by the *lex Voconia* of 169 B.C. that had banned women in the highest property class from being designated heirs or receiving as a legacy more than half an estate.²⁴ Livia was also given by legacy, and kept, vast tracts of land in Asia Minor, Gaul, Palestine, and in many parts of Italy.²⁵

Livia used her wealth for philanthropic activities and public building in Rome, assuming charge of paying others' dowries, rebuilding at least two temples, and constructing two, possibly three, new edifices, among which were the *Macellum Liviae* and the *Porticus Liviae*.²⁶ She

²¹J. Gardner, *Women in Roman Law and Society* (Bloomington, IN 1986) 5–29; Garnsey and Saller (note 18 above) 130–31.

²²Gardner (note 21 above) 19–21; ancient references include Gaius I.145.

²³Dio 49.38.1; Purcell (note 3 above) 85 and n. 41.

²⁴Dio 56.10.2; the grant in A.D. 9 included other privileged Roman *matronae* (Purcell [note 3 above] 85).

²⁵H. Willrich, *Livia* (Leipzig and Berlin 1911) 71–75; O. Hirschfeld, "Der Grundbesitz der römischen Kaiser in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten," in *Kleine Schriften* (Berlin 1913) 519–20.

²⁶Aid to fire victims in A.D. 16, Dio 57.16.2; payment of dowries, Dio 58.2.3; rebuilding of the *Bona Dea* Subura, Ovid *Fasts* 5.157–58, of *Fortuna Muliebris*, *CIL* VI 883, and perhaps of the ancient temples of *Pudicitia Plebeia* and *Pudicitia Patricia*, R. E. A. Palmer, *RSA* 4 (1974) 140; the construction of the shrine of *Concordia*, M. B. Flory, "Sic exempla parantur: Livia's Shrine to *Concordia* and the *Porticus Liviae*," *Historia* 33 (1984) 313–19; and the co-dedication with Tiberius of the Temple of the Deified Augustus, Dio 56.46.3 and Pliny *HN* 12.94 (who holds that Livia alone was responsible for the construction). For the *Macellum Liviae* and *Porticus Liviae*, see Flory, and Purcell (note 3 above) 102, nn. 64–65. Dio also reports that Livia was intending to feast the senators, equestrians, and their wives on the occasion of the dedication of the statue to Augustus in her house in A.D. 14: 57.12.5, cf. 56.46.5. She was also responsible for an aqueduct for the *vicani Matrini* in southern Etruria: *CIL* XI 3322.

underlined her independence and self-importance by using her filiation in her dedication of the temple of Fortuna Muliebris, as we saw above. In general, she manifested her power and her control of her finances in lavish public expenditure. In other ways as well she expended her wealth as did rich men: for example, at her death she bequeathed 50 million sesterces to Galba in a gesture of patronage and *amicitia* common among the elite, though unusual in its magnitude.²⁷ On a lesser scale, other imperial women of the Augustan period likewise engaged in public building in Rome, including Octavia and Agrippa's sister Polla.²⁸

In contrast, the imperial women of the early second century make no financial displays at all. No source expressly states that Plotina, Sabina, or any of the other imperial women had freedom of financial action. We hear of no public decree granting them such, although we should probably presume that they somehow had at least the right of three children, a privilege granted to Livia in 9 B.C., and later to other eminent Romans who similarly did not strictly qualify.²⁹ Although Hadrian and Antoninus Pius both ruled that legacies to the wife of the emperor lapsed if she died before the testator,³⁰ records of legacies to imperial women are lacking. Likewise, no evidence discloses the bequests of the women themselves. As opposed to a Livia or Agrippina the Younger, almost nothing attests the financial standing and activity of these second-century women. The difficulty of identifying the possessions of these women may be underscored by Antoninus Pius' grant of his personal *patrimonium* to his daughter, but its profits to the state (*HA*, *Pii* 7.9).³¹

²⁷Suet. *Galba* 5. Willrich (note 25 above) 77–79, lists other public gestures.

²⁸Octavia, S. B. Platner and T. Ashby, *A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (Oxford 1929) 76, s.v. Basilica Antoniarum Duarum; Polla, Dio 55.8.3; cf. Purcell (note 3 above) 102, n. 65.

²⁹It is commonly assumed, and sometimes buttressed by references to coins of the imperial women with Vesta on the reverse, that the imperial women had the privileges of the Vestals, including financial ones: S. B. Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves* (New York 1975) 184; H. Mattingly, *Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum*, I (London 1923) cxlvi. For the diffusion of the *ius liberorum*, see (e.g.) Pliny *Epp.* 10.2.1, 10.94.2 and 2.13.8; Gardner (note 21 above) 20–21.

³⁰F. Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World* (Ithaca, NY 1977) 157, citing *Dig.* XXXI 57 (Mauricianus, *Ad legem Iuliam et Papianam* II), which refers specifically to legacies to Plotina and Faustina (I).

³¹See H. Nesselhauf, "Patrimonium und Res Privata des römischen Kaiser," *Bonner Historia Augusta-Colloquium 1963* (Bonn 1964) 73–93. For our ambiguous knowledge of the legal classification of imperial holdings, see also Millar (note 30 above) 175–89.

The scant unambiguous financial information for the Trajanic and Hadrianic women is presented in Table I below.³²

TABLE I: FINANCIAL INFORMATION

- A. Ulpia Marciana:
 Villa at Cumae (lead pipe): *AJA* 2 [1898] 398, nbr. 67
Procurator libertus Oecius in Croton, perhaps indicating land ownership there: *CIL* X 106 = *ILS* 4039³³
Liberta Ulpia Sophe in Grottaferrata (*ager Tusculanus*): *EE* IX 682 = *AE* 1906, 81 = *NSc* 1905, 276
- B. Pompeia Plotina:
Figlinae around Rome, incl. *figlinae Quintianae*: *LSO* 589–93, 595–99; *CIL* XII 5678 = *CIL* XV 693.16; Steinby, “Ziegelstempel” 1524³⁴
 Equestrian . . . Rufus, *procurator Plot. Aug.*: *CIL* X 7587 = *ILS* 1402
Familia in Rome (*AE* 1958, 184, *CIL* VI 1878 = *ILS* 1912, with a *nomenclator a censibus*; *CIL* VI 3082* = *IG* XIV 331*; probably also *CIL* VI 29279, 29391), and in Aricia (*CIL* XIV 2161)
- C. Domitia Paulina, mother of Hadrian, and (Aelia) Domitia Paulina:
 No evidence
- D. Salonia Matidia (Matidia the Elder) (at times difficult to distinguish from Matidia the Younger):
 House in Rome (lead pipe found near Piazza Vittorio Emanuele): *AE* 1954, 62
 Seal of her slave, in *agro Allifano* NW of Beneventum, near Telesia, perhaps indicating land ownership there: *CIL* IX 6083.84
Familia in Rome (*CIL* VI 28804, ?28789, XV 7822, *AE* 1916, 53, *CIL* XI 6727.1 = *ILS* 8632, perhaps from Etruria), perhaps in Ampelum (Dacia) (*CIL* III 1312 = *ILS* 1593)

³²In addition to standard abbreviations, Table I uses the following: Eck, “Matidia” = W. Eck, *RE Suppl.* 15 (1978) 131–34, s.v. Matidia, #2; *LSO* = J. Suolahti, M. Steinby et al., *Lateres signati Ostienses*, I (Rome 1978); Steinby, “Ziegelstempel” = M. Steinby, *RE Suppl.* 15 (1978) 1489–1531, s.v. “Ziegelstempel”; Thylander, *Ostie* = H. Thylander, *Inscriptions du Port d’Ostie* (Lund 1951–52).

³³See also Chantraine, “Kaiserlicher Frauen” (note 7 above) 393, 397–98, 410–11, for the *familiae* of the imperial women under discussion.

³⁴Although the datable stamps from Plotina’s *figlinae* are from 123, and the *figlinae Quintianae* passed to Plotina after Trajan’s death, Plotina must have owned brickyards prior to 117: Steinby, “Ziegelstempel” (note 40 above) 1524; *LSO* 589, 590.

Presumable donation, together with daughter Matidia the Younger, of a foundation to Vicetia, in A.D. 242 still providing funds for the city *ex liberalitate Matidiarum*: *CIL* V 3112 = *ILS* 501, cf. *CIL* V 3111

E. Mindia(?) Matidia (Matidia the Younger):

Summo genere, summis opibus nobilissima femina de vobis optime merita: Fronto, *ad Ant. imp.* II.1, p. 98 VDH

Libertus procurator, and *Aug. lib.* in Suessa, probably indicating land-ownership in the area: *CIL* X 4746–47, cf. *CIL* X 4644–45, 3833

Procurator, perhaps indicating land-ownership: in Ephesus (*CIL* III 7123 = *ILS* 327 = *KEph* 283), *libertus proc. summ(arum)* at Castel Arcione on the Via Tiburtina (*AE* 1983, 161),³⁵ in Rome (*CIL* VI 9021), and perhaps in the Fucine Lake area (or of her mother?) (*CIL* IX 3668)

Vast tracts of land in Mauretania Caesarensis (less likely belonging to her mother): *CIL* VIII 8812 = *ILS* 5965, *ILS* 9382; see Eck, "Matidia" 133

Figlinae around Rome: *LSO* 600 and 601

Dwelling in Rome, near Piazza Vittorio Emanuele and via Buonarrotti (lead pipe): *CIL* XV 7306

Dwelling in Tusculana (lead pipe): *CIL* XV 7822

Dwelling in Ostia (lead pipe): *CIL* XIV 1978, cf. XV 7737

Land between Ostia and Portus Traiani?: "Pons Matidiae" attested here in the 5th century: *FA* 24/25 (1969/70) 903 nr. 13820

Familia (some perhaps belonging to mother), in Rome (*CIL* VI 9021, 25417, 28804), Ostia (Thylander, *Ostie* A 261), and perhaps Prymnessos, Phrygia (*AE* 1976, 654)

Presumable donation, with mother, of a foundation to Vicetia, in A.D. 242 still providing funds for the city *ex liberalitate Matidiarum*: *CIL* V 3112 = *ILS* 501, cf. *CIL* V 3111

Presumable donation of the B[y]bl[i]otheca M[at]idiana in Suessa: *CIL* X 4760 (A.D. 193)

Patronage of unidentified pupils, perhaps in Capua, each to inherit from her will an annuity of at least HS 50,000: Fronto *ad amicos* I.14, p. 173 VDH³⁶

³⁵ See H. Solin, *Epigraphische Untersuchungen in Rom und Umgebung* (Helsinki 1975) 66–68, no. 112.

³⁶ For the complications afflicting her will, see E. Champlin, *Fronto and Antonine Rome* (Cambridge, MA 1980) 71–72, and R. Duncan-Jones, *The Economy of the Roman Empire. Quantitative Studies*² (Cambridge 1982) 228, n. 637. The latter tentatively locates her wards in Capua, relatively near her benefactions and presumable property in Suessa.

F. Vibia(?) Sabina:

Presumed villa, in unidentifiable location: *Hermeneuta Leid., Corp. Lat. Gloss.* III, p. 37

Dwelling in Rome, between Chiesa S. Eusebio and Piazza Vittorio Emanuele (lead pipe): *CIL* XV 7313 (two examples, one not found *in situ*)

Figlinae around Rome: Steinby, "Ziegelstempel" 1525³⁷

Familia in Rome (AE 1916, 53; *CIL* VI 11221, 33802, 28804, 28789, 29143, ?28803, ?29194, ?10657³⁸; *BullComm* 82 [1970/71] 73 nbr. 7); perhaps at Tuder (Etruria) (*CIL* XI 4657); in Italica, Baetica (*ILS* 3563 = *EE* VIII 305); in Conimbriga, Lusitania (AE 1954, 86); and perhaps in Dionysopolis, Phrygia (*JHS* 50 [1930] 276)

?Land in Velleia, attested by a Vibia Sabina's contribution of HS 100,000 to alimentary scheme of 98/102: *CIL* XI 1147, line 52³⁹

Donation or dedication in Rome to the *matronae* of Rome: *CIL* VI 997 = *ILS* 324, probably originally erected in the Forum of Trajan, post 119⁴⁰

Named as *locupletator*, with Hadrian, at Gabii: *CIL* XIV 2799 = *ILS* 321 (publicly)

Despite running the risk of circumstance when dealing with inscriptions, we can make a few conclusions about this material. The evidence generally is indirect and concerns property: the most common witness of a woman's possessions is the names of her freedmen. The older women, Marciana and Plotina, are attested with but few holdings in their own names, although the existence of an equestrian procuratorship for Plotina's possessions indicates that her property was vast and important.⁴¹ The two Domitiae Paulinae have no documented holdings whatsoever. Matidia, the Elder, whose goods can be distinguished from those of her daughter Matidia only with difficulty, had landed and other financial interests farther afield than the attested ones of her mother

³⁷ Her nomenclature as Sabina *Augusta* on these stamps denotes a *post quem* of 119: Eck (note 1 above) 910–11.

³⁸ See Chantraine, *Dienst* (note 7 above) 239, 243.

³⁹ Duncan-Jones (note 36 above) #1241. Yet this woman may simply be a member of a local family attested elsewhere in the Velleian tablets: *ibid.*, p. 335.

⁴⁰ See Purcell (note 3 above) 100, n. 33.

⁴¹ Of the 17 other possible *procuratores rerum Caesaris* known to H.–G. Pflaum, two are *procuratores (Iuliae) Augustae*, and three procurators of the goods of an imperial woman and imperial man or men together (*Les Carrières procuratoriennes équestres sous le Haut-Empire romain* [Paris 1960–61] 1018).

Marciana, but again the evidence is meager. Given the emphasis in this period on the ties between women (discussed below), it is noteworthy that Matidia the Elder and her two daughters seem to have houses near one another in Rome.

Only from Hadrian's reign and later do more data exist, but they are not of a uniform type. The relatively abundant information about Sabina primarily attests possessions; only in Rome, Gabii, and perhaps Velleia, can we see or presume dispersion of wealth. On the other hand, Sabina's sister Matidia the Younger, with perhaps the most distant ties to the men on the throne, is attested as owning the most property and being the most generous with it. Her gifts are extraordinary. R. Duncan-Jones, calling her "Pliny's main rival in public generosity in Italy" and parenthetically adding "if the great-niece of an Emperor can be counted among private individuals," reckons her generosity in the millions, at least twice the next known largest benefactions.⁴² Although most of the evidence for Matidia the Younger dates after Hadrian's and Sabina's deaths, *a priori* it seems implausible that she would have had greater wealth than her sister Sabina, the emperor's wife, or than Trajan's wife Plotina, her great-aunt. The relative visibility of Matidia's wealth during her lifetime may be associated with her more attenuated ties to the emperors, or perhaps with evolving attitudes regarding imperial women.

A second, related, point is that only very rarely are these women commemorated as donors or benefactresses. Matidia the Elder and her daughter Matidia almost certainly gave some foundation to Vicetia. Matidia the Younger was additionally the benefactress of unidentified pupils, and very likely of Suessa as well. If Sabina is to be identified with the Vibia Sabina who participated in the Velleian alimentary scheme of 98/102, this liberality probably predates her marriage to Hadrian.⁴³ But Sabina definitely gave something for or to the Roman *matronae* by herself, and enriched Gabii in conjunction with her husband Hadrian.

The general absence of spectacularly generous acts by the Trajanic and Hadrianic women contrasts with what we have seen of Livia and other imperial women of the Augustan age. This cannot be due to poverty or parsimony, of which we never hear, but seems rather to

⁴²Duncan-Jones (note 36 above) 31.

⁴³And since she would have been only about 12-16 years old, a tutor would have been responsible for the investment.

reflect a reticence in accruing *gratia* by public liberality.⁴⁴ The one contemporary and unequivocal recorded benefaction by a Trajanic or Hadrianic imperial woman is that of Sabina for the Roman *matronae*. We shall see again below that associations of the imperial women of this period are more commonly with other women than with men.

III

A different means of assessing the power or influence of the second-century imperial women is by investigating the inscriptions recording dedications and statues erected to them during their lifetimes, obvious marks of their standing in society. Here the evidence, though frustratingly ambiguous, is relatively abundant, with some even attesting (Aelia) Domitia Paulina. Statues and dedications to individuals traditionally served many purposes, from expressing thanks for benefits received, to being an outlet for evergetism, to bringing the donors to the attention of the person thus honored.⁴⁵ Statues of imperial women could also be closely tied to obtaining the favor of the related emperor himself.⁴⁶ Yet we cannot always infer this latter reason for the installation of a statue, even though in almost every instance of such honors for the second-century women the relationship of the honored woman to a reigning and/or deified emperor is made explicit. The woman is identified as *gune*, *adelphz*, *soror*, *matertera*, or the like, sometimes even in dedications made after her own elevation to Augusta.⁴⁷

Table II below compiles the evidence for the dedications and statues raised to these women during their lifetimes, as far as can be determined by dating criteria.⁴⁸

⁴⁴Compare Antoninus Pius' sharp retort to Faustina when she complained that at his accession he had not given generously enough to his dependents: "Silly woman, after we acceded to the power, we lost even that which we owned before" (*HA, Pii* 4.8). See Nesselhauf (note 31 above) 77-78.

⁴⁵T. Pekary, *Das römische Kaiserbildnis in Staat, Kult und Gesellschaft: dargestellt anhand der Schriftquellen* (Berlin 1985) 12.

⁴⁶Pekary (note 45 above) 104 cites the example of Septimius Severus' statues to his former wife: *HA, SSev.* 3.2; see also Tac. *Ann.* 14.61.1-2.

⁴⁷See, e.g., the inscriptions from Lyttos, Table II, 1.5-9. Often reference is also made to the honored woman's relationship to deified imperial women.

⁴⁸P. Veyne, "Les Honneurs posthumes de Flavia Domitilla et les dédicaces grecques et latines," *Latomus* 21 (1962) 49-98, esp. 67-98, delineates the difficulties of distinguishing inscriptions originally on statue bases from those on altars, and the uncer-

TABLE II: STATUES AND DEDICATIONS

- I. Imperial shrines and installations⁴⁹ (evidence provided only for the Trajanic/Hadrianic period):
 - 1–4. Perge (Pamphylia): statues of Plotina, Marciana, Matidia the Elder, Sabina, Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, and the most important civic gods (119 to 122 or perhaps 128) (donated by Plancia Magna: *AE* 1958, 77)⁵⁰
 - 5–9. Lyttos (Crete): Plotina, Marciana, Matidia the Elder, Matidia the Younger, (Aelia) Domitia Paulina, Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius: *IC* I, pp. 193–202, nos. 17–44 = *IGR* I 982–1004 (publicly)
 - 10–12. Apamea (Phrygia): Plotina, Marciana, Matidia the Elder: *IGR* IV 773–75 (publicly)
 13. Aizanoi (Phrygia): Sabina, Hadrian: *CIG* III 3841 and 3841b (publicly)
 14. Hierapolis (Cilicia): Sabina, Hadrian, Trajan: *AE* 1984, 851–53 (publicly)
 - 15–16. Patara (Lycia): Sabina, ?Matidia the Younger, Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius, Faustina, L. Verus: *TAM* II, 2, 419 (by Vilia Procula, Claudius Flavianus and Ti. Claudius Flavianus Titianus)
 17. Xanthos (Lycia): Marciana, Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian: Balland, *Xanthos* ##29–32, pp. 53–57 = *AE* 1981, 818–21 (Marciana's publicly)
 18. Sidymis (Lycia): Plotina: *IGR* III 580
 19. Lindos: Plotina, Trajan or Hadrian: *IGR* IV 1147 (fragmentary)
 - 20–21. Heraclea–Perinthos (Thrace): Matidia the Elder, Sabina, Hadrian: *IGR* I 783–85 (publicly)
 - 22–29. Ephesus: Plotina, Trajan and 27 other gold and silver statues:

tain chronological significance of the epithet *thea*. For women in the imperial cult, see Temporini (note 1 above) 167–75, 194–259. I concentrate below on epigraphically attested dedications and honors of the Trajanic and Hadrianic period. In the following Table unfamiliar abbreviations are: Balland, *Xanthos* = A. Balland, *Fouilles de Xanthos. VII: Inscriptions d'époque impériale du Létéon* (Paris 1981); and Willeumier = P. Willeumier, *Inscriptions latines des Trois Gaules* (Paris 1963).

⁴⁹Cf. Pekary (note 45 above) 90–96 on imperial shrines, 104–105 on the usual association of imperial women with the emperors in statue installations (though noting the relative infrequency of women's statues); Veyne (note 48 above) 63; and W. Eck, K. Fittschen and F. Naumann, *Kaisersaal. Porträts aus den Kapitولينischen Museen in Rom* (Rome 1986) 16.

⁵⁰See M. T. Boatwright, "Plancia Magna of Perge, and the Roles and Status of Women in Roman Asia Minor," forthcoming in *Women's History and Ancient History*, ed. S. B. Pomeroy (Chapel Hill, NC 1991).

- IKeph* 27–37 (A.D. 104) (by C. Vibius Salutaris);⁵¹ Sabina, Hadrian: *CIG* II 2964 (publicly); five to Sabina alone: *IKeph* 278–80, 4334, 4108 (four publicly, one by M. Claudius Sabinus with son M. Claudius Phaedrus); Matidia the Younger: *CIL* III 7123 = *ILS* 327 = *IKeph* 283 (publicly, overseen by Successus *lib. proc.*)
30. Tenos: Sabina, Hadrian: *IG* XII Suppl., 322 = *AE* 1910, 179 (by Malthake)
 31. Laodiceia ad Lycum: Sabina, Hadrian: *AJA* 3 (1887) 345 = *AE* 1889, 133 = *IGR* IV 848 (publicly)
 32. Mytilene: Sabina, Hadrian, deified Trajan: *IG* XII, 2, 200 = *IGR* IV 88 (publicly)
 33. Tralles: Sabina, Hadrian: W. Ruge, *RE* VI A.2 (1937) 2107, s.v. Tralleis (publicly?)⁵²
 34. Pergamum: Plotina: *IGR* IV 335 (found in Traianeum)
 35. Macar Kalesi (Cestrus, Cilicia): Sabina, Hadrian: *AE* 1972, 649 (publicly)
 36. Bragylai (Macedonia): Sabina, Hadrian: *SEG* 12 (1955) 349 = M. B. Hatzopoulos and L. D. Loukopoulou, *Morrylos. Cité de la Crestonie* (Athens 1989), pp. 61, 72, pl. 32 (publicly)
 - 37–38. Luna: Plotina, Marciana, Trajan (A.D. 105): *CIL* XI 1333 = *ILS* 288 = Smallwood, #106 (publicly)
 - 39–40. Ancona: Plotina, Marciana, Trajan (A.D. 114/15): *CIL* IX 5894 = *ILS* 298 = Smallwood, #387 (SPQR)⁵³
 41. Lugdunum Convenarum, St.–Bertrand: Plotina, Trajan: Willeumier, #74, 70 (Plotina's by C. Iulius Serenus and wife Iulia L. f. Iuliola)
 - 42–43. Olisipo: Sabina, Matidia the Elder, Hadrian: *CIL* II 4992 + 5221 = *ILS* 323, *CIL* II 4993 = *ILS* 326, *CIL* II 186, cf. p. 692 (A.D. 121/22, by duoviri)
 - 44–46. Azugae (Baetica): Marciana, two to Matidia the Elder, Nerva, Trajan: *CIL* II 5543–46, 5549, cf. *CIL* II 2339–41 (from manuscripts, apparently fragmentary)
 47. Mactar: Sabina, P. Aelius Caesar: *AE* 1951, 43–44 (publicly)
 48. Gabii: Sabina, Hadrian: *CIL* XIV 2799 = *ILS* 321 (publicly)

II. Isolated dedications and statues:

- A. Marciana (2): Brixia, *I.I.* X, 5, 1, #94 (publicly?); Gightis (Tropolitania), *CIL* VIII 25 = 11020 (perhaps posthumously; fragmentary)

⁵¹Cf. Pekary (note 45 above) 48.

⁵²See Carandini (note 1 above) #64, 219–20.

⁵³Since the Arch of Ancona must have taken some time to build, it may have been begun while Marciana was still alive.

- B. Plotina (2, possibly 3): Aricia, *CIL* XIV 2161 (by Agathyrus *Aug. lib.*); Leptis Minor, *CIL* VIII 22898 (publicly); perhaps at Ostia, *CIL* XIV 5324 (fragmentary)
- C. (Aelia) Domitia Paulina (2): Fundi, *CIL* X 6220 = *ILS* 325 (publicly);⁵⁴ Attaleia, *IGR* III 773 (by Iulia Sancta); nothing for Domitia Paulina the Elder
- D. Matidia the Elder (2, possibly 3): Volubilis, ?*CIL* VIII 21824 (fragmentary), and (posthumously) *AE* 1927, 31 (publicly); Athens, *IG* II² 3389 (publicly)
- E. Matidia the Younger (13): five statues in Suessa, from the Minturnenses, Suessani, Sinuessani (found in Capua), Agathermerus *lib. proc.* and T. Flavius *Aug. lib.* Onesimus Campanus, *CIL* X 3833, 4744–47; Lanuvium, *CIL* VI 1007 (fragmentary); Vicetia, *CIL* V 3111 (by the *collequium cent(onariorum?)*); Augusta Vindelicum (Raetia), *CIL* III 5807 (fragmentary); Colonia Claudia Aequum (Dalmatia), *CIL* III 2731 (fragmentary); Athens, *IG* II² 3388 (publicly); Cuicul, *AE* 1911, 109 (publicly); Alexandria Troas, *AE* 1973, 515 (publicly); Delphi, *AE* 1950, 32 (by the *archeis* Flavia Clea)
- F. Sabina (15, possibly 16): Rome, *CIL* VI 996 (by *fabri tignarii*); S. Maria d'Arce, *IG* XIV 2239 = *IGR* I 474 (publicly?); Telesia, *CIL* IX 2202 (publicly?); Maxula (Afr. Proc.), *CIL* VIII 12458 = *EE* V 340 (publicly?); Avitta Bibba, *CIL* VIII 799 and 12266 (publicly); Sigus, *CIL* VIII 5697 (publicly); Thamugadi, *CIL* VIII 17847 (publicly?); Apulum (Dacia), *CIL* III 1169 (by *legl* . . .); Ceos, *CIG* II 2370 (publicly); Athens, *IG* II² 3387 (by P. Aelius Agnousius); Megara, *IG* VII 73–74 (by *demes*); Hermione, *IG* IV 702 (publicly); Teos, *AE* 1924, 44 = *SEG* II 594 (publicly?); Cremna, *CIL* III 6875 (publicly); Side, G. E. Bean, *The Inscriptions of Side* (Ankara 1965) p. 16, nbr. 102 (fragmentary); ?Attaleia, *ASAtene* 1925–26, p. 363, nbr. 1 = *SEG* VI 649 (publicly; fragmentary)

A few points should be made. More than half the inscriptions witnessing statues of our women, 48 of a possible total of 87, come from recognizable imperial shrines, frequently in the East. In both the East and the West, the wife of the emperor was quite often honored beside the emperor himself, sometimes with the attributes of a goddess.⁵⁵

⁵⁴Raepsaet–Charlier (note 1 above) 35 assumes from this that (Aelia) Domitia Paulina owned land at Fundi.

⁵⁵See (e.g.) Veyne (note 48 above) 52–56; Eck et al. (note 49 above) 23; and G. Grether, "Livia and the Roman Imperial Cult," *AJP* 67 (1946) 222–52, esp. 223.

More specific associations may be behind the triple dedications to Plo-tina, Trajan, and Marciana made publicly in Luna in 105, and by the senate and people of Rome on the Arch of Ancona in 114–15. These seem to reflect and reinforce Pliny's picture in the *Panegyricus* of the conscious harmony of the three in the palace (*Pan.* 83–84).

The isolated dedications and statues are less easy to explain. In these instances of homage the women are not physically represented as the companions of the emperors, although it may be that their statues were originally associated with ones of the emperors now lost. Reasons for the single dedications are never expressed, although it is tempting to presume personal friendship lies behind Iulia Sancta's dedication to (Aelia) Domitia Paulina, and behind that of Flavia Clea to Matidia the Younger.⁵⁶ We should note, moreover, that the steady rise over time in the number of statues and dedications to this group of women, particularly apparent with Matidia the Younger and Sabina, corresponds to a general rise in the number of imperial statues attested during this period.⁵⁷

A few other general points, most negative, can be made. Despite the fact that Sabina is assumed to have accompanied Hadrian to the Greek East only on the trip of 128–33,⁵⁸ few of her statues in the region date to this period. Similarly, the few documented trips of the other imperial women (see below) cannot be associated with the findspots of their statues. Nor do the isolated statues and dedications correspond with known or presumable holdings of the imperial women, except in the case of Matidia the Younger, who received statues in Ephesus, Vicia, and, most conspicuously, Suessa, where five images of her were dedicated.⁵⁹ We can only conclude the obvious, that these marks of honor for the imperial women are to be explained by the influence the women had, or were supposed to have, with the emperors. This infer-

⁵⁶ And perhaps helps explain the evergetism of Plancia Magna, and of Vilia Procula (1.1–4 and 15–16 above). For Iulia Sancta, see H. Halfmann, *Die Senatoren aus dem östlichen Teil des Imperium Romanum* (Göttingen 1979) #134, 200; Flavia Clea, P. A. Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods. An Analysis of the "Mulierum Virtutes"* (Cambridge, MA 1965) 2, tentatively identifying Flavia Clea with the *archais* Clea to whom Plutarch dedicated *The Bravery of Women* and the *De Iside*. For Plancia Magna, see note 50 above, Halfmann #31, 128–29, and Raepsaet-Charlier (note 1 above) #609, 494–95; Vilia Procula, Halfmann, #107, 184–85, and #91a, 172–73.

⁵⁷ Pekary (note 45 above) 4 and passim; Eck et al. (note 49 above) 15.

⁵⁸ See H. Halfmann, *Itinera Principum* (Stuttgart 1986) 91, and R. Syme, "Journeys of Hadrian," *ZPE* 73 (1988) 162–68.

⁵⁹ Cf. Duncan-Jones (note 36 above) 31.

ence is supported by the dedications to Matidia the Younger, almost all of which term her *matertera* or *tethis* (maternal aunt) of Antoninus Pius, although the relationship was not a legal or blood one.⁶⁰ This deduction, however, must be qualified by the evidence discussed in the following section, which reveals little actualization of any power presumably held by the Trajanic or Hadrianic women. We can thus say only that the statues and dedications to the imperial women are explicable by the influence they were supposed to have with the emperors.

IV

Only scant and allusive references, most in literary works, touch on the relations of the Trajanic and Hadrianic women with the emperors. As in other spheres, the evidence is much less full than it is for Livia and imperial women of other periods, such as Agrippina the Younger and the Severan empresses, women depicted again and again, most often with horror and contempt, as muscling into male spheres of politics.⁶¹ The Trajanic and Hadrianic women are much less assertive: only Plotina evokes such reactions, and not uniformly.

Plotina's presumable influence with Trajan is the basis for the biased and untenable stories which hold her mainly, if not solely, responsible for Hadrian's marriage with Sabina and his rise to power. In one passage Dio even alleges Plotina's sexual impropriety with Hadrian (69.1.2).⁶² But these slanderous rumors are repeated more to discredit Hadrian than to disparage Plotina: they reveal the fear and envy the concept of an influential empress aroused at this time, when the absence of male offspring rendered paramount the influence of the male *amici principis* and *concilium*. Much more reliable is the Athenian inscription commemorating Plotina's successful advocacy to Hadrian for the Epicurean school in Athens.⁶³ Yet this, the one unimpeachable con-

⁶⁰See Mommsen, *CIL* X, p. 467. The only dedications without such an epithet for Matidia the Younger are those from Augusta Vindelicum (fragmentary), Alexandria Troas, Cuicul, Vicetia, and Claudia Aequum. Yet the ties between Matidia the Younger and Antoninus Pius seem primarily to have been with the female members of his family: Fronto, *ad Ant. imp.* IV.1, p. 109 VDH, and II.1, p. 98 VDH.

⁶¹Purcell (note 3 above) esp. 80–81, 94–95; Balsdon (note 1 above) 107–22, 150–64.

⁶²And see *HA, Hadr.* 4.1, 4.4, 2.10; Dio 69.1.4, 69.10.3¹. Temporini (note 1 above) 78–86, 120–59, 179, convincingly shows that these rumors have no basis in verifiable fact.

⁶³*JG* II² 1099 = *ILS* 7784 = Smallwood #442; Temporini (note 1 above) 162–67.

temporary witness of Plotina's influence with an emperor,⁶⁴ does not relate to her husband, but to his successor Hadrian, whom she addresses as *domine*. Furthermore, in what remains of her letter announcing the good news to the Epicureans, she is silent about her intervention with the emperor. This type of humble request and self-effacement may be behind Hadrian's laudatory comment about Plotina: "Though she asked much of me, she was never refused anything." Dio, who reports this fragment of Hadrian's funeral laudation for his adoptive mother-in-law, explains this: "Her requests were of such a character that they neither burdened me nor afforded me any justification for opposing them" (Dio 69.10.3a).⁶⁵

There are no other verifiable instances of requests from Plotina to Hadrian or to Trajan, although two later documents have been taken to witness her interventions with the emperors. The untrustworthy *Acta Hermisci*, a tendentious tract written in the Hadrianic period by Alexandrian Greeks, recounts Plotina's mediation with Trajan for the Jews during an imperial hearing of the Alexandrian Greeks and Jews. Here the object is to discredit the imperial decision made in favor of the Jews: the piece at best reflects the influence the empress was supposed to have.⁶⁶ Much later, the anonymous fourth-century *Epitome de Caesaribus* cites Pompeia Plotina as the exemplar for imperial women: she is extolled for adding to Trajan's glory when she brought to his attention the abuses of his provincial procurators (42.20–21). This narrative may derive from an actual incident, to judge from the very rare appearance of Plotina's *gentilicium*.⁶⁷ Further, it corresponds generally with Dio's

⁶⁴ Temporini (note 1 above) 162, n. 705 persuasively refutes other attempts to see Plotina's influence, in the Sacred Thymelic Synod in Nemausus (as J. H. Oliver, "The Empress Plotina and the Sacred Thymelic Synod" *Historia* 24 [1975] 125–28), or as the addressee of the *Manuale Harmonicum* of Nicomachus (as W. C. McDermott, "Plotina Augusta and Nicomachus of Gerasa," *Historia* 26 [1977] 192–203). For the untrustworthy reports in the Talmud and Midrash about Plotina's political activity, see Temporini, 96–100. Tacitus' harsh depictions of Livia, Agrippina the Younger, and other powerful women probably are not influenced by his analysis of Plotina's roles: Temporini, 157–59, R. Syme, "Princesses and Others in Tacitus," *Greece and Rome*, ser. 2, 28 (1981) 50.

⁶⁵ Translations by E. Cary, *Dio's Roman History* VIII (Cambridge and London 1925) 445. For this topos in laudations of imperial women (of this period), see Temporini (note 1 above) 172–73.

⁶⁶ *P.Oxy.* 1242 = Smallwood #516; see Temporini (note 1 above) 90–100.

⁶⁷ J. Schlumberger, *Die Epitome de Caesaribus. Untersuchungen zur heidnischen Geschichtsschreibung des 4. Jhs. n. Chr.* (Munich 1974) 81, n. 24, 210–11; Temporini (note 1 above) 180.

account of Plotina's first entrance into the palace, when she proclaimed to the populace, "However, I go in here as the type of woman I wish to be when I depart." Dio adds the comment that she conducted herself throughout Trajan's reign in such a way as to incur no censure (Dio 68.5.5).

Taken together, all the evidence, even that alleging *favor Plotinae* in Hadrian's rise to power, confirms Pliny's praise for Plotina in the *Panegyricus* early in Trajan's reign: among Plotina's many virtues was that she claimed nothing for herself from Trajan's position (*Pan.* 83.6).⁶⁸ She, the most august of women (*sanctissima femina*: Pliny *Ep.* 9.28.1), is a helpmeet to the emperors, as well as to the apolitical Epicureans.

Although the sources indicate some influence by Plotina over the emperors, we have nothing comparable for the other imperial women of this era, who played even less conspicuous parts when they were publicly visible. After Marciana's death in 112, her daughter Matidia the Elder went with Plotina and Trajan to the East in 113, not to return until accompanying Trajan's ashes.⁶⁹ From the dedications to Matidia the Younger in Athens and Patara, A. Carandini has tentatively assumed that this woman attended Hadrian and her sister Sabina in the East around 128–30.⁷⁰ Moralists during the empire generally decried wives' accompaniment of Roman officials in the provinces, since women in such situations were depicted as liable to flattery, and prone to leading their husbands astray.⁷¹ Yet the lack of any such reported incidents, together with the constant linking of women on the journeys mentioned above, suggest rather that what was at stake for the imperial women abroad was maintaining close relationships with one another.⁷² They certainly are not reported as interfering in male activities, as had (e.g.)

⁶⁸The effects of Pliny's praise are the same whether the chapters on Plotina and Marciana (83–84) were only added to the published *Panegyricus*, or publicly pronounced in his senatorial presentation of 100 (for the controversy: Temporini [note 1 above] 176–79).

⁶⁹*HA, Hadr.* 5.9; cf. Temporini (note 1 above) 171.

⁷⁰Carandini (note 1 above) 78.

⁷¹*Tac. Ann.* 3.33–34, reporting a senatorial debate on the subject in A.D. 21; see A. J. Marshall, "Roman Women and the Provinces," *AncSoc* 6 (1975) 109–27, esp. 122, and M.-T. Raepsaet-Charlier, "Epouses et familles de magistrats dans les provinces romaines aux deux premiers siècles de l'Empire," *Historia* 31 (1982) 56–69.

⁷²Compare Iulia Balbilla's accompaniment of Sabina and the rest of Hadrian's entourage in Egypt in 130: A. and E. Barnand, *Les Inscriptions grecques et latines du Colosse de Memnon* (Paris 1960), nbrrs. 28–31, esp. 29–31, pp. 80–95.

Agrippina the Elder in military operations in Germany in A.D. 15 (Tac. *Ann.* 1.69).

Other evidence underscores the domestic and retiring roles of the imperial women. Pliny's glorification of Marciana in the *Panegyricus* (84) individuates her as someone important in Trajan's court and household, where she lived in complete harmony with Trajan and her sister-in-law Plotina after Trajan's accession. Similarly, in Hadrian's fragmentary *laudatio funebris* for his mother-in-law Matidia the Elder (d. 119), he stresses her companionship with Sabina (and himself?), and seems to say that she never sought from him anything for her own use or profit, and did not seek many things that he would have been happy to grant.⁷³

In the same vein is the documentation for these women that incidentally stresses the importance of the imperial family and house. Hadrian's mother Domitia Paulina is the addressee of a letter supposedly written by the emperor on his birthday and preserved in an early third-century collection of Hadrian's pronouncements written out in Greek and Latin for school children. The lacunose and fictitious letter paints a picture of familial harmony as Hadrian lauds the piety and chastity of his "dearest" mother, and prays that all his acts be praiseworthy in her eyes.⁷⁴ The importance of the imperial house is even more striking in Hadrian's dismissal of Septicius Clarus and Suetonius, "because^c against his order they conducted themselves more familiarly with his wife Sabina than the reverence due the imperial house demanded" (*HA, Hadr.* 11.3).⁷⁵ Dio notes sharply that Hadrian was ridiculed for the extravagance of his honors for Antinoos, which contrasted with his neglect of immediate posthumous honors for his own sister (Aelia) Domitia Paulina (69.11.4). Beside the underlying criticism of Hadrian's excess with Antinoos is the presumption that the women of the imperial house deserved at least some veneration, if only because of their family ties.⁷⁶

⁷³ *CIL* XIV 3579, lines 5–7, 26–30; see Temporini (note 1 above) 170–73, and above, n. 65.

⁷⁴ *Hermeneuta Leid., Corp. Lat. Gloss.* III, p. 37. Although this letter also mentions "sisters" of Hadrian, only (Aelia) Domitia Paulina is known.

⁷⁵ Carandini (note 1 above) 65–68, and Pflaum (note 1 above) 247 discount possible political reasons for the dismissal.

⁷⁶ We might also suppose that (Aelia) Domitia Paulina's connection to the imperial power figured in Hadrian's forced deaths of Pedanius Salinator and Servianus, respectively her grandson and husband, but she is not portrayed with any role in the "conspiracy": Champlin (note 17 above) 79–89.

In sum, no real data substantiate the actual working of influence by any of these women, except in the case of Plotina. No imperial rescript of Trajan or of Hadrian ever even names the imperial women, aside from that recording Hadrian's grant of privileges to the Epicureans at Athens on Plotina's urging. Again, we should compare Livia, attested by epigraphical as well as literary sources as powerful and independent. An inscription found in Aphrodisias records Augustus' reply to a request for freedom for Samos. Although Augustus here rejects the request, saying that it is against his general policy, he includes in his letter the information that Livia had interceded on behalf of the Samians, and that he had been tempted to favor her. In fact, Dio shows that Augustus later changed his mind, thus acceding to Livia's and the Samians' pleas (Dio 54.9.7).⁷⁷ Such public admission of Livia's influence in important political matters surpasses the scanty verifiable information of Plotina's influence with Hadrian, which furthermore concerned a cultural matter. Similarly, a letter of Tiberius to the Gytheians, concerning permission to establish an imperial cult for himself and for Livia, reveals that Livia received and responded to such petitions on her own behalf.⁷⁸ Livia is active, not passive, and the emperors acknowledge her independence of action and thought.

The political power and financial autonomy demonstrably wielded by the imperial women of the Trajanic and Hadrianic period were much diminished from what Livia and other Julio-Claudian women had. Yet the second-century women were far from invisible. The numerous dedications and statues to them are one sign of their standing in the state. Other manifestations of their prominence are the epithet *Augusta* decreed by the senate to many of them,⁷⁹ rights of coinage granted by the emperors,⁸⁰ consecrations voted by the senate after their deaths,⁸¹ the funeral laudations spoken by Hadrian for Plotina and Matidia the Elder,⁸² buildings erected in Rome for Matidia the Elder, Marciana, and

⁷⁷J. M. Reynolds, *Aphrodisias and Rome* (London 1982) Document 13; for the circumstances of the grant, see G. W. Bowersock, *Gnomon* 56 (1984) 52.

⁷⁸SEG XI 922=V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones, *Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Augustus and Tiberius*² (Oxford 1955) 102b.

⁷⁹Temporini (note 1 above) 23–78.

⁸⁰Temporini (note 1 above) 100–15, 255–59; coins illustrated in A. Banti, *I grandi bronzi imperiali* (Florence 1983–84) vol. II, 1, pp. 286–99; vol. II, 2, pp. 411–28.

⁸¹Temporini (note 1 above) 100–5, 229–34.

⁸²Temporini (note 1 above) 168–73.

Plotina,⁸³ and the use of some of these women's names for city tribes and cities themselves.⁸⁴ H. Temporini has emphasized that such distinctions were an essential component of a dynastic conception of the principate.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, as S. B. Pomeroy underscores, this type of homage primarily exalts the men to whom the honored women were connected.⁸⁶ The women are passive: the presumption that (Aelia) Domitia Paulina, otherwise not recorded as close to her brother Hadrian, would receive posthumous honors indicates how little the women needed to do to "deserve" veneration (see Dio 69.11.4).

We thus face a seemingly paradoxical situation. On the one hand, the reverence accorded these women is palpable, literally so in the coins struck with their effigies on the obverse. But these and similar manifestations of veneration, many of which were posthumous, were customary from the time of Livia on, and redounded to the glory of the emperors. On the other hand, almost nothing demonstrates that the Trajanic and Hadrianic women actively exercised power, influence or autonomy, in contrast to earlier and later imperial women. Indeed, the evidence for Matidia the Younger may imply that in this period the farther the imperial woman was from the source of power, the emperor, the more power she could be seen as holding. The larger context is that of numerous other elite Roman women, who are documented from the late first century A.C. into the third in public roles as benefactresses and even officials in Italy and the provinces, apparently with no diminution of their numbers in the Trajanic and Hadrianic period.⁸⁷ Yet the relative autonomy and visibility of Matidia the Younger seems also related to changing attitudes concerning imperial women at the end of the period under discussion, perhaps partly triggered by the undisguised discord

⁸³ M. T. Boatwright, *Hadrian and the City of Rome* (Princeton 1987) 58–62, 93–98.

⁸⁴ Most obviously Marciana: Eck (note 1 above) 933; Temporini (note 1 above) 188–89; W. Weber, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Hadrianus* (Leipzig 1907) 175–78; B. Galsterer-Kröll, "Untersuchungen zu der Beinamen der Städte des Imperium Romanum," *Epigraphische Studien* 9 (1972) 77.

⁸⁵ Temporini (note 1 above) 262; M. Hammond, *The Antonine Monarchy* (Rome 1959) 206.

⁸⁶ Pomeroy (note 29 above) 182–84.

⁸⁷ R. MacMullen, "Women in Public in the Roman Empire," *Historia* 29 (1980) 208–18; R. Van Bremen, "Women and Wealth," in *Images of Women in Antiquity*, eds. A. Cameron and A. Kuhrt (Detroit 1983) 223–42; E. P. Forbis, "Women's Public Image in Italian Honorary Inscriptions," *AJP* 111 (1990) 493–512. Female officials are restricted to the Greek East. See also n. 50 above.

of Hadrian and his wife Sabina (*HA, Hadr.* 11.3, 23.9; *Epit. de Caes.* 14.8). Subsequently, the two Faustinae were said to be actively and scandalously involved with politics and the army.⁸⁸ In the case of the imperial women of the early second century, however, we see that although the institution of the imperial family is puissant, the imperial wives and female relatives themselves are relatively powerless: quiet, subservient, and self-effacing.

V

The great contrast offered by the Trajanic and Hadrianic imperial women to other imperial women lends itself to numerous explanations. We should look to political and social changes as the context for the roles of the imperial women of the early second century.

Most important is the break with a strictly dynastic monarchy. The possibility to ascend to the throne by adoption or by force reduced the significance of women's reproductive roles in the transfer of power, and the perceived threat of women's active participation in power plays must have loomed correspondingly larger. Tacitus' praise of the wife and mother of A. Vitellius for their refusal to exploit his power as emperor (*Hist.* 2.64; 3.67) may tell us as much, if not more, about the attitudes of his own time as about the realities of the year of the four emperors. More in his own era of childless emperors than during the military struggles of 68–69, the political power of individual "friends" and patrons must have seemed extraordinarily instrumental.⁸⁹ The biological role of women in the transfer of power was obsolete, and although Temporini contends that the dynastic principle was reinstated even during the Trajanic era,⁹⁰ a break had occurred. A woman's power in the imperial house could not be justified or tied automatically to her function as the mother of caesars and the mother of the state,⁹¹ as seems to have been the case with Agrippina the Younger.

⁸⁸ See above, n. 5.

⁸⁹ See the contemporary topos of discussion of possible successors: e.g., Dio 69.17.3 (probably drawing on an earlier source; in the version of Zonarus, a Hadrianic banquet, in that of Xiphilinus, a Trajanic one); Tac. *Ann.* 1.13.2 (Augustus), 14.47.1 (Nero).

⁹⁰ Temporini (note 1 above) 262, and *passim*.

⁹¹ See the marriage arrangements of Augustus for his daughter, and Marcus Aurelius' reported refusal to dismiss Faustina for infidelity because the empire, which he owed to his marriage, was her "dowry" and would have to be returned if he divorced her (*HA, Marc.* 19.8–9).

The end of the Julio-Claudian dynasty signaled a change in the position of women associated with the throne. Both Vespasian and Titus reigned unmarried, and during his reign Domitian repudiated, but then "from love" was reconciled with his wife, the independently rich and famous Domitia Longina.⁹² Yet this very dynasty focused attention on female members of the family such as the two Flaviae Domitillae, Vespasian's wife and daughter who died before he reached the throne but who received public veneration nonetheless.⁹³ Together with Domitia Longina, who was granted the title *Augusta* immediately upon Domitian's accession,⁹⁴ they may illustrate a transitional period: in the era of the Julio-Claudians the imperial women wielded power and assumed public positions, and in that of Trajan and Hadrian the imperial women were personally retiring and submissive although surrounded by public respect. It is probably not coincidental that with Faustina the Elder the empresses resume more personally powerful roles, to judge from the notoriety of their political and sexual intrigues cited above. It is at this point that imperial marriages become fecund again after the childlessness of Plotina and Sabina.

Yet broader trends must also be in play. The prosopography of the Neronian period and its aftermath reveals increasing permeation of the governing elite by newcomers from northern Italy, Gaul, Spain, and (by the beginning of the second century A.C.) Africa, Asia and other eastern provinces.⁹⁵ These individuals had to establish themselves in the Roman hierarchy by their behavior as well as by their connections. Tacitus notes for his time a much more sober and parsimonious attitude than that in the Neronian period, in part due to the advent of new men in the senate from the municipalities and provinces as well as to the example of Vespasian (*Ann.* 3.55, cf. 16.5). Although in the late first century A.C. long-lived individuals such as Ummidia Quadratilla still evoked the earlier frivolous days, they were disapproved of (Pliny *Ep.* 7.24). We have seen that the background of the Trajanic and Hadrianic women fits this context. They could not parade glorious Roman lineages, but they

⁹² Vespasian and Titus, *PIR*² F 398 and 399; Domitia Longina, Raepsaet-Charlier (note 1 above) #327, 287-88. By 79 Titus had divorced his second wife Marcia Furnilla (Suet. *Tit.* 4; his first wife Arrecina Tertulla had died; Raepsaet-Charlier, #525, 442-43).

⁹³ Veyne (note 48 above) 50-67; the daughter was even deified and granted the epithet *Augusta*. (Flavia) Iulia, Titus' daughter (most likely by Arrecina Tertulla) also received that title during her father's reign, and was divinized after her death between 87 and 90; Raepsaet-Charlier (note 1 above) #371, 323-24.

⁹⁴ Temporini (note 1 above) 32.

⁹⁵ See above, n. 18.

could make a display of doing the right thing, as we see them doing in Dio and Pliny (e.g., *Pan.* 83.5–8).

The definition of “the right thing” at this time, however, suggests another possible explanation for the relative subservience and apparent impotence of the imperial women of the early second century. P. Veyne and M. Foucault have remarked sweeping social changes in male–female relationships and sexuality in the Roman world from the middle of the first century (A.C.) on. Veyne ties the conception and promulgation of a new ideal—a more equitable and mutually respectful marriage—to the diminished political power that almost every man had after the end of the Roman republic.⁹⁶ With more specific references, Foucault links his comparable conception of more equal and respectful conjugal relations from the Neronian to the Antonine periods to a broader reinterpretation of the changing discourse of sexuality at this time.⁹⁷

It is true that some philosophical texts of this period support the interpretations of these two scholars, most obviously Plutarch’s *Conjugal Precepts* (*Mor.* 138A–46A, ca. A.D. 115–25) and the writings of Musonius Rufus and his pupil Hierokles the Stoic. These and other authors intermittently theorize that women can have or are capable of the same virtues as men, and they advocate that women, as well as men, study philosophy.⁹⁸ Yet such “feminist” ideas are set in an unmistakable reaffirmation of what might be called “traditional roles” for women: as submissive and receptive helpmeets of their husbands, responsible for the house and especially for raising children.⁹⁹ What is different at this

⁹⁶P. Veyne, “La Famille et l’amour sous le Haut–Empire romain,” *Annales ESC* 33 (1978) 35–63, esp. (e.g.) 37.

⁹⁷M. Foucault, *The Care of the Self*, trans. R. Hurley (New York 1986).

⁹⁸Mus. Ruf. 46.32, 38.26–42 (*Oration III*: “That Women Should Also Study Philosophy”; all references to Musonius Rufus are to the edition by C. E. Lutz, “Musonius Rufus, ‘The Roman Socrates,’” *YCS* 10 [1947] 3–147); Plut. *Mor.* 242F; cf. Plutarch’s fragmentary *That a Woman Also Should Be Educated* (VII, 125–27, ed. Bernadakis), and Sen. *Dial.* 6.16.1; less explicitly, Hierokles, Stob. IV.28.21, ed. Hense V, pp. 696–99. Socrates earlier suggested that a woman, though weaker, had the same nature and virtue as man, and could be educated by her husband (Xen. *Sym.* 2.9; cf. Plato *Meno* 73AB, Arist. *Pol.* 1260a 21); the principle was accepted by Antisthenes (Diog. Laert. 6.1.12). See too Cleanthes, who wrote on the thesis that virtue is the same in man and in woman (Diog. Laert. 7.175); Chrysippus, in Clem. *Stromata* 4.8, and in Lact. *Div. Inst.* 3.25; and Epict. II.14.9. D. L. Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive. The Domestic Code in I Peter* (Chico, CA 1981) 143–47 discusses the similar stance of the Roman Stoic Antipater (II or I c. B.C.).

⁹⁹Musonius Rufus encourages women to study philosophy so that they might better perform their womanly and wifely duties (see n. 98 above, and Balch [note 98 above] 146–47). Hierokles stresses the importance of begetting children throughout his

time is that with Plutarch and Musonius Rufus, for example, the reaffirmation of women's domestic and subordinate roles is couched as an exhortation to the women themselves, rather than as a bald statement of fact (cp., e.g., Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.25.4).¹⁰⁰

This new twist on the old theme may be in part a result of the instability of most upper-class marriages, clear in prosopographical studies and mentioned often by ancient authors, and apparently accounting for the shift in marriages at the end of the republic from marriages *cum manu* to marriages *sine manu* during the empire.¹⁰¹ Among the upper classes, divorce seems to have been prevalent.¹⁰² The increased possibility of unattached women is matched by the facts that during the principate upper-class women were often emancipated by their fathers, financed independently, and made heirs of large portions of their families' wealth. Further, as mentioned earlier, women seem to have had more control *de facto* of their own resources, rather than being under the strict supervision of a guardian.¹⁰³ It was thus possible for women to be more personally and financially independent than they had been even at the end of the republic. The emphasis philosophical and other texts from ca. A.D. 50 to 150 place on the "traditional" subservience and quietude of women may be partly in reaction to these changes.¹⁰⁴

"On Marriage," although he also highlights the importance of wives as helpful companions to their husbands (Stob. IV.22a.21–24, ed. Hense IV, pp. 502–507); cf. Epit. III.7.13, 21, 26; III.21.5. Marcus Aurelius thanks god that he was blessed with a wife "so docile, so affectionate, so simple" (I.17.7). Epictetus holds that men should stress to women that they are honored for two things only: modesty and self-respect.

¹⁰⁰Plutarch and Musonius Rufus are also basically free from the traditional misogyny and scorn of women apparent in earlier Stoics and philosophers such as Cicero and Seneca (cf. C. E. Manning, "Seneca and the Stoics on the Equality of the Sexes," *Mnemosyne* 26 [1973] 170–77).

¹⁰¹R. P. Saller, "Roman Dowry and the Devolution of Property in the Principate," *CQ* 34 (1984) 195–205.

¹⁰²M. Humbert, *Le Remariage à Rome: Etude d'histoire juridique et sociale* (Milan 1972) persuasively suggests a fairly high rate of divorce; contra, Gardner (note 21 above) 81–95; M.–T. Raepsaet-Charlier, "Ordre sénatorial et divorce sous le Haut-Empire: un chapitre de l'histoire des mentalités," *ACD* 17–18 (1981–82) 161–73.

¹⁰³Saller (note 101 above) esp. 196–202; J. A. Crook, "Women in Roman Succession," in *The Family in Ancient Rome: New Perspectives*, ed. B. Rawson (Ithaca 1986) 58–82; and n. 21 above. See too (e.g.) Plut. *Mor.* 139B and F, advice to couples in which the wife is wealthier or more noble than her husband.

¹⁰⁴Some "good women": Agricola's wife (Tac. *Agr.* 6.1) and Pliny's Calpurnia (Ep. 4.19); "bad women," Juv. *Sat.* 6, and Tacitus' vituperative characterizations of Agrippina

VI

The evidence discussed in the first part of this paper shows that the Trajanic and Hadrianic imperial women exemplify the newly re-emphasized female roles. This seems a conscious aim: for instance, Pliny refers to Plotina as a paragon of the ancient virtues (*quid enim illa sanctius, quid antiquius?*, *Pan.* 83.5), and we have already mentioned the approval accorded Plotina's example by Dio and the *Epitome de Caesaribus*. Whether these women took on such roles willingly or unwillingly we shall never know. Plotina's documented participation in a philosophical school may suggest a voluntary assumption of the submissiveness advocated for women. We may also infer this for the others from their retiring stance, unrelieved except for the rumors of too great familiarity between Sabina and Suetonius and Septicius Clarus (*HA, Hadr.* 11.3). More important than such speculations, however, is the perception we now have of the nuanced public characters assumed by female members of the imperial family.

Recognition of the roles of the imperial women of the Trajanic and Hadrianic period gives us a sharper picture of this era and its individuality, and of the history of Roman women. We can now see more of the distinctions of this pivotal time from what came before and what came after it. Similarly, although the relative brevity of the resurgence of women's domestic and submissive roles embodied by the Trajanic and Hadrianic imperial women may be encouraging, that such a resurgence took place at all must warn us against complacency and unquestioning acceptance of the relative liberation of elite Roman women during the imperial period.

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the Younger and other women who "transgress the limitations of their sex" (*Ann.* 16.10.4). See M. Kaplan, "Agrippina semper atrox: A Study in Tacitus' Characterizations of Women," in *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History, I*, ed. C. Deroux [Brussels 1979] 410-17; and (with caution) H. Königer, "Gestalt und Welt der Frau bei Tacitus" (Diss. Erlangen-Nürnberg 1966). It requires much special pleading, ultimately unpersuasive, to hold that Juvenal was directing criticism against Plotina in *Satire* 6 (as L. Zusi, "Plotina e Giovenale," in *Sodalitas. Scritti in onore di A. Guarino*, III [Naples 1984-85] 1095-1117).

BRIEF MENTION

I. THE COMPUTER, HYPERTEXT, AND CLASSICAL STUDIES

Classicists, who have painfully acquired a facility for word processing over the past several years, may well believe that they have come to terms with the computer. The word processor has replaced the typewriter on their desk and occupies more or less the same niche in their scholarly routine. They may be dismayed to learn that word processing is itself about to be supplemented, if not replaced, by a new kind of computer program called *hypertext*. Using a word processor, a writer creates a document on the screen and then prints out the document to be read in the conventional way. By contrast, a hypertext is an interactive document designed to be both written and read on the screen. A hypertext is organized as a network of interrelated elements (individual sentences, paragraphs, or sections), and these elements are joined together by electronic links, which determine the multiple orders in which the elements can be examined by a reader.¹ In word processing, the computer is simply used to facilitate traditional publication; hypertext exploits the power of the computer as a medium in its own right.

We can imagine a hypertext of, say, the *Aeneid* in which passages of the poem are linked to lines and episodes in the Homeric epics. Hundreds of these allusions are already catalogued in Knauer's *Die Aeneis und Homer*²: they would only need to be fed into the computer. To use this hypertext, the reader would call a passage from the *Aeneid* into a window on the screen, and in a separate window the computer would display one or more passages from Homer. That is, the computer tracks the current passage in the *Aeneid* and follows its links to retrieve related passages in Homer. Knauer's book or any traditional commentary would be a candidate for hypertext. Indeed, classical philology has

¹Hypercard is a hypertext system for the Macintosh computer. There are several others for the Macintosh and a few (including Toolbook) for IBM personal computers. It will come as no surprise that the term "hypertext" was not coined by a classicist: the term was devised by Ted Nelson in the 1960s. On the possibilities of hypertext for pedagogy, see Michael Joyce, "Siren Songs: Exploratory and Constructive Hypertexts," *Academic Computing* 3,4 (1988) 10-14, 37-42.

²G. N. Knauer, *Die Aeneis und Homer* (Göttingen 1964).

in one sense always been hypertextual in spirit, since the essence of philology is to explain one word, idiom, or passage in terms of others from the ancient canon. In a hypertext such relationships find their expression as electronic links.

The best known computer project in the classics is no doubt the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*, directed by Theodore Brunner at the University of California at Irvine. The *TLG* is not itself a hypertext; it is a collection of Greek texts stored in machine-readable form. However, search programs that scan the collection (on Ibycus, Macintosh, or IBM computers) are hypertextual in the sense that they permit a scholar to isolate and display precisely those passages from the canon of ancient texts that share a particular word or phrase. In searching for words or phrases, the scholar is in effect rereading ancient texts with a particular word, theme, or image in mind. The computer makes this rereading possible through rapid and flexible retrieval.

The most ambitious current project for hypertext in classical studies is *Perseus*, under the direction of Gregory Crane at Harvard.³ Its goal is to fashion within the computer analogues for all the printed materials that a student generally needs. *Perseus* will provide Greek texts, English translations, morphological analyses, notes on grammar, and dictionary definitions. It will also provide diagrams (e.g., plans for various archaeological sites) and an historical atlas. This vast hypertext will eventually include color pictures of sites and objects, stored on a videodisc and displayed on a television monitor next to the computer. A student could, for example, call up a plan of the Parthenon on the computer screen, while a picture of the front of the temple appears on the television monitor. By issuing simple commands to the computer, the student could then walk around the Parthenon: a sequence of still images of the sides and back of the temple would appear on the monitor. There is a similar, though far less ambitious system, called *De Italia*, for viewing Roman antiquities (as well as later Italian art).⁴

The combination of computer-controlled verbal text, graphics, and video is sometimes called *hypermedia*. The principle in hypermedia is the same as in exclusively verbal hypertext. Whenever a text of words or images is divided into discrete elements and offered to the reader as a

³See "Redefining the Book: Some Preliminary Problems," *Academic Computing* 2,5 (1988) 6-11, 36-41.

⁴*De Italia, Videodisc Encyclopedia of Italian Civilization*, Edizioni della Fondazione S.R.I. (Turin 1987).

structure of linked paths, linear text has been replaced with hypertext. The defining quality of all hypertext is its multiplicity. Each reader's path through the text results from his or her interaction with the network defined by the author. The interaction makes hypertext qualitatively different from a printed book—or for that matter a handwritten codex or papyrus roll.

The question is to what extent classicists (and other humanists) will make use of this new interactive form of reading and writing. Some will want to use the pedagogical hypertexts, like *Perseus* and *De Italia*, and to write their own. Some electronic commentaries may appear. It is perfectly possible that hypertext will have no greater effect on classical studies than this, that scholars will be content with word processing to produce traditional articles and books. On the other hand, the computer as hypertext could be used to fashion a new kind of scholarly communication—a hypertextual “essay” in which the author defines a variety of possible orders for the points in his or her argument. The essay would then be examined by the reader from various perspectives and could even lead to different conclusions depending upon the path chosen. Such an essay would call into question the traditional notion of scientific scholarship, in which the author is expected to marshal evidence into a linear argument in support of a single conclusion.

The challenge of hypertext, then, is that it offers a new medium in which to record and present scholarship. In some ways classical studies have been defined by the qualities of the book in general and the printed book in particular. The goal of scholarship in the past two centuries has been, above all, to fix each text of each ancient author: to determine the authenticity of works ascribed to an author and for each work to establish the *Urtext*—what the author actually wrote, letter for letter. On this foundation scholarship then proceeds to fix the text in its historical and literary milieu. Notions of authorship and textual accuracy belong, of course, to all writing, but they have been especially important in the age of print, where authors have gained in authority as they have distanced themselves from their readers.⁵ With its capacity for nearly perfect duplication, printing is much more effective at stabilizing a text than is handwriting. Elizabeth Eisenstein has shown that many of the changes

⁵ Alvin Kernan has argued that the term “literature” itself took on its modern meaning when the technology of printing created new audiences and a professional class of writers. See *Samuel Johnson and the Impact of Print* (Princeton 1987) and *The Death of Literature* (New Haven 1990).

brought about by printing were due not to the mere multiplication of copies of a text, but to the improved accuracy of each copy.⁶ The accuracy of printing has permitted classical editors systematically to collate and emend medieval manuscripts. It is no accident that the scholarly passion for textual accuracy and authenticity reached its zenith in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, which was the zenith of the mechanical technology of print.

In recent decades, the ideal of the Urtext has been called into question by postmodern literary theory, which sees any text as unstable, the shifting product of an interaction between words on the page, the reader, and the language and culture. But classical studies have been relatively untouched by postmodern theory, and classicists have been reluctant to abandon the Urtext.⁷ It is here that hypertext enters the picture. For hypertext now challenges the Urtext not in the jargon of postmodern theory, but practically and visibly in the way that it handles text. The reassuring physical presence of the printed book is replaced by invisible encodings on magnetic disk or CD-ROM. And once inside the computer, text *is* inherently unstable, appearing and disappearing with the touch of a few buttons. Furthermore, the reader usurps to some degree the author's traditional role in constituting the text. Examining a text in the Perseus system, the reader decides when to ask for a morphological analysis or a translation, which pictures to call up on the television monitor, and so on. In so doing, the reader is making his or her way through a space of possible texts stored in the machine. Each reading activates only a small fraction of the available material, and each is the unique expression of the decisions of one reader. The same would be true of a commentary of the *Aeneid* linked to Homer or of any hypertext. Each reading constitutes a new text. Each reading of a printed commentary or handbook is also unique, in the sense that one chooses to read some sections or ignore others. But again the physical presence and fixity of the printed book suggest otherwise. It is hard to deny that a printed text exists apart from its readers. In the electronic medium, the text is nowhere until the reader calls it onto the screen.

⁶See E. Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communication and Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe* (Cambridge 1979).

⁷It is interesting to note that even in the volume *Classics: A Discipline and Profession in Crisis?* (Lanham 1989) there is relatively little about the postmodern critique—even in the ten essays that deal explicitly with the methods and goals of archaeology and philology.

The coming of hypertext, therefore, offers a new perspective on a central issue in classical studies. Whether classicists will take up the offer remains to be seen. But it already seems clear that the primary tasks of establishing the Urtext (textual criticism and studies in authorship and chronology) do not command the same interest within the profession that they did in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Scholars working in the electronic medium may be less concerned to establish and explain the Urtext itself and more interested in exploring connections among texts. They may prefer to emphasize the continuity between the ancient text and its ancient, medieval, and modern interpretations. Their attitude toward the ancient texts themselves may become correspondingly less reverent. And such changes in approach would bring classical studies more in line with current work in modern literature and literary theory. That very prospect—becoming more like contemporary scholars in French or English literature—may be enough to send classicists in search of their old typewriters. But in any case, it seems unlikely that scholarly practices defined and sanctioned by the technology of print can continue unchanged in an age when more and more reading and writing, scholarly as well as practical, is being done on the computer screen.⁸

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II. THREE RECENT PUBLICATIONS

A potentially useful bibliographical survey is *Regards sur les études classiques au XIX^e siècle: Catalogue du fonds Morante*, by Pascale Hummel (Paris 1990). The library of the Ecole Normale Supérieure contains a rather little known collection of about 1500 “programs” on classical subjects published by scholars throughout Europe in the 18th

⁸I am indebted to Professor Lowell Edmunds for a number of important insights about hypertext and scholarly writing, which he has offered in correspondence and in a postscript to his forthcoming monograph on *Oedipus Rex*. I have pursued the argument here in greater detail in “Hypertext and the Classical Commentary” in *Classics and Computers*, ed. Jon Solomon, scheduled for publication by the University of Arizona Press in 1992. See also *Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing* (Hillsdale, N.J. 1991).

and 19th centuries and collected by Gómez de la Cortina, Marquis de Morante, whose library was sold in the 1870s. They include *dissertationes*, *observationes*, *emendationes*, *reliquiae*, and other examples of scholarship. The volume is well indexed by places, authors and subjects and should make possible access to many rare items. It is also a potential source for study of the history of classical scholarship throughout this period.

Although we welcome the revival of the journal *Arion*, the second issue of the new series is disfigured by a long and tasteless review of recent work by John Winkler and David Halperin on sexuality, with numerous aspersions on their ignorance and that of Jacques Foucault and others. Scholarly comment is so buried under mud-slinging that it is hard to take any of the reviewer's judgments seriously even when they may deserve it. The most valuable feature of the later work of Winkler and the work of Halperin seems to me to be the demonstration that for most Greeks of the classical period, life was a "zero sum game": I win only to the extent that you lose. The *Arion* reviewer seems to have similar values. She also engages in invective against attendance at conferences on particular subjects where classical scholars come together, try out their ideas, and learn what others are doing, and she wants a return to the lonely work of the isolated scholar in an ivory tower. Classicists, more than most academics, are members of small departments and only rarely have a colleague who shares their own research interests. From visits to various departments in various universities, it seems to me that classicists are often much more isolated than are scholars in other disciplines. The meetings attacked by the *Arion* reviewer are not, in my experience, mutual admiration societies, at least not generally, and I have heard some very spirited argument. In the earlier part of my career, I was very much a loner—for one thing, rhetoric was regarded as a rather disreputable subject—; I rarely if ever discussed my work with anybody and did not ask others to read it before sending it to a publisher. I think this was wrong and that mistakes resulted from it, and I have tried to mend my ways in recent years. Symposia often offer an opportunity for graduate students to engage in a dialogue that becomes important for their studies. I seem to recall a Greek philosopher of some importance who frequented symposia. Like much else in the *Arion* review, the criticism of scholarly meetings should not be taken very seriously.

Leslie Dewart's *Evolution and Consciousness: The Role of Speech in the Origin and Development of Human Nature* (Toronto 1989) is not a

book that is apt to be reviewed in classical journals, but it has some discussions relevant for classical studies. Dewart's basic argument is that in human evolution, consciousness is a result of the development of speech in which speakers hear their words and internalize the experience of the self. Greek literature communicates the kind of experience that we call consciousness in ourselves, but though the Greeks "were conscious, and indeed reflected philosophically upon their experience, they did not discover that their experience was consciousness. At least, nothing that they wrote shows otherwise" (p. 48). To Dewart, Aristotle's statement in *Metaphysics* (12.1072b19–23) that the mind is able to understand itself is not the same as an awareness of consciousness. My own reaction to this is that Dewart may be looking in the wrong places for signs of awareness of consciousness among the Greeks and that lyric poetry might be a better indication. Sappho's *Phainetai moi keinos* poem might be read as a phenomenological experience of consciousness that is fully aware of the self.

Another interesting feature of Dewart's book is its exploration of the distinction between ontic and phenomenal concepts of reality, which is based on study of the differences between Indo-European and non-Indo-European languages. His conclusion is that the ambiguous nature of the verb "to be" in Greek and other Indo-European languages, absent in all the other languages of the world (except for ancient Sumerian), and thus the linguistic tendency to assert the external existence of observed phenomena, has created in the West the illusion of an ultimate reality, sought by Plato and other philosophers and fundamental in western religion. In the rest of the world, reality lies in the consciousness of the self and its changing relationships to perceived phenomena. These views, which are not entirely original but are given unusually thoughtful exposition, may be important for our research and teaching in fundamental features of classical culture that have molded the thought of the West, and in their most extreme form tend to deconstruct that culture. We have of course long known that the potentialities of the Greek language had much to do with the Greek invention of philosophy. It is not yet clear to me whether the form western philosophy took resulted from accidental changes in linguistic use or whether the actualization of the linguistic potentialities reflects some other cultural condition.

BOOK REVIEWS

GEORG DANEK. *Studien zur Doloneia*. Wiener Studien 12 (Wien 1988). Pp. 248 + 31 (Anhang).

It is a treat to find a book on the *Doloneia* which begins with an optimistic statement:

Die Doloneia hebt sich stilistisch von der übrigen *Ilias* ab, wurde aber für ihren Platz in der *Ilias* geschaffen und fügt sich inhaltlich gut in sie ein.

The *Doloneia* needs every friend it can get and in this study it is at least regarded as an artistic whole even if Homeric authorship is denied to it. Danek's book is the reworking of the author's dissertation, and, as such, it is bold and largely successful in justifying the publication of another study on the *Doloneia*—basically regarded as a closed issue—and in stirring serious rethinking of the various offending features of the book. The author's claim is that previous studies rejecting Book 10's claims to be an integral part of the *Iliad* have not been informed by the results of theories of oral verse-making. Therefore he consistently applies the methods derived from the work of Milman Parry and his followers in assessing the arguments against the *Doloneia*. While he finally concludes that it was composed by an author different from the poet of the *Iliad*, he does find surprising artistry in the narration of this single episode and defends it as an early composition.

Danek's very precise stylistic explorations produce four major results: 1) The *Iliad* and Book 10 are drawn from the same store of traditional language, 2) there are identifiable formulae in the *Doloneia* which are used in functions different from their usage in the other parts of the *Iliad* or are misunderstood, 3) speeches and dialogues in the *Iliad* are carefully constructed on the basis of ring-composition, parallel structure, or balanced responses while those in Book 10 are not, and 4) arming and dressing scenes are handled differently in the *Iliad* from Book 10. Together these results bring him to the following major conclusion: if one wishes to maintain that the *Doloneia* was composed by the poet of the *Iliad*, then one must assume that this poet did not from the beginning strive for the compositional unity of the *Iliad* including the *Doloneia*, but rather he inserted this song into the complete epic, having in fact crafted it as an individual poem so that there are slight disagreements with the *Iliad* which do not weigh much compared with the unity of Book 10 as an individual poem (paraphrased from p. 233).

But the major premise of this statement immediately reveals the desperate straits in which Danek places the defender of the Homeric authorship of

Book 10; there is another easier hypothesis which arises from evidence in the scholia (Schol. T on Book 10.1), explains most of the stylistic variations listed in the body of the study, seems to accord with a probable situation in early Greek poetic composition, and can be stated with enough humility that it is believable as a scholarly statement rather than a credal assertion. The *Iliad* became a fixed text somehow—either by memorization or writing. The *Doloneia* was performed by bards as an individual composition and was felt by Peisistratos (upon evidence unknown to us) to have a special relationship to the *Iliad*. Since other early narratives were ascribed to Homer, it was understandably easy for the *Doloneia* to be regarded as legitimately Homeric once Peisistratos had included it in the presentation of the *Iliad* at the Panathenaia. After this time—given the authority of Peisistratos—there is little cause to expect further testimony for its special position in the *Iliad*.

Such is the basic argument of this study. Its strength depends on tight and clear definitions in reviewing the work of previous scholars and in identifying slight variations in the usage of traditional language. Danek claims only to evaluate the stylistic oddities in Book 10. Such an aim, however, immediately raises problems in terms of distinguishing what is an “oddity” from what is parallel and possibly normal poetic compositional technique. Danek labors to protect his objectivity but eventually admits that the statistical method is unable in itself to demonstrate the authenticity of a text (pp. 38f. and 48–50); rather one must use non-numerical, philological interpretations to define the individual nature of the poet of Book 10 on the basis of his departures from the poet of the *Iliad*. Danek attempts to assess the formulaic usage of the author of Book 10 in order to build an image of his imagination, ideas and convictions, his world picture and his poetic outlook.

In attempting such an ambitious goal Danek depends on several principles. 1) Book 10 is a small, tightly-knit unit while the *Iliad* is a large interrelated series of tales—thus there is a different scale in each which so influences statistics as to render them useless by themselves. 2) If there is a reference, direct or indirect, in Book 10 to events in Books 8 or 9, then this is a sign that the author of the *Doloneia* sought to integrate his work in an already established text. In other words, the references to the wider poem in Book 10 support the notion of a text of the *Iliad*, which was fixed prior to the composition of Book 10. 3) A highly literary reading is *per se* preferable to a mere list of untraditional usages and disjunctions.

On the basis of these principles Danek examines in minute detail—virtually line by line—the occasions in the *Doloneia* in which the poet seems to depart from traditional language as practiced elsewhere in the *Iliad*. He defends the usage of formulae in Book 10 by a variety of arguments: by citing parallel structures in other admittedly legitimate Homeric passages, by identifying the clever employment of a convention to express more precisely the point of his narrative, by pointing out conscious references to earlier events in the *Iliad*, by arguing for the introduction of more colloquial words into the old formu-

laic language, by insisting on the author's attempt to make his scenes unique, and by justifying the introduction of slight illogicalities when the author forces formulaic expressions in order to produce purposeful vagueness and indeterminacy as characterizing features of his narrative. The question is whether in aggregate these individual departures from *Iliadic* usage permit the characterisation of a poetic style. There are inevitably points where one can disagree with Danek or feel that he is overpleading his case, but he does maintain his focus on establishing the relation of the poet of Book 10 to the oral tradition. Through his lengthy and detailed argumentation he is able to coordinate the majority of individual variances from the Homeric norm with the larger compositional techniques in composing speeches and dressing/arming scenes in such a way that a consistent picture of a poetic style emerge. His poet is experienced in the traditional language but created an individual story which was told in a livelier, more spontaneous, and more realistic style.

To illustrate the method of this study let me cite a few examples of the techniques of reading the language of Book 10 used by Danek.

1) Line 15, προθελύμνους: H. Diller, *Philol.* 97 (1948) 361–63, has established a meaning for this word as 'flat or level surface' which can be applied throughout the two epics satisfactorily and this meaning has been accepted by Chantraine. 10.15 cannot, however, be made to accept this meaning and thus Diller identifies the use of the word as another disagreement between Book 10 and the *Iliad*. Danek feels that the assumption that only other passages in the *Iliad* can be a source for a word in a divergent usage presupposes too limited a system for producing word meanings. He wants to leave room for other singers using the same word in their own idiosyncratic ways; thus the larger tradition may have generated two different, yet traditional, meanings for προθελύμνους. In which case he concludes that Book 10 and the *Iliad* came from different oral poets since one poet would not use a single word with two such different meanings.

2) Line 80, ὀρθωθείς δ' ἄρ' ἐπ' ἀγκῶνος κεφαλὴν ἐπαίρας: the troubling phrase is ἐπ' ἀγκῶνος; it is excessive in the phrasing of the line and does not permit an early caesura. *Odyssey* 14.494 contains the same formula although in a different position in the line. Danek rightly notes that the line from the *Odyssey* suffers from spareness of expression, and that both probably are derived from an earlier formulation. Moreover, he justifies the pleonasm in Book 10 by the author's desire to make the scene more visual.

3) Line 83, νύκτα δι' ὀρφναίην: here there are parallel phrases which are well represented in the store of formulae: νύκτα δι' ἀμβροσίην and νύκτα διὰ δνοφερήν. From these parallel uses he identifies a distinction in the aspect of the night which is emphasized in the passage: the epithet ἀμβροσίη is used for contexts where the night appears in connection with sleep while ὀρφναίη and δνοφερή are confined to places where the aspect of darkness is stressed. Yet this distinction is not applicable to the repeated mentions of night in the *Doloneia*: νύκτα δι' ἀμβροσίην appears in lines 41 and 142 and νύκτα δι' ὀρφναίην

in lines 83, 276, and 386 even though all are referring to the same night and the same situation. Thus the poet of Book 10 is attempting to vary his expressions for increased liveliness.

The common theme in these three examples—and in the other detailed analyses—is the desire of the author of the *Doloneia* to make the traditional language work for him in ways which are not practiced by the poet of the *Iliad*. Because Danek does not regard Book 10 as merely a compilation of oddities, he attempts to define a poetic style through such comment. His author would vary his expressions and would attempt to make a scene more visual; further, in his desire to locate Book 10 within the *Iliad*, he would take a formula which is used in Book 9 even if he may have “misunderstood” its meaning there because of his own separate set of formulaic usages.

The debate on Book 10 continues, but Danek has given readers a new approach to consider the problems which it presents.

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MAE J. SMETHURST. *The Artistry of Aeschylus and Zeami: A Comparative Study of Greek Tragedy and Nō*. Princeton University Press, 1989. Pp. xii & 343.

Noh plays and Greek tragedy, though products of entirely different cultures and ages have quite a number of similarities and have always challenged those interested in drama to comparison and elucidation of their high esteem as classical arts. Consequently we have a good many studies that compare the two kinds of drama mostly in their aesthetic or cultural aspects. But the most important essential examination of the plays themselves—namely a comparison based on their written texts—has long been left unchallenged. There is much reason for this, since the work demands the extremely rare competency of reading two difficult languages—ancient Greek and ancient Japanese—as well as amply-gifted literary sensitivity. No doubt the number of people who can undertake such a task, and with much success, is very limited. The author has proved to be one.

Fifty per cent of the great success achieved in this book lies in the choice of the plays to be examined, Zeami's *Sanemori* and Aeschylus' *Persians*, which, the author has found, share the same kind of dramatic appeal. The remaining fifty per cent of the success is because the text alone is taken up as the subject of study. This enables her to conduct an economic and careful analysis of the two plays from the viewpoints, first of structure, then of style, thus accomplishing her aim of a reevaluation of Aeschylus, especially of *Persians*. As a result the authorized and time-honored misinterpretation of Aeschylean art is corrected. But she has done more. She has revealed how the stirring excitement of Noh

drama is created by dint of its text and how the poetry of the words and phrases supports its dazzling theatrical appeal. Curiously enough, the importance of the text in appreciating Noh drama has been underrated or even forgotten in Japan, partly because classic Japanese is not easy to understand and partly because the stage delivery of words (often in muffled tones) adds greatly to difficulty in comprehension. Another reason for the lack of appreciation of the text may be found in the fact that the chanting of Noh texts has formed an independent field of vocal art in which the literary value of the text tends to be regarded as secondary. Now that Smethurst has shown how the text is closely related to performance and how the verbal impact serves to integrate visual, kinetic, musical, rhythmical and spiritual force into one enthralling experience, Noh-lovers and scholars will, I sincerely hope, pay due attention to Noh texts as literature.

In her structural analysis of *Sanemori* the author demonstrates how Zeami's principle of Jo-ha-kyu composition (opening-development-finale, as the author translates at p. 27) is employed in engaging the full attention of the audience to provide them with a gradual emotional absorption ending in elevation and satisfaction. When the principle is next applied to the analysis of Aeschylus' *Persians* to show that a play lacking in what Aristotle called the soul of tragedy, namely a plot (*with peripeteia and anagnorisis*), can nevertheless have genuinely tragic effect, the orthodox western dramatic theory which has prevailed for nearly two millennia has to be revised.

There has been recent attention to the validity of non-Aristotelian dramaturgy among the scholars of Greek tragedy, but no other attempt has so thoroughly clarified the cause of success of *Persae*, a play falling short of Aristotelian prescriptions (p. 83). For example, not a few scholars point out the effective use of the third person neuter pronoun instead of the more normal first person plural in the first line of *Persians*, but, when the fact is reviewed in the light of the similar design of Zeami's Noh, we cannot but be convinced of its function as a preliminary part of the evolving construction of a coherent organization.

The author further directs our attention to the significance of such words as *melangchitōn* (115), *bathyzōnōn* (155), *ampechei* (848), *stola* (1018), etc., which they bear in the developing scheme of the *Persians*. By elucidating the difference between two stichomythiae (232-48 and 715-38) in their respective relationship to the play as a whole, the author suggests a probable aspect of the musical accompaniment (p. 115). The author suggests how Darius' appearance was staged (p. 132). The author discusses what dramatic consequence the actors' gestures have as they are indicated in the text (e.g., 1038-77) to lead us to discern the carefully worked-out plan from less to more focus on the main character and his tragedy. All these propositions revealing the importance of costume, music, and dance—which Aristotle regarded as the lowest in rank among the elements composing tragedy—are definitely persuasive, since they are based on an accurate analysis of the structure of the play and endorsed with the similar examples in Noh drama.

The second half of the book, where the verbal techniques and borrowings from literary tradition in *Sanemori* are first discussed and then corresponding stylistic features in *Persians* are expounded, the author rectifies another 2400-year-old misunderstanding of Aeschylean art.

By paralleling Aeschylus' use of puns, pivot-words, etc., and considering the preeminence given to the words *qua* words over the logic of sentences in the context of theatrical performance, Smethurst shows how Aeschylus' "verbosity and repetitiveness," which might seem blemishes in a silent reading of the text, are effective in yielding the striking sensation of performed dramatic poetry.

One point of interpretation may be raised. Smethurst says that Zeami, in order to present his Sanemori as worthy of the audience's admiration, suppressed his model's reason for wearing a brocade robe (p. 74). The reason, to which she refers, as given in the Tale of Heike, Zeami's source, was indeed to compensate for his cowardly action in an earlier battle. But the Heike narrator also mentions the Chinese paragon to be followed, as implied in Sanemori's wish. So I suspect that Zeami is rather subtly hinting at the warrior's disgrace so that the audience may feel not only admiration and emulation but also sympathy and compassion for the remorseful past which he had to go through in spite of himself. I cannot help feeling that Zeami even meant the audience to give thought to Sanemori's former betrayal of the Genji clan which he had initially served. Switching from one lord to another was considered to be the greatest shame in warriors' ethics but was occasionally a necessary choice in order to feed their family and followers. Sanemori's rueful past was undoubtedly well-known to those familiar with the Tale of Heike, an epic almost as popular as Homer was with the Greeks.

How much a playwright expects the audience to be aware of the history of a legendary (epic) hero is difficult to decide. For instance, how much of the death of Megareus, Haemon's brother, was expected by Sophocles to be in the audience's consciousness in *Antigone* is controversial. Megareus is mentioned as late as line 1303, but, if the Athenian audience of 442/1 B.C. (when the citizens were undoubtedly *polis*-conscious) knew about his patriotic death from the start, they would not have failed to evaluate Creon's silence about it as a mark of his devotion to civic-political ideals.

The case with *Antigone* is indecisive, but with *Sanemori* the issue seems clear enough, since Sanemori's former allegiance to Genji is not only mentioned, though briefly, in the Kyogen scene (p. 58), but because the vivid description of how Higuchi, his former acquaintance, identified his head cannot but remind one of Sanemori's personal history. (When Sanemori's reason for wearing a brocade robe is given as "not for selfish reasons," (p. 74) the phrase refers to the official permission which Sanemori was to obtain from his present lord, not to the wish to compensate for his past shame. Unless this is explained, isn't the phrase, as it stands in English, somewhat misleading?)

Unless Zeami intended to suggest to his audience the life-long mortification of the warrior, he would not have staged such an elaborate scene of head-

washing where Sanemori's deep-rooted attachment to this world is so skillfully visualized. His attachment was caused, as it seems to me, not only by his unfulfilled desire to fight with the best enemy, but also by his failure in killing the leader of the Genji clan. By killing Lord Kiso, Sanemori could have proved the truthfulness of his past choice to all people as well as to himself. Is it only I who become aware of Sanemori's profound retroactive compunction in this illusory but engrossing scene?

In any case the book is a great contribution not only to Aeschylean study, but also to the study of Noh drama. I hope that the book will be read by as many classicists as Noh-lovers.

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PETRUS ALLANUS HANSEN, EDITOR. *Carmina Epigraphica Graeca: Saeculi IV a. Chr. n. (CEG 2). Accedunt addenda et corrigenda ad CEG 1.* Berlin and New York, W. de Gruyter, 1989. Pp. xvii + 358. Cloth, DM 248. (Texte und Kommentare, Bd. 15)

The pace of scholarship does not always keep up with an enthusiastic reviewer's expectations. Concerning Hansen's *CEG 1*, I wrote (*AJP* 106 [1985] 376): "The book will become the standard resource for the early Greek verse inscription." So it will; yet Svenbro's treatment of early epigrams (*Phrasikleia* [1988]) cites only Pfohl (*Greek Poems on Stone* [1967]) for epitaphs and Lazzarini (*Le formule delle dediche votive* [1976]) for dedications. Nevertheless, *CEG 1* is clearly beginning to eclipse earlier collections.

Those familiar with the first volume will find in *CEG 2* the same clear, concise presentation, the same epigraphical and philological acumen, and the same phenomenal accuracy in printing complex texts, bibliographies, and indices. In short, they will discover that what *CEG 1* did for early metrical inscriptions, the new book accomplishes for the fourth-century material.

CEG 2 presents 408 fourth-century texts in an uncompromising corpus of metrical *inscriptions*. Epigrams preserved only in literature are rejected, even if they were originally inscribed. Despite Hansen's conservative criteria for inclusion, however, *CEG 2* is the fullest collection available, containing as it does all types of epigram and even very fragmentary pieces. Much will be new to those who do not keep up with epigraphical publications. For example, 24 of the 156 Attic epitaphs have come to light since Peek assembled *Griechische Vers-Inschriften* 1 (1955). Perhaps the star of the new pieces is the long set of inscriptions from the Letoön at Xanthos (no. 888). J. Bousquet generously shared with Hansen the report he will publish in *Fouilles de Xanthos* 9, and permission was granted to present the *editio princeps* of the third text in *CEG 2*.

The numbering of entries in the new volume continues that of *CEG 1*, and

the same format is employed. Nos. 466–626 are Attic epitaphs, 627–741 other epitaphs arranged geographically, 742–784 Attic dedications, 785–889 other dedications, and 890–903 Attic and other *tituli varii*. Within each group, chronology determines the order, although Hansen acknowledges that fourth-century inscriptions cannot be dated by letter forms as precisely as earlier ones (p. xii). Each entry begins with a brief discussion of the inscribed object, its date, provenance, and current location. Then comes a selective but often lengthy bibliography, followed by a list of published photographs and drawings. The heart of the matter is next, *viz.*, the texts of all inscriptions on the object, both epigrams and prose. Finally, in an apparatus, Hansen reviews the establishment of the text and often comments on epigraphical and literary parallels, the meaning of obscure passages, and prosopographical matters. These notes are condensed and selective, but generally longer than the commentaries in *CEG* 1 on its laconic and more intensely studied texts.

Technically, *CEG* is an edition rather than a republication, since Hansen has personally examined few inscriptions. Still, many new readings turn up. Hansen often makes better use of squeezes, drawings, and photographs than have others. Moreover, he frequently cites private communications from scholars who have looked at the inscriptions for him. This reviewer was one such contributor, and his readings of several Athenian stones are reported accurately. Hansen generously acknowledges this sort of help, and he concludes from the diversity of his correspondents (vii–viii): “Scholarship, even if it were to be deemed to contribute nothing else in this world, has a role in showing that geographical, linguistic, and political boundaries are at least in some contexts of no consequence.” In the spirit of such internationalism, one must applaud Hansen’s use of Latin everywhere except in the preface. Any inconvenience this causes in the descriptions of complex monuments is mitigated by the glossaries in *CEG* 1 (xvi–xvii) and 2 (xiii).

Even when new readings are not reported, Hansen’s texts are generally preferable to those of other scholars. The epigraphical and philological qualities that make *CEG* so reliable stand out clearly in the conservative practice of restoration adopted by Hansen, who prefers “dull fact to exciting fiction” (xii). One encounters his high standards most pointedly in the systematic dismantling of earlier restorations. In the apparatus to no. 499, for example, Peek’s restoration (*GVI* 1652) is shown to be inconsistent with vestiges of letters in Koehler’s transcription and to violate appropriate epigraphic style and vocabulary on several points. This matter of the appropriateness of language is the key to Hansen’s own method. Epigraphers are commonly tempted to restore on the basis of apparent parallels in literature or in the plentiful supply of later inscriptions. All too often, this leads to fanciful or anachronistic restorations that gain wide acceptance among unsuspecting literary scholars. To prevent this, Hansen restores anything beyond obvious formulas very sparingly in his texts. The single word $\alpha\lambda\eta$ at no. 548.3 is rather bold by his standards. Fuller restoration, if attempted, is confined to the apparatus and defended by epigraphic parallels

of the fourth century or earlier. Hansen passes on to his readers the ability to duplicate this method by means of a complete *Index Graecus* in each volume.

In one respect, *CEG* 2 differs from the first volume: the longer, more varied and complex texts will appeal to a broader range of interests. Historians of religion, for example, will find in the epitaphs invocations of underworld personalities (e.g., nos. 591, 680) and interesting reflections on eschatology (nos. 575, 593). Social historians will find that a wider variety of people were deemed worthy of inscribed grave markers and that the epitaphs contain more information about them. There are epitaphs for the very young and old, for women who died in childbirth (nos. 576, 604), for Bakchios the potter (567), Telephanes the flute-player (552), and Manes the wool-shearer (626), and for the nurse Melitta, a charming but awkward piece composed by her young ward Hippostrata (571). Since some of these people or their relatives are known from other sources, *CEG* 2 will interest students of prosopography. One Attic family in particular is represented by no less than four epitaphs from a single cemetery (nos. 473, 561, 562, 591). From these and the list of relations on the earliest stone (473), Hansen constructs a family tree. Occasionally one runs across famous names, apart from sculptors' signatures: Aeschines composed no. 776 and perhaps 519; 674 is the "epitaph" of Archilochus; Lysimache in 757 was the model for Aristophanes' Lysistrata.

Students of literature will find in *CEG* 2 a changing world, one that retains archaic features but moves closer to the literary genre of the epigram than anything in *CEG* 1. Among epitaphs, for example, the archaic habit of recalling funerary ritual continues (e.g., the Muses' dirge in no. 578; cf. Day, *JHS* 109 [1989] 16–28). However, a distinctly bookish sensibility pervades many of the entries. Grammar is more complex, and the emotional tone is heightened. Rather than drawing on a common stock of oral formulas in the archaic manner, fourth-century epigrammatists often quote literature (e.g., nos. 520, 567, 578). The juxtaposition of *τύχη* and *ἐλπὶς* as in no. 568 had become a literary commonplace, and we encounter it frequently in the *Anthology*. Still, one is tempted to interpret its occurrence in the Theban epitaphs at no. 630 and perhaps 635 as a direct imitation of Pindar, the motif's originator (cf. Nisetich, *TAPA* 107 [1977] esp. 249). These mostly amateur authors sometimes strain for literary effect, often with awkward, even impenetrable results. No. 595, for example, picks up the wording of a contemporary epitaph now preserved in literature (*AP* 7.253), only to overturn its conventional literary sentiment that military death is best. To puzzle out the author's point, however, one must have recourse to Hansen's apparatus.

In his review of *CEG* 1 (*JHS* 104 [1984] 270), Woodhead suggested that such epigraphical collections be "published" in machine-readable form. Bibliophiles would rightly bridle at the loss of de Gruyter's elegant job of printing. Nevertheless, the suggestion has merit, especially since other data-bases include epigrams only in limited ways. The use of epichoric alphabets would admittedly cause many problems in computerizing *CEG* 1, but far fewer in *CEG* 2,

where the orthography is much more regular. Electronic publication would also have allowed Hansen to integrate *addenda* and *corrigenda* completely into subsequent releases, instead of printing them separately in the next volume of *CEG*. As things are, *CEG 2* is indispensable for anyone working with *CEG 1*.

The second volume contains 32 inscriptions antedating 400 B.C., either newly discovered or overlooked in *CEG 1*. They appear throughout, embedded into the chronological and geographical sequence of *CEG 2*. However, their appropriate position in the earlier collection is indicated; e.g., no. 470 = 16a is a recently published archaic piece that would have followed *CEG 1.16*. A convenient overview of these entries is provided on p. 299. There follows a densely printed list of *addenda et corrigenda* to *CEG 1* (pp. 299–305), in which Hansen often reports various scholars' autopsy of the inscriptions in question.

As Hansen puts it in reviewing his whole epigram project, (*Actes du IXe Congrès International d'Epigraphie 1* [1987] 167), the verse inscription's "proper scholarly ambiance consists of students of Greek literature." Thanks to him, they now have one complete, convenient, and reliable collection that contains epigrams of all types inscribed before 300 B.C.

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DIETER NÖRR. *Aspekte des römischen Völkerrechts. Die Bronzetafel von Alcántara*. Munich, Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1989. Pp. 174. Paper, no price stated (Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Abhandlungen, N.F., Heft 101).

Who could count how many wars the Romans waged, and how many times the vanquished surrendered to the victors' mercy? This event, the *deditio*, often described by historians, left by the vagaries of chance no documentary trace—until the soil of Spain, fertile in bronzes, yielded a tablet of thirteen lines (broken off at the right edge), recording the *deditio* in 104 B.C., *C. Mario C. Flavio* [cos., of the hitherto unknown *populus Seano[corum]*? to the (also until now unattested) Roman commander L. Caesius C.f. termed as *imperator* (no doubt a governor of the Ulterior, acclaimed *imperator* after a victory). The tablet was found in Alcántara in Hispania Ulterior to the south of the Tagus, and was originally published with an initial commentary in *Gerión* 2 (1984) 265–314. Now Dieter Nörr, editor of the venerable *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung*, and acclaimed for his earlier contributions to Roman legal history, offers us an excellent, erudite and exhaustive study of the document itself within the broad theme of Roman international law. He assembles and analyzes all the parallels for the technical phrases appearing in the inscription or postulated for the supplements: *se suaque dedere, in fidem* or *in dicionem* (no legal difference between

those locutions, pp. 16–18, 95–101) *accipere* (or *recipere*—again only a terminological variation, pp. 21, 30–31, 65–71); next the role of the general and his *consilium*: it is *de consilii sententia* that Caesius *imperavi[t arma, obsides] / captivos equos equas quas cepisent [ut dederent]*. All important is the restitution formula referring both to the *populus* itself and its possessions: the commander *eos . . . [. . . liberos] / esse iussit*, and also *agros et aedificia leges cete[raque omnia] / . . . eis redidit*. Here follows the much ventilated clause *dum populus [senatusque] / Romanus vellet* (it also appears in the decree of L. Aemilius Paulus of 189 *de servis Hastensium*, *ILS* 15). After a brilliant discussion (pp. 22, 56–60) Nörr opts for the restrictive (“insoweit,” “insofern”) rather than temporal (“solange als”) understanding of the *dum–vellet* clause: the Roman people and the senate reserve for themselves the final approval of the settlement (and not the right to revoke it at some unspecified date in the future). This interpretation is bolstered by the obligation imposed on the *Seano* to send the envoys to Rome (the supplement [*Romam* appears certain] *de . . . ea re* (pp. 23, 60–63). On top of his extended commentary Nörr presents inspiring thoughts on the legal framework of Roman foreign policy, on the religious aspects of Roman warfare (the excellent monograph *Imperatores Victi* by N. Rosenstein [Berkeley 1990] throws further light on this fascinating subject), on the *bellum iustum* and *ius belli*. But this brief review cannot do justice to the legal riches of the inscription and of the monograph we are fortunate it elicited.

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D. R. SHACKLETON BAILEY. *Onomasticon to Cicero's Speeches*. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1988. Pp. xi + 140. \$29.95.

Here is another significant volume from a scholar whose production continues unabated into retirement. Here is another useful prosopographical tool to supplement other recent works (notably, Broughton's bibliographic Supplement: *MRR* III [1986]). Here is another work by SB that replaces a standard work—in this instance, the relevant entries in Orelli–Baier, *Onomasticon Tullianum* II (1838).

SB prefaces his *Onomasticon* with an essay, “*Tria Nomina*,” that supplements and corrects J. N. Adams, “Conventions of Naming in Cicero,” *CQ* 28 (1978), 145–66. The *Onomasticon* proper begins with a catalogue of “Persons & Deities.” Romans are, of course, listed by their *nomen gentilicium*. For all *personae*, SB includes *RE* numbers or notes those missing from *RE*, citation of Ciceronian texts, and a brief identification. Separate catalogues follow, for “*Cognomina*” (with cross-reference to the entries under *nomina*), “Places,” “Laws,” “Tribes” (where errors and an omission have crept in [p. 139]: add *Cam[ilia]*; delete *Vei[entina]*; read *Vot[uria]* for *Vet[uria]*), and “Miscellaneous”

(*ludi*, philosophers, etc.). But this is no mere compilation: SB also cites pertinent, recent studies and includes important corrections to his own earlier work, new arguments and observations, and corrections to standard works.

Here, then, is an extremely useful reference book, attractively produced and fairly priced. Furthermore, a significant work should perhaps prompt as many questions as solve problems. Herewith are a few addenda, primarily bibliographic and epigraphic, prompted by study of this *Onomasticon*:

C. Albanus (senator and father-in-law of P. Sestius: *Sest.* 6): correct SB's reference to "*HSPh* 92 (1989) 213." SB noted the clearly-attested *L. Albinus* of Livy 5.40 and argued for "Albinus" in *HSCP* 89 (1985) 147. He now favors anew, for good reasons (cf. Val Max. 1.1.10), "Albanus." Correct, therefore, the cross-reference under "Sestius" (p. 89) to "Albanus." We may add: (1) epigraphic evidence of the republican era favors Albanus: *CIL* I².26 (a clear photograph in A. Degrassi, *CIL Auctarium: Imagines* [1965] #21): an ancient dedication to Aesculapius by L. Albanus K.f.; I².383 (= J. Krummrey, *CIL* I².4 "Addenda Tertia" [1986] 879): M. Albanus L.f., a magistrate in Picenum; I².933 (tessera of 52 B.C.): "Philonicus Albani (servus)."

(2) epigraphy seems not to record Albinii until the Augustan era, when they appear as municipal worthies at Praeneste (*CIL* 14.2968 and 2974) and Livy's Albinus recurs in official inscriptions: in the *elogium* of L. Albinus from Augustus' forum (Degrassi, *Inscript. Ital.* 13.3 #11) and in Verrius Flaccus' annotations on the Praenestine *Fasti* (*Inscript. Ital.* 13.2, p. 121 with the commentary on pp. 417–19). I leave open the question as to whether Livy's "Albinus" was the source of the orthography in the *elogium* and the Praenestine *Fasti*. Livy's "Albinus" manifestly produced the "Albinus/Atinius" of Florus 1.7.12 and Plut. *Cam.* 21. *Albinus* is, however, well-attested as a nomen during the imperial era in southern Italy (see *CIL* 10), Ostia (14.1134), and in and around Mediolanum (e.g., 5.5272 and 5478).

Allienus: the *subscriber* of Div. *Caecil.* 48f. and A. Allienus (pr. 49). The former may reappear as Quintus Cicero's legate in Asia (Cic. *Qfr.* 1.1.10 with SB's commentary). The latter *may* be the same man (or his son). The orthography and praenomen are confirmed by a late republican inscription from Rome: *ILLRP* 396 (= *CIL* I².1237). See also Harvey, *Athenaeum* 68 (1990) on *Qfr.* 1.10.

L. Billienus (pr. 107?): J. A. S. Evans, *LCM* 14.7 (1989) 103, elucidates *Brutus* 175 with Plut. *Marius* 14.7 and suggests that B. was a consular candidate in 103; cf. *MRR* III, p. 34.

C. Caudinus (senator mentioned in *Cluent.* 107): "Caudinus seems to be a *gentilicium*"—a good guess. The name is rare, but note: *CIL* 6.8127: Abuccia Caudina; 6.14611: Caudina L.f. Prima; 10.6320 (Terra-

cina): Caudina C.f. The first Caudina may be a cognomen, but the second and third look to be *gentilicia*.

Fadii: on the identity and municipal origin (certainly Arpinum and the vicinity) of this family prominent in Cicero's letters, add to SB's bibliography: P. J. J. Vanderbroeck, *Chiron* 16 (1986) 240; Harvey, *Athenaeum* 68 (1990) on *Qfr.* 4.3 (both arguing against M. Dondin-Payre, *Historia* 30 [1981] 76–79).

L. Licinius Murena (cos. 62): of the Lanuvine connections of this *novus homo* (*Mur.* 86), we knew. Filippo Coarelli has now plausibly argued that it was Murena who adorned Juno Sospita's Lanuvine sanctuary (cf. *Mur.* 90) with marble copies of Lysippus' bronze vision of Alexander at the Granicus: *I Santuari del Lazio in età repubblicana* (1987) 155–61, with T. P. Wiseman's qualifications: *Gnomon* 60 (1988) 279.

Lysiades (5 *Phil.* 13: "Phaedri, philosophi nobilis, filius"; 8 *Phil.* 27): on Lysiades and other prominent, contemporary Athenians (cf. SB, p. 140: *Areopagus*) met in Cicero's works, see the late Elizabeth Rawson's study: *Athenaeum* 63 (1985) 44–67. This Areopagite may well be the eponymous archon of 510: *IG II²*.1713, cf. 1046 *Ins.* 24–25; B. Meritt, *Historia* 26 (1977) 190; cf. Münzer, *RE* 13 (1927) cols. 2529–30.

Memmi/C. *Memmius* (pr. 58): the family may well derive from Terracina (note *ILLRP* 912 [Ephesus]: "L. Memmius T. [f.]/Ou[f](entina) / Tarrichinensis heic situs est") or the vicinity (Memmi at Setia: *ILLRP* 665; cf. *RE* 15, col. 602). Coarelli has recently attributed the great temple at Terracina to the praetor of 58: *I Santuari del Lazio*, 134f.

M. Tugio (*Balb.* 45): "Expert on aqueducts." Tugio's expertise was probably less in aqueducts than in *Wasserrecht* (so Münzer) or servitudes and municipal levies. Cicero alludes in the *pro Balbo* to the *vectigal* he paid Tusculum for use of the aqua Crabra (3 *leg. agr.* 9 with Frontinus *Aq.* 9; cf. Cic. *Fam.* 16.8.3, *CIL* 10.4842, *Ins.* 37ff.).

C. Verres (pr. 74): SB usefully lists the references that enable identification of the members of Verres' family. Add R. E. A. Palmer, *RendPont-Acc* 51–52 (1978–80) 111–36, locating the "vicus statuæ Verris" mentioned in *AE* 1971 #34 and discussing Verres' adornment of Rome with stolen statues.

Vibellii (2 *leg. agr.* 93)/*Vibellius Taurus* (*Pis.* 24): these two entries should be combined. These plural *nomina*—where they do not refer to close relatives (e.g., *duo Scipiones*; *Decii*: see Austin's note on Vergil *Aen.* 6.824) or a family associated with a place or circumstance (e.g., *Blossii*: 2 *leg. agr.* 93)—evoke a specific person. Vergil *Georg.* 2.169–70 offers an example of these plural *nomina* used in both generic and specific senses: ". . . Decios Marios magnosque Camillos / Scipiadas duos bello. . . ." In the orations cited by SB, *Vibellii* should thus be translated as "men such as Cerrinus Vibellius Taurea." Cicero was fond of this rhetorical

device throughout his orations and essays; later Latin authors using this device often chose just those famous Romans whom Cicero had cited: thus Martial (9.27 and 28) and Jerome (*Epist.* 58.5), for example.

Q. Voconius (Hor.) *Saxa* (tr. pl. 169) *RE* 4; 2 *Verr.* 1.107; *Balb.* 21; 3 *Phil.* 16 (wherein we learn his *origo*—Aricia—and hence his tribe). Other sources (see *MRR* I, p. 425) agree as to his praenomen. SB: "C. in *Verr.* l.c. must be a scribal error." Perhaps not scribal: cf. SB on "Fadius, Q. or C." (evidence from Cicero's letters favors Gaius): "I blamed the copyist for the discrepancy, but Cicero himself may have slipped." Thus also at 2 *Verr.* 1.107—and the mistake is explicable. A Voconius served as legate or prefect under Lucullus in 73–72 (Βοκώνιος; Plut. *Luc.* 13.1–2; date: *MRR* II, p. 113 with *MRR* III, p. 122); Broughton once compared P. Barronius Barba (*MRR* II, pp. 112, 467, 538), a curule aedile recorded on a Roman stone (*CIL* I².4, 954; *ILLRP* 437). But a stone from Nemi, dated by material and letter-forms to the late republic, records "—] Leicinius L.f. [—/—] C. Voconius C.f. [—]" (*CIL* I².1434 = 14.2222). Coarelli identifies this Voconius as Lucullus' officer and sees here a dedication by a man of Aricia (and perhaps also by Lucullus) to Diana: *I Santuari del Lazio*, 178f. The "C. Voconius" of 2 *Verr.* 1.107, then, may simply be Cicero's mistake, founded on the orator's recollection of a contemporary military man.

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Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes, eds. *Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989. Pp. viii & 302. Cloth, \$55.00.

The hero of this excellent collection must be L. Gellius Poplicola, the Roman governor who, stopping off in Athens en route to his province, allegedly summoned the philosophers together to chide them for wasting their time in dispute and to offer himself as arbitrator among them (Cicero, *Leg.* 1. 53). If Cicero's anecdote is to be taken as fact, the joke was in dubious taste, sparing neither Greeks nor Romans. It does however accurately represent the image left by *Philosophia Togata* in the reader's mind, one not so much of cultures clashing (let alone merging) as of ships passing in the night. It is an image that reflects not only ancient life but modern scholarship as well.

The book contains a selection of papers originally delivered at an Oxford seminar on philosophy and Roman society. The explicitly interdisciplinary aim of the seminar was to bring together ancient historians, philosophers, and classicists, each with their own ideas and methods, to discuss topics of common interest. The hope, surely realized, was to inform and inspire scholars in the

adjacent disciplines. As far as a single reviewer can judge there is not a dud in the lot published here, and the worst charge one can bring, that some papers are a bit prolix or abstruse, is a matter of personal taste. Whether they are right or wrong is immaterial: they all stimulate and inform.

The book is explicitly one of soundings, and since there is no attempt at cohesion or comprehensiveness, the title gives no precise hint as to the contents. Potential readers should know what they are. Four papers are contributed by students of ancient philosophy: I. G. Kidd, "Posidonius as Philosopher-Historian"; Jonathan Barnes, "Antiochus of Ascalon"; David Sedley, "Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World"; Julia Annas, "Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property." Three are identifiably the works of historians: Miriam Griffin, "Philosophy, Politics, and Politicians at Rome"; P. A. Brunt, "Philosophy and Religion in the Late Republic"; Elizabeth Rawson, "Roman Rulers and their Philosophic Adviser." And two are more the work of literary critics and historians: D. P. Fowler, "Lucretius and Politics"; Christopher Pelling, "Plutarch: Roman Heroes and Greek Culture." The whole is rounded off by a valuable Bibliography compiled by Philippa Smith. There are, in the nature of the enterprise, no general conclusions, but reviewers can be less cautious than editors.

The most striking impression must be one of the severely limited impact of Greek philosophy on Roman society. For a start, the book's subtitle misleads slightly: from first to last, it is concerned with philosophy and Roman politics or the political elite. That is largely a result of its explicit emphasis on the first century B.C., a time of great intellectual ferment, but not a time when the Roman-in-the-street sought aid from the corner philosopher. Shift the emphasis to the high empire and broaden the definition of "philosopher" and a very different work would result—Apollonius of Tyana just makes it, in Rawson's concluding essay, which pursues the central political question of the republic into the empire.

Granted that politics must be the central issue when Greek thought first meets Roman action, the result is not a fruitful marriage. Griffin, in what is rightly the first paper in the book, surveys the exposure of leading Romans to Greek philosophy and the popularity of the different schools in the late Republic (concluding with a splendid discussion of Stoicism's progression from being a comparatively poor seller to the upper class under the republic, to dominating the market in the empire). She then considers how Roman conduct was affected by Greek teaching: even though one might find important guidelines for one's private life, one could divorce public action from philosophical beliefs, disapprove of the Greek's basic frivolity, worry about the serious negative effects on Roman public life (abdication of responsibility, impracticality, subversion). And she asks the basic question: can we identify situations where a Roman statesman adhering to a particular sect acted in accordance with that sect's creed? The answer, for varying reasons, is no. She then concludes, in effect, that it is form, not content, that matters. Greek philosophy provided not answers or

imperatives, but the conventions and vocabulary for taking a decision and acting on it.

Griffin's paper finds echoes throughout the book. Setting out the evidence reign by reign, Rawson carries the story into the principate, essentially destroying the notion of the philosophic adviser to Roman emperors and of the effect of philosophy in shaping imperial conduct. Barnes radically reassesses the thought and influence of Antiochus of Ascalon, arguing in four brief pages (out of 45) that "Cicero and his friends associated with Antiochus not, or not merely, for his political *aperçus* or his moral authority but rather for his prowess in the traditional and technical sport of philosophizing." After a wide-ranging survey of Roman republican religion, the views of Greek thinkers, and the reactions of educated Romans, Brunt concludes that "It seems *probable* that the theological doubts and contradictions of the philosophic schools had little effect on Roman religious practices, or so far as concerns the mentality of most Romans, on the beliefs associated with them": whatever doubts the educated might admit to privately, they stoutly suppressed them in the supreme interest of the social cohesion of the state. And on the other side of the problem Fowler, after discussing Epicurean views against (and even for) participation in politics, closely examines half a dozen passages in Lucretius to bring out their close relevance to late Republican political life, their "realistically sceptical view of social institutions," their emphasis on individual salvation, and their basic message of "stay away from politics."

On the evidence presented, then, philosophy and politics emerge as essentially separate trades in the first century B.C. This is curiously reflected in the nature of *Philosophia Togata*. Broadly speaking, the three papers by historians attempt to gather evidence to illuminate a particular theme, while the papers of the classicists and the philosophers start from close consideration of a single author or group of texts, and their conclusions essentially illuminate that author or those texts: Kidd uses Posidonius' description of Athenion's brief tyranny at Athens to show how the philosopher brought ethnological explanations to bear on history; Barnes transforms Antiochus into a syncretist who offered order in an age of degenerate and unproductive scholasticism; Pelling demonstrates how Plutarch's picture of Roman heroes is deeply affected by his view of their understanding, or lack thereof, of Hellenistic culture; and so forth. The one partial exception to this dichotomy is Sedley's essay which, while devoting $\frac{2}{3}$ of its length to consideration of Philodemus, demonstrates that the identity of philosophical movements lay not so much in doctrine and dogma as in "a virtually religious commitment to the authority of a founder figure"—and with debate swirling around the fixing of a canon, the establishment of the text, or the rooting out of heresy, the religious parallel is strong indeed. Nevertheless, it remains true that six out of the nine papers have little or nothing to do with Roman society or Rome's contribution to philosophy: their subject is the history of philosophy or the history of literature, not the history of Rome. There are excellent discussions of Greek views of Greek or Roman history (Kidd and Pelling), or the debates and squabbles among the Greek schools (Barnes and

Sedley), even of Roman comprehension of Greek philosophy (Fowler and Anas, whose paper, despite its title, explicates Cicero's misunderstanding of a Greek moral problem, and has nothing to do with property as a legal or economic entity). But it is not clear that Rome matters much at all.

On a pessimistic view one might say that the book offers us a one-way street that looks suspiciously like a cul-de-sac: despite its title and sub-title, philosophy does not really don a toga, and its influence on Roman society is severely limited. But that is only to say that the sum of the parts is greater than the whole. These papers are offered as preparatory studies toward "a complete and serious history of the subject." How that history might look, whether *philosophia togata* is even a subject, remains very obscure. The clear gain lies in another direction. Classics, the original interdisciplinary discipline, lies always in peril of being torn apart by external forces, by the strong and seductive attractions of history, literary criticism, philosophy, linguistics. Most of the authors in this book have bravely ventured beyond their own fields to take into serious consideration other contexts, other dimensions, other interests, and to expose themselves to the criticism of others who know more than they. As an intradisciplinary exercise it is welcome and one can well believe in "the excitement which the seminar generated." The ships continue to pass in the night, but their signals are friendly.

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FRANCIS CAIRNS. *Virgil's Augustan Epic*. Cambridge University Press, 1989. Pp. xi & 280. Cloth, \$44.50.

Wendell Berry, the most Vergilian of current American writers, takes on Huck Finn in a recent essay entitled "Writer and Region" (in *What are People For?* [1990]). Huck's decision to "light out for the Territory" to escape being "sivilized" by Aunt Sally is seen by Berry as symptomatic of a flaw in much of our history and literature, the tendency to encourage eternal boyhood and individual "liberation" over maturity and responsibility to one's community.

In his remarkable new book on the *Aeneid*, Francis Cairns traces in Chapter 5 ("Geography and Nationalism") a reverse journey: Aeneas' homecoming to Italy and his Italianization as he assumes his role as leader of his people. This chapter as well as any demonstrates Cairns' gift for close reading and thoughtful reinterpretation of Vergil's epic. Noting the necessity of taking seriously every element in a Vergilian simile, Cairns points out that of the two similes in Book 12 referring solely to Aeneas, both contain Italian references. The first, at 12.701-3 just before the last battle between Aeneas and Turnus, compares Aeneas' size and might first with Mt. Athos, then Mt. Eryx, and finally the Italian Apennines—a nice gloss on the movement of Aeneas' journey from Troy to Italy, but also a way of identifying Aeneas with the most prominent feature of the Italian



landscape. In the second simile at 12.749–57, Aeneas is referred to as a *vividus Umber*, an Italian hunting hound, as he pursues Turnus. Conversely, in the three similes of Book 12 devoted solely to Turnus, all contain non-Italian references. For example, at 12.4–8 Turnus is likened, significantly, to a wounded Carthaginian lion. Elsewhere in Book 12 he is compared with the river Hebrus in Thrace and with a Thracian North Wind on the Aegean. Consistent with his meticulous scholarship, Cairns looks to the Homeric antecedents for these similes and discovers that there are no precedents for the particularized geographical elements added by Vergil. The implication is that by the end of Book 12 Vergil has succeeded in converting Aeneas into the defending champion of Italy and Turnus into the outside invader.

No one line of inquiry informs Cairns' book. In some ways it is a collection of essays, the first five of which deal with ideas of kingship in the Augustan age (not nearly as abhorrent as we thought); concord and discord (the former strongly linked, it seems, to kingship); and Vergil's emphasis on *tota Italia* in Chapter 5.

In Chapters 6 and 7 Cairns offers truly elegant readings of Dido and Lavinia, whom he considers the two most important female characters in the epic, by placing them in two different literary traditions to which Vergil was heir. Dido becomes a creation consistent with the Roman elegies of Vergil's fellow protégé of Maecenas, Propertius. Like Propertius' Cynthia, Dido is the active lover in the affair, not the beloved; she is also more afraid than her lover that the affair will end. She falls in love with Aeneas in an elegiac context, a *convivium*, and her wandering, sleeplessness, and even open-air lovemaking are all characteristic of Latin elegy. At the same time, Dido is a bad "king" with bad advisors (e.g., Anna), lacking the kingly self-control demonstrated by Aeneas. In Chapter 7, Lavinia becomes more interesting than on first (or second or third) reading through Cairns' sophisticated comparisons with the conventions of Greek lyric poetry, especially that of Sappho, who often expresses the attractions of young girls not directly but indirectly through the effect they have on those around them.

In the final two chapters Cairns argues first—and persuasively—that the Homeric influence in the *Aeneid* is mediated through the *Odyssey* throughout, belying the traditional bipartite structure with an initial six books modelled primarily on the *Iliad*. (This may help account for the virtual absence of Otis from Cairns' analysis.) Chapter 9 continues this emphasis, concluding that the games in *Aeneid* 5 are strongly linked not only to the funeral games of *Iliad* 23 but also to the more familial Phaeacian games in *Odyssey* 8. The layout of the games in *Odyssey* 8 and *Aeneid* 5 is similar, the number of named competitors is the same, concord is emphasized in both, and as the Phaeacian games end with dancing and singing, so the games of *Aeneid* 5 end with play, the *lusus Troiae*. The Trojan games of *Aeneid* 5 celebrate not a dead warrior but an old leader who died peacefully; they also look forward to leadership and concord to come, undergirding what Cairns calls the "public-spiritedness" of the Trojans.

The *Odyssey* celebrates concord, kingship, and peace. So also, suggests Cairns, does the *Aeneid*. Odysseus is a good king. Aeneas becomes one.

Cairns' method is largely one of a skillful accumulation of persuasive evidence. He is pleasingly modest about this ("Statistical methods are not appropriate . . . On the other hand cumulative arguments should be effective," p. 137) but is extremely good at it. His superb bibliography will serve as an important resource for the next generation of Vergilian scholars.

There is no introduction or conclusion to this book. One conviction, however, is evident throughout and constitutes the theme of Cairns' reading of the *Aeneid*: Vergil's thoroughgoing and comfortable assimilation of his narrative to Augustan literary and political ideals. No ragged edges are left. No tension between the artist and his environment is admitted. Concord is all. Aeneas is home and everyone is happy. Of the two muses flanking the poet in the famous Bardo mosaic, only the historian Clio stands firm; tragic Melpomene fades sorrowfully away.

To accomplish this happy accord, one must dismiss all the complexities of the poem: the in many ways sympathetic treatments of Dido and Turnus; the defensible decision of the mothers who wanted to travel no further than Sicily (which Cairns terms their "moral lapse"); the nature of Aeneas' departure from Carthage, which according to Cairns is "not cowardly or furtive" but is a signal that Aeneas has resumed "his role as good king." ("In fact he intends to speak to Dido about his departure when the opportunity presents itself." p. 52) Most particularly, one must explain away Aeneas' fury at the conclusion of the poem. (The more complex readings of the end of the *Aeneid*, it seems, are the results of political events of the 1960's and 1970's [p. 66, n. 22], rather than of the text itself.) Cairns disposes of this last problem as merely a matter of semantics: "Aeneas is fired by *furiae* rather than by *furor*. *Furor* is beyond the moral pale, but this is not the case with *furiae*" (p. 84).

After all the dazzling arguments marshalled here have had time to settle, one still unsettling question remains: Why, at the end, did Vergil want his poem burned? Cairns gives us the glorious epic Augustus commissioned, not the tragic epic Vergil wrote. This Aeneas may be too civilized after all.

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SHADI BARTSCH. *Decoding the Ancient Novel: The Reader and the Role of Description in Heliodorus and Achilles Tatius*. Princeton University Press, 1989. Pp. 201.

In recent years a number of books, from Bryan Reardon's *Courants littéraires grecs des IIe et IIIe siècles après J.D.* in 1969 to J. J. Winkler's *Auctor et Actor* in 1985, have revitalized the study of the ancient novel, repositioning the

genre as central to our understanding of the period of the Second Sophistic, and making it as pertinent to the psychology of its literary world as the epic or the drama was for earlier periods. Ancient novels have become fertile fields for narratological studies, and texts that were often perceived as slight or even incompetent efforts by marginal talents are beginning to be viewed as sophisticated rivals of their modern counterparts. *Decoding the Ancient Novel* continues this trend. The author takes as her subject the apparently intrusive narrative digressions that abound in the novels of Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus, digressions which for most readers and scholars have served as barriers to esthetic appreciation as well as to critical understanding. Bartsch herself provides a sample of representative opinion from previous commentators who view such descriptions as rhetorical excrescences with "no organic connection with the plot," "contributing nothing to the artistry of the main story," or "pedantic expositions that from time to time suspend the narrative," and "which to our taste disfigure *Leucippe and Clitophon* and the *Ethiopica*." She rightly observes that such critics have expectations for coherence and relevance in plot structure which were not necessarily those of ancient writers and readers (5). Her book attempts to reconstitute some of those ancient criteria and to evaluate the narratives of two novels in light of them.

Like many of her predecessors, Bartsch locates this predilection for digression in the rhetorical training of the Second Sophistic. In her opening chapter, by means of liberal quotations from the rhetorical theorists themselves, she discusses the prevalence of the habit of description in the period of the Second Sophistic. In the rhetorical handbooks, proper subjects for description uniformly included "persons, circumstances, places and periods of time," to which others added "crises," "animals and plants," "festivals and assemblies," and "statues and paintings" (10). The inclusion of a typical descriptive passage was, however, not intended to function simply as a device to display the skill of the writer or to arouse an audience to admiration, but as part of a complex hermeneutic activity (35). As she illustrates by examples from the Philostrati and Lucian, ancient readers would have expected an ethical content to their description, an allegory or even an enigma, sometimes explained by an interpreter within the confines of the text, sometimes left exclusively for the reader to ponder.

Building on this cultural context, Bartsch proceeds to demonstrate the integral connections between these seeming digressions and the narratives of the two novels in question. Descriptions may of course be used rather straightforwardly to advance the narrative, as when a dream or an oracle dictates a course of action, or the scene on a painting mirrors a subsequent event within the story or gives insight into a human emotion, but much more subtle relationships are normally to be found. Bartsch suggests that a description often functioned to mislead a reader into making an obvious interpretive assumption, only to discover later in the narrative that he or she has been tricked. For example, in Achilles Tatius, when Leucippe's mother dreams that her daughter has been

thrown onto her back and is about to be disemboweled by an unknown assailant, she rushes into her daughter's bedchamber to find Clitophon in the act of penetrating the girl sexually (2.23.5). The reader, of course, "interprets" the mother's dream as referring to the potential deflowering. But at a later point in the narrative, when Leucippe seems actually to have been disemboweled as the human sacrifice of a band of brigands, the reader is forced to adjust or "reinterpret" this earlier sign (3.15.4). This dream, so far from being a simple ornament, functions within the narrative on several levels, by averting the deflowering of Leucippe, which would have been most inappropriate for a novel heroine, by precipitating the flight of the lovers to avoid her mother's anger and by foreshadowing Leucippe's *Scheintod* in Book III. And in Heliodorus, when Thyamis and his brother Petosiris are described as locked in combat in front of the city of Memphis, their struggle and flight around the walls is deliberately reminiscent of the battle of Achilles and Hector around the walls of Troy. Bartsch argues that readers are led by these allusions to expect that one brother will kill the other, but "when the outcome is paradoxically a reconciliation, they realize they have interpreted the spectacle incorrectly" (139).

She organizes her discussion in five chapters, in each treating a separate type or related types of description: ecphrasis, which is technically the description of works of art like paintings or ceramic objects (chapter two), dreams and oracles (chapter three), spectacles, including processions, festivals and contests (chapter four), and a variety of other types including natural phenomena like the Nile or the cameleopard (chapter five). This structure has the advantage of giving equal weight to all facets of narrative description, and allows us to grasp the considerable role that descriptions other than ecphrasis play in these two texts. It makes very clear, for example, that ecphrasis is much more common in Achilles Tatius, while the description of spectacles are central in Heliodorus. But there is a disadvantage: in each chapter we move between illustrations from the two novels very rapidly and often in what feels like a random sequence, reading now about the description of a dream in one author, now of an oracle in the other. We lack a sustained discussion of these narratives as a whole and an assessment of the relative weight description plays within each. Further, we miss a sense of the way in which a succession of various types of descriptions might function within a narrative sequence.

Notwithstanding these objections, Bartsch does identify significant differences in the way that Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus, for the most part, employed description. Heliodorus' descriptions function less to deceive than to implicate the reader in the narrative as if a spectator at a dramatic performance. This deliberately theatrical mode of presentation she links to an authorial conceit that the narrative action is "a play staged by divine will." "The explicit analogy of the author to the divine power that controls actors and audience alike and brings understanding to the latter can only serve to remind us of the author's all-powerful role in guiding the work and in our own understanding of it. This effect is then reinforced by the narrowing range of possibilities for the

interpretation of his descriptions of dreams and oracles; the author's guidance, the progress of the plot, and the convergence of several prophecies and dreams around a single goal make interpretative activity obsolete, because the gaps have already been filled by the author. Hence, the reader is compelled to accept the author's intentions for his work and to concede to his will with regard to its meaning" (176). In contrast she argues for an opposite intentionality in Achilles Tatius. Throughout his tale, "the readers continue either to supply their own interpretations, which are inevitably shown by the author to be incorrect and inadequate, or else to accept the faulty interpretations offered by the characters, the viewers in the text, in which case they are again shown to be wrong. As a result, these descriptions, by drawing into uncertainty an assumed process, compel the readers to question their ability to read" (174).

While it is possible to quibble with individual elements in Bartsch's interpretations, in the main her argument has a convincing ring about it. After reading through her study, it is difficult, if not impossible, to doubt her general premise, namely, that description forms part of a self-conscious authorial manipulation of the text, and that it is therefore necessary to approach them, as Bartsch would argue their ancient audience did, expecting to become involved in narrative games, authorial tricks and conundra, expecting to question continuously the truth value of each assertion, and in the process to become more sophisticated at spotting the author's traps and stratagems; in short to experience these texts not as trite or conventional love stories but as hermeneutic entertainments. Her style is straightforward and simple; and she blends with some skill the traditional techniques of the classical scholar and an understanding of modern works on narrative theory. This book is well worth reading both for classicists and for non-specialists who are interested in the novel or in narrative theory in general.

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LUKAS THOMMEN. *Das Volkstribunat der späten römischen Republik*. Stuttgart, F. Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1989. Pp. 287, Paper, DM 66. (Hermes Einzelschriften, H. 59)

The tribunate was the bulwark of Roman freedom, as ancient and modern authorities alike attest in abundance, though one does not forget how aware the Romans themselves were that even the *telum libertatis* (Sall. *Or. Macri* 12) was blunted somewhat by institutional safeguards, not the least of which was the expectation that some of each year's ten tribunes would feel their strongest loyalties to the *senatus auctoritas* (e.g., Cic. *Leg.* 3.23ff.). That the tribunate was filled by and served the needs of the aristocracy during the middle republic was magisterially demonstrated by J. Bleicken in 1955 (*Das Volkstribunat der klassi-*

schen Republik [Munich], though one should at least consider the points observed by F. Millar, *JRS* 79 [1989] 144f.): tribunes proposed legislation desired by the senate and they impeded troublesome magistrates. Which is not to say that tribunes neglected the rights of ordinary individuals who sought their *auxilium*, and of course individual tribunes actually advanced the interests of the *plebs*—or at least some portion of the *plebs*, the term being broad and therefore suitably vague so as to accommodate varying inclinations. The point is that the holders of the tribunate during the third and early second centuries represented no threat to the primacy—which is something different from sovereignty—of the senate in the *res publica*. But what of the late republic? The very period is defined for us by the tribunate: traditionally it begins in 133 B.C., with Tiberius Gracchus, witness Rome's first civil war in 88 B.C., after P. Sulpicius removed Sulla from his Mithridatic command, experiences Caesar's invasion of Italy "ut tribunos plebis in ea re ex civitate expulsos in suam dignitatem restitueret" (*BC* 1.22.5), and meets its end in 43 B.C., when P. Titius created the triumvirate. The late republic was characterized by intense strife and in the midst of it all were tribunes, some apparently in service to powerful figures, others pursuing independent political agenda. A comprehensive study of these tribunes, one comparable to Bleicken's, has long been an obvious need.

Which brings us to the recent dissertation of Lukas Thommen, an ambitious project that, following Bleicken's lead, endeavors to collect systematically all known tribunician activity between 133 B.C. and 43 B.C., thereby making it possible to reach a fully informed understanding of the nature and the political significance of the office. And it is the office more than the individuals holding it, one must note, that occupies Thommen's primary interest. I must stress at once how valuable a service Thommen has performed for students of the late republic: tribunician undertakings—with *testimonia* and pertinent scholarship—are conveniently catalogued by type (under three general headings: 1. *ius agendi cum plebe*, 2. *ius agendi cum senatu*, 3. *ius intercedendi*, each with numerous subheadings) and listed by year, as a result of which patterns of development may be discerned easily. If for no other reason, Roman historians will henceforth want a copy of Thommen's book at their elbow. It must be admitted that Thommen's organization of his material, while systematic, is often strained. This is due not to the fault of the author, but to the ill-defined nature of the office under study, whose functions ranged so widely that it is understandably difficult always to find suitable and helpful rubrics under which to sort them (hence the subcategory "Sonstige Interzessionen ausserhalb des *ius auxilii*"). Thommen's organization also requires that certain major issues, like the clash of Tiberius Gracchus and M. Octavius or the reforms of Sulla, be discussed piecemeal throughout the book rather than treated *in toto* in one place. Yet cross-references mitigate the difficulty, so that by and large Thommen's arrangement makes his book a useful reference.

But Thommen offers us more than a mere handbook. His detailed examination of tribunician conduct is meant to demonstrate that, contrary to pre-

vious scholarship's emphasis on *popularis* tribunes, most tribunes of the late republic were faithful to the senate majority. Even if the traditional modes of cooperation between tribunes and *patres* fell out of use, the tribunate still cannot be considered independent of the senate: the tribunes were and perceived themselves to be senators; none, not even the most reform-minded, sought fundamental changes in Roman society (by now this has become a familiar observation). Not only were few tribunes *popularis*, but during the late republic most legislation was proposed by other magistrates—and the most substantial reforms were effected not by tribunes but by consuls. In fact, the relative political weakness of the tribunate, for all its *potestas*, is a point Thommen brings out more than once. Some changes from the middle republic were symptomatic of the late republic's ever more competitive politics: individual tribunes began to attach themselves to major figures (especially military men), which sometimes led them to stand against the senate, and tribunes more frequently interfered with one another's actions. Indeed, obstruction—both through the veto and increasingly through *obnuntiatio*—while always basic to the tribunate's proper function, attained to new levels of intensity during the late republic.

Several of Thommen's conclusions, while representing a challenge to views expressed by J. Martin (*Die Popularen in der Geschichte der späten Republik* [Freibourg 1965] 213ff.), H. Schneider (*Wirtschaft und Politik. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der späten römischen Republik* [Bonn 1977] 259ff.) and Bleicken (*Chiron* 11 [1981] 87ff.), may not seem especially innovative to readers of E. S. Gruen's *Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1974) cf. 23ff., though in Thommen one will find detailed substantiation of points made more summarily by Gruen. In fact, Gruen's work anticipates much of Thommen's and would have made an excellent point of departure for the author's ampler study. Thommen's most obvious debt to Gruen is his first chapter, wherein he offers a detailed treatment of the social background and the subsequent political careers of late republican tribunes. Like Gruen (*op. cit.* 180ff.), whom he here scrupulously cites, Thommen examines the relevant prosopographical data (though for a somewhat more extensive period) and his results are essentially the same, though more fulsomely presented. None of this is meant in criticism. To possess a thorough consideration of points maintained by Gruen is a genuine advance and provides necessary material for the (inevitable) detection of further refinements.

Still, a greater awareness of certain previous discussions might have lent keener focus or greater depth to Thommen's treatment generally. One serious example can be adduced. An indisputably crucial episode in the story of the tribunate, one whose significance is heightened by Thommen's evidence that obstruction and strife in the tribunician college were hallmarks of the late republic, was the deposition of M. Octavius by Tiberius Gracchus. Thommen discusses this precedent-setting incident at two points (pp. 91ff., under "Amtsentzug," and pp. 217f., under "Interzessionen gegen tribunizische Rogationen"); at neither does he come to grips with the constitutional conundrum

posed both by Octavius' *patientia* and Tiberius' resort to *abrogatio*. Yet the subsequent symbolism of the Gracchi and the reluctance of anyone to imitate Tiberius (violence became the typical means of overcoming a tribunician veto, a change of tactics not adequately explained merely by indicating that *abrogatio* was "zu brisant") until Gabinus threatened to remove L. Trebellius in 67 B.C. (itself a move of questionable legality, cf. E. Badian, *AHB* 3 [1989] 78ff.) require that the episode be discussed in full, certainly in a work bearing Thommen's title. And so it is disappointing to find no trace of Badian's seminal examination of the issues involved in Octavius' deposition (e.g., *concordia*, a term that does not appear in Thommen's *Sachregister*; cf. *ANRW* 1.1 [Berlin 1972] esp. 706ff.) or the critique of Badian by Morgan and Walsh (*CP* 73 [1979] esp. 204ff.), items not to be missed even amid *Wissenschaft* so intimidatingly extensive as that concerning the Gracchi. A recent, fully informed discussion (if not convincing in every particular) may be found in L. A. Burkhardt, *Politische Strategien der Optimaten in der späten Republik* (Stuttgart 1988) 34f. and 161ff.

In a work of this scope, a reviewer will inevitably find the occasional fault or quibble. To mention only a few, Thommen, despite his asseveration that previous scholars have ignored "die senatsstreue Seite des Amtes (p. 14)," frequently focuses his attention on *popularis* activities nevertheless (the nature of our evidence to some extent requires this) and sometimes seems simply to equate tribunician goals with *popularis* ones (e.g., p. 138). And in view of his definition of *popularis* politics as activities contrary to the will of the senatorial majority (p. 11), one is hardly astonished by Thommen's later conclusion that "sofern es sich nicht um populäre Gesetzesprojekte handelte, waren die Anträge der Volkstribunen im Senate mehrheitlich erfolgreich (p. 254)." Finally, while I would agree with Thommen that protecting the rights of the *plebs*, not advancing its material interests, was the tribunes' principal responsibility (pp. 70f.), the connection that the Romans felt between popular liberty and *commoda populi* cannot be ignored (cf. P. A. Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays* [Oxford 1989] 32ff. and 346 ff.).

Caesar demonstrated the superiority of real arms over the *telum libertatis*; his heir assumed the accoutrements of both *dux* and tribune, with the result that the office itself soon lost any authentic luster (Pliny *Ep.* 1.23). The most dynamic phase of the tribunate, as Thommen has recognized, was the late republic. Thommen has usefully outlined for us the patterns and trends of the office, and, if many of his conclusions seem only to validate common sense, he has nonetheless shown how the tribunate fits into the general political tendencies of the period. His industrious dissertation represents an immense undertaking, and its results make a valuable contribution.

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